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VOLUME No. 4

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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Subject:

File No.

[illegible]

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SECRET

Printed during visit to New Zealand 1977.



The Museum of Transport and
Technology of New Zealand (Inc.)

Presents

'LONE VENTURER OF THE SKIES'



JEAN BATTEN AND HER PERCIVAL GULL THE DAY BEFORE HER EPIC FLIGHT FROM ENGLAND TO NEW ZEALAND.

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Jean Batten was one of a small, elite band of pilots who, during the 1920's and 1930's demonstrated to an admiring world public, the possibilities of air travel as a normal method of transport.

These pioneers blazed the trail for the modern airlines in the days when air travel was considered a novelty and relatively few people had ever been up in an aeroplane.

Only the long distance pioneer fliers, the great aircraft and engine designers and other visionaries closely connected with aviation believed that one day travellers would go by air as a matter of course; and that airliners would eventually compete with such success on the well established shipping routes of the world.

Nowadays, when we have already entered the supersonic age and Concorde airliners span the Atlantic between Europe and the United States in a mere 3½ hours, it is difficult for the present generation of young people to imagine the days when Jean Batten and her contemporaries, some of them like her, quite alone, set out to fly immense distances and create record times, in small aeroplanes, many of which were made of wood and canvas.

Born in New Zealand on 15 September 1909 only a few weeks after Louis Bleriot flew the English Channel, thus creating the first great air record in the history of international flight, Jean Batten was interested from an early age in the exciting new method of transportation.

The pioneer flight of Alcock and Brown across the Atlantic Ocean in 1919 and the first flight between England and Australia the same year fired her imagination as did the lone flight of Charles Lindberg from New York to Paris eight years later.

She greatly admired Squadron Leader Bert Hinklers' solo flight from England to Australia in 1928 and the epic journey across the Pacific by Charles Kingsford Smith, Flight Lieutenant Ulm and crew from the U.S.A. to Australia the same year.



JEAN BATTEN AND HER GYPSY MOTH.

It was in fact during the visit to Australia shortly after this flight that Jean met Charles Kingsford Smith who became a lifelong friend. He offered to take her up for a flight in the historic Fokker aeroplane "The Southern Cross" and it was on this first flight that, cruising high above the Blue Mountains, she realized that the air was her element and resolved to become an air pilot.

To grasp the significance of her achievements when reading this resume' one must remember that her long distance flights were done before the days of radar and other radio directional aids to navigation. The aircraft she flew was without radio.

In a forward to Miss Batten's book "My Life" (published by George G. Harrop and Co. London Ltd 1938) the Marquis of Londonderry, Secretary of State for Air pays a tribute that has not been diminished by the passing years:

"Jean Batten is a name which will figure for all time in history and we can feel proud that we have lived in the same period and been the contemporaries and the witnesses of her remarkable achievements. The pioneering spirit of the British, their careless indifference to danger, their modesty in success and their refusal to accept failure are national qualities demonstrated by the great names we honour at all times in our history, and the same brilliant company has been responsible for our far-flung Empire and the great responsibilities which fall to our national lot and which succeeding generations have sought to discharge.

Jean Batten typifies all these great qualities and embodies in her attractive personality the true tradition of the British race.

Miss Batten has demonstrated that, given the good fortune of overcoming what we might call the major risks of weather and mechanical difficulties, she left nothing to chance in the way of inspection of her aeroplane and attention to the minor points of detail, which are the hallmark of the good and experienced pilot. As a navigator she is in my judgement second to none."

After qualifying for a flying licence at the London Aero Club in 1930 and passing the examination for a Commercial Pilot's licence two years later, she made her first long distance flight to India in 1933; and in May 1934 flew solo to Australia, then back to England the following year.

Two of these three solo flights were made in a fifth-hand De Havilland Gipsy I Moth G-AARB, but in 1935, aided by Lord Wakefield, the 'Patron Saint of Aviation', who had also helped finance her flight to Australia, she bought a Percival Gull monoplane G-ADPR with a De Havilland 200 h.p. Gipsy VI engine.



1935 WELCOMED TO ROME BY COLONEL TEMPESTI DURING RETURN FLIGHT TO ENGLAND FROM AUSTRALIA.

In November the same year she created a World record by flying the Gull from England to Brazil covering the 5000 miles in 61½ hours total elapsed time, thereby lowering by a whole day the previous best time between the two countries. After landing at Rio de Janeiro, Miss Batten was decorated by President Vargas with the Order of the Southern Cross for linking England and Brazil in the fastest time in history. For this flight she was later decorated by France with the Order of Chevalier of the Legion of Honour.

In 1936 Jean Batten created another World record by once again linking two countries in the fastest time in history and flew the same Percival Gull solo from England to Auckland, New Zealand, covering the 14,224 miles in 11 days 45 minutes total time including 2½ days spent in Sydney. Jean also linked Australia and New Zealand in what was then the fastest time ever for the Tasman Sea crossing, 10½ hours from Sydney to Auckland. On the way to New Zealand, Jean lowered the men's solo record from England to Australia by a whole day, and her time of 5 days 21 hours for the 10,500 mile journey remains unbeaten although attacked many times, most recently in the B.P. Air Race in 1969.

Even though it was made so long ago and without the aid of radio, the England-New Zealand record time is also still the fastest for men or women pilots flying alone.

In 1937 Jean Batten flew the Gull, back to England from Australia, again lowering the men's solo record by over 14 hours and completing the journey in 5 days 18 hours, thus becoming the first person to hold the solo record both ways at the same time.

During the war the faithful Gull camouflaged and with the serial number AX 866 flew in the Royal Air Force as a communications aircraft.

For the flight to New Zealand, Jean Batten was awarded the Seagrave Trophy for the most outstanding demonstration of the possibilities of transport on land, sea or in the air and received the Britannia Trophy for the second time and the Harmon International Trophy (U.S.A.) for the third. She also became the first woman to receive the coveted medal of the F.A.I. (Federation Aeronautique International) at the awarding of which the delegates of 22 nations voted, Miss Batten's name being proposed by the Dutch delegation and seconded by the Yugoslav.

In addition to capturing five important records and establishing four World records for any type of aeroplane, Jean Batten was the first woman to make a return flight to Australia, fly solo to South America and to New Zealand and cross the South Atlantic Ocean and the Tasman Sea alone.



JEAN BATTEN WHO INTRODUCED GLAMOUR TO THE SKIES.



A PROUD OWNER WITH HER PERCIVAL GULL.
NOTE THE FUEL TANK TAKING UP HALF THE
COCKPIT SPACE.

The Percival Gull monoplane G-ADPR in which Jean Batten became the first flier, man or woman, to make a direct flight between England and New Zealand is preserved in the Shuttleworth Collection at Old Warden Aerodrome Bedfordshire, England.

During her career Jean Batten has received many trophies and medals. In addition to those already mentioned, she was awarded the Johnson Memorial Air Pilots' London; the Gold Medals of the Royal Danish Aeronautical Society;

Academie des Sports, France; the Royal Aero Club of Great Britain; Aero Club de France; Royal Swedish Aero Club; and medals from the Aero Club of Argentina; Belgian Royal Aero Club; Aero Club of Finland; Royal Norwegian Aero Club and Ligue Internationale des Aviateurs. The most recent award was in 1971 when she received the City of Paris Medal.

In 1972 a "Jean Batten Archive" was established at the Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, England.

Accustomed as we are to the luxury and safety of jet travel it is interesting in paying tribute to Jean Batten's courage to recall her pioneering flights by quoting excerpts from her book "My Life". Flight to Australia 1934 (Italy to Greece section):

"When I rounded a rocky promontory to fly over the Gulf of Patras I experienced a bump of such intensity that had I not quickly grasped a metal longeron on the floor of the cockpit I should probably have been thrown out of the machine. For the rest of the flight to Athens I clung to the metal longeron with one hand and the lower part of the control column with the other, as the Moth was buffeted about like a feather in the boisterous wind.

The wind strengthened as I flew northward and approached Athens, surely one of the most beautiful cities on the face of the earth. I had been flying into the teeth of the gale and averaging only about 40 m.p.h. ground speed, and at times the aeroplane seemed almost to stand still. The aerodrome of Tatoi is in a valley fourteen kilometres northwest of Athens and after circling a few times I was relieved to see two Greek mechanics running towards the centre of the landing area, where they stood waiting to catch a glimpse of the wing-tips of the Moth when I landed. As I closed the throttle to glide down to a landing the machine made scarcely any progress, and finally I was obliged to fly on to the ground.

Strong arms caught the wing tips and the two mechanics ran alongside the Moth as I taxied into the large hangar. The wind was so strong that later when I walked along the tarmac to the customs office I was nearly blown off my feet."

South American Flight 1935:


"When nearing the Spanish border I expected to see the great snowy peaks of the Pyrenees silhouetted against the skyline. To my consternation there was not a mountain to be seen - only dark, treacherous rain clouds which I knew were concealing the peaks. Heavy raindrops splashed on to the windscreen, to be whipped into tiny rivulets by the slipstream of the propellor as the aeroplane plunged into the storm. Visibility became steadily worse as I flew south and the raindrops formed a prelude to thousands of tiny silver arrows which beat against the cabin windows as if vainly seeking admission. Hail... I thought of the weather report... "possibility of hail."

Flying lower and lower that I might see the coast, I suddenly lost it completely as the machine nosed into the rainclouds. This would never do. I was flying into a trap. Only a few hundred feet up and heading at 150 m.p.h. straight for the mountains. Wheeling the machine about I turned back. Should I return to Biarritz and wait for the storms to clear? Over the Bay of Biscay the low rain clouds foretold more storms to come, and if this flight was to be a record every minute was precious. I decided to keep to my schedule."



COMING INTO LAND IN THE PERCIVAL GULL
THERE WAS ALWAYS AN ADMIRING CROWD TO
GREET HER.

Guild of
Air Navigators



THE PERCIVAL GULL FLYING OVER AUCKLAND 1936

(Flying over Asia):

"Over Lower Siam I met several severe squalls, but as I neared Malaya the weather improved. At Alor Star I refuelled and when taxiing out to take off the aeroplane became bogged in the wet ground. Stepping out of the cockpit I waded around to the front of the machine, and saw that only the tops of the wheels were visible above the mud. Everyone was most helpful and the superintendant requisitioned a number of natives to pull the aeroplane out of the mud. The machine was eventually lifted on to a dry patch, and I took off for Singapore. Isolated storms loomed ahead, looking like giant mushrooms, but I was able to fly round them. Despite the fact that my shoes were covered with mud and my feet wet through, I felt very happy as I speeded towards Singapore.

Sydney to Auckland, 1936:

"Visibility had become steadily worse and storms were drawing in round the machine on all sides. As I plunged into the storm area heavy rain beat down on the Gull, which was tossed about like a feather.

The sea was whipped up into a foaming mass and I lost sight of it completely as I flew blind through storms of such fierce intensity that I almost despaired of ever reaching land. My arm ached trying to steady the machine and steer an accurate compass course. As soon as I would fly through one storm it was only to find curtains of black nimbus heralding another. At times I would fly very low, trying to keep the sea in view and when that was blotted out I immediately climbed to a safe height and flew on entirely by instruments.

Tired and disheartened I watched the hours pass as the weather grew even worse until it became a supreme effort to keep my eyes on the instruments, while sheets of rain beat against the cabin. I realized that the slightest mistake would tip the scales against me and the Gull would go spinning down into the sea."

Perhaps the greatest achievement of Jean Batten, New Zealand's "Ambassador of the Skies", is that she was the first flier, man or woman, to make a direct flight between England and New Zealand.



In 1976 the Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, England, issued a special Commemorative Cover to mark the 40th anniversary of Jean Batten's historic solo flight to New Zealand. The 13,000 Covers were flown over the route by British Airways in October and released for sale in December to aid Air Force Charities. The remaining 450 Covers were brought to New Zealand by Miss Batten to be sold by MOTAT to help the Sir Keith Park Memorial Museum's appeal fund, when she returned to her homeland to open the Museum's Pioneers' of New Zealand Aviation Pavilion on 2 April 1977.



HOWEVER TIRED AT THE END OF A LONG SOLO JOURNEY JEAN PUT ON A BRAVE SMILE FOR THE CROWDS THRONING THE AERODROME TO WELCOME HER.



Today, still very youthful she retains her interest and enthusiasm for everything connected with aviation and is an ardent supporter of the Anglo-French supersonic airliner Concorde for which she has campaigned for many years.



A FITTING WELCOME HOME TO NEW ZEALAND'S OWN JEAN BATTEN.



16 OCTOBER 1936 ARRIVED AT AUCKLAND AIRPORT ON CONCLUSION OF
FIRST DIRECT FLIGHT FROM ENGLAND TO NEW ZEALAND
14,224 MILES IN 11 DAYS 45 MINS INCLUDING 2½ DAYS IN SYDNEY.

66/5/1A
Pt 4

VETTING STATEMENT

All New Zealand documents on this file will be considered declassified with effect from 1 August 20. 1.4

(MFAT documents only)

Foreign-source documents on this file may be regarded as cleared for access with effect from 1 August 20. 1.4

~~(no classified documents on file)~~ (delete as appropriate)

Some foreign-source documents have been placed on a restricted parallel file (see separation sheets herewith recording transfer).

Other comments:

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Sgd. 

Date: 13/8/04

for Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

ACTION SHEET

PAPERS **ABOVE** THIS SHEET **REQUIRE ACTION**

ACTION COMPLETE ON RECORDS **BELOW**
THIS SHEET.

**NOTE—Position of this sheet in file must NOT
be changed except by Records staff.**

Message : 101561.RCV

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION
COPY

B66/S/1A
B41/10
15 JUN 89
Page 1

FROM: NEW YORK

C/C: 850

TO: WELLINGTON 01040 - PRIORITY :

RFTD: LONDON 00115 - ROUTINE : OTTAWA 00153 - ROUTINE

11169
ERT(P)
CLIPS

LD :SERT (UNC LGL DIS EAB EUR)

SUBJ:SECURITY COUNCIL : UK/CZECH INITIATIVE : PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES

OUR 973.

SECURITY COUNCIL LAST EVENING ADOPTED CONSENSUS RESOLUTION 635 (1989) CALLING ON STATES TO COOPERATE IN RESEARCH ON ENHANCING THE DETECTABILITY OF PLASTIC AND SHEET EXPLOSIVES, AND FOR EFFORTS TO DEVISE IN ICAO 'AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE MARKING' OF SUCH EXPLOSIVES FOR THE PURPOSES OF DETECTION.

2 TEXT AS ADOPTED IS A LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM THAT FORWARDED WITH OUR MEMO 4/111/49 OF 1 JUNE, AS NON-ALIGNED WOULD NOT SUPPORT TEXT IN FORM CAPABLE OF BEING INTERPRETED AS A TOO BROAD CONDEMNATION OF ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE, IN VIEW OF THEIR CONCERN NOT TO UNDERMINE LEGITIMACY (AS THEY SEE IT) OF CERTAIN ACTS CONDUCTED FOR PURPOSES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION ETC. IN ABSENCE OF AN AGREED DEFINITION OF 'INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM', REFERENCE TO THIS WAS REPLACED WITH 'ACTS OF TERRORISM'. THE FORMER SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE LOCKERBIE BOMBING WAS DELETED, AND THE FOCUS MORE NARROWLY PUT ON ACTIONS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION THROUGH DELETION OF REFERENCE TO THE 9 OCTOBER 1985 PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT CONDEMNING TERRORISM IN ALL ITS FORMS.

3 NON-ALIGNED COUNCIL MEMBERS ALSO INSISTED THAT RESOLUTION BE ADOPTED WITHOUT DEBATE - OR THREATENED IN THE ALTERNATIVE A LENGTHY DEBATE IN WHICH LEGITIMACY OF CERTAIN ACTS OF VIOLENCE MIGHT BE UPHELD. THEY INSISTED ALSO THAT TEXT BE TABLED BY THE PRESIDENT RATHER THAN AS A UK DRAFT.

4 IN CONSEQUENCE, UK REFRAINED FROM COMMENT UNTIL AFTER COUNCIL MEETING, WHEN A PRESS STATEMENT WAS SUBMITTED AS OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE COUNCIL. STATEMENT NOTES UK/CZECH COOPERATION IN INITIATIVE, RECALLS ITS GENESIS IN THE LOCKERBIE BOMBING, AND ASSERTS THAT COUNCIL, WITH ADOPTION OF

Message : 101561.RCV

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RESOLUTION, HAS GONE BEYOND ITS PREVIOUS LIMITS
(OF MERELY 'USING WORDS AGAINST SUCH BARBARIC
ACTS OF TERRORISM BY ADOPTING CONDEMNATORY
RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS') BY PLACING ITS
AUTHORITY BEHIND PRACTICAL INITIATIVE BEING
TAKEN BY ICAO.

5 TEXT OF RESOLUTION 635 (1989) AND UK
STATEMENT BY FAX FOR WELLINGTON ONLY (BY BAG
FOR OTHER ADDRESSEES).

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15/1145LT FC
NYK 0737

TORW 16/06/89 05:06:05
TORL 15/06/89 19:42:23
WLN 2566
NNNN

B66/S/1A
~~CP~~ B30/1

Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs presents his compliments to their Excellencies and Messieurs, the Heads of Diplomatic Missions, and with reference to Article IX of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971, has the honour to state that an Instrument of Ratification of the Protocol was deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom by the Government of the Republic of Peru on 7 June 1989.

The Secretary of State avails himself of this opportunity to express to their Excellencies and Messieurs the Heads of Diplomatic Missions the assurance of his highest consideration.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON SW1A 2AH

8 June 1989



cc'd
hello.

(F)

B66/5/1A



NEW ZEALAND MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

4/111/49

~~F.A.~~

~~111.~~

1 June 1989

The Secretary of External Relations and Trade
WELLINGTON

(LGL UNC DIS EUR EAB)

cc: London
Ottawa

SECURITY COUNCIL : MARKING OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES

Further to our cable of today's date, we attach copies of the Czech/UK draft resolution and talking points issued by the United Kingdom Permanent Representative.

NIGEL FYFE

Permanent Representative

Encl



DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE MARKING OF EXPLOSIVES

The Security Council,

A. Recalling the statement of 9 October 1985 by the President of the Security Council resolutely condemning terrorism in all its forms wherever and by whomever committed;

B. Recalling also the important role of the United Nations in supporting and encouraging the efforts of States and intergovernmental organisations in combating international terrorism;

C. Conscious of the implications of acts of terrorism for international security;

D. Déeply distressed by all acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation, and in particular the destruction of a civilian aircraft on 21 December 1988, with the loss of 270 lives;

E. Mindful of the importance of cooperation by all States in preventing and eliminating all acts of terrorism, including those involving the use of explosives, and ensuring that the perpetrators of acts of terrorism are brought to justice;

F. Determined to encourage the promotion of effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism;

G. Deploring the fact that terrorists are able to make use of plastic or sheet explosives with little risk of detection;

H. Noting the International Civil Aviation Organisation Council resolution of 16 February 1989, which urged ICAO Member States to expedite current research and development on detection of explosives and on security equipment;

1. Condemns the destruction of a civilian aircraft on 21 December 1988, and all acts committed against the security of civil aviation;

2. Calls upon all States to cooperate in devising and implementing measures to prevent all acts of terrorism, including those involving the use of explosives;


3. Welcomes the work already undertaken by ICAO, and by other international organisations, aimed at eliminating international terrorism, in particular in the field of aviation security;

4. Urges ICAO to intensify its work aimed at preventing all acts of terrorism against international civil aviation, and in particular its work on devising an international regime for the marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection;

5. Urges all States, and in particular the producers of plastic or sheet explosives, to intensify research into means of making such explosives more easily detectable, and to cooperate in this endeavour;

6. Calls upon all States to share the results of such research and cooperation with a view to devising, in ICAO and other competent international organisations, an international regime for the marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection.

25 May 1989

- I have asked you to come and see me as President of the Council to give you the text of a draft resolution on the marking of explosives, which I have in mind to introduce into the Security Council before the end of this month. I should like to explain our thinking in more detail, and to learn your reactions.
 - You will remember that on 21 December 1988 PanAm flight 103 was destroyed over Lockerbie with the loss of 270 lives. A statement was made on behalf of the Members of the Security Council on 30 December strongly condemning the act.
 - It is now known that the aircraft was destroyed by plastic explosive. Since plastic explosives give off very little vapour, their detection is very difficult. There is a pressing need to devise means of marking such explosives (by adding a vapour enhancing chemical) so as to make them more easily detectable.
 - On 6 January Czechoslovakia, a significant producer of plastic explosive for peaceful uses, suggested to the United Kingdom the development of a joint initiative, the object of which would be the convening of meetings of experts leading to the conclusion of an international convention on the marking of explosives for the purposes of detection.
- 

- Bilateral talks took place in London and Prague in January and April.
- On 16 February the ICAO Council, meeting at Ministerial level, adopted a resolution which urged Member States to expedite research and development on detection of explosives and on security equipment, to continue to exchange such information, and to consider how to achieve an international regime for the marking of explosives for the purposes of detection. On 6-10 March an ICAO ad hoc Group of Specialists on detection of explosives met in Montreal.
- The expert consensus is that the marking of plastic explosives is probably technically feasible but further study is needed.
- Work will continue within ICAO. On 19 May the ICAO Committee on Unlawful Interference met to consider the Anglo/Czech proposals, and recommended to the ICAO Council that the matter should be given the highest priority. Given the importance of the subject to international peace and security, we feel that it would be desirable and appropriate for the Security Council to give political impetus to the initiative.
- To this end, we have drafted the resolution. An earlier draft was discussed with the Czechoslovak Government and the text reflects their ideas.

- We seek your agreement to the draft resolution being introduced into the Council. We think it would be preferable if it could be adopted without a debate. We would however make a short statement after adoption in which we would acknowledge the important role which Czechoslovakia has played and is continuing to play.
- Particular points to note about the draft resolution are:
 - The draft concentrates upon acts of terrorism involving the use of explosives, especially those involving civil aviation.
 - Although we think ICAO is probably the best forum for devising an international regime, we have an open mind as to the forum in which a convention would eventually be adopted.
 - The term "plastic or sheet explosives" is used because there is a new type of explosive which is very similar in composition to plastic explosive. Both have ingredients which have very low vapour pressures. This makes both virtually undetectable. Sheet explosives are, however - unlike plastic explosives - not malleable. Instead they are made into rigid sheets which can be cut to a desired form.

- We consider the Council has an important role to play in this exercise. It has condemned acts of terrorism; it is right that it should also urge States to take preventive means to combat acts of terrorism.

WLN 1960

B66/S/1A.

Message : 100951.RCV

Page 1

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

UNCLASS SECURE 01 JUN 89

9944

FROM: NEW YORK

C/C: 850

TO: WELLINGTON

00973 - ROUTINE :

RPTD: LONDON

00101 - ROUTINE :

OTTAWA

00133 - ROUTINE

ERT (P)

CLIPS

LD :SERT (LGL UNC DIS EUR EAB)

SUBJ:SECURITY COUNCIL : MARKING OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES

IN OUR MEMORANDUM 4/111/49 OF 30 MAY WE NOTED POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON CZECH/UK INITIATIVE FOR MARKING OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES. WE HAVE NOW OBTAINED COPIES OF CZECH/UK DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND TALKING POINTS USED BY UK AS PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL FOR MONTH OF MAY IN SEEKING SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR THE TEXT. COPIES BY BAG.

2 DRAFT RESOLUTION COVERS BOTH PLASTIC AND SHEET EXPLOSIVES (LATTER ARE DESCRIBED AS SIMILAR TO PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES IN HAVING LOW VAPOUR PRESSURE, AND HENCE VIRTUALLY UNDETECTABLE, BUT ARE NOT MALLEABLE). IT WOULD CONDEMN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE (UNIDENTIFIED) PAN AM FLIGHT OVER LOCKERBIE, CALL UPON STATES TO COOPERATE IN DEVISING AND IMPLEMENTING MEASURES TO PREVENT ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE INVOLVING THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES. URGE ICAO TO INTENSIFY ITS WORK ON DEVISING AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE MARKING OF PLASTIC OR SHEET EXPLOSIVES FOR THE PURPOSES OF DETECTION, URGE STATES TO INTENSIFY RESEARCH INTO MEANS FOR MAKING SUCH EXPLOSIVES MORE EASILY DETECTABLE, AND TO COOPERATE ON THIS.

3 THE TALKING POINTS NOTE THAT THE EXPERT CONSENSUS IS THAT THE MARKING OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES IS PROBABLY TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE BUT FURTHER STUDY IS NEEDED. THEY CONTINUE: GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WE FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE AND APPROPRIATE FOR THE COUNCIL TO GIVE POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE INITIATIVE.

4 THAT LAST ASSERTION HAS, HOWEVER, NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY NON-ALIGNED COUNCIL MEMBERS, WHO HAVE AS YET REFUSED TO LEND SUPPORT TO THE INITIATIVE. CLAIMING THEY NEED FURTHER TIME TO CONSIDER THE TEXT, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THEY APPARENTLY DO NOT ACCEPT THAT ISSUE IS ONE THAT MERITS COUNCIL INTERVENTION. RESOLUTION HAS NOT THEREFORE BEEN ACTED UPON DURING UK PRESIDENCY OF COUNCIL IN MAY, AND IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE CONSIDERED BY COUNCIL FOR SOME DAYS YET.

UNCLASS SECURE

866/5/1A.



NEW ZEALAND MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ONE UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 U.S.A.

TELEPHONE: (212) 826-1960

TELEX: 230-261210 TANAKAHA

FACSIMILE: (212) 758-0827

4/111/49



30 May 1989

The Secretary of External Relations and Trade
WELLINGTON

Attention: LGL UNC

cc: OTTAWA
LONDON

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM : MARKING OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES

Further to our cable 826 of 9 May we attach copies of Australian cables reporting on developments relating to the UK/Czech initiative for the negotiation of a Convention to mark and allow detection of explosives that might be used for terrorist purposes.

2 We understand that action by the Security Council is imminent, and will report by cable shortly.

NIGEL FYFE

Permanent Representative

Encl: Canberra's 1879 (to New York from file 240/8/5) of 11.5.89
Canberra's 222 of (to New York from file 252/12/10) of 19.5.89
Canberra's 1887 (to New York from file 240/8/5) of 19.5.89

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OT29331 1545 19.5.89 CLA

TO.

RR CANBERRA/4439

RP.

RR LONDON/4049 WARSAW/131 UN NEW YORK/1887

RR GENEVA/2203 WASHINGTON/180

FM. OTTAWA / FA REF O.OT29252

R E S T R I C T E D

ICAO: NEW MULTILATERAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT ON MARKING OF EXPLOSIVES

FROM FILE 240/8/5

START OF SUMMARY

DISCUSSION IN ICAO'S UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE COMMITTEE ON 19 MAY SHOWED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT ON THE MARKING OF EXPLOSIVES.

END OF SUMMARY

THE OFFICE OF THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO ICAO IN MONTREAL ADVISES THAT THE UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE COMMITTEE (UIC) DISCUSSED THE PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON THE MARKING OF EXPLOSIVES ON 19 MAY AND THAT THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR AN INSTRUMENT OF THIS TYPE. THERE WAS SOME QUESTIONING WHETHER THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTRUMENT MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATELY DONE BY THE U.N. THAN BY ICAO, BUT IT WAS GENERALLY CONSIDERED THAT ICAO SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE MATTER ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT COULD BE EFFECTED MORE QUICKLY IN ICAO THAN IN THE U.N. AND WITHOUT HAVING THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MOVING THROUGH THE SIXTH COMMITTEE AND THE LEGAL APPARATUS OF THE U.N. THIS WOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE SUBJECT'S BEING RAISED AT THE U.N. WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT THE ICAO INITIATIVE WOULD BE SUPPORTED. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, E.G. IMO, COULD ALSO BE CONSULTED.

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTRUMENT WAS SEEN BY SOME MEMBERS AS AN EXTENSION OF THE ICAO COUNCIL MEETING ON AVIATION SECURITY ATTENDED BY MINISTERS IN FEBRUARY 1989. THE PANEL ON EXPLOSIVES WHICH WAS SET UP AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THAT MEETING HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF AN APPROPRIATE ADDITIVE TO FACILITATE DETECTABILITY.

3. THE UIC WILL RECOMMEND TO THE COUNCIL THAT IT AGREE TO THE INCLUSION OF THE INSTRUMENT IN THE LEGAL WORK PROGRAM, WITH THE

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HIGHEST PRIORITY. THE WORK PROGRAM WILL THEN BE SUBMITTED TO THE ASSEMBLY, WHICH IS NOT ABLE TO CHANGE THE WORK PROGRAM OTHER THAN BY ADDING NEW ITEMS. THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE ASSEMBLY WILL BE SOUGHT FOR THE NEW INSTRUMENT.

4. THE COUNCIL COULD THEREFORE BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE A DECISION ON THIS MATTER AS EARLY AS ITS NEXT MEETING ON 29 MAY. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO THE MATTER. THE INFORMATION PAPER SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH HAS BEEN FAXED TO DOTAC WILL PROVIDE USEFUL BACKGROUND, THE DETAILED DECISION OF THE UIC WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

5. THE INITIATIVE WAS SUPPORTED BY THE USA, USSR AND MOST OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UIC. THE USSR HAS OFFERED TO CO-SPONSOR THE PROPOSAL AND TO HOLD A MEETING IN MOSCOW OF EXPERTS AND ICAO REPRESENTATIVES TO PROGRESS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS MATTER. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WHOSE ROLE IN THE INITIATIVE FLOWS FROM ITS REACTION TO THE SUGGESTION THAT ITS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE LOCKERBIE DISASTER, STILL HARBOURS THOUGHTS OF PROCEEDING THROUGH THE U.N., WITH EVERY INDIVIDUAL SALE OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE BEING REPORTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THE U.K. HAS HELD THE LINE ON PROCEEDING THROUGH ICAO, POINTING OUT THAT IDENTIFICATION OF EVERY SALE IS JUST NOT/NOT FEASIBLE IN MANY COUNTRIES. THIS BACKGROUND DOES EXPLAIN SOME OF THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE INFORMATION PAPER, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF ULTIMATELY PROCEEDING THROUGH THE U.N.

6. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MANUFACTURE OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES TAKES PLACE IN ABOUT 40 COUNTRIES WITH APPARENTLY ANOTHER 25 INVOLVED IN FURTHER PROCESSING.

XC. 0.OT29331 4439 4049 131 1887 2203 180

CM.

SE. 000

SU. OGDD

SU. OGDH

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NNNN-----

Cable print completed

89/05/19 at 16:31

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RESTRICTED

UWANG86

WS32372 1500 19.5.89 CLA

RESTRICTED

TO.

PP CANBERRA/9822

RP.

PP PARIS EMB/861 MOSCOW/1938 WASHINGTON/949

PP OTTAWA/241 UN NEW YORK/222 LONDON/805

PP GENEVA/131

FM. WARSAW / FA REF O.OT29252

R E S T R I C T E D

ICAO : 'SEMTEX' CONVENTION OF MARKING EXPLOSIVES

FROM FILE 252/12/10

START OF SUMMARY

PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL ARE CLOSE TO SETTLING DRAFT RESOLUTION TO SET UP ICAO AS FORUM FOR PREPARATORY WORK ON CONVENTION FOR MARKING EXPLOSIVES. CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL SEND A LETTER TO SECRETARY GENERAL OF UNITED NATIONS OUTLINING THE JOINT CZECHOSLOVAKIA/UNITED KINGDOM INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD BE CIRCULATED AND COULD BE DISCUSSED UNDER THE SIXTH COMMITTEE TERRORISM ITEM AT UNGA THIS YEAR.

END OF SUMMARY

WE HAD BRIEFINGS IN PRAGUE FROM UK AMBASSADOR, O'KEEFE, AND THE HEAD OF MFA INTERNATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, KOZUBEK, ON THE JOINT UNITED KINGDOM/CZECHOSLOVAK MOVE FOR NEGOTIATION OF A CONVENTION TO MARK AND ALLOW DETECTION OF EXPLOSIVES WHICH MIGHT BE USED FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES.

O'KEEFE SAID THAT UK AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD HELD TWO TECHNICAL MEETINGS WHICH HAD GONE WELL AND HAD RESULTED IN AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION OF A CONVENTION PREMISED ON MARKING OF EXPLOSIVES BY VAPOURISATION TO ALLOW 'SNIFFER' DETECTION RATHER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, BY RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES. SUCH MARKING/DETECTION HAD BEEN OPTED FOR AS THE CONTROL BASIS RATHER THAN A RECORDING AND TRACKING SYSTEM WHICH, IT WAS CONSIDERED, WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE.

THE CZECHOSLOVAKS HAD FAVOURED THE SIXTH COMMITTEE OF UNGA AS THE NEGOTIATING FORUM, BUT THE BRITISH HAD PRESSED HARD FOR ICAO BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL MINEFIELDS THEY SAW IN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE.

- CZECHOSLOVAKS HAD FINALLY ACCEPTED THAT ICAO BE THE FORUM BUT ON

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A COMPROMISE BASIS THAT THE SIXTH COMMITTEE BE AVAILABLE IN RESERVE

. KOZUBEK EXPANDED ON THIS SAYING THAT THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A WIDER ONE THAT JUST FOR CIVIL AVIATION AND THEY FELT THAT UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS GENERALLY SHOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEBATE THE MATTER. FOR THE TIME BEING, THE PREPARATORY WORK ON AN INSTRUMENT WOULD BE DONE IN ICAO, BUT IT WAS OPEN THAT AT A LATER STAGE IT COULD BE DECIDED THAT NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE SHIFTED TO ANOTHER FORUM.

2. O'KEEFE SAID THAT DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN GOING ON AMONG THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHO EXCEPT FOR FRANCE, WERE NOW AGREED ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION INTENDED TO BE DEALT WITH BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE END OF NEXT MONTH. FRANCE HAD TENDED TO CONFUSE THE 'SEMTEX' ISSUE WITH DISARMAMENT, WHICH IT IS AVERSE TO SEEING DEALT WITH BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT THIS CONFUSION IS BEING STRAIGHTENED OUT.

. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS NOT AT PRESENT A SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER SO THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD BE AT PAINS IN STATEMENTS OR EXPLANATION OF VOTE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE CZECHOSLOVAK CONTRIBUTION.

3. KOZUBEK SAID THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS PREPARING A LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR CIRCULATION TO UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS. THEY ENVISAGE THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO DISCUSSION OF THE INITIATIVE UNDER THE ITEM ON MEASURES TO PREVENT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHICH COMES UP FOR BIENNIAL DISCUSSION THIS YEAR IN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO GIVING MEMBER STATES THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS VIEWS ON THE INITIATIVE AND ON THE CHOICE OF FORUM. IN THIS WAY THE SIXTH COMMITTEE COULD GIVE THE POLITICAL SUPPORT THAT IS NEEDED.

. HE SAID THAT UNITED KINGDOM AND CZECHOSLOVAKIAN GOALS ARE THE SAME. CZECHOSLOVAKIA WANTS A GOOD CONVENTION AND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

XC. O.WS32372

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OT29252 1600 11.5.89 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/4364

RP.
PP UN NEW YORK/1879 LONDON/4042 WARSAW/129
PP GENEVA/2198

FM. OTTAWA / FA

R E S T R I C T E D

ICAO: NEW MULTILATERAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT ON MARKING OF EXPLOSIVES
FROM FILE 240/8/5

START OF SUMMARY

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAVE BRIEFED OUR DELEGATION TO ICAO ON A PROPOSED JOINT INITIATIVE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT ON THE MARKING OF EXPLOSIVES FOR DETECTABILITY.

END OF SUMMARY

THE OFFICE OF THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO ICAO IN MONTREAL ADVISES THAT BRITISH AND CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE ICAO COUNCIL HAVE INFORMALLY BRIEFED THE EUROPEAN, NORTH AMERICAN, JAPANESE AND AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVES ON THEIR PROPOSED JOINT INITIATIVE TO SEEK ASSEMBLY APPROVAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL INSTRUMENT ON THE MARKING OF EXPLOSIVES FOR DETECTABILITY.

2. THE PROPOSED DETAILS OF THE INSTRUMENT ARE YET TO BE FULLY DEVELOPED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. AT THIS STAGE IT IS SUGGESTED THAT A DRAFT INSTRUMENT COULD :

- . PROVIDE A DEFINITION OF THE TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES TO BE COVERED: ,
- . IMPOSE A REQUIREMENT ON STATES TO ENSURE THAT MANUFACTURERS MARK PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES: ,
- . REQUIRE STATES TO REFUSE THE IMPORT OR EXPORT OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES AFTER A CERTAIN DATE UNLESS THEY WERE MARKED AS SET OUT IN THE INSTRUMENT: ,
- . REQUIRE STATES, AFTER A CERTAIN DATE, TO SEIZE ANY SUCH UNMARKED EXPLOSIVES WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION.

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3. CHECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM HAVE HELD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE AND HAVE ALSO CONSULTED INDIVIDUALLY A NUMBER OF OTHER STATES. THEY HAVE ADVISED THAT, AS A RESULT OF THESE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, A CONSENSUS APPEARS TO HAVE EMERGED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

. THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF ACHIEVING THE DESIRABLE INTERNATIONAL REGIME WOULD BE THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE LEGAL INSTRUMENT, PREPARED IN A MULTILATERAL FORUM WITH WIDE PARTICIPATION.

. TO EXPEDITE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON SUCH AN INSTRUMENT, IT SHOULD, INITIALLY AT LEAST, BE RESTRICTED TO AN OBLIGATION TO MARK PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETECTION.

. ICAO IS THE PREFERRED FORUM FOR THE PREPARATORY TECHNICAL AND LEGAL WORK REQUIRED FOR THE DRAFTING OF A NEW MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT.

. THE DRAFTING OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT UNDER THE AEGIS OF ICAO SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE IN OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA (E.G. THE U.N., IMO), NOR SHOULD IT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A CLOSE ASSOCIATION OF THE UN WITH THIS WORK AT A LATER STAGE.

4. THE PROPOSERS SEE THE MAIN REASONS FOR PREFERRING ICAO AS THE FORUM FOR THE NECESSARY PREPARATORY WORK AS BEING THAT:

(A) THE COUNCIL AND SECRETARIAT ARE ALREADY WELL SEIZED OF THE PROBLEM;

(B) THE NECESSARY TECHNICAL WORK ON IDENTIFYING A SUITABLE ADDITIVE IS ALREADY UNDER WAY IN THE AD HOC GROUP ON EXPLOSIVES;

(C) ICAO HAS CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN PREPARING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS OF THIS KIND AND HAS PROVED ITS EFFICIENCY IN THIS RESPECT AS RECENTLY AS FEBRUARY 1988 WITH THE PREPARATION AND ADOPTION OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE MONTREAL CONVENTION;

(D) IT IS TERRORIST ATTACKS ON AIRCRAFT WHICH HAVE CREATED THE POLITICAL IMPETUS FOR SUCH AN INSTRUMENT.

5. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL PROVIDE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL TO THE COMMITTEE ON UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. AUSTICAO MONTREAL WILL KEEP US ADVISED OF ANY CHANGE IN THE THRUST OF THE PROPOSALS.

6. THERE IS NOT/NOT MUCH TIME LEFT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS INITIATIVE DURING THE CURRENT SESSION, WHICH ENDS AT THE END OF JUNE. WHILST NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON THE PROCEDURE FOR HAVING THE ISSUE PLACED BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY, IT IS EXPECTED THAT IT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE LEGAL COMMISSION'S FUTURE WORK PROGRAM WHICH GOES TO THE ASSEMBLY FOR APPROVAL.

XC. 0.OT29252 4364 1879 4042 129 2198

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File for AIF Del 17.5.89
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

B66/S/1A

SENT adeline (LGL)

CABLES: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1

TELEX: 27678

TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

FAX: 01-930 0827

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE

PALL MALL

LONDON

SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:

Our ref:


Circular Letter No. 19/89

11 May 1989

Re: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES

I have pleasure in sending you herewith copies of the above publication for transmission to your Government.

Additional copies are available from the Commonwealth Secretariat on request.



E C Anyaoku
Deputy Secretary General (Political)

Encs

Message : 100234.RCV

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

B66/5/1A

Page 1
B14/3c

15 MAY 89

8441

ERT(P)

clips

FROM: WELLINGTON

C/C: 913

TO: ALL POSTS 00719 - PRIORITY :

LD :SERT (DLO DIS MEA SEC CON)

:NZSIS

CUSTOMS (BORDER OPERATIONS)

:POLICE (PTIU)

AIR TRANSPORT (AVIATION SECURITY)

:DEFENCE (DOT DDI)

:DESC

SUBJ:TERRORISM ALERT : INCREASED ATTENTION TO TRAVELLERS FROM
MIDDLE EAST :

AN ALERT HAS BEEN RECEIVED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST AMERICANS, BRITISH AND FRENCH PERSONS FOLLOWING RECENT REMARKS BY AN IRANIAN DIGNITARY (NOTWITHSTANDING APPARENTLY LATER QUALIFICATION).

2. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO SPECIFIC THREAT TO NEW ZEALAND OR NEW ZEALAND INTERESTS, NOR APPARENTLY TO AMERICAN, BRITISH OR FRENCH INTERESTS HERE, ALL POSTS ARE ASKED TO PAY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO ALL TRAVELLERS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST (IRANIANS PARTICULARLY) AND TO ALERT US ASAP IF ANYTHING COMES TO LIGHT. (FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE SEE RELEVANT SECTIONS OF CONSULAR INSTRUCTIONS - APPENDIX 6 TO CHAPTER 5 ESPECIALLY - AND OUR MEMO 109/1/4(NZ) OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1983 AND 21 APRIL 1988 ENTITLED 'PASSPORT EXAMINATION MANUAL, (A GUIDE TO THE DETECTION OF COUNTERFEIT AND ALTERED TERRORIST DOCUMENTATION) AND THE RED BOOK').

3. FOR CANBERRA: PLEASE ALERT OTHER AUSTRALIAN POSTS AS APPROPRIATE.

151657LT TBB

TORL 15/05/89 08:20:43

WLN 1253

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Message : I00168.RCV

TLX NZ3513

TLX NZ3550

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

UNCLASS SECURE

10 MAY 89

8247

ERT(P)
Chips

FROM: ATHENS

C/C: 803

TO: WELLINGTON 00275 - ROUTINE :

RPTD: LONDON	00055 - ROUTINE	:	THE HAGUE	00033 - ROUTINE
BRUSSELS	00042 - ROUTINE	:	BONN	00036 - ROUTINE
PARIS	00038 - ROUTINE	:	ROME	00035 - ROUTINE

LD :SERT (DLO EUR DIS SEC LGL EAB)
:PS MFA : POLICE (PTIU)
:NZSIS (TIC) : DEFENCE (DOT DDI)
:DESC : PMO (DIRECTOR)

SUBJ:GREECE : TERRORIST ATTACK

OUR 274. THE NOVEMBER 17 GROUP HAS NOW CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACK ON PETSOS, IN A LETTER TO THE INDEPENDENT DAILY ELEFTHERTOTYPIA. POLICE SAY THE LETTER IS GENUINE. WHILE FOCUSSEING ON THE KOSTOTAS AFFAIR, THE LETTER IS A WIDE-RANGING ATTACK ON ALL POLITICAL PARTIES. IT ENCOURAGES VOTERS IN THE 18 JUNE ELECTION TO SPOIL THEIR BALLOT PAPERS THUS INDICATING SUPPORT FOR THE GROUP. (FURTHER DETAILS BY BAG TO SERT ONLY).

2 THE GROUP HAS CARRIED OUT 20 ATTACKS IN ATHENS SINCE 1975 WHEN IT KILLED THE CIA STATION CHIEF. THIS IS THE FIRST ATTACK ON A POLITICIAN. NO MEMBER OF THE GROUP HAS EVER BEEN CAUGHT.

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TORW 11/05/89 20:41:47

TORL 11/05/89 09:43:35

WLN 1187

NNNN

UNCLASS SECURE

Message : I00100.RCV

UNCLASS SECURE

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

09 MAY 89

Page 1

FROM: NEW YORK

C/C: 850

8117

TO: WELLINGTON 00826 - ROUTINE :

RPTD: LONDON 00094 - ROUTINE :

LD :SERT (UNC EUR EAB DIS LGL)

SUBJ:UNDC : CZECH STATEMENT : PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES

IN HIS STATEMENT YESTERDAY IN THE UNDC, CZECH PR MADE PASSING REFERENCE TO A CZECH 'PROPOSAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UK TO COSPONSOR A JOINT CZECH-BRITISH INITIATIVE IN THE UN DESIGNED TO PROMPT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONCLUSION OF A CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES.

2 UK DELEGATION HAS SINCE CONFIRMED TO US THAT, AS ONE OF CONSEQUENCES OF PAN AM BOMBING OVER LOCKERBIE, TECHNICAL TALKS ARE TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, APPARENTLY AT INITIATIVE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LATTER APPEARS WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE INCLUSION OF AN ODOUR AGENT IN SEMTEX TO ENABLE ITS EASIER DETECTION. UK UNDERSTANDS THAT ANY UN ACTION WOULD BE IN ICAO.

3 WE WERE ALSO TOLD CT) THAT A UK INITIATIVE ON SUBJECT IN SECURITY COUNCIL IS POSSIBLE, BUT CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHERS HAVE NOT YET CLEARED THE WAY FOR THIS.

4 WE LEAVE IT TO YOU TO GIVE THIS MESSAGE ANY WIDER DISTRIBUTION.

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09/1430LT PC

NYK 0453

TORW 10/05/89 09:23:49

TORL 09/05/89 22:58:32

WLN 1119

NNNN

UNCLASS SECURE

Message : 100075.RCV

TLX NZ3513

TLX NZ3550

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

UNCLASS SECURE

09 MAY 89

8058

ERT(P)

chips

FROM: ATHENS

C/C: 803

TO: WELLINGTON 00274 - ROUTINE :

RPTD: LONDON	00054 - ROUTINE	:	THE HAGUE	00032 - ROUTINE
BRUSSELS	00041 - ROUTINE	:	BONN	00035 - ROUTINE
PARIS	00037 - ROUTINE	:	ROME	00034 - ROUTINE

LD :SERT (DLO EUR DIS SEC LGL EAB)
:PS MFA : POLICE (PTIU)
:NZSIS (TIC) : DEFENCE (DOT DDI)
:DESC : PMO (DIRECTOR)

SUBJ:GREECE : TERRORIST ATTACK

A FORMER PUBLIC ORDER MINISTER NARROWLY ESCAPED DEATH IN A CAR BOMB ATTACK IN ATHENS YESTERDAY.

2 GEORGE PETSOS, WHO IS ONE OF THOSE UNDER ATTACK IN THE KOSTOTAS AFFAIR AND WHO LOST HIS JOB AS PUBLIC ORDER MINISTER IN THE LATEST CABINET RESHUFFLE (OUR 181), WAS THE OBJECT OF A CAR BOMB ATTACK YESTERDAY. IN AN OPERATION VERY SIMILAR TO THAT IN WHICH THE AMERICAN NAVAL ATTACHE WAS KILLED LAST YEAR, A BOMB WAS DETONATED BY REMOTE CONTROL IN A PARKED CAR AS PETSOS' CAR WAS PASSING. ACCORDING TO THE POLICE, IF THE BOMB HAD GONE OFF A SECOND LATER THE OCCUPANTS OF PETSOS' CAR WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED. AS IT WAS, THE FRONT OF HIS CAR TOOK THE FULL BLAST. NONETHELESS HE, HIS DRIVER AND BODYGUARD WERE ALL INJURED.

3 NO GROUP IMMEDIATELY CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE ATTACK, BUT IT LOOKS LIKE THE WORK OF THE 17 NOVEMBER GROUP. IT WAS CONDEMNED BY ALL POLITICAL PARTIES. PETSOS HIMSELF, IN A STATEMENT FROM HOSPITAL, BLAMED THOSE WHO ACCUSE HIM IF INVOLVEMENT WITH KOSTOTAS. "THESE DESPICABLE SLANDERERS HAVE BEEN SEEKING MY POLITICAL EXTERMINATION AND NOW THEY HAVE EVEN ATTEMPTED MY PHYSICAL EXTERMINATION."

4 THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE NEAR PETSOS' HOME IN THE WEALTHY RESIDENTIAL SUBURB OF PSYCHIKO WHERE MANY AMBASSADORS LIVE.

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TORW 09/05/89 21:25:49
TORL 09/05/89 10:29:39
WLN 1095
NNNN

UNCLASS SECURE

Message : 100089.RCV

SECRET

1366/5/1A
B 69/47
Page 1

CLAS: SECRET

09 MAY 89

8127

FROM: TEHRAN

C/C: 879

TO: WELLINGTON 00676 - ROUTINE :

RPTD: CANBERRA 00059 - ROUTINE :
OTTAWA 00045 - ROUTINE :

LONDON 00122 - ROUTINE
WASHINGTON 00062 - ROUTINE

ERT(P)
No chips

LD :SERT MEA EAB

SUBJ:IRAN : TERRORISM

FILE: 82/1/1.

THE PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR (PLEASE PROTECT) SAYS HIS GOVERNMENT IS CONVINCED THAT ABU NIDAL WAS IN IRAN FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES A MONTH AGO. THE RISK WAS NOT TAKEN OF BRINGING HIM TO TEHRAN, BUT HE STAYED IN TABRIZ, AND A PROCESSION OF MEMBERS OF THE IRI GOVT. AND OTHERS CALLED ON HIM THERE.

2. THE PAKISTANIS TRY AND KEEP CLOSE TABS ON ABU NIDAL WHO IS UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH, COMMUTED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT THERE, FOR INVOLVEMENT IN A PARTICULARLY NASTY HIJACKING.

TEH 683
090617Z TEH DR

TORW 10/05/89 07:15:28
TORL 09/05/89 20:17:05
WLN 1108
NNNN

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

B37/1

B66/5/1A

B42/28

B69/96/5


B66/1/17

LIAISON WITH UK CUSTOMS

I spoke to Pocock (UK Customs) this morning, returning his call to the High Commission. Pocock said his "operational" people had picked up details of a shipment of arms, in transit in the UK and destined for New Zealand. Pocock said UK Customs were always on the lookout for arms shipments in transit, and particularly the ultimate destination. As a matter of routine they always sought to check on the bona fides of the shipments and their documentation.

In the case of this shipment to New Zealand, Pocock said he had now established that it was indeed destined for New Zealand (from Belgium) and that the documentation was in order. He said he had had some difficulty establishing this, however, having spoken to several people in the High Commission and in the Customs Office in Brussels. Pocock, who was perfectly polite on the point, said it would be helpful if there were one point of contact in London, especially since Dave Kay (Brussels) had mentioned to him, informally, that his post may be disestablished shortly.

Obviously it is in our interests to deal expeditiously with enquiries such as this and that they be handled sensitively, given the possibilities of illegal shipments being made under fraudulent documents and to destinations that are in breach of sanctions. I have told Pocock that in future he might call David Walker (or myself) and that we would check on the situation with our people here, and if necessary in Brussels, and get back to him. Any enquiries, Pocock said, would be only occasional in nature, but given the sensitivities involved it would obviously be helpful to UK Customs to have one point of contact in London. Pocock's telephone number is 353 1525, extensions 276-341.


Clive Pearson
Counsellor
3 March 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

Terrorism

Mr. Hunter: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will list all incidents of terrorist activity in Great Britain since 1979 which are attributable to groups connected with Northern Ireland.

Mr. Hurd: The table lists those terrorist incidents resulting in casualties. All were bomb incidents. There have also been a number of other incidents not resulting in casualties, but a full list of these could not be made available except at disproportionate cost.

Date and location	Killed	Injured
30 March 1979 Car park Palace of Westminster, Westminster, London SW1	1	—
17 December 1979 Post office sorting office, Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire	—	2
Post office sorting office, Charlton Green, Dover, Kent	—	2
2 December 1980 Princess Louise Regiment Territorial Army Centre, Hammersmith Road, London W6	—	5
10 October 1981 Ebury Bridge Road, London SW1	2	39
17 October 1981 76 South Croxted Road, London SE21	—	1
26 October 1981 Wimpy bar, Oxford Street, London W1	1	—
23 November 1981 Government House, Woolwich New Road, London SE18	—	2

Date and type of incident	Location	Casualties
17 December 1979 Explosive device	Turkish Airline Office, London	—
17 January 1980 Explosive device	Mount Royal Hotel, London	One dead, one injured ¹
11 April 1980 Shooting	Libyan journalist shot at Regents Park mosque	One dead
25 April 1980 Shooting	Libyan lawyer shot in Annismore Garden Mews, Kensington, London	One dead
30 April 1980 Shooting	Siege at Iranian Embassy	Seven dead (including five terrorists)
17 May 1980 Explosive device	Queen's Garden Hotel, Bayswater, London	One dead ¹ , one injured ¹
1 June 1980 Explosive device	Kuwait Oil Co., New Bond Street, London	—
12 October 1980 Explosive device	Turkish Tourist Office, London	—
12 October 1980 Explosive device	Swissair Office, Leicester Square, London	—
15 December 1980 Explosive device	French Tourist Board, Piccadilly, London	—
15 December 1980 Explosive device	French Railways Office, Piccadilly, London	—
28 December 1980 Explosive device	Libyan Airline Office, Piccadilly, London	—
23 June 1981 Kidnap	Kidnap of daughter of Saudi General	—
7 September 1981 Attack on Iranian Consulate		—
13 December 1981 Car bomb	Connaught Square, London	Two dead, one injured

Date and location	Killed	Injured
20 July 1982 South Carriage Road, Hyde Park, London W1 Regents Park, London NW1	4 7	28 31
10 December 1983 Royal Artillery Barracks, Repository Road, London SE18	—	3
17 December 1983 Harrods, Knightsbridge, London SW3	6	91
25 December 1983 Orchard Street, London W1	—	2
12 October 1984 Grand Hotel, Brighton, Sussex	5	30
1 August 1988 Inglis Barracks, Bittacy Hill, London NW7	1	8
20 February 1989 Clive Barracks, Tern Hill, Market Drayton, Shropshire	—	1

Mr. Hunter: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will list all incidents of terrorist activity in Great Britain since 1979 which are attributable to groups not connected with Northern Ireland.

Mr. Hurd: Statistics of main terrorist incidents which have taken place in Great Britain from 1979 to date are listed. These do not include incidents apparently caused by extremist, nationalist or anarchist groups based in Great Britain, or by extremist animal rights activists. To list all terrorist incidents which have taken place in Great Britain since 1979 would have incurred disproportionate costs.

<i>Date and type of incident</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Casualties</i>
26 February 1982 Hijack	Stansted, Essex	—
14 March 1982 Explosive device	London	—
3 June 1982 Shooting	Israeli Ambassador Argov shot Park Lane, London W1, plus find of bombs and weapons (N)	Two injured (includes one terrorist)
31 July 1982 Explosive device	Middle East newspaper office, Cough Street, London	—
9 September 1982 Explosive device	Lancaster Hotel, London. Plot to assassinate Turkish Diplomat (find of guns and bomb)	—
31 August 1983 Explosive device	Leumi Bank, Woodstock Street, London W1	—
3 February 1984 Shooting	Murder of Mr. Mhatre, Assistant Commissioner, Indian High Commission, Birmingham	One dead
10 March 1984 Explosive device	Five bombs in various locations in London	Twenty-three injured
11 March 1984 Explosive device	Two bombs in Manchester	Three injured
12 March 1984 Explosive device	Omar Kayyam restaurant and nightclub, Regent's Street, London W1	—
17 April 1984 Shooting	Shooting in St. James's Square, London	One dead, 11 injured
20 April 1984 Explosive device	Heathrow Airport Terminal	Twenty-seven injured
8 June 1984 Incendiary device	Indian High Commission, Liverpool	One injured
5 July 1984 Kidnap	Kidnap of Mr. Dikko, former Nigerian Minister, London	—
17 August 1984 Shooting	Murder of Mr. El Giahour, Bickenhall Street, London W1	One dead
12 November 1984 Incendiary device	Hindu temple, Heathfield Road, Birmingham	—
30 November 1984 Incendiary device	Asian mosque, 18a Church Lane, Tooting, London. Attempted arson	—
3 June 1985 Explosive device	Syrian Embassy, Mayfair, London	—
6 June 1985 Explosive device	Travel Office, 8 Canans Corner, Stanmore, Middlesex	—
15 June 1985 Explosive device	Dazzling New Peepshow, 33 Great Windmill Street, Soho, London	—
16 July 1985 Incendiary device	Anti-Apartheid Movement Offices	—
12 August 1985 Incendiary device	Warehouse at Eastleigh Airport, Hampshire	—
11 October 1985 Assassination attempt	Plot to kill Indian Prime Minister	—
23 September 1985— 7 November 1985 Explosive device	Suspected conspiracy, Central London	—
21 November 1985 Shooting	Sikh moderate, Luton (Lidder)	One injured
25 November 1985 Explosive device	Iranian Embassy, Letter bomb	One injured
29 November 1985 Shooting	Exiled Seychelles leader, Horeau	One dead
16 January 1986 Shooting	Sikh moderate, Middlesex (Sandhu)	One injured
23 January 1986 Shooting	Sikh moderate, Middlesex (Toor)	One dead
17 April 1986 Explosive device	El Al flight, Heathrow Airport	—
24 April 1986 Explosive device	British Airways Office, Oxford Street, London	—
19 August 1986 Explosive device	Kensington Video Company, Kensington High Street, London	One dead, 13 injured
10 October 1986 Shooting	Sikh moderate	—

Date and type of incident	Location	Casualties
18 July 1987 Explosive device	Car bomb, Kensington High Street, London Mr. Parviz	One injured
22 July 1987 Shooting	Assassination of Mr. Al-Ali, Chelsea, London	One dead
2 October 1987 Shooting	Mr. Tavokoli Nabai and son Nadir, Wembley, Middlesex	Two dead
11 November 1987 Shooting	Shooting in temple, Southall, Middlesex. Singh Das Darshan	Three dead, two injured
20 January 1988 Poisoning	Iraqi poisoned with Hallium	One dead
21 December 1988 Explosive device	PAN AM jumbo jet crashed on town of Lockerbie, Scotland	270 dead

¹ Believed to be "own goals".

Crime Statistics

Mr. Sumberg: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on the figures for reported crime in Bury for 1988.

Mr. John Patten: I understand from the chief constable of the Greater Manchester police force that some 12,500 crimes were recorded in Bury in 1988, 4 per cent. fewer than in 1987.

Metropolitan Police

Mr. Ian Taylor: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what progress he has made in securing greater value for money from the Metropolitan police.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: I would refer my hon. Friend to my reply to my hon. Friends the Members for Epping Forest (Mr. Norris), Fulham (Mr. Carrington) and for Dulwich (Mr. Bowden) on 2 February at column 386.

Prison Officers

Mr. Butler: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the average cost of training a prison officer.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: The cost of training a prison officer for the initial 11-week training period in 1987-88 was £3,549.

Mr. Butler: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department why the Cubbon formula was not implemented in the Wandsworth prison dispute.

Mr. Hogg: The principles and the spirit of the Cubbon formula were preserved before and during the dispute at Wandsworth prison.

Police Manpower

Mr. Butler: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will indicate the current level of police establishment in Cheshire; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Mrs. Winterton) on 21 February at column 540.

Crime Prevention

Mr. Thurnham: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement about current initiatives to reduce crime.

Mr. John Patten: Police manpower has increased substantially, and we shall add a further 1,100 officers in 1989-90. Under the safer cities programme, nine areas were agreed last year with seven more to be announced this year; two project teams are now in post and recruitment is well advanced in the other areas. The second phase of the Government's crime prevention publicity campaign was launched in November, and over two million copies of the new crime prevention handbook—"Practical Ways to Crack Crime"—have been distributed. At the local level, there are now 64,000 neighbourhood watch schemes in England and Wales and it is estimated that some three and a quarter million households are now covered by neighbourhood watch schemes.

Wakefield Prison

Mr. Hinchliffe: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make it his policy to provide integral sanitation in Wakefield prison.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: Wakefield prison will be examined during the next year to determine the best way of providing access to night sanitation, as will the other prisons without such access, to which my right hon. Friend referred in his reply to the hon. Member for Boothferry (Mr. Davis) on 20 February at columns 506-08.

Wandsworth Prison (Police Officers)

Mr. Dobson: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department who paid for the services of the Metropolitan police officers deployed in Wandsworth prison; and how much it cost.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: I understand from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis that although final figures are not yet available the cost of the Metropolitan police services provided at Wandsworth prison is expected to be about £975,000. The cost is being met by the Home Office prison department.

London Underground (Police Officers)

Mr. Dobson: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department who is paying for the Metropolitan police officers deployed on the London Underground; and how much are they costing.

Mr. Douglas Hogg: I understand from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis that at present manpower levels the annual cost of Metropolitan police officers attached to British Transport Police would be about £1.6 million. The cost will be met by London Underground Ltd.

Military and Police Training

Ms. Mahon: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if any training was given to police or military personnel from Turkey or Chile during 1988; and whether there are any plans to give training in 1989.

Mr. Douglas Hogg [holding answer 9 February 1989]: No police officers from Turkey or Chile visited the United Kingdom for training in 1988. Some 40 police officers from Turkey are at present attending English language training courses in this country, which will be followed by training programmes in various aspects of police work. I have no information on training for military personnel.

Mrs. Maltman

Mrs. Beckett: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he expects that Mrs. Maltman of 97 Carlton road, Derby, is likely to receive an answer either to the letter she wrote to him on 1 January 1988 or

to the letter sent on to his office by the private secretary to Her Majesty the Queen on 21 November 1988, concerning her disentanglement to United Kingdom citizenship.

Mr. Renton [holding answer 30 January 1989]: I believe the question relates to Mrs. Dorothy Maltman. Her application for British citizenship has been approved, as have the similar applications for her two sisters. I have written to the hon. Member to explain the position.

Prevention of Terrorism Act

Mr. Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many people have been held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act since 1 December 1988; what areas of the United Kingdom and other countries they were from; for what period they were held before being charged; and how many were subsequently charged.

Mr. Hurd [pursuant to his reply, 13 January 1989, c. 760]: The available information relates to persons detained in December 1988 and is given in the table.

Persons detained under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, by country of permanent residence and period of detention

Great Britain, December 1988

Period of detention	Country of permanent residence				Total
	England	Northern Ireland	Republic of Ireland	Lebanon	
Less than two hours	—	—	—	—	—
Two hours and less than four	—	—	—	—	—
Four hours and less than eight	3	—	—	—	3
Eight hours and less than 12	1	—	—	—	1
12 hours and less than 24	1	13	—	1	15
24 hours and less than 36	—	2	3	—	5
36 hours and less than 48	—	2	—	—	2
Total under 48 hours	5	17	3	1	16
Two days and less than three	1	—	—	—	1
Three days and less than four	—	—	—	—	—
Four days and then less than five	1	—	—	—	1
Five days and less than six	—	—	—	—	—
Six days and less than seven	2 ¹	—	—	—	2 ¹
Seven days	—	—	—	—	—
Total 48 hours or more	2 ³	—	—	—	2 ³
All periods	28	17	3	1	319

¹Two of these persons were charged with an offence.

²One of these persons was charged with an offence.

³Three of these persons were charged with an offence.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Mr. Patrick Haseldine

Mr. Foulkes: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on what date Mr. Patrick Haseldine was suspended on full pay; what further disciplinary action has been taken since that date; what further action he proposes; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Eggar: Mr. Haseldine was suspended on full pay on 7 December 1988. In accordance with diplomatic service regulations, the matter will shortly come before a disciplinary board.

Consular Fees

Mr. Conway: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he has any plans to increase any of the consular fees.

Mr. Eggar: Yes, an Order in Council (the Consular Fees Order 1989) was made on 7 February which provides for increases in certain consular fees with effect from Saturday 1 April 1989 and a rationalisation of the consular shipping fees, reducing them in number from 30 to 10. It has been the policy of this and previous Governments that the cost of consular services should as far as possible be borne by the users.

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE

In answer to a question Spokesman said he rejected any allegation that British policy towards the Vietnamese Boat People was hypocritical.

TERRY WAITE

In answer to questions, Spokesman said that today (20 January) was another sad anniversary. Terry Waite had now been missing for two years. As Sir Geoffrey Howe had said on 4 January:

"We express our deep concern for all the hostages and their families They have endured for far too long a personal anguish that we can barely imagine".

We continued to make every effort to work for their release. Our Ambassador and his staff in Beirut, in particular, pursued all information on the hostages and their whereabouts despite the severe constraints under which they worked. We continued to call on those holding Terry Waite, and all the other hostages of whatever nationality, to release them immediately and unconditionally.

In answer to further questions Spokesman said that the British Government had no hard information as to the whereabouts of the British hostages nor about the conditions in which they were being kept. Spokesman confirmed that the Iranians had raised both with us and with the Archbishop of Canterbury, the question of Iranian diplomats missing in Beirut. Enquiries had been made, which had not yielded any new information. Mr Waldegrave had raised the question of the hostages most recently when he met the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr Velayati, in Paris.

B66 1/10A

B66 15/1A

Explosives and machine guns in south London flat • Three-hour

Gunmen on run after

Thursday December 22 1988

Siege • Alert raised after teenager is shot by man in car

bomb factory find

David Pallister
reports on persistent
efforts to set up
bombing units

EVER since Patrick Magee blew up the Grand Hotel in Brighton, five years ago, the IRA has been trying to set up another active service unit on mainland Britain.

Apart from an uncharacteristically isolated bomb attack at the Inglis Barracks postal centre in Mill Hill, north London, in August, it has been singularly unsuccessful.

But the latest attempt in south London, which appears to have escaped the notice of the security and intelligence services, shows that the IRA's appetite and capabilities for striking at the capital remain undiminished.

The recruitment, training and logistics of active service units in Britain are still based on the principles set out in the early 1970s by the IRA's most important planner, Brian Keenan. Until his arrest in 1979, Keenan was deputy chief of staff and the director of operations. He put together the unit that caused more than a year of mayhem in London until arrested in 1975.

There were five "Keenan principles":

- If possible, the team was to come from Southern Ireland and include people with a low security profile.

- They would base themselves away from such traditional Irish areas as Kilburn and establish themselves unobtrusively in rented flats. Clapham has been a favourite choice. Contact with Republican sympathisers was forbidden, as was heavy drinking.

- The active service operators were sometimes to be preceded

by others, with no criminal record, to gather intelligence.

- Explosives and weapons were to be landed on remote coasts, though container traffic to Liverpool has also been used.

- Couriers, usually young women, were to ferry messages and cash from Ireland, but the unit, once established, was to choose its own targets, based on the broad strategy of the IRA Army Council.

In practice, however, the IRA has increasingly had to use some of its most experienced and — to the RUC, Special Branch and M15 — well-known volunteers. It has also relied on people a thoroughly disciplined organisation would avoid like the plague.

When Magee was arrested in 1985, he was about to launch an assault on English seaside towns. One of his lieutenants was Gerard McDonnell, a big, distinctive man on the run from the Maze prison. Another, Peter Sherry, was a renowned IRA sniper. A third man had a history of manic depression.

In Gibraltar and in West Germany this year, as the IRA decided to select soft European targets, other known people had to be deployed.

Early last year another serious attempt was foiled. Liam McCotter, a man with no criminal record, and Patrick McLaughlin, an internee from 1972, were watched as they set up a base in Manchester and collected arms and explosives from Anglesey, and arrested when they buried the cache near Macclesfield.

In the debate on the Prevention of Terrorism Act this month, the Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, said that earlier this year several people suspected of being members of an active service unit had been excluded under the Act. He said it was not possible to bring charges because no terrorist act had been committed.

B66/51.1A

IRA Semtex 'could last for years'

Richard Norton-Taylor

INTELLIGENCE sources believe the IRA has several tons of Semtex, now its most prized weapon. This is enough to make thousands of car bombs and, as one official has put it, sufficient "to keep the IRA going for years".

It was assumed in Whitehall yesterday that the Semtex discovered in a flat in south London had been smuggled to Britain from Ireland and was among large shipments known to have entered Ireland from Libya in 1985 and 1986.

However, there is speculation in intelligence circles that quantities of Semtex are also available to the IRA on the continent. Libya and the IRA, it is said, would have been more cautious after two tons of Semtex were discovered on the freighter, Eksund, which was seized by the French off Brest a year ago.

Semtex was discovered in a hired car parked in a garage in Marbella, southern Spain, two

days after three unarmed IRA terrorists were killed by the SAS in March in Gibraltar. There is no evidence that Libya has shipped further quantities to Ireland in the last year.

Czechoslovakia is believed to be the sole manufacturer of Semtex. The Foreign Office said yesterday that Czechoslovakia, believed to be the sole manufacturer of Semtex, had still not responded satisfactorily to its requests in August and last month to control exports of the explosive, first reported in the Guardian.

Prague has suggested it cannot interfere because Semtex is produced commercially.

Semtex has no smell; it is light, easy to transport, can be moulded like Plasticine, and its power is far out of proportion to its weight. Two pounds of Semtex can cause as much damage as two hundredweight of conventional explosive.

The Foreign Office has asked Czechoslovakia to mark Semtex with "fingerprints" such as a tracer or odour, so that it could be detected.

'Stroke of luck' led police to IRA cache

Owen Bowcott

TWO gunmen believed to be preparing an IRA bombing campaign were on the run last night after one of them shot a teenager trying to break into his car in Clapham, south London.

A bomb factory was discovered nearby when armed police broke in to a flat after a three-hour siege. They found about 150lb of the Czech-made explosive Semtex, machine guns, rifles, handguns and documents.

Last night, anti-terrorist squad officers also searched a house in Elm Park Road, Leyton, east London.

The flat was described last night by the anti-terrorist squad as a "major IRA bomb factory" which had been uncovered thanks to "a considerable stroke of luck".

The two men, suspected of being part of an IRA active service unit, had already escaped. Their red 2.3 Rover saloon was found abandoned near Rayners Lane Tube station in Harrow at lunchtime yesterday.

Police warned the public not to approach the men — described as dangerous and probably armed — and appealed for information. They warned people to beware of suspicious packages. Police forces throughout the country were alerted, as were customs, sea and airport authorities. A photograph, found in the flat and believed to be of one of the men, was issued by Scotland Yard.

Although the bomb factory

was "disrupted", police said there was a small possibility that some devices could have been planted already.

A bizarre sequence of events appears to have led to the bomb factory's discovery. Government premises in London yesterday morning were only on "black alert" — the lowest security level.

The chain of events began at about 12.30am yesterday when a teenager, described by police as an opportunist thief, broke a side window of a green Renault estate parked just off Northcote Road, Clapham.

But, according to police, one of the two IRA men was asleep on the back seat. He woke up, opened the car door and shot the 18-year-old in the stomach as he was backing away.

Neighbours who saw the shooting called the police and ambulance service. The teenager was said to be in a stable condition yesterday at St George's Hospital, Tooting. The man in the car ran into a ground-floor flat in Staplehurst Court.

Police who arrived on the scene delayed entering the building until armed officers arrived. They evacuated residents and cordoned off the area. Sometime after 4am they broke in to find it empty, apart from the arms cache.

The two men fled in such a hurry, according to police, that one of them, using the names "I.P. Flynn" or "Jim Errington", left his glasses behind.

A revolver was recovered from the car, but police believe it was not the one used to shoot the youth.

The man in the Renault may have been on guard outside the flat to provide cover for surveillance.

The men are believed to have been in the flat for up to a week. One neighbour, Ms Elizabeth Marlow, said yesterday: "I didn't think there was anybody there."

The Metropolitan Assistant Commissioner, Mr Hugh Annesley, appealed to the public for information if anybody suspicious sought accommodation. He issued two telephone numbers for the anti-terrorist unit's emergency operations room: 01-230-3347 or 230-3421.

He said it would be wrong to assume the IRA had been planning a pre-Christmas bombing campaign in London, but added: "It is fairly obvious that those who were in the flat were in the process of making bombs."

He said the threat of terrorist activity in London had been high for some time.

Of the teenage thief, he said: "I would not wish him to face any charges in the circumstances."

Police did not issue a description of the second man they wished to interview but said they believed one would emerge during their inquiry.

About 20 officers, including armed police in blue berets, broke through the back door of the two-storey terraced house in Leyton, after breaking down a neighbour's fence. They found a 10-year-old boy who was joined later by his mother.

Detectives from the anti-terrorist squad searched the house, and forensic scientists took fingerprints from the upper floor.

It is five years since the IRA launched a "successful" Christmas bombing campaign. On December 17, 1983, six people were killed and more than 90 injured when a bomb exploded outside Harrods in Knightsbridge.

CONFIDENTIAL

B66/S/1A

Message : I05336.RCV

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL

B69/146

Page 1

08 DEC 88

FROM: WELLINGTON

C/C: 957

TO: SUVA 03393 - ROUTINE :

RPTD: CANBERRA 03804 - ROUTINE : WASHINGTON
LONDON 06394 - ROUTINE : OTTAWA

03604 - ROUTINE
02647 - ROUTINE

30721

FA (P)

CLIPS

LD :SERT (SPA DLO DIS SEC LAL EAB ECO)
:P/S MFA
:POLICE (PTIU)
:NZSIS (TIC) DEFENCE (DOT DDI)
:DESC PMO (DIRECTOR)

SUBJ:FIJI HIJACKER SENTENCE

YOUR 3761 AND WASHINGTON'S 2942.

THE LINE TAKEN BY PIA (AS REPORTED BY WASHINGTON) VERY MUCH MATCHES OUR THINKING ON THE MATTER. IN OUR VIEW THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT IN LINE WITH ITS COMMITMENT TO RECOMMENDATIONS OF WOGTAH THE GOVERNMENT RECOMMENDED A STIFF SENTENCE. THE FACT THAT THE JUDICIARY ACTED OTHERWISE IS REGRETTABLE BUT WE WOULD NOT WANT OUR POSITION OF SUPPORT FOR AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY TO BE IN ANY WAY COMPROMISED BY THE ISSUING OF A PROTEST OR WORSE STILL BACKING CALLS FOR AN APPEAL. SHOULD YOU CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE, WE WOULD ACCORDINGLY LIKE YOU TO TAKE SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT GENTLY ABOUT THE LIGHTNESS OF THE SENTENCE., BUT TO NOTE AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE RECOGNISE IT WAS A DECISION OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AND THAT THE FIJI GOVERNMENT RECOMMENDED A STIFF SENTENCE.

R117012
080322Z WLN EBR
TORL 08/12/88 02:23:13
WLN 6429
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

B66/5-1/1A.

FO official calls Thatcher stance 'self-righteous'

A FOREIGN Office official has accused Mrs Thatcher of "self-righteous invective" by criticising the Belgian and Irish handling of Britain's request for the extradition of Father Patrick Ryan, writes Richard Norton-Taylor.

In a letter in today's Guardian, Mr Patrick Haseldine, of the FO information department, refers to a 1984 decision to allow four South Africans charged with arms embargo offences to leave the country after a South African embassy official agreed

to waive diplomatic immunity and stand surety for them. The embassy gave assurances they would return to Coventry magistrates court for their next hearing. They did not do so.

Letters, page 22

Letters to the Editor

The double standards on terrorism

IT IS all very well for Mrs Thatcher to inveigh against the Belgians and the Irish with such self-righteous invective. Naturally, she would not care to admit it but in the not too distant past her allegations of being soft on terrorism and allowing political considerations to override the due legal process could have been levelled at Mrs Thatcher herself.

Remember the Coventry Four? These were the four (white) South Africans brought before Coventry magistrates in March 1984 and remanded in custody on arms embargo

charges. Rumour has it that Mrs Thatcher was rather annoyed with the over-zealous officials who caused the four military personnel to be arrested in Britain. Rightly, she refused to accede to the South African embassy's demand for the case to be dropped but she was keen for the Embassy to know precisely how the legal hurdles governing their release and the return of their passports could be swiftly overcome. Thus the First Secretary at the Embassy stood bail for the Coventry Four, having declared in Court that he was waiving his diplo-

matic immunity. (The Embassy did not, however, formally confirm the waiver.) Then a petition to an English Judge in Chambers secured the repatriation of the four accused.

Clearly, Mrs Thatcher wanted the four high-profile detainees safely out of UK jurisdiction, back in South Africa and off the agenda well before her June 1984 talks at Chequers with the two visiting Bothas. Strange that Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, was able to find an excuse for not allowing the Coventry Four to stand trial in the Autumn of 1984.

Stranger still that Mrs Thatcher failed to denounce Mr Botha's refusal to surrender the four "terrorists" (cf declaration by US Governor Dukakis that South Africa is a "terrorist state").

P. J. Haseldine.

Information Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth
Office,
London SW 1.

UNCLASS SECURE

Message : 105330.RCV

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED SECURE

7 DEC 88

30726

FA(P)

clips

FROM: WASHINGTON

C/C: 957

TO: WELLINGTON 02994 - ROUTINE :

RPTD: SUVA	00102 - ROUTINE	:	LONDON	00257 - ROUTINE
CANBERRA	00459 - ROUTINE	:	WELLINGTON B	00249 - ROUTINE
OTTAWA	00341 - ROUTINE	:	NEW DELHI	00019 - ROUTINE

LD : SFA (DLO SPA DIS AMER SEC LGL EAB ECO)
: P/S MFA PMO (DIRECTOR)
: NZSIS (TIC)
: DEFENCE (DOT DDI)
: DESC

SUBJ: FIJI: HIJACKER SENTENCE

OUR 2942.

STATE (PIA) INFORMED US TODAY THAT THE TERRORISM OFFICE +WON OUT+ ON MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO FIJI ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE HIJACKING CASE. CONSEQUENTLY THE TALKING POINTS SET OUT BELOW HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR THE US EMBASSY, SUVA, TO MAKE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME IN A LOW-KEY WAY. IT IS UP TO THE EMBASSY'S DISCRETION HOW AND WHEN TO CONVEY WASHINGTON'S CONCERNS.

2 TALKING POINTS ARE:

- THE UNITED STATES CONDEMNS HIJACKING, REGARDLESS OF POLITICAL PROVOCATION OR MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES., THE SERIOUS THREAT TO FLIGHT SAFETY AND THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE AND HOSTAGE SITUATIONS MAKES THIS CRIME PARTICULARLY REPREHENSIBLE.
- THE US GOVERNMENT IS AWARE THAT CONVICTED HIJACKER AMJAD ALI RECEIVED A TWO YEAR SENTENCE THAT WAS SUSPENDED FOR THREE YEARS FOR HIS ROLE IN THE MAY 1987 HIJACKING OF AN AIR NEW ZEALAND AIRLINER. ALTHOUGH WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE CONVICTION, WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A STIFFER SENTENCE AS A DETERRENT TO FUTURE HIJACKERS.
- ON A RELATED MATTER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF FIJI CURRENTLY DOES NOT HAVE LEGISLATION SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING HIJACKINGS AND THAT ALI WAS TRIED UNDER AN ANTI-SABOTAGE LAW.
- THE LACK OF SUCH A STATUTE POINTS OUT THE NEED FOR DRAFTING ANTI-HIJACKING LEGISLATION THAT WOULD IMPOSE STIFF SENTENCES AS A DETERRENT TO SIMILAR INCIDENTS THAT MAY OCCUR IN THE FUTURE.
- TO THIS END, WE ENCOURAGE FIJI TO ADOPT LEGISLATION ON HIJACKING OR TO AMEND CURRENT STATUTES TO ADDRESS SUCH ACTS, CONSISTENT WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HAGUE AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS.

4 WE ALSO UNDERSTAND US EMBASSY WELLINGTON HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CHECK WHETHER YOU PLAN TO MAKE ANY DEMARCHES ON THIS ISSUE.

UNCLASS SECURE

THE SUNDAY TIMES 4 DECEMBER 1988

THE FUGITIVE

How three governments bungled attempts to bring this man to trial

● The Belgians were keen to wash their hands of him in case the IRA should take revenge; the Irish were anxious to ensure that justice was being seen to be done, and to avoid provoking political problems at home; the British bureaucracy, once again, made some elementary blunders when writing out an extradition order. So an unlikely agreement between the Belgian and Irish governments saw Patrick Ryan, the IRA suspect, flown secretly to Dublin rather than London. INSIGHT reports on how the legal loopholes were fully exploited

R661511A

THE fugitive in the back of the black Mercedes had no clear idea where he was being taken as the car sped out of Saint-Gilles high security jail on the outskirts of Brussels.

He had been told just 20 minutes earlier that he was leaving the cell where he had spent the past five months. En route to a military airbase outside Brussels, Patrick Ryan, a Roman Catholic priest allegedly turned IRA bomb maker and fund raiser, worried about his likely destination: Ireland, and the prospect of further legal wrangling, or London, to face trial at the Old Bailey on alleged terrorism charges.

But others knew precisely where he was headed. Even as Ryan's car left the prison, Scotland Yard was alerted by a private source that its bid to extradite from Belgium the man accused of masterminding a device used in more than 180 IRA bombs had failed. Ryan was being secretly taken to Dublin.

Detectives, together with officials from the attorney-general's office and Crown Prosecution Service tore through the London rush hour to Bow Street magistrates' court to have new extradition warrants sworn.

At Scotland Yard and the attorney-general's office, facsimile machines then wired the necessary documents to both the Garda and the Irish attorney-general's office. The paperwork was in Dublin before Ryan's plane had left Belgian soil.

Still, Scotland Yard took no chances. Two detectives were dispatched to Heathrow to courier the original documents to Dublin, and another placed a call to Garda HQ.

It should have been a routine procedure; the Garda were being asked to arrest Ryan as soon as his plane landed, and hold him until the Irish attorney-general had considered the evidence against him.

But the reception the detective received did not augur well for the operation, and the events that both preceded and followed Ryan's arrival in Ireland were destined to ignite an explosive confrontation between three nations supposedly allied in the battle against terrorism.

WHEN the call from London came through in the Garda's Dublin control room, the most senior officer available was a duty inspector. A call from the British attorney-general's office had even less success. The Irish attorney-general's phone just rang and rang.

When Ryan, who had been on hunger strike for 22 days, landed, he walked unscathed from Dublin airport and checked into a private clinic in Blackrock, on the outskirts of Dublin. Two days later he left again, apparently a free man. Last week Irish government sources admitted they did not know his precise whereabouts but were "confident" they could find him if — or when — they have to.

The Belgian refusal to extradite Ryan, and the subsequent events in Ireland, produced a fierce parliamentary response from Margaret Thatcher. In the week she was due to travel to Rhodes for a European Community summit, she fired an angry broadside at both the Bel-

gian and Irish governments. She saw the Belgian decision not to extradite him as a betrayal of a united European front against terrorism, and the Irish inaction as a dereliction of its duty under the Anglo-Irish agreement.

The British government was "utterly dismayed" at the Belgian decision, she said, and the Irish government "makes fine sounding speeches and statements which they do not always seem to back up by appropriate deeds."

"It is no use governments adopting great declarations and commitments about fighting terrorism, if they then lack the resolve to put them into practice," she said.

The Irish promptly dubbed her outburst "megaphone diplomacy", and in the republic there was widespread condemnation of her perceived interference in internal affairs.

Sources at the Dail, the Irish parliament, then leaked a string of alleged British "blunders" in the extradition process to help justify their inaction.

The Belgians, who were clearly seen to have been anxious to wash their hands of Ryan, were equally furious; they had maintained throughout that the reasons for refusing the extradition request were legal and also highlighted apparent inadequacies in the British case against Ryan. As the week progressed the row showed no signs of abating. It headed, instead, for yet another summit row.

AT THE EC summit in Rhodes last Friday, Thatcher met Wilfried Martens, the Belgian prime minister, for the first confrontation. During a private meeting, Thatcher told Martens she found his government's action "impossible to understand".

Thatcher, a qualified tax barrister, asked how a Belgian cabinet which was not legally qualified could take a decision on legal grounds.

Martens replied that three-quarters of his cabinet were lawyers. "Madam, I

wish you to know I have a doctorate in law; do you?"

Earlier, Charles Haughey, the Irish prime minister, eager to avoid the appearance that he had been summoned to a dressing-down, "snubbed" Thatcher by postponing a meeting they had scheduled together.

By the time they finally met yesterday, Thatcher had softened her tone, referring sympathetically to Haughey's ill health. But even so harsh words were inevitable.

TO THE British, the case against Ryan had been clear-cut. His identity had been known to the British security forces for more than 12 years as a suspected fund raiser and arms supplier to the IRA. He was believed to have banked hundreds of thousands of pounds for the organisation in a variety of European countries. He had visited Libya, and he had in the past been found in possession of a large number of timer devices of a type used in IRA bombs.

Before moving to Belgium shortly before his arrest, after Britain and Spain agreed a new extradition treaty, he had lived for about 10 years in Benidorm where he had been under frequent surveillance.

After the launching of an IRA terror campaign against British servicemen on the continent earlier this year, and Ryan's move to Brussels, Belgian police raided his flat on June 30.

There they found a number of small devices of a type used by the IRA to make bombs inactive until ready to be primed. Ryan, who prides himself on his engineering know-how, is believed to have

invented the technique.

Wooden rods used in the same process were also found, together with a radio receiver similar to those used in a number of remote control bombings.

More tellingly, it is alleged, instructions were discovered in Ryan's handwriting on how to use the equipment for bomb making, and documents were found indicating that he had been purchasing bomb making equipment.

After a two-month examination of the haul from his flat and frequent consultations with the Belgian authorities, British police decided that the new evidence, together with details about his earlier activities, constituted strong grounds for prosecution.

The British authorities, who took advice from the Belgians throughout, then drew up four charges: accusing Ryan of conspiring with persons unknown to murder other persons, conspiring to cause explosions, possessing explosive substances with intent to endanger life, or enabling other persons to do so, and having explosive substances for an unlawful purpose.

Nobody was more surprised than Scotland Yard's detectives when last Friday, five minutes after Ryan's plane had taken off from Brussels, Martens issued a communiqué claiming that the British had failed to satisfy the court that Ryan was a member of a criminal organisation.

"THIS allegation would have been the only one on which Belgium could have allowed an extradition to the United Kingdom," said the Belgian prime minister.

The statement indicated that the two charges of possession which Ryan faced had been rejected by the Belgians, and they had also found that the two conspiracy charges against Ryan did not correspond with the Belgian offence of *association de malfaiteurs*, which requires evidence of an "organisation".

It is clear the Belgian authorities feared that a hunger strike mounted by Ryan might create a martyr to be avenged by the IRA, unless they disposed of him quickly.

In the end, the Belgians decided to pass the buck and persuaded the Irish to co-operate with their plans to expel Ryan back to his country of origin.

The Irish had little option but to agree: Ryan, as an Irish citizen, had the right to enter the country at any time. But why was he not arrested on his arrival?

One of Ryan's defence lawyers in Belgium had called Dublin to confirm

that Ryan would not be arrested if he was returned to Ireland.

Ryan had apparently threatened that he would have to be forced off the aircraft if there were any police or military presence. The resulting publicity would have been a serious embarrassment for Charles Haughey, whose Fianna Fail party forms a minority government in the Dail. Feeling is particularly strong in Ryan's home county of Tipperary, in which three of Haughey's ministers have their constituencies.

The agreement even included provision for the plain-clothes Belgian army personnel accompanying Ryan to search an ambulance which drove on to the tarmac to meet the plane in Dublin.

THE Belgian government already had its excuses prepared. It was initially adamant that the decision had been legal rather than political. The government claimed the warrants contained serious flaws. The documents, for instance, said that each offence was committed within the "jurisdiction of the central criminal court for England and Wales". This, the Belgians argued, was a nonsense as Ryan was not in Britain at the time.

Britain's Crown Prosecution Service countered that the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1975, signed by both Britain and Belgium, and ratified in Britain by the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978, allowed that an act committed in one signatory country could be held to fall within the jurisdiction of another.

The evidence against Ryan, the British maintain, is strong enough to stand a good chance of obtaining convictions at the Old Bailey.

Yesterday, Martens was forced to concede that his cabinet had indeed rejected the recommendation of the Belgian courts to agree to Britain's request.

Thatcher, it seemed, had grounds for launching her attack on the Belgian prime minister; but did she have grounds for lashing out at Dublin too?

AT lunchtime yesterday, Charles Haughey met Margaret Thatcher and outlined the reasons why the Garda had refused to arrest Ryan when he landed in Dublin.

They had already been well rehearsed in Dublin earlier in the week. When the extradition papers were wired to Dublin and then delivered personally early on Saturday morning by Scotland Yard's detectives,

a date had been missed off the accompanying certificates.

A statement of law which accompanied the documents was so badly put together that parts of it were unintelligible.

Such oversights are astonishing in the wake of the débâcle over IRA terrorist Evelyn Glenholmes, who was released from a Dublin court in March 1986 because of faulty extradition warrants.

But however clumsy the British bureaucracy might have been in drawing up the papers, the CPO last week maintained the missing date was an irrelevance, and had been corrected by late Saturday. They added that they had only heard that some papers were unintelligible from press reports. Why had the Irish not simply called back for clarification and then picked up Ryan?

The answer appears to lie in a loophole in Ireland's

1987 Extradition Act which the Ryan case has exposed. Quite simply, the legal mechanism does not exist in Ireland for holding a person in custody for any period longer than three days while Britain applies for extradition.

UNDER the old 1965 Extradition Act, when extradition was applied for, a Garda commissioner simply had to satisfy himself that a valid warrant had been issued and extradition would follow.

There was a problem in that terrorists could claim the offence with which they had been charged was political, but in recent years Irish judges acted to close that loophole.

The new legislation, however, rules that in the case of extradition to the United Kingdom alone, the Irish attorney-general can choose to examine the evidence to determine if it is valid. Dublin maintains the attorney-general needs time to consider such cases, but the problem lies in the lack of an effective mechanism for holding suspects in prison.

Under Irish law a provisional arrest warrant can only be granted for three days, and no precedent exists for renewing such a warrant in Ireland while the extradition case is being reviewed.

Dublin clearly believed that the issue of a provisional warrant in Ryan's case would have been a waste of time: he would have been free before the attorney-general had decided on extradition.

THATCHER clearly believes this loophole will enable terrorist suspects on Irish soil to have time to escape before the question of extradition can be reviewed by the attorney-general in Dublin.

When she finally met Charles Haughey in Rhodes yesterday, the 60-minute meeting exposed the gulf between the two leaders.

Haughey accused Thatcher of prejudicing the extradition of Ryan by launching her attack on the handling of the affair by the Belgium and Irish governments. Indeed he hinted that her "outburst" could tip the balance against Ryan being eventually extradited.

In turn, Thatcher demanded that the extradition procedures be tightened up by the Irish government to prevent a repeat of the Ryan case.

She reminded Haughey of his pledge last year that the new extradition law would be reviewed if the procedures were not working properly. She wants greater use of provisional warrants so that suspected terrorists will be detained while the first stage of the extradition process is completed.

At the end of an acrimonious week, Thatcher was unrepentant. She told a press conference in Rhodes yesterday that she had expressed "the utter dismay, not merely of the British government but of the British people, at being so badly let down".



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VERBATIM SERVICE VS100/88

THURSDAY 1 DECEMBER 1988

PRODUCED BY LONDON PRESS SERVICE, CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

EXTRADITION OF PATRICK RYAN

Private notice Question in the House of Commons on Thursday 1 December 1988

Mr John Morris: To ask the Attorney-General if he will make a statement on the action taken by her Majesty's Government to seek the extradition of Patrick Ryan to the United Kingdom.

The Attorney General: (Sir Patrick Mayhew): The Government have sought the extradition of Patrick Ryan from Belgium, and the Metropolitan police sought it latterly from the Republic of Ireland.

In the Belgian proceedings, which followed Patrick Ryan's arrest in Belgium on 30 June 1988, extradition was sought in respect of the following offences:

- (1) conspiracy to murder.,
- (2) conspiracy to cause explosions.,
- (3) possession of explosives with intent to endanger life or cause serious injury to property.,
- (4) possession of explosive substances without a lawful object.

Our own prosecuting authorities consulted the Belgian prosecuting authority before initiating the extradition proceedings and were given no reason by the Belgian authority to suppose that the request might fail to satisfy Belgian legal requirements. The extradition of Patrick Ryan was authorised by the Belgian court of first instance on 26 September, subject to the approval of the Minister of Justice, and by the Belgian Court of Appeal of Brussels on 12 October in respect of the two conspiracy charges.

As I understand it, Patrick Ryan's case then fell to be considered by the Belgian Minister of Justice. On 25 November - Friday - the Belgian Government refused to order extradition and ordered Patrick Ryan's repatriation to the Irish Republic. On learning on Friday afternoon of the Belgian decision and that Patrick Ryan was expected to arrive in Dublin that evening, an immediate application was made by the Crown Prosecution Service at Bow Street magistrates' court for fresh warrants for Patrick Ryan's arrest, as was necessary to comply with Irish requirements. Warrants were issued in the late afternoon and facsimiles at once transmitted to the Irish authorities in Dublin at 6.20pm. Facsimiles of the documentation, which the Irish Attorney-General requires under the provisions of the Irish Extradition (Amdt) Act 1987, were transmitted to his Department

between 4.30 pm and 6.30 pm that evening.

That documentation contained a full statement of the facts upon which the allegations were founded, a statement setting out the relevant English law, and a certificate by me that it is the Crown Prosecution Service's clear intention to bring a prosecution and that that prosecuting authority has satisfied itself that there is sufficient admissible evidence to found a prosecution.

The documentation with which I provided the Irish Attorney-General last Friday fulfilled the requirements of the legislation.

On Friday the Metropolitan police had requested the Gardai to obtain provisional warrants for the arrest of Patrick Ryan pending the arrival in Dublin of the warrants just issued at Bow Street, which in the event were delivered to the Irish authorities in Dublin in the early hours of Saturday. No provisional warrants, however, were sought.

My Department was in touch with its counterpart in Dublin late on Friday night with a view to enabling me to speak to the Irish Attorney-General, Mr Murray. That was because we had learnt that the Metropolitan Police had been told by the Gardai that no action was to be taken on any warrant until the two Attornies-General had spoken. In the event, I spoke to Mr Murray for the first time when he telephoned me at 10.30 am on Monday. He informed me that he was still considering the documentation. I drew attention to the risk that Ryan might discharge himself from the clinic where he was undergoing treatment, and asked him to make an early decision.

Mr Murray acknowledged that risk. I told him that if there were any problem with the documentation or any other question I would be immediately available. No question about the adequacy of any of the documentation sent to him for the purposes of the 1987 Act has been raised with me. I understand that Mr Murray is still considering the application.

Before the effective warrants were obtained on Friday, warrants in draft form were submitted to the Irish Attorney-General's office on Wednesday 23 November. That followed a helpful practice, for which I am grateful and which has been developed between the two Departments, the law and practice in relation to warrants being different in the Republic of Ireland from that in England. Those documents were sent on a contingency basis lest the Belgians should decide to repatriate Patrick Ryan. The draft warrants did not constitute the sending of a request for extradition: the very purpose of sending drafts to the Irish is to allow them to comment on the form of the warrant. I mention that because of certain misleading publicity.

Irish officials, apart from drawing attention to two minor details and to certain purely presentational matters, expressed themselves content with the form of the proposed warrants. The Bow Street warrants took account of those comments on Friday. On Saturday 26 November, the Irish authorities alerted us to the omission by the Bow Street chief clerk of a date in the certificates accompanying the warrants. That omission, which we were advised was not a serious matter, was immediately rectified the same day.

We believe that this matter affected neither the Gardai's statutory power to seek provisional warrants from Friday evening nor

the statutory power to back the effective warrants on their arrival in Dublin early on Saturday morning.

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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM: WASHINGTON

C/C: 957

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 :P/S MFA : PMO (DIRECTOR)
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SUBJ:FIJI: HIJACKER SENTENCE

SUVA'S 3761 TO YOU.
 WE TOUCHED BASE WITH STATE (KAMBARA, FIJI DESK OFFICER, PIA) ON

THIS SUBJECT ON 29 NOVEMBER. SHE CONFIRMED THAT THE COUNTER
 TERRORISM OFFICE WAS KEEN TO PROTEST, BUT INDICATED THAT PIA
 WAS
 MORE CAUTIOUS. TO PIA THE HIJACKING SENTENCE RAISED MANY
 ISSUES
 - INCLUDING THE FAIR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POST-COUP AMNESTY.,
 RACE RELATIONS IN FIJI, AND MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, THE
 INDEPENDENCE
 OF THE JUDICIARY. PIA HAS POINTED OUT THAT THE FIJI GOVERNMENT
 HAD RECOMMENDED A STIFF SENTENCE WHICH INDICATED THE
 AUTHORITIES
 WERE TAKING A TOUGH LINE ON TERRORISM AND THEY ALSO APPEARED TO
 BE COGNISANT OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS.
 PIA
 HAD ALSO NOTED FIJI SENSITIVITIES TO CRITICISM AND THE
 POSSIBILITY THAT A US DEMARCHE WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE
 INTERFERENCE. MOREOVER PIA HAVE RECOGNISED THAT AN APPROACH
 COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IF IT LED TO FETTERS BEING PLACED ON
 THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY
 HAD
 POINTED OUT TO THE COUNTER-TERRORISM OFFICE THAT THE US
 ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE A SIMILAR
 JUDICIAL
 DECISION HERE.
 2 KAMBARA'S EXPECTATION OF THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS
 IN
 STATE ABOUT THIS MATTER WAS THAT A 'LOW KEY, FOCUSSED
 COMMENT'
 WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. IT WOULD RECOGNISE THE INDEPENDENCE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JUDICIARY BUT CALL ON THE FIJI GOVERNMENT TO LOOK AT LEGAL PROVISIONS COVERING HIJACKING WITH A VIEW TO STIFFENING EXISTING LEGISLATION OR DEVELOPING MORE SPECIFIC LEGISLATION ON HIJACKINGS. WE WILL REPORT STATE'S EVENTUAL ACTION (IF ANY) IN DUE COURSE.

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ANTI-TERRORISM RULING AND THE RYAN AFFAIR

Government feels grip of a new shackle in battle against IRA

By Charles Hodgson in London and David Buchan in Strasbourg

THE RULING by the European Court of Human Rights that Britain's anti-terrorism laws are in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights coming amid the row over the failed extradition of a leading Irish terrorist suspect has left the Government feeling embittered and friendless in its battle against the IRA.

The court ruling confronts the Government with an uncomfortable dilemma. It will have to decide either to water down its new Prevention of Terrorism Bill, introduced only days ago to renew the existing core powers of detention and arrest without trial, or seek a rare derogation from the ruling on the grounds that the powers are justified by the threat posed by terrorism to national security.

Coming on top of the row over the failure of the Belgian authorities to extradite Father Patrick Ryan, the Irish priest wanted in Britain on conspiracy charges, his speedy repatriation to Dublin, and the subsequent failure of the Irish authorities to arrest him, the ruling left the Government feeling suspicious of its European partners' commitment to fight terrorism.

The Strasbourg-based European Court ruled that Britain was in breach of the convention for not bringing terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland before a judge "promptly" after their detention.

The case arises out of a complaint by four men who in 1984 were detained in Northern Ireland without charge or judicial review for periods varying

from more than four days to nearly seven days.

The court judged the UK to have failed to comply with Article 5 of the convention under which those arrested "shall be brought promptly" before a judge or legal officer. The UK was also wrong to deny those detained "in contravention of the convention" an enforceable right to compensation under Northern Ireland law.

However, the main court ruling - by a 12-7 majority of the court's judges - made no judgment about the possible overall duration of detention for terrorist suspects. In recognising the special problem terrorism presented in Ulster, the court said "the context of terrorism in Northern Ireland was therefore held to have the effect of prolonging the permissible period of police custody prior to appearance before a judge".

The UK's offence had been simply to prolong that period a bit too far, the court suggested.

Ministers were last night insisting that they would have to study the 40-page court ruling in detail before taking any decisions. But Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, was adamant in the Commons that the police would be given adequate powers to fight terrorism effectively.

Mrs Thatcher also stressed that the Government had to take account of the human rights of the victims and potential victims of terrorism in framing its legislation.

Some comfort was being taken in Whitehall from the court's acceptance that the

powers of the Prevention of Terrorism Act to detain suspected terrorists were justified. What is at issue is the length of detention without access to "judicial authorities". At present the police can hold a suspect for 48 hours before having to seek authorisation for further periods of detention from the Home Secretary or Northern Ireland Secretary up to a total maximum of seven days.

The Northern Ireland Office stressed that more than 80 per cent of those detained under the act had been charged or released within a five-day period and more than 50 per cent of those detained for six days or longer were subsequently charged with serious offences, including murder and attempted murder.

While the Government is not ruling out seeking a derogation, it may decide either to reduce the overall period of detention to the European average of 72 hours, or make provision for a court hearing during the first 72 hours, at which it would seek a further period of detention. It is likely to announce its initial response to the court ruling by mid-December when the new Prevention of Terrorism Bill comes before the Commons.

European Court officials said they expected Britain to comply with the judgment, as it had done with the 21 previous human rights rulings that had gone against it.

They discounted the possibility that the Government might successfully seek a derogation for Northern Ireland from provisions of the European

Human Rights Convention. Until 1984 Britain had such a derogation for Ulster in the context of special legislation then applying to the province.

The officials pointed out that the current Prevention of Terrorism Act applied to the whole of the UK, which could not be argued to be in a state of "war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation". This is the phrase in Article 15 of the convention under which derogations can be justified.

They noted that while periods of detention without judicial review in Northern Ireland may have outstripped those prevalent in the rest of Europe - where a maximum of 72 hours was the legal norm - this was not so in Spain, where a suspected terrorist could be detained without judicial review for 72 hours, plus a possible further extension of seven days by the executive, although a Spanish judge had to be notified of such an extension and could order release of the detainee.

While officials stressed that Britain would respect its obligations under the human rights convention, there will be pressure from Conservative MPs, Ulster Unionist politicians and the police in Northern Ireland to retain the seven-day detention period.

Mr Alan Wright, chairman of the Police Federation for Northern Ireland, which represents more than 10,000 Royal Ulster Constabulary officers, said it was essential that the seven-day period for detention of suspects was retained.

Conspiring to cloud the issues

A.H.Hermann analyses differing views on the law of conspiracy

ANY ATTEMPT to make a legal analysis of the UK request to extradite Father Patrick Ryan and of actual refusal of the Belgian authorities and the imminent refusal of the Irish Republic to comply with this request, is tainted by an air of unreality: Belgium's fear of reprisals by the IRA and the political climate of Dublin, together with similar fears, seem to deprive legal arguments of all significance.

Nevertheless legal arguments of sorts are likely to be crossing the English and Irish Channels in abundance. Trying to analyse them brings us up against a second cloud of unreality: the authorities asking for, or denying, the extradition are extremely vague in their claims making it difficult to know what their arguments really are.

The British request for extradition to Belgium, appears to have been based on a charge of conspiracy to commit murder between 1975 and 1988. Nothing more is known about the evidence which the Director of Public Prosecutions intends to present to the trial court. The quality of such evidence is an important consideration for the judicial and administrative authorities deciding on extradition in the country which holds the fugitive.

The other three charges specified in the request for extradition concern the possession of explosives and of 52 integrated circuits suitable for detonating explosives. The nature of these charges would make one assume that British authorities can offer some sub-



Father Patrick Ryan: alleged to have had bomb manual

stantial evidence, and indeed, according to reports Fr Ryan was arrested in 1976 by the Swiss authorities after he was found to be in possession of bomb-timing devices. Since this was not a crime under Swiss law, he was released 10 days later.

According to reports from British official sources, Fr Ryan has been collecting and laundering money for the IRA and buying arms and explosives. It is also alleged that when arrested in Belgium, he had numerous workshop manuals for making and handling bombs.

The common law offence of conspiracy has been substantially amended by the Criminal Law Act 1977. This defines the offence as an agreement with

one or more persons to do something which, if completed as intended, would be a criminal offence. Most extradition agreements and certainly the two with Belgium and the Republic of Ireland provide for extradition only if the suspected act would be a criminal offence in both the requesting country and the country holding the fugitive.

The republic's criminal law includes an offence of conspiracy parallel to the British; indeed, Mr Charles Haughey, the Irish Prime Minister, was acquitted in 1970 of conspiring to import illegally arms destined for the IRA.

The Belgian criminal code, by contrast, does not include an offence denominated "conspiracy", though it has another

similar one known as "associating with criminals". It can also be assumed that an agreement to commit an offence in co-operation with someone else, particularly when some practical steps were taken towards the criminal objective, could lead in Belgium to prosecution for a criminal attempt.

The offence of conspiracy is a widely used device to prevent the intended crime taking place. It is used in connection with fraud, and still survives as the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud.

It has, however, always attracted the greatest attention when used against politically motivated conspirators. Here, agreement can often be proved only indirectly, by parallel actions of the conspirators which could not be explained without a prior agreement.

The offence of political conspiracy got a particularly bad name in Communist countries where convictions were obtained on the flimsiest of grounds: in the early 1950s to buy a railway ticket for a relative who returned to a country illegally from abroad was often enough to result in a 20-year prison sentence.

This indicates the enormous elasticity in the offence of conspiracy and the ease with which it can be abused. In their turn, authorities which are asked to extradite someone accused of criminal conspiracy can, if they are reluctant to comply, use the suspicion of a possible abuse as an argument against extradition.

PM 'dismayed' by Belgian decision

By Tom Lynch

MRS Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, yesterday attacked the Belgian and Irish governments over the events which led to the disappearance in Ireland of Father Patrick Ryan, whose extradition Britain is seeking for alleged terrorist offences.

She told MPs at Question Time she was "utterly dismayed" at the Belgian decision to refuse to extradite Fr Ryan last week, after he staged a 22-day hunger strike. He returned to a clinic in Ireland, from which he discharged himself on Monday in spite of extradition proceedings by the British Government.

She said fresh extradition warrants had been acquired for Fr Ryan on Friday and sent to Dublin "together with all the documentation required by the Irish Attorney General," who had taken no action.

"It is no use governments adopting great declarations and commitments on fighting terrorism if they lack the resolve to put them into practice."

The failure of the Irish Attorney General to secure Fr Ryan's arrest was "a matter of very grave concern," said Mrs Thatcher. "Although the Government of the Republic of Ireland makes fine-sounding



Michael Mates: 'abject surrender' by republic

speeches and statements, they do not always seem to be backed up by the appropriate deeds."

From the Conservative back benches, Mr Timothy Kirkhope (Leeds North East) and Mr Michael Mates (Hampshire East) expressed anger over Fr Ryan's disappearance.

Mr Kirkhope said the Bel-

gian decision was "utterly shameful." Events in Ireland showed "apparently deliberate lethargy," which cast doubt on the republic's commitment to the fight against terrorism.

Mr Mates urged the Prime Minister to make immediate representations to the Irish Government over its "abject surrender for short-term political gain."

Despite the "fine words" of the Anglo-Irish agreement, the republic was still seen as a safe haven for terrorists.

Mr Paddy Ashdown, leader of the Social and Liberal Democrats, distanced himself from the "overheated rhetoric" of Tory backbenchers, but said events in Ireland were particularly disturbing in view of the forthcoming review of the Anglo-Irish agreement.

After Question Time, Mr John Hume, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, protested that nobody been called in the course of questions to put a differing point of view. He and some Labour backbenchers called on the Government to make a full statement about the affair.

Later, Conservative backbenchers reacted angrily when Mr Edward Heath, the former Prime Minister, appeared to suggest that British lack of co-

operation in European initiatives created the climate for decisions such as the Belgian refusal of extradition.

During the debate on the economy, Mr Heath renewed his call for full UK membership of the European Monetary System and accused Mr Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor, of being "politically insensitive" in failing to understand the attitude of other European Community members when the UK took positions which they believed were against their interests.

Mr Norman Tebbit, the former Conservative Cabinet minister, said Mr Heath appeared to imply that the Irish or Belgian attitude towards the extradition of suspected terrorists was "conditioned in some way by the attitude of this country towards the EMS."

Mr Heath retorted: "The attitude of countries is affected psychologically by how other countries behave towards them. Anyone with experience of international politics understands that full well."

Challenged by other Conservatives, he maintained that lack of co-operation spread a psychological attitude among other countries.

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FROM: SUVA

C/C: 875

TO: WELLINGTON 03761 - ROUTINE :

RPTD: WELLINGTON B	00340 - ROUTINE	:	LONDON	00277 - ROUTINE
WASHINGTON	00261 - ROUTINE	:	OTTAWA	00241 - ROUTINE
CANBERRA	00529 - ROUTINE	:		

LD :SFA (DLD SPA DIS SEC LGL EAB ECO)
 :P/S MFA
 :POLICE (PTIU)
 :NZSIS (TIC)
 :DEFENCE (DOT DDI) : DESC : PMO (DIRECTOR)

SUBJ:FIJI : HIJACKER SENTENCE

THE 1 NOVEMBER DECISION BY LAUTOKA HIGH COURT JUDGE, JUSTICE SADAL, TO GIVE CONVICTED AIR NZ HIJACKER, AMJAD ALI, A TWO YEAR JAIL SENTENCE, SUSPENDED FOR 3 YEARS, HAS AROUSED CONCERN HERE AND OVERSEAS. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, MATAITOGA, THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT APPEAL AGAINST THE SENTENCE. IF THE DEFENCE LAWYER WERE TO APPEAL, THEN THE DPP COULD COUNTER-APPEAL BUT THAT IS MOST UNLIKELY. KOYA, REPRESENTING ALI, DECLARED HIS INTENTION TO APPEAL AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE BUT GIVEN THE LIGHTNESS OF THE SENTENCE, NEITHER MATAITOGA NOR WE CONSIDER HE WOULD SERIOUSLY RE-OPEN THE CASE WHICH WOULD NO DOUBT LEAD TO STIFFER PENALTIES BEING IMPOSED. MATAITOGA ADDED THAT HE HAD WRITTEN TO THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL SEVERAL MONTHS AGO TO CHANGE THE APPEAL PROCEDURES BUT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE. EVEN IF THERE WERE A CHANGE NOW, IT WOULD NOT BE RETROSPECTIVE.

2 MATAITOGA SAID HE WAS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE. USING INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY AIR NZ SOLICITORS, HE HAD CAREFULLY POINTED OUT TO THE JUDGE THE HEAVY SENTENCES IMPOSED FOR SIMILAR OFFENCES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE JUDGE HAD ALSO NOTED SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE CASE THAT THE FACT OF IMMUNITY FOR PROSECUTION BEING GRANTED TO POLITICAL OFFENDERS AFTER THE COUP WAS NOT RELEVANT TO ALI'S DEFENCE. BUT, SAID MATAITOGA, THE JUDGE HAD USED THIS AS ONE OF HIS CENTRAL ARGUMENTS FOR APPLYING A LENIENT SENTENCE. MATAITOGA ADDED SOMEWHAT BITTERLY THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF JUSTICE SADAL REFLECTED THE LOW STANDARDS OF JUDGES APPOINTED AFTER THE SECOND COUP WHEN THE EXPATRIATE JUDICIARY LEFT.

3 MATAITOGA TOLD US THAT THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAD COMPLAINED TO HIS MINISTER, IE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, ABOUT THE SENTENCE. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT IATA HAD PROTESTED SIMILARLY TO THE MINISTER OF CIVIL AVIATION AND TOURISM. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE US EMBASSY (OWENS) THAT THE COUNTER

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Page 2

TERRORISM OFFICE IN STATE DEPARTMENT ALSO WANTS TO PROTEST AND THE AMERICANS ARE LOOKING AT HOW TO DO SO. MATAITOGA SUGGESTED THAT PROTEST TO THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE, WHILE IT WOULD NOT CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF ALI'S TRIAL, SHOULD HELP EFFECT A CHANGE TO THE LEGAL PROCEDURES FOR FUTURE CASES OF THIS KIND.

4 WE UNDERSTAND FROM AIR NZ HERE THAT THEY ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE DECISION WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE LEGAL PROCESSES HAVE BEEN DULY OBSERVED. THEY HAVE NOT HAD ANY RESPONSE/DIRECTIVE FROM AIR NZ HEAD OFFICE ON THE NEXT STEP.

5 GRATEFUL ANY FEEDBACK YOU CAN PROVIDE ON NZ REACTIONS. DO YOU WISH US TO TAKE ANY FOLLOW UP ACTION?

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CONFIDENTIAL

B66/5/1A

2 HOME NEWS

Government seeks control on IRA's explosive supply

Czechs face fresh urging on Semtex

Richard Norton-Taylor

THE Government is to renew its request to Czechoslovakia to control exports of Semtex, the plastic explosive regarded as the IRA's most prized weapon.

It also plans to ask the Czechs for detailed information about the explosive, including how it could be mixed or diluted with other chemicals to make even more bombs.

Prague has not responded to the Government's first approach three months ago, when the Foreign Office asked for the supply to be controlled and for metal or odour "fingerprints"

to be included during manufacture. The Czechs, the sole producers of the explosive, said then that they had never knowingly supplied to terrorists.

It is now believed that several tons of Semtex, sufficient to make thousands of car bombs, were included among shipments of an estimated 100 tons of weapons smuggled into Ireland from Libya in 1985 and 1986. Sources indicated yesterday that there is enough Semtex unaccounted for "to keep the IRA going for years."

Two tons were discovered with other weapons in the freighter, Eksund, seized by the French off Brest a year ago, and a quantity of the explosive was found in a Marbella garage two

days after three unarmed IRA terrorists were killed by the SAS in Gibraltar in March.

There is no evidence that Libya has supplied the IRA with further quantities of the explosive recently.

The real threat posed by the quantities of arms available to the IRA, Whitehall officials are suggesting, contrasts with the series of "anti-terrorist" initiatives, including the recent broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein. Privately, Whitehall officials are surprised by the broadcasting companies' muted reaction to the ban. There is also scepticism about ending the right to silence in Northern Ireland, given the 94 per cent prosecution success rate in Diplock courts.

Today's Queen's Speech is expected to point to further measures in a new Prevention of Terrorism Bill, including the freezing of bank accounts. The Government also wants to prevent anyone in Northern Ireland from standing for election for five years after release from prison, and to oblige them to take an oath of "non-violence."

The security services are concerned most about combatting the threat posed by the quantities of arms in IRA hands. A further increase in military presence in border areas, remains an option but increasing rewards to informers appears to have fallen out of favour.

RUC man shot dead at checkpoint

David Hearst in Belfast

A POLICEMAN was killed and his officer nephew injured in a gun attack launched as they were closing the security barriers in the centre of the border town of Castlederg, County Tyrone, last night.

The gunman, who was believed to be a pillion passenger on a motorcycle, fired a number of shots into the security hut where the policemen were, at 5.45 pm. The

hut is designed to be bomb- and bullet-proof, but the door would have been open at the time of the attack.

The dead man, Mr William Monteith, was a full-time member of the RUC reserve and is the sixth policeman to die this year.

The barriers are closed to prevent car bomb attacks on the RUC station and commercial targets at night. Earlier this year, a similar attack in Belfast led to the UDR varying the times at which they close the gates.

THE GUARDIAN
Tuesday November 22 1988

Gagging the messenger

The Notice from the Home Secretary, banning material relating to listed Northern Ireland organisations, was published on 19 October. The next week — after discussion with the BBC — a letter of clarification was issued by the Home Office. Taken with the letter, the Notice means that the cold words of statements by members of listed organisations can be broadcast verbatim — whatever their content. But there can be no actuality of those speaking on behalf or in support of the listed organisations. The Notice also forbids:

- actuality of a speech by a foreign leader or a politician giving specific support for, say, Sinn Féin;
- actuality of words of support spoken by a politician in the European Parliament or by defendants in a court anywhere;
- shouts of support for a listed organisation by members of a crowd — for instance, at a soccer match;
- actuality of acceptance speeches by members of listed organisations successful in an election (though their electioneering speeches may be carried);
- certain historical documentary footage of members of listed organisations.

The Home Secretary's Notice does grave damage to broadcast journalism; it undermines the independence of British broadcasting organisations, and it weakens the standing in the world of the British tradition of free speech and one embodiment of that tradition in the minds of many: the BBC and in particular the World Service.

The aim of broadcast journalists in Northern Ireland is to record all significant incidents and to convey all shades of opinion, so that viewers and listeners may be informed and may better understand why events occur and why intense convictions are held — this so that they may judge for themselves the significance of events, and what policies can or should be adopted in Northern Ireland. Many journalists labour with dedication in wearying and sometimes ugly and dangerous circumstances to provide this service.

On rare occasions on national radio and television, journalists have judged that coverage will be deficient unless it includes interviews with members of listed organisations. This has been accomplished with care and consideration, and with the advice of BBC staff in Northern Ireland, who know at first hand the human consequences of, and the feelings unleashed by, acts of terrorism. Editors have worked under precise and comprehensive guidelines. All broadcast journalists recognise the balance to be struck between pertinence on the one hand and possible offence on the other. When the judgement is well made, as it almost always is, the audience recognises the fact.

A recent example was the dissection by the BBC's *On the Record* programme of a key feature of the Northern Ireland political landscape — the long series of discussions between the Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sinn Féin that ended this summer. The programme revealed to a national audience, for the first time, the exchange of letters between the two political parties on the circumstances in which the Provisional IRA would give up its campaign of violence. The exchange was most revealing. So was the brief interview with Gerry Adams, who was pressed at the end of the programme on a question that the SDLP's John Hume had put to him in the



talks. The programme was watched by 2.4 million viewers. The BBC's Duty Office received no complaints about the interview with Gerry Adams. There is no evidence we can uncover from the enormous body of audience research that, properly handled, programmes of this kind cause offence.

Another example is a brief sequence on an edition of *Panorama* earlier this year, which filmed a Noraid fund-raising dinner in New York. Eight hundred apparently prosperous, mostly young, Irish-Americans sat down to a festive \$45-a-head dinner, at which they were addressed by Seamus Twomey in passionate and explicit terms of support for the IRA. The whole sequence was instructive, and the manner and the feel of the occasion and the response to Twomey's words was more revealing than the dry fact of the dinner itself. That sequence could not now be shown; and more than a measure of understanding is lost by that.

There has been much mention in recent weeks of "easy platforms"; of the need to deny the "right" of Sinn Féin and others to reach the screen. There has been no such right and no such easy platform. *Journalists* have decided whom to invite on their programmes, and when to invite them. The journalist's test has been pertinence. Interviewees were pressed. Views were placed in an appropriate context. Sometimes, in the aftermath of an outrage, the claims made by apologists have chilled and shocked viewers, and have caused real distress to those most personally affected. Journalists themselves find this part of their duty distasteful and distressing. But the quality of such information, and not just the cold, printed words now allowed, supplies an important piece of a tragic picture.

We have been told that broadcast reporting remains unrestricted, that we are free to use the plain words like our colleagues in print. But the Notice denies broadcast journalists the tools of their trade: the captured moment, the cross-examination in interview, the penetrating, unblinking eye of the camera which notes the pause or the uncertainty when answering difficult questions, the conviction or the lack of it. All tell a tale. From that we learn.

Journalism for the community of Northern Ireland itself poses a different kind of problem. Last year the Ulster Defence Association put forward a political initiative which was taken up by some parties in Northern Ireland. Should the UDA wish to

John Birt argues

**that the ban on
interviews with
Irish terrorists
undermines
broadcasting
freedom and the
British tradition
of free speech**

adopt a similar approach in future, radio and television journalists in Northern Ireland will be unable to test and to explore its motives directly.

Sinn Fein is an established political party with around 35 per cent of the Nationalist vote, one elected MP and some 60 local councillors. The party has a presence in 17 of the Province's 26 council chambers. Sinn Fein is the joint second largest group on Derry Council. The chairman of Strabane Council is a member of Sinn Fein.

BBC Radio Foyle serves the area around Derry, including Strabane. Up to now, a full representation of opinion has been aired. Complaint has been rare. The heartening achievement of Radio Foyle — whose journalists are marked by a strong blend of realism and idealism — is that it has won the trust of the local community for its reliability and for providing a forum for discussion in a society which has few others. That trust will now be under stress.

Some kinds of reporting in Northern Ireland will no longer occur. Hours after the explosion in Enniskillen, the Sinn Fein chairman of Fermanagh Council was interviewed on BBC Television. Seamus Mallon of the SDLP has observed that in the encounter "... the chairman was stripped and torn apart by the journalist in such a way that it has changed the face of Fermanagh district council and, perhaps, in the long term will change the political posts in that troubled area". A verdict from a political rival; but evidence perhaps that no easy platform was available here.

As a result of the Notice, the day-to-day reporting of community politics will be bedevilled by the tests of, "do these words support?" and "in what he or she is saying, is he or she speaking for a council or a group or for a listed organisation?". Broadcast journalism will be distorted by this Notice. When we are unable to broadcast material because of it, we shall explain to our audiences why.

The Notice has no precedent in the United Kingdom in modern times. The British broadcasting organisations have broad obligations placed on them, which they welcome, to be fair and impartial; not to offend against good taste and decency; and to offer a range of programmes. Hitherto, it has been for the BBC and the Independent Broadcasting Authority to turn these invocations into detailed and exten-

sive guidelines for working programme-makers.

Incalculable difficulties will emerge from the Home Secretary's Notice because it is in essence the first programme guideline drawn up from outside broadcasting. The Notice is a programme guideline from Government. (We must hope the new Broadcasting Standards Council will not adopt a similar approach.) The Notice carries the force and rigidity of contract law into an area where flexibility and sensitivity to shifts and changes need to be the rule. It trespasses on the independence and editorial integrity of the BBC.

Existing broadcasting guidelines are interpreted by those responsible for drafting and amending them. No doubt intending to be helpful, the Home Office has already proffered a service of advice from officials when programme-makers are in doubt. But the BBC will interpret the Notice itself. And we trust we have had our first and last telephone call from an official inquiring if a forthcoming programme might face difficulties with the ban.

The BBC World Service reports on and transmits services to countries with every shade of regime from the democratic to the totalitarian. Many of these regimes face violent opposition and constantly press for constraints on reporting such opposition. The Foreign Office has always responded that reporting on the World Service is a matter for the BBC and not for the Government. Since the Notice, some governments have already pressed for similar restraints; others will no doubt follow. The BBC will resist. So, no doubt, will the Foreign Office. But the traditional response will now have something of a hollow ring.

The Notice has attracted widespread comment throughout the world. The *New York Times* saw it as a free speech issue, accusing the Government of tarnishing Britain's good name and describing attempts to justify the restrictions on interviews as "feeble defences for a rule that sets so damaging an example". Others were quick to praise the new limitations. The *Kenya Times* said: "We remind No 10 Downing Street that this is exactly what the [Kenyan] government has been demanding of the BBC. Mrs Thatcher has that power ... let her use it." In South Africa, President Botha, in a speech exhorting the country's media "to black out the propaganda of tyrants", said that if the media failed to do this, they should not complain if his government introduced similar measures to those of the British government.

Truth, they say, is the first casualty of war; British broadcast journalism is the latest victim of terrorism. After two decades of terrorism in Northern Ireland, our government has finally adopted a measure which may or may not counter terrorism but which inflicts certain damage on some of the most cherished elements of a democratic society — freedom of expression and the independence of the media. "In modern societies, success depends on openness and free discussion. Suppress those things and you are unable to respond to the need for change." Few would disagree with Mrs Thatcher's remarks to the Poles. Broadcast journalists hope that even in the painful circumstances of Northern Ireland, she and her ministers can be persuaded that similar considerations should apply here, too.

John Birt is the Deputy Director-General of the BBC

B66/5/1A.

Government plans to continue making terrorists the target

MRS Margaret Thatcher's staunch defence of recent government efforts to curb terrorism in Northern Ireland will be backed up next week by a series of measures aimed at limiting political activity by terrorist sympathisers and at starving paramilitary groups of funds.

The most controversial measures, due to be outlined in the Queen's speech setting out the government's legislative programme for the new parliamentary session, will force local election candidates to renounce support for terrorism and extend the period of disqualification on candidates who have previously served prison sentences.

Powers will also be introduced allowing confiscation of funds destined for terrorist groups, and the government will announce its long-awaited proposals to curb employment discrimination on the minority Catholic population.

The government's intention to strengthen measures to combat terrorism was signalled by the Prime Minister in her speech at the Lord Mayor of London's banquet in the Guildhall earlier this week. The new legislation forms part of continuing efforts to counter IRA violence and to woo nationalist support away from Sinn Fein, the IRA's political wing.

The new curbs on political activity by representatives of terrorist groups and their supporters will be introduced in a local authorities bill, drawn up by Mr Tom King, the Northern Ireland Secretary.

The Bill is expected to propose that successful candidates in local elections in the province be required to take an oath renouncing the use of violence before taking their seats.

It is also likely to extend the existing five-year disqualification from office of candidates who have served more than three months in prison. At present the period of disqualification begins on the date of conviction. Mr King is expected to propose that the ban runs from the date of release.

The initiative is designed to end the current disruption of local government caused by the refusal of Unionist councillors to serve alongside those of Sinn Fein, whose 60 councillors frequently cause chaos at council meetings.

Charles Hodgson on the likely shape of measures to be outlined in the Queen's speech

But sceptics argue that the proposals will simply present Sinn Fein with a further propaganda victory, following international criticism of the recent curbs on the right to silence and the ban on interviews with terrorist sympathisers, which have been attacked as assaults on civil liberties.

Critics of the proposed oath also argue that it is unenforceable since it is thought highly unlikely that Sinn Fein candidates will feel bound by it.

Action for disqualification of elected representatives for



Tom King: Northern Ireland Secretary

breach of the oath is likely to be through the civil, rather than criminal courts, with cases brought by fellow councillors rather than the Crown.

The Bill will also extend voting rights in local and European Parliament elections to Republic of Ireland nationals resident in the province.

The government hopes to have the legislation in place in time for local elections in May, although officials concede that the timetable will be tight.

The Government also plans to introduce a Prevention of Terrorism Bill to replace the existing Act, whose five-year life expires in March 1988 with permanent legislation.

Although the new legislation will have no limit on its timespan, its powers will still have to be renewed annually by parliament and those relating particularly to Irish terrorism – proscription of terrorist groups and exclusion of suspected terrorists – will remain temporary.

Among the key changes in the new legislation will be the creation of a new criminal offence, making it illegal to raise money or other assets for terrorist organisations. These provisions, similar to those already in force for assets from drug trafficking, will allow courts to freeze and confiscate funds destined for paramilitary groups.

Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, intends to seek wider international support for moves to prevent the IRA obtaining funds from abroad, particularly the US and Europe.

The Government will also publish its long-awaited Fair Employment Bill, strengthening efforts to end religious discrimination and reduce sectarian tensions.

The legislation will create a Fair Employment Commission, to replace the Fair Employment Agency, which will issue directions to companies, which will be enforced through a fair employment tribunal to which employers have right of appeal. Failure to comply with rulings will be punishable by heavy fines or imprisonment.

There will be a code of conduct for employers. Both public and private sector companies with more than 10 employees will be required to monitor the religious composition of their workforce and submit annual returns to the FEC. Employers in breach of these statutory obligations will be ineligible for government contracts or grants.

The Dublin Government has put special emphasis on stronger fair employment laws at regular meetings of the Anglo-Irish conference. They are seen as a crucial step in reducing alienation among the Catholic community.

The government is also seeking to counter the growing support in the US for the so-called MacBride principles, which impose fair employment obligations on US companies planning to invest in Northern Ireland.



New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
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London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

Yercw

Reference:

B66/5/1A

B67/1/5

2 November 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

UK/IRA: News Media Ban: BBC

reflective article on effects on BBC of recent Government measures to
restrict coverage to Irish 'terrorist' organisations

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

B66/5/1A.

OBSERVER SUNDAY 30 OCTOBER 1988

Pendennis

PETER HILLMORE

Call for BBC ban on foreign 'terrorists'

■ YOU have to admit that there is a great degree of logic behind the following argument: if the BBC is not allowed to talk to members of organisations regarded by the British Government as terrorists, then perhaps its Overseas Service shouldn't be allowed to talk to people who are regarded as terrorists by other Governments.

Why, for example, should an Overseas Service programme destined to be heard in South Africa, contain an interview with a member of the African National Congress. Mr Botha certainly regards the ANC as a terrorist organisation. Come to think of it, so does Mrs

Thatcher. And why should church leaders like Archbishop Tutu be given the, er, oxygen of publicity to air their views and spread dissent.

This is not mere idle speculation. A number of foreign governments have already commented publicly on the Irish ban and suggested it be extended to their own opponents. These include Kenya, Cuba, Romania, Czechoslovakia and, of course, South Africa.

The Foreign Office is unable to say — it refuses to comment, it retains the right not to answer questions about itself — whether any of these governments have yet made a formal approach to Britain, requesting that political opponents be kept off the air waves, be pre-

cluded from expressing their views on the World Service.

But the Indian commerce minister is due in London this week and is expected to demand a ban on all interviews with Sikh extremists, even ones who have committed no crime.

It's pretty obvious that governments have long been badgering the Foreign Office to bring the BBC into line. I'm sure that the Russians weren't happy at the way people like Sakharov were given the oxygen of publicity. But the traditional explanation has always been that the BBC is an independent organisation, outside the government control. That excuse will no longer wash. And overseas governments know it.

9/62(u)

→ B66/6
B66/5/1A

28 October 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(LGL)

Montreal Convention on Hijacking

Attached for your information is the FCO press notice of the signing by Britain on 26 October 1988 of the Protocol to the Montreal Convention.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.



New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

YELAW

Reference:

B66/5/1A

B67/1/12

24 October 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

UK/Ireland: Anti-terrorist News Media Bans

Further press reportage and discussion of issues involved in restrictions on press reportage of Northern Ireland groups deemed to be involved in terrorism or support of terrorist organisations.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.



New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

21 OCT 1988

Yellw

Reference:

B66/5/1A
B67/1/12
B67/1/3

21 October

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

UK/Northern Ireland/IRA

press reportage and commentary on measures to restrict right of reportage of organisations deemed to be associated with terrorist organisations and on measures to curb the 'right to silence' of terrorist suspects.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Hurd to ban IRA interviews

By David McKittrick
Ireland Correspondent

PLANS to restrict media interviews with members and spokesmen of terrorist organisations, particularly the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, are likely to be announced today.

The Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, is due to make a statement to the House of Commons today when it returns from its summer recess. The Government apparently favours banning radio and television interviews with the IRA and Sinn Fein. Its position on press interviews is not clear.

Several journalists who participate in the Westminster lobby system have already been encouraged to predict such a ban, with the intention of preparing public opinion for an official announcement. Margaret Thatcher has made clear her strong personal opposition to republican spokesmen appearing on television.

A ban would provoke strong opposition from civil liberties quarters, but would be welcomed in Northern Ireland by Unionist

politicians, who advocate a complete ban on Sinn Fein. The Irish government has, since the early 1970s, prohibited interviews on RTE, the Irish broadcasting service, with the IRA and Sinn Fein.

Although the IRA is a proscribed organisation, Sinn Fein is legal. The organisation regularly takes around 40 per cent of the nationalist vote in elections and currently has a Westminster MP, Gerry Adams, and around 60 local councillors.

The initiative to remove the IRA and Sinn Fein from the television screens will be seen as another sign of the Government's dissatisfaction with the broadcasting authorities. This reached a pitch this year with the controversy over Thames Television's programme, *Death on the Rock*, on the SAS shooting of three IRA members in Gibraltar.

Sinn Fein also likely to fall under prohibition on broadcasts involving terrorist spokesmen

Mr Adams and other Sinn Fein spokesmen appear frequently on BBC and ITV in Northern Ireland, but interviews with IRA spokesmen are rare.

The ban would be one of a series of anti-republican measures decided on during the intensive security review which followed the upsurge of IRA violence in August. Mr Hurd has already declared his intention of removing the right to silence of a suspect in custody, and further new measures will be incorporated in a new Prevention of Terrorism Bill.

The Government will shortly

also announce plans to introduce a declaration for candidates in council elections, requiring them to say that if elected they will not support or assist the activities of any illegal organisation.

Robin Eames, the Primate of the Church of Ireland, yesterday supported the idea of a ban. He added: "If such a thing as the banning of these interviews can in some way remove the spotlight from these people who are causing such misery and heartache, I believe I am speaking on behalf of a great many people when I say this should be done."

A Sinn Fein spokesman said: "More repression and censorship is not the way to resolve the problem. This will be vigorously opposed by the nationalist community in the north. Any attempt to censor Sinn Fein, given that we are a legal, open political party, will just underline the double standards and hypocrisy of the British Government."

■ A ban would appear to fly in the face of a recommendation last year from Lord Colville QC, in his review of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, that a provision in the Act, which has been used to curb media interviews with terrorists, be abolished, **Sarah Helm** writes.

Section 11 of the Act makes it an offence not to pass on to the authorities information about terrorists which might be of use to the police or the security forces.

The section was not originally intended to be used against the media, but rather to ensure witnesses in general passed on information about terrorists.

However, it has increasingly been used to prevent interviews with terrorists being shown. In July 1979 the BBC's *Tonight* programme interviewed a member of the INLA, which the Attorney General warned could constitute an offence under Section 11. A few months later, the BBC programme *Panorama* abandoned a broadcast of an interview with terrorists at the Carrickmore checkpoint after being threatened with prosecution under Section 11. The Government later made it clear that it could have constituted an offence.

In 1984, critics urged the Government not to renew Section 11 because it was being used for a purpose other than the one intended: in other words, to control the media. But when the Act was renewed, it was made clear that it could and should be used for this purpose. Since then, no British broadcasting organisation is believed to have carried interviews with known terrorists.

15661511A

Broadcasting and Terrorism

3.45 pm

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Douglas Hurd): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement about access to the broadcast media by certain organisations in Northern Ireland.

For some time, broadcast coverage of events in Northern Ireland has included the occasional appearance of representatives of paramilitary organisations and their political wings, who have used these opportunities as a attempt to justify their criminal activities. Such appearances have caused widespread offence to viewers and listeners throughout the United Kingdom, particularly just after a terrorist outrage.

The terrorists themselves draw support and sustenance from access to radio and television—from addressing their views more directly to the population at large than is possible through the press. The Government have decided that the time has come to deny this easy platform to those who use it to propagate terrorism. Accordingly, I have today issued to the chairmen of the BBC and the IBA a notice, under the licence and agreement and under the Broadcasting Act 1987 respectively, requiring them to refrain from broadcasting direct statements by representatives of organisations proscribed in Northern Ireland and Great Britain and by representatives of Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defence Association. The notices will also prohibit the broadcasting of statements by any person which support or invite support for these organisations. The restrictions will not apply to the broadcast of proceedings in Parliament, and in order not to impair the obligation on the broadcasters to provide an impartial coverage of elections the notices will have a more limited effect during election periods. Copies of the notices have today been deposited in the Library, and further copies are available from the Vote Office so that hon. Members will be able to study their detailed effect.

These restrictions follow very closely the lines of similar provisions which have been operating in the Republic of Ireland for some years. Representatives of these organisations are prevented from appearing on Irish television, but because we have had no equivalent restrictions in the United Kingdom they can nevertheless be seen on BBC and ITV services in Northern Ireland, where their appearances cause the gravest offence, and in Great Britain. The Government's decision today means that both in the United Kingdom and in the Irish Republic such appearances will be prevented.

Broadcasters have a dangerous and unenviable task in reporting events in Northern Ireland. This step is no criticism of them. What concerns us is the use made of broadcasting facilities by supporters of terrorism. This is not a restriction on reporting. It is a restriction on direct appearances by those who use or support violence.

I believe that this step will be understood and welcomed by most people throughout the United Kingdom. It is a serious and important matter on which the House will wish to express its view. For that reason, we shall be putting in hand discussions through the usual channels so that a full debate on the matter can take place at an early date.

Mr. Roy Hattersley (Birmingham, Sparkbrook): Like the overwhelming majority of citizens in this country, the

Labour party is dedicated to the defeat of terrorism, and we share the natural revulsion at the exhibition on television of support for terrorists and terrorist organisations. But the important task is not so much demonstrating disapproval as defeating the IRA and the UDA, and it is against that criterion, together with the consequences for freedom of speech and the practicality of the proposals, that the Home Secretary's statement must be judged.

Will the Home Secretary confirm that nothing that he now proposes reduces the opportunities for the opinions of terrorist organisations to be reported on television or in newspapers? All that he has done today is to prevent personal appearances. Why does the Home Secretary believe that the net effect of such a specific prohibition will be to damage terrorism and help in the defeat of terrorists? Has he considered the damaging way in which his proposal will be used at home and abroad, especially in the United States, to portray the Government as the enemy of free expression? Has he weighed that publicity coup for the IRA against the advantage of keeping its representatives off television? Does he not have enough faith in the British people to accept that such personal appearances only increase the revulsion and contempt felt by most British viewers for terrorism and terrorists?

Can the Home Secretary tell us how the law will define such general concepts as "representatives of" and "supporting"? Will he assure us that there will be a more objective test of those terms than simply the Government nominating individuals who must not be interviewed on television or radio? That would be an absolutely unacceptable power for any Government to possess.

What consequences does the Home Secretary foresee from his necessary exemptions of both the House and the period of parliamentary elections? Is there not something absurd in allowing the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Adams), were he to attend the House, to voice his views on "Yesterday in Parliament", while at the same time preventing him being interviewed on that speech as he left the building? What consequences does the right hon. Gentleman foresee for the impending parliamentary by-elections, other than the near certainty, for which the Government must take responsibility, of Sinn Fein candidates being nominated in all of them?

Does not an examination of the detailed results of the proposal demonstrate that it is trivial, worthless and almost certainly counter-productive in the real fight against terrorism? Today's statement is intended to create the illusion, rather than the reality, of activity. It will make the Government look simultaneously repressive and ridiculous.

Mr. Hurd: I am surprised—not wholly surprised—that the right hon. Gentleman takes that line, because I am afraid that it stands four square with the attitude that he has taken personally for some time now to the measures that we and the House have thought to be necessary in the fight against terrorism. The notice that I have given to the two chairmen today is, I believe, clear and precise. It specifies organisations, and I believe that it is as clear and precise as such a notice can reasonably be. Of course, it distinguishes between speech in the House and speech outside. If I had not done that, I should have been immersed in considerable argument about privilege, which I wish to avoid as that would have obscured the main issue.

Murder list 'carried by King plotters'

Dennis Johnson

A LIST of 19 potential murder victims was being carried by two men and a woman accused of plotting to murder the Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Tom King, it was alleged at Winchester crown court yesterday.

The list was said to have been found written on tightly folded pieces of cigarette paper, wrapped in a blue Wrangler shirt, in a tent occupied by the three accused at a campsite at Wookey Hole, Somerset.

Besides Mr King it included six present or former Northern Ireland ministers: Dr Rhodes Boyson, Mr Nicholas Scott, Sir Adam Butler, Sir Peter Mills, Mr Richard Needham and Mr Chris Patten.

Also named were the retired judge Lord Scarman; Lord Bridge of Harwich, the judge in the IRA Birmingham bombers case; and nine generals and one colonel, most of whom had Northern Ireland connections.

Beside the names of Mr King, Dr Boyson, Mr Scott and General Sir Richard Clutterbuck, an expert on terrorism, were their vehicle registration numbers. The names of Mr King and Mr Needham were marked with crosses, it was alleged.

Mr Alan Rawley QC, for the Crown, asked the jury: "What do you think they were doing with the list? Is it not inescapable that they were plotting to kill one or more of these people when and by what method they could?"

John McCann, aged 25, Finbarr Cullen, 28, and Martina Shanahan, 23, all from the Irish Republic, all plead not guilty to conspiring with persons unknown to murder Mr King. They also deny a second charge of conspiring with others to murder persons unknown.

They were arrested on August 30 last year after Cullen and Shanahan had been seen sitting on a wall near Mr King's house at Ford, near Chippenham, Wiltshire.

Mr Rawley said that, although being Irish was by itself a "neutral fact," it had assumed in the evidence a significance of which the jury must be aware.

The three were, he said, representatives of some terrorist organisation — "the Provisional IRA, the Irish National Liberation Army, who knows?"

A statement from Mr King's daughter, Miss Elisa Jane King, aged 25, was read in court. She had told her father's police protection officers that she had seen two people, later identified as Cullen and Shanahan, sitting on a wall when she was out riding with a friend on August 30.

PC Roy Moore said he and another officer went to investigate. He told the two he was inquiring about poachers and noticed the man had a strong Irish brogue.

The man gave his name as James John Doyle, and when PC Moore checked this by radio it was found to correspond with the name of someone wanted for interview. The two were arrested.

The trial was delayed for two hours while the three defence counsel submitted that the jury should be discharged and the case postponed for a month because of widespread publicity in the media about the IRA, the Conservative Party conference and the Brighton bombing four years ago. This created an "emotional and psychological" atmosphere in which a fair trial was impossible, they said.

Mr Justice Swinton Thomas disagreed and, when the jury were called in, instructed them to ignore what they read in newspapers or saw on television and reach conclusions only on the evidence.

THE GUARDIAN
Wednesday October 12 1988

BGG/S/1A



New Zealand High Commission

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Yellow

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B66/4

12 October 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

C.C. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

UK: Support for Right-Wing Terrorist Groups

Observer report of 9 October on groups in Britain supporting right-wing terrorist groups in southern Africa, central America etc.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Selling terrorism to the Tories



Marc Gordon: 'Anti-Marxist' advocate of terror.

DAVID LEIGH and PAUL LASHMAR
uncover US-funded right-wingers seeking support for murder gangs in southern Africa.

THIS WEEK, at the Conservative Party conference, a 24-year-old named Marc Gordon will be showering delegates with glossy literature promoting terrorism.

Gordon, a bookmaker's son and one of the new breed of British ultra-rightists, is receiving backing from the United States.

Investigations by *The Observer* reveal that large sums of foreign money have been pumped into an extraordinary epidemic of new 'institutes' and 'foundations', staffed by young British right-wingers.

Their aim, apparently co-ordinated, is to promote the image of a man universally agreed by Western leaders to be one of the most murderous terrorists in Africa: Alfonso Dhlakama, of Renamo, the Mozambique National Resistance.

Gordon has never been to Mozambique and has never met Dhlakama. But he praises him as an anti-Communist freedom fighter, just like Arturo Calero, the Nicaraguan Contra leader.

'Renamo is the best-run anti-Marxist campaign of the 1980s,' he says: 'People are no longer ashamed of supporting them. Mrs Thatcher is misguided.'

Calero is being brought to Brighton in person this week by Gordon's 'International

Freedom Foundation' (IFF). Dhlakama — who spends much of his time in South Africa — is apparently not yet considered sufficiently presentable for the world stage.



The propaganda campaign on behalf of Dhlakama is echoed in a British chorus by two organisations in particular: Western Goals UK, managed by a youthful Conservative, Andrew Smith, with a group of his friends; and the Mozambique Solidarity Campaign, run by a former Young Conservative, Dominic Collins, from the same address as the International Society for Human Rights (ISHR).

The ISHR is run in London by a one-time member of the Federation of Conservative Students, Karen Cooksley. (Conservative Central Office disbanded the Federation in 1986 for 'extremism'.)

Other hitherto little-known organisations which are now singing the praises of Renamo or the Contras in Britain include: the Institute for the Study of Terrorism, the Campaign for a Free Britain, and the Committee for a Free Nicaragua.

They have suddenly joined the group of oddly-titled right-wing organisations which emerged in Britain around the time of the general election in June 1987 — among them, the Coalition

THE PROPAGANDA TRAIL



HERITAGE FOUNDATION

WORLD ANTI-COMMUNISM LEAGUE

INTERNATIONAL
FREEDOM FOUNDATION,
Washington DC

WESTERN GOALS
FOUNDATION,
Alexandria, Virginia

MOZAMBIQUE
RESEARCH CENTRE,
Washington DC

ISHR Inc. US section
and headquarters,
Frankfurt

FREEDOM Inc.

'Mozambique
is a key target'

'The immediate
objective is
Mozambique'

'Renamo relies
on popular
support'

'Government forces
have...a programme
of murder'

'Renamo has the
willing support of
the villagers'

INTERNATIONAL
FREEDOM
FOUNDATION (UK)

WESTERN
GOALS (UK)

MOZAMBIQUE
SOLIDARITY
CAMPAIGN

INTERNATIONAL
SOC. OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (UK)

INSTITUTE FOR
THE STUDY OF
TERRORISM

JILLIAN BECKER

MARC GORDON

ANDREW SMITH

DOMINIC COLLINS

KAREN COOKSLEY

for Peace Through Security, the Social Affairs Unit and the Institute for European Defence and Security.

All these organisations take a generally Reaganite line: anti-Communist, pro-nuclear weapons, and in favour of 'rolling back' Marxism throughout the world by armed force, whether in Grenada, central America or southern Africa. None of them declares the source of its funding.

Some had direct links with intelligence figures in the US and with the private-enterprise anti-Communist adventures organised by the now-disgraced Colonel Oliver North from the White House basement.

Gordon — who, with his young colleagues, has been taken to the US and 'on patrol' with the Contras — works as a junior partner to the International Freedom Foundation in Washington.

He was recruited by Jack Abramoff, a leading figure in the new American ultra-Right, who first came to prominence when he organised a dinner in memory of Senator Larry McDonald, of Georgia, one of the 269 killed aboard the South Korean airliner shot down by the Russians in September 1963: McDonald had been a prominent supporter of the far-Right John Birch Society and of the extremist

'World Anti-Communist League'.

The spotlight fell on Abramoff again later when it was disclosed during the Irangate hearings that he had had regular meetings with Colonel North. Abramoff's IFF also has an office in South Africa.

The wealthy Washington Heritage Foundation has pumped funds and literature into many of these lobbying and propaganda activities, in Britain as well as in the US.

According to its internal documents, Heritage channelled £140,000 to Britain via Brian Crozier, a veteran anti-Communist journalist who ran the CIA-backed news agency Forum World Features in the 1970s and more recently presided over the Institute for the Study of Conflict.

The funds were designated for the IFFE — International Freedom Fund Establishment. Crozier refuses to say what he did with the money. Gordon denies that it went to the IFF but adds that he welcomes Heritage support. The organisers have now been trained in US-style direct-mail techniques for soliciting current running costs from British businessmen.

Similarly, Western Goals UK was launched by a Washington parent, set up by Larry McDonald with Carl 'Spitz' Channel. The original parent body has since been dissolved, after controversy during Irangate about the handling of funds and dealings with Colonel North.

The young Tories employed by Western Goals were supplied with \$15,000 in off-shore bank accounts in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man: they, too, now concentrate on US-style direct-mail techniques for continued funding.

These are far from the only US-based campaigns and foundations which have sprung up to promote Renamo.

For example, a recent flight into Mozambique by selected US journalists, to interview Dhlakama, was organised by Harry Schultz of Freedom Inc. Schultz, a Monaco resident, was previously European representative of High Frontier, the lobbying organisation for the US Star Wars campaign run by General Daniel Graham, former deputy director of the CIA.

There is also a Mozambique Research Centre, run in Washington by Tom Schaaf, which claims to represent Renamo's interests. It is based in the Heritage Foundation building.

Right-wing evangelists have become involved as well. An Australian, Ian Grey, captured by Mozambique government forces, testified that he was helping Renamo in association with the Shekinah Ministries, a group dealing both with the Mozambique Research Centre and with the Jimmy Swaggart fundamentalists in the US.

The big obstacle to world recognition of Dhlakama as an anti-Communist crusader is that he and his men are not 'freedom fighters' but

terrorists, created by white intelligence agencies. They are 'vicious, murderous bandits, as a million refugees can bear witness' — in the words of David Harris, Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe.

A report by the US State Department last April said bluntly that Dhlakama's men had brought chaos and misery to the civilian population of Mozambique, murdering, terrorising, enslaving and chopping off ears and noses to enforce their demands.


The report declared: 'It is conservatively estimated that 100,000 civilians may have been murdered by Renamo...' They also poach elephants and rhino for their valuable ivory and horn.

The Mozambique National Resistance was in fact created and funded in 1974 by white Rhodesia's intelligence chief, Kenneth Flower. In his memoirs, he described its members as 'pseudo-terrorists'.

In 1980, after the fall of the white regime in Rhodesia, Flower admits that he handed over control of the Renamo guerrillas 'lock, stock and barrel' to South Africa and they became 'just another group of foreign mercenaries'.

South Africa, which handles all Renamo's communications and supplies under General C. J. van Tonder, head of military intelligence, uses them to keep Mozambique in a state of collapse. The aim is to weaken South Africa's black opponents.

For the right-wingers in the West, the purpose of the pro-Renamo propaganda campaign is to try to persuade Mrs Thatcher and the US Administration to change their foreign policy. Both governments have cordial relations with Mozambique's Frelimo Government: Britain supplies the latter with mercenary troops and training, through a private firm of ex-SAS officers, DSL Ltd.



Dhlakama (top) and Calero: Terrorists.

It might seem ironic for Marc Gordon and his friends to lobby in Brighton, where the sea-front has been sealed off in a £1.5 million anti-terrorist operation, and where Mrs Thatcher has seen her friends and colleagues killed by the IRA.

As he sees it, though, Renamo is in a category which he describes in these terms: 'If a group uses legitimate means — and I'm not talking about civilians killed in cross-fire, because that happens in all wars — and if its aims are to replace a totalitarian State with a free democracy...'

Then that, Marc Gordon says, is why he supports the 'armed struggle' of Alfonsa Dhlakama.



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Yellow

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B67/1/12

7 October 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Northern Ireland - IRA

IRA/funding
IRA/Libya

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

IRA arms supplies linked to Libyan bureaux

By DAVID WALLEN, Diplomatic Correspondent

LIBYAN People's Bureaux, Col Gaddafi's embassies across Europe, are being used to channel funds to the IRA, according to a new study on the terror group's international links.

The offices said to be most frequently used by terrorists receiving cash are those in Amsterdam and Rome, which are known to have been visited by IRA arms buyers.

The report on the foreign connections of the IRA and Irish National Liberation Army published by the Institute for the Study of Terrorism says that almost every Western European country now has a

group campaigning on behalf of the terrorists.

The Netherlands has become an important transit point and invaluable refuge for members of both the IRA and INLA in recent years and much arms traffic moves through the country.

Amsterdam's Schiphol airport is also used as a transit point by members of the Provisional IRA attempting to move into the US or Canada without attracting the attention of the security forces on both sides of the Atlantic by flying direct from Dublin.

Links between the IRA and West German extremist groups extend back to 1972 and there are long-established links between the Provisionals and the INLA, although they have been denied by Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA.

In recent years the IRA has been trying to broaden its base of support in Germany, and has had some success with the Green movement, the researchers, Ian Geldard and Keith Craig, claim.

The report claims links also exist with terrorist organisations in France, Belgium and

Switzerland. There is said to be contact between the Provisionals and ETA, the Basque separatist group in Spain, and with terrorists in Italy.

But while the IRA sees itself in Ireland as part of a worldwide struggle against imperialism, in which Britain is often hidden beneath a veneer of "green nationalism" when appealing for funds from wealthy Irish-Americans.

References to support for the Sandinistas, the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the African National Congress in

Southern Africa which appear in the pages of *An Phoblacht/Republican News* are left out of the American sister publication *The Irish People*.

Along with links with Central American groups, the report also claims the IRA has established contacts with the pro-Iranian Hezbollah movement in Lebanon.

It says two members of the IRA were reported to have visited West Beirut last year where they met Sheikh Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, while trying to seek the release of the Belfast teacher hostage, Mr Brian Keenan.



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YERKAN

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3 October 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

UK - Anti-terrorism

post-Gibraltar IRA-shootings inquest reflections on British anti-terrorist
methods and practice

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Ex-priest may have perfected bomb technique

INSIGHT

A FORMER Roman Catholic priest being held by police in Belgium is believed to have masterminded the design of a failsafe device used by the IRA in more than 180 bombings.

One of the devices, known as a "memo park", was found in the car in Marbella which was to be used to bomb the Royal Anglian Regiment's changing of the guard ceremony in Gibraltar. Two similar devices were used in the Brighton bombing.

The memo park is a simple timer, generally used by lorry drivers to warn them when they are approaching statutory rest periods, or by researchers carrying out experiments in which exact timing is required.

The IRA, however, has modified the memo park to neutralise bombs while they are being put in position. The device gives terrorists up to an hour to set up a bomb before its timing mechanism is automatically switched on.

A Spanish report on the car bomb found in Marbella, submitted to the Gibraltar inquest last week, included a description of a Swiss-made memo park.

"This timer is widely used in the UK as a parking time adviser. The Provisional IRA uses this frequently as a safety element to their devices," the report said.

Police sources in Belgium say that Patrick Ryan, 58, has admitted showing the IRA how to adapt the device after buying a number of them in Zurich.

He is also believed to have supplied weapons used in two recent IRA attacks on servicemen in The Netherlands and Belgium.

Ryan was captured in Brussels on June 29 this year. He first came to the attention of British intelligence in the early 1970s as a key figure in the IRA's contacts with Colonel Gaddafi of Libya. He then dropped from sight and reappeared about three years ago.


The British authorities believe Ryan was the IRA's

quartermaster on the European mainland and are now applying for his extradition. On Friday, four box files of evidence in support of the application were delivered to Ryan's lawyers.

Before his arrest, he spent 10 years living in a small studio apartment in Benidorm in Spain. Maria Felipe, his neighbour, told The Sunday Times: "He was like a monk; he didn't spend any money. He spoke Spanish and perfect French and he had been learning Russian."

Felipe said she last saw Ryan on June 28. On July 2, his flat was raided by police. They found manuals on explosives and circuit diagrams incorporating the memo park.

Another neighbour, who did not want to be named, said Ryan was well known locally for his knowledge of electronics and DIY. She said he kept a large electrical welding ma-



Ryan: facing possible extradition

chine and a bench drill in his apartment. "He was very good at anything electrical," she said.

Ryan is understood to have come to the notice of Belgian police soon after entering the country. He was followed from Spain to Brussels, where he rented a room at 6 Avenue d'Overghem.

He is being held in solitary confinement in a high security section of Brussels' Vorst prison and has refused to talk to British security officials.

They are anxious to establish whether he had any links with the three terrorists shot dead in Gibraltar.

New IRA onslaught expected

THE IRA is mobilising a massive stockpile of sophisticated weaponry, including four tons of Semtex explosive ideal for terrorist attacks, according to intelligence sources, *writes Victor Smart.*

Ulster security chiefs are

braced for a bloody and sustained upsurge of violence lasting well into next year.

Latest intelligence estimates of the IRA's present hoard of Semtex, a powerful, odourless Czech-made plastic explosive, have caused dismay. Since consignments were first smug-

gled in two years ago, less than a ton of Semtex has been seized or exhausted in IRA bomb-making.

The terrorists are also estimated to have 2,000 Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles. 'The Provos have barely touched the depths of their arsenal,' said a security source.

The IRA is believed to have stockpiled weapons from four Libyan shipments until the chance interception of the gun-running ship Eksund a year ago.

Security forces now routinely assume the terrorists have access to SAM-7 or even more advanced surface-to-air missiles. None of these weapons, however, appear to be causing such grave concern as the Semtex, with 10 times the power of the IRA's home-made explosives. Sniffer dogs are unable to detect it by smell.

'Most alarming is that a terrorist can wrap the explosive around him for hours quite happily until he needs to prime it,' said one source.

The lethal substance has been used with devastating effect in recent attacks.

There are fears that its deployment could decisively alter the balance of power in the province. If troop movements by road become too risky, British troops could be forced to travel by air as the Americans did in Vietnam. Helicopter support for such a massive operation is seen as totally impractical.

New measures against Sinn Fein and IRA racketeering are increasingly certain: they include requiring Sinn Fein activists standing for political office to be required to sign a declaration disavowing violence, the curtailment of Ulster's remission of up to half a prison term—described as a 'nonsense' by senior security sources—and immediate police access to suspect bank accounts to prevent 'laundering' of the IRA's estimated annual income of £4 million.

THE TIMES SATURDAY OCTOBER 1 1988

How IRA tightened its security

By Jamie Dettmer

A few weeks after the SAS shootings an IRA wall mural to the three terrorists appeared in West Belfast. Three more republican "martyrs" had been honoured.

The mural to the Gibraltar three is, from the IRA's viewpoint, probably one of the most deserved ever drawn to honour dead comrades. For the killings of Daniel McCann, Mairead Farrell and Sean Savage spurred the IRA army council to investigate how deeply the organization had been penetrated by British intelligence.

Some intelligence experts believe army council conclusions from the investigation have helped the IRA to tighten its own security and stop British penetration of the movement.

The SAS ambush in May last year at Loughgall, Co

Tyrone, where eight experienced IRA terrorists were killed, was a triumph for British intelligence.

It was followed by significant arms seizures. Many IRA operations had to be postponed because the security forces were clearly alerted.

According to republican sources, the IRA has responded by reorganizing its command groups and tightening its cell structure.

The IRA has also done much to protect its forty or so middle-ranking area commanding officers who control operations at ground level. They are the most vulnerable of the estimated 400-strong IRA and make many of the operational decisions.

The IRA has also shown it can mount operations against British Army bases and personnel on the Continent.

The security forces gather counter-terrorist information in three main ways: "high grade" intelligence from moles; "low grade" intelligence from piecing together local gossip and surveillance; and electronic monitoring.

The IRA's reorganization has helped to blunt the effectiveness of that intelligence gathering. The terrorists are also becoming more adept at circumventing high-technology electronic monitoring.

According to republican sources, several British high-tech tactics are not working as well as in the past.

The border watch towers, equipped with man-seeking radar and linked to seismic alarms buried in the ground, are not so effective in preventing the transporting of arms and explosives from the Republic into the Province.

The IRA has become more skilful in disguising its movements. Farm animals in particular are being used to camouflage IRA activity. The ambushing of Judge Gibson and the planned killing of Lord Lowry, in which the Hanna family died, were both mounted close to several border observation posts.

Remote sensing equipment on planes and helicopters is also being side stepped more often.

IRA operations are being mounted more frequently in wet and windy weather when aerial observation is less effective. IRA men cover up their tracks around farmland by using cattle.

The increased use of Semtex, the odourless plastic explosive supplied to the IRA by Libya, has given the terrorists a significant advantage.

Rules laid down to thwart IRA plot

THE rules of engagement governing the SAS were drawn up in London specifically for the Gibraltar operation to thwart the IRA bomb plot.

According to Soldier F, the men's commander, the decision to send the SAS to Gibraltar was taken in the Ministry of Defence and sanctioned by ministers. Similarly, the rules for "Operation Flavius" were devised in the ministry.

Titled "Rules of Engagement for the Military Commander in Operation Flavius", they were at the time marked "top secret" and made out in the correct name of Soldier F. For the inquest, his name was obliterated and they were released to the court.

They read:

OBJECTIVES.

1. These instructions are for your guidance, once your participation in Operation Flavius has been duly authorised. You are to issue orders in compliance with these instructions to the men under your command.

2. You are to operate as directed by the Gibraltar Police Commissioner or by the officer(s) designated by him to control this operation.

Should the latter request military intervention, your objective will be to assist the civil power to arrest members of IRA, but subject to the overriding requirement to do all in your power to protect the lives and safety of members of the public and of the security forces.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3. You will be responsible to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, through his Chief of Staff, for the way in which you carry out the military tasks assigned to you. You will act at all times in accordance with the lawful instructions of the senior police officer(s) designated by the Gibraltar Police Commissioner to control this operation.

USE OF FORCE

4. You and your men will not use force unless requested to do so by the senior police officer(s) designated by the Gibraltar Police Commissioner; or unless it is necessary to do so in order to protect life. You and your men are not then to use more force than is necessary in order to protect life; and you are to comply with rule 5.

OPENING FIRE

5. You and your men may only open fire against a person if you or they have reasonable grounds for believing that he/she is currently committing, or is about to commit, an action which is likely to endanger your or their lives, or the life of any person, and if there is no other way to prevent this.

FIRING WITHOUT

A WARNING

6. You and your men may fire without a warning if the giving of a warning or any delay in firing could lead to death or injury to you or them or any other person, or if the giving of a warning is clearly impracticable.

WARNING BEFORE FIRING

7. If the circumstances in paragraph 6 do not apply, a warning is necessary before firing. The warning is to be as clear as possible and is to include a direction to surrender and a clear warning that fire will be opened if the direction is not obeyed.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

8. Under no circumstances are you or your men to enter Spanish territory or Spanish territorial waters for the purposes connected with Operation Flavius, nor are you or your men to fire at any person on Spanish territory or Spanish territorial waters.

B66/5/1A

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STAFFORD HOUSE
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
RAINBOW WARRIOR AFFAIR

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MEDIA RELEASE BY THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONFIRMING THAT NEW ZEALAND WOULD SEEK
ARBITRATION OF THE DISPUTE WITH FRANCE REGARDING
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECRETARY GENERALS 1986 RULING ON
THE RAINBOW WARRIOR AFFAIR.

=

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COLIN KEATING X 8244

APPROVED



MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

22 September 1988

MEDIA RELEASE : RAINBOW WARRIOR ARBITRATION

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon Russell Marshall, confirmed today that the Government has decided to submit the dispute with France about compliance with the United Nations Secretary General's Ruling on Mafart and Prieur to arbitration.

"We have reached the end of the road in our direct talks with France," said Mr Marshall.

"Enormous efforts have been made at the diplomatic level for several months now. Initially it seemed that the new Government in France would be able to bring itself to reverse the shameful decisions by former Prime Minister Chirac. But those efforts have run into the sand."

"Both sides have exhausted the possibilities for a negotiated settlement."

"In these circumstances we hope that by referring the dispute to an impartial third party as provided under an existing agreement, the problem can now be resolved through legal channels and avoid further damage to our relations."

"The decision to seek arbitration should not be seen as a rupture in relations with the French Government," said Mr Marshall.



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VERBATIM SERVICE VS073/88

WEDNESDAY 21 SEPTEMBER 1988

PRODUCED BY LONDON PRESS SERVICE, CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

NEW MEASURES AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCES

The Home Secretary, the Right Honourable Douglas Hurd CBE, MP, has announced plans for radical new measures to help deprive terrorist organisations of their sources of finance.

Addressing an audience of police superintendents in Blackpool on 20 September he said:

"The recent upsurge of violence in Northern Ireland, together with savage attacks by the Provisional IRA on the mainland and on the Continent, have brought home to us once again the menace of terrorism to our free and open society. Members of the police service pay a high price in defending society against the scourge of terrorism. We owe a particular debt to the many members of the RUC who have been killed or injured in cowardly terrorist attacks. Nor do we forget WPC Yvonne Fletcher and the other police officers who have been murdered, or maimed in terrorist attacks on the mainland.

"We insist that our police officers and soldiers operate under the rule of law, and this must be right. But there is another side to that coin. Those who make the laws must ensure that the laws give our defenders the means to defend us. These means must include clearly defined exceptional measures to deal with exceptional dangers.

"In the knowledge of the latest outrages, no democrat with any grip on reality can sensibly oppose a Prevention of Terrorism Act. I doubt that anyone here with direct experience of dealing with terrorist outrages would do so.

"We intend to introduce a new Bill in the next session of Parliament which will renew the existing provisions including the power to exclude known terrorists from the United Kingdom and the power to arrest on reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorist acts.

"We shall use this opportunity to go further and strike directly at the financial roots of terrorism.

"Terrorist organisations need money to sustain them. Organisations which run continuous campaigns of terror need big money. The annual income of the Provisional IRA runs at between 3 million pounds sterling and 4 million pounds sterling.

"The mainstay of their finance - and that of loyalist para-military organisations too - is large scale Mafia-type

racketeering. Although much of this involves crude violence and extortion, there is an increasing element of superficially legitimate money making. Besides the control and exploitation of registered social clubs, there is a worrying growth of involvement in businesses such as pubs, hotels, estate agents, video clubs and taxis.

"So the defeat of Northern Irish terrorism requires the defeat of racketeering.

"We also know of attempts made by other international terrorist organisations to use the United Kingdom as a home for amassing, laundering and banking their funds. We believe that many millions of pounds have been deposited in bank accounts which will ultimately be used to fund acts of terrorism either here or abroad. The time has come for firm action to throttle the flow of cash to terrorist organisations.

"I propose in the Bill to seek a package of new measures to enable the police and the courts to get their hands on this money, and the people who manage it.

"First, we shall outlaw the handling, moving about and holding of money and property that is to be used for terrorist purposes - even if that activity is going on in an otherwise 'legitimate' business. We shall draw the definition of 'terrorist purposes' wide enough to catch anyone connected with this trade of death.

"Second, we shall ensure through the new legislation that banks and others will not be restricted by any contractual obligations from passing on to the police any suspicion about the terrorist origin or destination of money and property.

"Third, when a person is convicted of one of these new offences, the courts will have the powers to confiscate any property or money that he has handled and is intended for use in terrorist acts or in connection with terrorism: the court would assume that such money would be used for terrorist purposes unless someone with an interest in it could show otherwise.

"Fourth, the Bill will enable courts to freeze any dealings in the property liable to be forfeited from the time that the person is charged.

"Finally, police will be given new powers to investigate funds suspected to be the proceeds of terrorist crime or of being intended to finance terrorist activity. They will be able to seek warrants to get at relevant material including bank records of transactions. These new powers will be modelled on those already being used successfully by the police against drug traffickers.

"Democratic governments need to consider long and hard before proposing further measures of this kind even when dealing with the enemies of democracy. We have done so. Our conclusion is that the police and the courts must no longer lack the necessary powers to find and cut off the fuel which sustains the engines of murder."

ENDS VS073/88

How the INLA is coming back from


THE Irish National Liberation Army has its own memorial in Belfast's Milltown cemetery, well apart from the main Republican burial areas. It is inscribed with the plough and stars above the names of volunteers killed either by the security forces, Loyalist gunmen or in brutal feuding with other Republican groups since it broke away from the old Official IRA in 1974.

There is no room, however, on the memorial for the names of those who fell victim to the bloodletting of early 1987 when rival factions within the organisation hunted each other down in Belfast's streets and pubs as well as in country lanes in South Armagh.

Some commentators predicted the INLA's demise at the time, which is never wise with Northern Ireland's paramilitary bodies. Largely unnoticed by the British press, it has in fact re-emerged in the last few weeks amidst the havoc of the Provisional IRA's offensive against the security forces. On August 10, outside Strabane, INLA men attacked a strongly-defended Army post and one of them, James McPhilomey, was killed in a suicidal attempt to engage Army marksmen with nothing more than a revolver.

Gerry Adams paid tribute to McPhilomey's courage, while blaming the INLA for squandering a volunteer's life. Not for the first time Adams called upon it to disband if it couldn't operate with more military effect.

A week later, however, on August 17, another INLA unit in Belfast shot dead in his shop a prominent Shankill Road Loyalist with Ulster Volunteer Force connections, Fred Otley. In a message to the Press, the INLA claimed this as revenge for Otley's role in setting up the murder a few days earlier of two Catholics in the Ardoyne area.



The bloody past of the INLA: the Ballykelly disco bombing outrage in 1982 and Dominic McGlinchey, one of its generals now in jail

As Home Secretary Douglas Hurd yesterday promised to crack down on the funds reaching terrorists, Ian S Wood reports on how a once-feared gang is regrouping

These are as yet isolated indications that the INLA is resuming an active role, but its history has shown that it is always at its most dangerous when it feels itself either to be ignored or in danger of being upstaged by the Provisionals.

Some regrouping within the organisation is thought to have taken place since the truce of late March 1987 which was negotiated by two West Belfast priests. This brought to an end the wave of killings which followed a series of arrests of activists in the organisation made possible by the supergrass Harry Kirkpatrick. He became a star RUC witness against the INLA after serving for a time in Belfast as its assistant brigade

operations officer in a period when, in 1982, it killed more people than the IRA.

The removal of so many of the active membership from the streets, followed by the collapse of the RUC's case against many of them over a three-year period, produced a power struggle, involving both those who then were still at liberty like Dominic McGlinchey and those on remand like Gerard Steenson.

The ideological issues remain obscure, though some Belfast sources now suggest that one point at issue was how far the INLA should go in raising funds from the handling of drugs. In the event the dispute resolved itself in a shooting war between an "Army Council"

faction led by Steenson — which called for the INLA to disband and for a new Irish People's Liberation Organisation to take its place — and a "General Headquarters Group" supported by the INLA's political arm, the Republican Socialist Party. It clings to a shadowy existence and Kevin McQuillen who was lucky to escape assassination during the period of the feud, still makes statements on its behalf as its vice-chairman.

The RUC for a time believed that the two factions would wipe each other out, not a prospect that troubled it unduly, but this appears not to be the case. New INLA units have been formed in Dundalk, South Armagh and in Belfast's Divis Flats, which are now being

demolished but were once a stronghold of the organisation. There are reports too, that survivors of the gang led by imprisoned "Border Fox" Dessie O'Hare are now ready to co-operate along the Armagh border with the INLA. They were operating until recently as the Irish Revolutionary Brigade and are hardened killers who will add to the INLA's striking power.

The Irish People's Liberation Organisation, which Steenson controlled until his own violent death last March, has not vanished from the scene either. It has begun once more to issue communiques to the Press and the cigar-box bomb which, but for his own alertness, could have killed Ken Maginnis,

B6615/1A

the dead

Official Unionist MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone on August 18, was mailed to him by the IPLO. It could easily have exploded before reaching its intended target, killing postal workers or members of the public.

All talk, however, of splits, regrouping and command structures within these bodies probably involves less than 100 people if sympathisers, couriers, and providers of safe houses are left out of the count.

AMONG the latter have been some bizarre products of Northern Ireland's conflict, including middle class and intellectual women, attracted it seems to paramilitary violence and capable of rationalising it ideologically. A prime example of this was the Queen's University lecturer in anthropology, Dr Miriam Daly who was murdered in 1980 by the UDA.

In a broader sense, however, mere numbers and an addiction to grandiloquent military titles are irrelevant to the INLA's capacity for destructive violence, for it still has a core of activists who, in their mostly young lives, have known little but prison and the troubles and in many cases have been brutalised beyond redemption by both.

Their ruthlessness in action against the security forces and the Loyalist community has been characterised by the carnage of the Ballykelly disco bombing in 1982 and the machine-gunning a year later of a congregation in the Gospel Hall at Darkley in Armagh. Although more recently their appetite for killing has been satisfied by internal feuding, there remains good reason for the RUC to keep an open file on both the INLA and those who have broken away from it.



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Reference:

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B67/1/12

21 September 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Northern Ireland/IRA

Proposed legislation aimed at cutting off funds to IRA
(Prevention of Terrorism Bill to be introduced March 1989).

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Hurd to act on terrorist assets

By Terry Kirby
Crime Correspondent

NEW POWERS allowing the police and courts to investigate, freeze and confiscate the assets of the IRA and other terrorists were outlined yesterday by Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary.

Mr Hurd said the IRA had funds of up to £4m a year at its disposal, most of it gained from "Mafia-style racketeering". The Government's crackdown will shift the legal burden of proof, with people holding suspect funds having to demonstrate innocent intentions for the money.

The Government's proposals were first revealed in *The Independent* in June. The key section of the new Prevention of Terrorism Bill, to be introduced next March, will outlaw the handling, movement and holding of money and property destined for terrorist purposes, even if it is within a legitimate business enterprise.

Outlining the proposals to the annual conference of the Superintendents' Association in Blackpool, Mr Hurd said the measures were aimed at the "financial roots of terrorism". Organisations which ran continuous campaigns of terror needed "big money", and Mr Hurd told the press conference afterwards that the image of terrorists as "ragged individuals operating on negligible costs out of bedsits" was inaccurate. He told the conference that the estimated annual income of the Provisional IRA was between £3m and £4m.

Mr Hurd said the new law would draw the definition of terrorist purpose wide enough to catch anyone connected with what he described as a "trade of death", although officials admit privately that there are difficulties in securing such convictions.

The new legislation is modelled on the successful Drugs Trafficking Offences Act, and in the same manner will remove the obligation of confidence on financial institutions which suspect terrorist connections with money they are handling. Mr Hurd said the new Bill proposed the freezing of money or property from the point of charge; once a person was convicted under the new law, courts would confiscate any money involved unless it could be proved that it was for innocent purposes. The police would also be given powers to investigate and trace suspect funds, including the power to inspect bank records.

The measures seem aimed at both republican and loyalist terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland, which are known to be heavily involved in racketeering and use "front" companies. Mr Hurd said: "The mainstay of their finance ... is large-scale Mafia-type racketeering. Although much of this involves crude violence and extortion, there is an increasing element of superficially legitimate money-making."

Reaction, page 3

Hurd terror moves 'dangerous'

NEW MEASURES proposed by the Home Secretary for the seizure of terrorist funds, including a move to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, were provoking grave misgivings last night.

Leading lawyers, civil liberties campaigners and politicians expressed fears that the moves to combat racketeering by paramilitary groups, unveiled by Douglas Hurd at the Police Superintendents' annual conference yesterday, were inherently dangerous.

Sarah Spencer, general secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties, said: "The defendant would be asked to prove a negative — that he did not intend to spend the money on terrorism. In many cases this could prove an impossible task."

Seamus Mallon, MP, deputy leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, said: "I am deeply concerned that the onus of proof could be moved to the suspect."

"This important principle should not be sacrificed, and I hope that this proposed section of the legislation can be changed on the floor of the Commons."

Brian Raymond, a leading civil rights lawyer, also attacked the move. "It opens up the possibility that people will be wrongly de-

prived of their property. The end is one that everybody would agree with, but I think the means to be used will not achieve that."

IRA funds were salted away in numbered Swiss bank accounts, beyond the reach of the proposed legislation. "I would regard this as a largely symbolic gesture. They are not going to get their

hands on the real terrorist funds. That money does not filter down to the bomber or the hijacker."

However, Roy Hattersley, Labour's home affairs spokesman, said: "We support all the new measures... but none of them requires a Prevention of Terrorism Act. He could introduce them all by other means."

By Ian MacKinnon and Colin Brown

IRA raises £4m a year

THE IRA raises an estimated £3m to £4m a year, the vast majority of which comes from extortion and racketeering in Northern Ireland.

Other money is raised through bank and post office raids in the Irish Republic, and a dwindling sum is collected in America by Noraid, the IRA's support group. Attacks such as the Enniskillen bombing have resulted in a big drop in support in the US.

Security chiefs estimate the IRA needs £5m to keep its terrorist machine in operation annually, although Douglas Hurd puts the figure at £3m to £4m.

The figure does not include money to buy the huge stocks of

weapons and explosives sent from Libya in recent years — the security services believe they were a gift from Colonel Gaddafi.

The main source of cash is from drinking clubs in republican areas, gaming machines, building site frauds, extortion and armed robberies and the black taxis in west Belfast.

The measures announced yesterday give teeth to an anti-racketeering task force set up recently in Northern Ireland by Tom King, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. A tax expert has been appointed head of a team with members from the Inland Revenue, RUC, Government, DHSS and Customs and Excise.

He warned that Labour would continue to vote against the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the new measures — to be introduced in the Queen's Speech in November — because of its alleged infringement of civil liberties.

Labour leaders believe the inclusion of the new financial measures in the revised PTA is part of a Conservative tactic to open Labour to the charge that, by opposing the legislation, it is "soft on terrorism".

Michael Zander, professor of Law at the London School of Economics, said that the dangers posed by the terrorists made drastic steps necessary. "It does pose a threat to civil liberties. If you change the burden of proof you risk things going wrong, but it is a risk one might be able to take. It is good from the point of law enforcement, but bad from the point of civil liberties. I would give the authorities the benefit of doubt."

Alan Wright, chairman of Northern Ireland's Police Federation, welcomed the new legislation. "I am very pleased at any steps being made to help defeat terrorism. If we can stop the IRA's money at source we can help to prevent them buying arms and explosives. No organisation can last without funds."

Hauls from Republican clubs, smuggling and tax fiddles keep funds flowing in

IRA rackets pay for its war

David Hearst explains the difficult task facing the police and customs authorities in their efforts to check the arms supply

THE IRA's operations are planted very firmly on home ground, even though its latest campaign is largely provisioned by Colonel Gadafy of Libya. In the words of one RUC Special Branch source, it is still conducting a "do-it-yourself war."

He was not merely referring to the ease with which the IRA can convert domestic technology into bombs — using Swiss parking meter timers, Dutch radio transmitters, mercury tilt switches and agricultural fertilisers, for example.

There is no evidence in the three years since the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed that the IRA has had difficulty raising the funds it needs. Yet during this period the staunching of funds from the IRA's traditional foreign source, Republican sympathisers in North America, has been considerable, largely through the efforts of the FBI.

There has also been an unprecedented level of co-operation between police forces in Britain, Ireland, Europe and America. But that, again, appears to have left the IRA fundraising ability undented.

The source of paramilitary

funds lies in rackets closer to home than bank accounts in London or Switzerland. The chief source for the IRA remains the Republican social clubs, which provide anything up to £9 million of revenue a year.

One clue to the money raised by the clubs is to be found in the statistics published each year by the Department of Social Security, showing annual turnovers.

Clubs in Ballymurphy and Turf Lodge bought in over £2 million of drink last year. In the Ardoyne, an area of only 4,000 registered voters, the figure was £1 million. These figures must stretch the credulity of even the most hardened north Belfast drinker.

The building sites are another lucrative source of funds. Traditional protection rackets are the least of the problems posed to the Housing Executive, the province's public housing authority. The RUC estimates that since 1970 as much as £40 million has been creamed off the £1 billion the Housing Executive has spent on house renovation and construction.

The cornucopia of funds in the building trade is such that



IRA rackets replace weapons like these, lost to an RUC raid

there is evidence of collusion between the IRA and the Ulster Defence Association in dividing the territory of west and north Belfast. In some sites the paramilitary group may act as an employment agency, signing on a group of plasterers for a job in return for an agency fee. The bona fide building contractor will then be approached. If he does not employ this other group of plasterers, his men will be threatened.

Along with employment agencies, a host of legitimate fronts, like estate agents, have been bought up by paramilitary groups as ways of hiding their money.

Tax exemption certificates

are another means of fraud. The plastic card, with a colour photograph identifying the holder, entitles the main contractor to pay cash to a subcontractor who is supposed to declare the income to the Inland Revenue.

At a trial of two subcontractors who had passed £200,000 to the Irish National Liberation Army using the cards, Mr Justice Nicholson said in February last year that the IRA no longer needed to go to America for funds when they could get British taxpayers to buy guns and explosives for them.

Smuggling, the third main source of funds, has reduced the Republic of Ireland's coffers

by up to £100 million a year. Smuggling can involve anything from a scheme to convert agricultural into domestic diesel at £1,000 a run, to cattle or spirits. With a 300-mile border and substantial tariff barriers for a range of goods between the Republic and the North, the opportunities are limitless.

Britain's response has been slow. But there are signs that it is becoming more effective. A Government committee, known as the Paramilitary Finance Committee, has been trying since August to co-ordinate the work of the RUC anti-racketeering squad, the Inland Revenue, and the Customs and Excise. Profiles are being constructed of well-known paramilitary figures whose names are listed as trustees of social clubs, but whose income appears to be limited to unemployment benefit.

Last year the RUC's squad conducted 40 operations against rackets, involving blackmail, intimidation, tax exemption offences, theft, and handling of stolen goods. A total of £2 million of business was involved.

This is only the tip of the iceberg, but it is a start. Until recently the RUC squad had only 20 officers to cope with a multi-million-pound fraud. But as the offensive against the racketeers steps up the days of the financial city states of west Belfast may be numbered.

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THE TIMES THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 15 1988

THE TIMES



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MYTH ON THE ROCK

The Special Air Service has thrived on its reputation as a ruthless band of heroes. It has also been threatened by it — and rarely more so than in the run-up to the inquest on the IRA terrorists shot dead in Gibraltar in March.

The legends born from past operations have been a bonus by creating fear in enemy minds. When the Ministry of Defence ran a radio propaganda campaign from Ascension Island during the Falklands campaign, the main message for the occupying Argentinian soldiers was the “ferociousness” of the SAS.

In earlier years too, when Harold Wilson announced that he was sending the SAS to Northern Ireland in 1976, it was the same deliberate ploy. Although the SAS had, in fact, carried out assignments in Ulster since 1969, the IRA was so alarmed at the announcement that it ordered all operations to be abandoned for a month.

But behind the guise of the SAS myth it has also become easier to tell lies about it. As the Gibraltar inquest progresses, some of the extent of this is already clear.

The three terrorists who were shot dead by the SAS in March were not, for example, tracked by Spanish police right up to the border on the day they entered the Rock. It was not known that the IRA man, Savage, would be driving a white Renault. Nor was he running away when he was shot. According to the SAS tactical commander, Soldier E, Savage was appearing to do the opposite, “to be dangerous and lethally aggressive.”

Before the inquest began many premature judgements had been made. In particular the Thames Television programme, *Death on the Rock*, which appeared at the end of April, attempted to produce all the answers before crucial facts were known. Many of the assumptions made in the programme have since proved to be inaccurate. But the myths — as is their wont — live on.

The evidence at the inquest does, in fact, do

much to clear away the mythology surrounding the SAS. First of all, it is clear that the SAS, very special though they are, are bound by as much bureaucracy as any other unit called in by the civilian authorities.

Formal documents had to be signed on several occasions as Operation Flavius progressed. It had to be ensured that the hand-over from civil to military was conducted according to the proper procedures.

Any action taken by the SAS soldiers had to be based strictly on the rules of engagement that were drawn up and approved by ministers. It appears that the rules were no different from the guidelines laid down in the yellow card carried by all soldiers in Northern Ireland. There was just one exception: the SAS men were told that under no circumstances should they enter Spanish territory.

The aim of the operation was to arrest the terrorists. The myth is that confrontation with the SAS always leads to death. Perhaps the most fascinating statistic produced so far at the inquest was the statement from Soldier F that the ratio between the number of arrests and killings in operations carried out by the SAS was 75 per cent to 25 per cent in favour of arrests.

No one hears of arrests by the SAS in Northern Ireland, because these incidents are never publicized. It is only the firefights between the SAS and IRA that make the headlines.

On the narrow question of the Gibraltar killings, the Government was right to allow the SAS men to appear at the inquest. For they are the only ones who can properly give their side of the story.

On the broader question of the future SAS role, it may also turn out to have been a good decision. The Army's most highly-trained soldiers must not only engender fear in their enemies but confidence among their friends.



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14 September 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT*)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

IRA/Gibraltar Inquest

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

IRA Gibraltar inquest

'Cynical' bomb shocked SAS

From Tony Dawe, Gibraltar

The huge bomb discovered after the killing of three IRA terrorists in Gibraltar was "even more cynical" than the security forces had imagined and would have had a devastating impact on the colony, the inquest into the shootings was told yesterday.

The 141 lbs of Czech-manufactured Semtex explosives found in a car in Marbella, Spain, could have been detonated from outside the territory and would have caused one of the most violent attacks on a city by the Provisional IRA, Mr Alan Fereday, a forensic scientist, said.

A claim that the SAS was ordered to carry out a "shoot-to-kill" operation in advance of the killing of three IRA terrorists in Gibraltar was strongly refuted yesterday by the commander of the SAS team.

The commander, known as Soldier F, refused to accept a claim that the SAS represented "the unholy high priest-

hood of violence charged with dangerous and brutal duties in the cause of the State".

Mr Patrick McGrory, representing the families of the terrorists, told the Gibraltar inquest into the deaths that the unleashing of the SAS on the terrorists was "like signing their death warrant".

Soldier F said: "The actual bomb that was found was

Inquest details5

even more cynical than we ever imagined in our wildest thoughts".

Mr Fereday, of the Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment, Kent, said he examined a Spanish report on the Semtex explosive, detonators and timing devices found in a car in Spain which had been hired by the terrorists.

He said: "I am in no doubt that the device found in Spain is solely attributable to the

IRA". He said Semtex, the detonators and the timing devices had been found in other IRA bombs and that the integrated circuits in the timing devices bore the same batch numbers as a series of IRA bombs, including one found with the gang which planned a series of seaside bombings in Britain in 1985.

Mr Fereday said the 141lbs of explosives would be "absolutely devastating". It was "one of the most violent bombs that the IRA had ever produced in a city centre."

A security scare surrounded the appearance in court of Soldier F, who gave evidence from behind a heavy 15 ft-high curtain so that he could be seen only by the coroner, jury and lawyers. A trick of the light made it possible for his reflection to be seen on a door behind the curtain by some people at the back of the court.

After being informed, Mr

Continued on page 22, col 8

'Cynical' bomb in car link to IRA

Continued from page 1

Felix Pizzarello, the coroner, told the press and others in court: "If by any chance a glimpse is obtained or reflection seen of the witness, I need hardly tell you that you must not in any way describe or sketch them".

Soldier F clashed several times with Mr McGrory during nearly four hours of cross examination. At one point, Mr McGrory accused him of drawing up documents relating to the events of March 6 several days later.

When challenged by Mr Michael Hucker, representing the SAS, Mr McGrory said: "I am going to put a great many more things to this witness indicating that he is not telling the truth. My instructions are that a plan was devised sometime before March 6 that, if this active service unit came into Gibraltar, they would be killed."

Mr Hucker said: "Soldier F has been accused of telling lies in this court. I object to that in the strongest possible terms."

The SAS commander stressed that the aim of the operation was "to arrest the Provisional IRA active service unit so that they could come before the courts and be properly dealt with as criminals and receive their just deserts for the sort of operation they were attempting to mount here in Gibraltar".

Soldier F said that when the SAS team was given control of the situation by the Gibraltar police commissioner it was on the point of arresting the terrorists "in an ideal situation" when the three unexpectedly split up.

"In that sort of situation, you have to arrest all three together

"We did not know which of the three had an initiation device (to explode a bomb). We did not know which of the three would employ it. With the threat that these three people posed, you could not risk the lives of the people of Gibraltar by going on a two-one hunt."

Soldier F, who was not present at the scene, said: "The SAS are trained to fire very accurately and in some circumstances, mainly associated with the role of counter-terrorism, to be able to fire very quickly if the threat merits it."

He confirmed in evidence that the SAS officers had flown to Gibraltar several days before the shootings. They had left later on the day of the shootings without giving statements to the local police. He said that a Gibraltar police officer flew to Britain about three days later to take statements.

● The Sunday Times is being referred to the Gibraltar Attorney General for possible contempt proceedings after publishing remarks made out of court by Professor Alan Watson, a pathologist who gave evidence, and for speculating on Mr Fereday's evidence. The inquest continues today.

B66/5/1A



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JB/CW

9 September 1988

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B67/2/9

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

UK/Ireland: Gibraltar Shootings

Details of SAS deployment and modus operandi in Gibraltar
in IRA terrorist case.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.



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Yacw

Reference:

B66/5/1A

B106/7

6 September 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Independent backgrounder on nature and operations of
British SAS in anti-terrorist situations

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.



New Zealand High Commission

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Yellow

Reference:

B66/5/1A

B67/2/9

B67/1/12

5 September 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Northern Ireland/IRA/Gibraltar Shootings

Backgrounders to Gibraltar inquest on SAS shootings of IRA terrorists, including comment on ROEs for British troops.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Murder of the

THEY buried Sean Dalton and Sheila Lewis in the hillside cemetery that overlooks the wide sweep of the River Foyle as it flows through the city of Derry to the sea. Their bodies were carried down through the steep streets of Creggan, which is now a bleak warren of housing estates synonymous across the world with IRA violence, but was once the inspiration for the hymn 'There Is A Green Hill Far Away.'

Sean Dalton was 55 and a taxi driver. His wife Pauline died a few weeks ago and he leaves six children. Sheila Lewis was 60 and a widow. Last Wednesday they both died in an IRA explosion which the local Sinn Féin leader Martin McGuinness described as 'a tragic accident'. They had been worried about a neighbour of theirs, a young man whom they had not seen about the place for nearly a week. They went to check that he was all right and set off a booby trap bomb which had been left with the hope of luring the RUC to the empty flat.

Before they went on this Good Samaritan's errand both of them had attended Mass at St Mary's church in Creggan, where yesterday Edward Daly, the Bishop of Derry, who has buried so many of his flock in tragic circumstances, preached at their funerals. A local man said to me: 'People here are just stunned, shocked that the Provos could think that anyone in Creggan would be so uncaring as not to worry that a neighbour might have fallen ill or had an accident.'

Compared with some of the deaths that have taken place in Northern Ireland over the past few weeks, those of Sean Dalton and Sheila Lewis may not seem particularly dramatic. Neither of them ever carried a gun and when they died there were no urgent meetings of security chiefs. Yet the deaths of these two good people may be more important in the current crisis in the Province than the much more spectacular IRA bomb attack on an army coach, which killed eight soldiers, or the deaths last Tuesday of three members of the IRA in County Tyrone.

We know from the headlines that the losses which the IRA sustained last week have been a cause for considerable satisfaction to security chiefs involved in the fight against terrorism. But the deaths of three senior activists in County Tyrone and the arrests in West Germany, impor-




MARY HOLLAND, our Correspondent in Ireland, argues that the recent surge in IRA violence could end up by politically isolating the Provos even within the Catholic community.

tant though they are, will not significantly damage the organisation.

Indeed, the ambush by the security forces in County Tyrone, which is seen locally as a carefully planned reprisal for the murder of the eight soldiers, has evoked a certain grim satisfaction, since it seems to underline publicly that what is going on in Northern Ireland is a war between the British Army and the IRA.

The most significant setback which the Provos suffered last week was the bomb that went wrong in Derry because it killed two innocent members of a tightly knit community on which the IRA relies absolutely for support. That is why Martin McGuinness, who has been notable in the past for his refusal to criticise much worse IRA atrocities, issued an immediate statement saying that the incident 'raised questions that the IRA must answer'.

It has been clear for some time now that there is an active debate going on within the Provisionals. This has focused on how to manage the campaign of violence in such a way as to maximise the propaganda effect in Britain without destabilising the situation within Northern Ireland itself to the point of full-scale sectarian conflict. The deliberate targeting of soldiers from British mainland regiments has been central to this strategy.



Edward Daly, Bishop of Derry, preached at the funerals of the 'Good Samaritans.'

The argument for this, as explained by Gerry Adams, is that such attacks on British soldiers not only have more impact on political opinion in Britain but remove 'the worst of the agony' from Ireland. But in recent months, as the IRA's capacity to operate has increased, there have been extremely ominous signs that it was preparing to extend a new bombing campaign in Northern Ireland itself. A statement, issued after the attack on the soldiers' coach at Ballygawley, appeared to threaten a widescale campaign against what the Provos described as security and economic targets.

Bleak prospect

Police sources in Northern Ireland interpreted this to mean that the IRA was preparing to bomb city centre shopping areas, court houses, public buildings and so on. The statement said that such bombs would be accompanied by warning signals but, as past experience has shown, such warnings have a tragic way of going desperately wrong. If such a bombing campaign does ever materialise, the prospects for both communities in Northern Ireland are bleak indeed.

There were — and maybe still are — two reasons to take the threat very seriously. The first is practical. The easy availability of the explosive Semtex has made it much easier for the IRA to make and plant deadly bombs and there are those in the organisation who are eager to show off this new capacity for terror. The second is political. The Provos themselves believe that by their recent successes they have seized the initiative in Northern Ireland and that, despite Mrs Thatcher's assurances to the contrary, the Government is running out of ideas about what to do in the Province.

Father Denis Faul, the Dungannon priest with an intimate knowledge of feelings among the Provisionals' own supporters, claimed last week that the IRA has been recruiting successfully in County Tyrone on the slogan 'Join us, we're winning.'

innocents

But the IRA relies, emotionally as well as practically, on the loyalty it is able to command in Catholic areas, and this is not wholly unconditional. The organisation is still committed to the dual strategy of the ballot box and the armalite and needs to be able to demonstrate that it can command a degree of popular support that extends beyond its own activists. That is why the deaths of Sean Dalton and Sheila Lewis are so important.

The shock the tragedy has caused in the Catholic community is more likely than any other event of recent weeks to put a brake on those within the IRA who have been arguing for an escalation in the campaign of terror in Northern Ireland on the grounds that what is needed now to sicken public opinion in Britain is 'one big push'.

The breakdown of Sinn Fein's talks with the SDLP is another sign that the recent surge of IRA violence may have alienated moderate Catholic opinion to the point that the Provos now face the prospect of increasing political isolation in their own community.

If the events of last week, and in particular the deaths in Creggan, do lead to mounting pressure on the IRA from the Catholic community, that is a bonus which owes nothing to the policies of either the British or the Irish Governments. It does not refute the argument, which many people on both sides of the Irish Sea are beginning to accept, that it is the IRA which now sets the agenda for all debate on Ulster policy.

This week Ministers from the British and Irish Governments will gather in Dublin or Belfast for a hastily convened meeting of the Anglo-Irish conference. Given the pattern of recent violence it seems inevitable that this meeting will be dominated by security matters. Yet both sides know, and to their credit keep repeating, that the only hope of restoring peace in Northern Ireland is through political progress. The prospects for such progress seem bleaker than ever just at the moment, yet it is essential that both Governments demonstrate a common determination to get political discussions going again. If they fail both communities in Northern Ireland will draw the conclusion that the initiative has now been ceded to the men of violence.

NEWS IN

AMBUSHED

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A11

FOCUS

IN OMAGH

● The security forces were delighted. An SAS unit had wiped out three armed IRA terrorists and prevented a murder. But in the aftermath the authorities displayed excessive caution, refusing to capitalise on their success. The IRA snatched the chance to turn a defeat into a victory in the all-important propaganda war

INSIGHT

THE MAN in the boiler suit heard the car first then, looking up, he saw the white Ford Sierra speeding down the road towards him. Something had gone terribly wrong. He should have been warned. That was the plan.

He jumped up from the spare wheel he had been crouching over and ran for the gates of a derelict farm just 10 yards away. As he ran, he heard the all-too-familiar staccato chatter of an AK47 assault rifle firing a sustained burst.

Bullets sprayed around him, ricocheting off the ground and buildings. Miraculously, he was not hit.

The car continued past the lorry. Seconds later its occupants must have realised the awful truth.

The white Sierra had driven into a carefully prepared trap. As it emerged from the shadow of the lorry it was raked with fire from the SAS men in position and waiting. Men hidden on both sides of the road fired con-

tinuously. Unlike the man in the boiler suit, the occupants of the car had nowhere to run.

Some 50 yards past the lorry the car came to a shuddering halt. The operation was over. The three terrorists were dead.

THE operation, the security services claim, began after they received intelligence that the IRA planned to murder a former member of the UDR living in the Omagh area. They learnt the likely date of the planned attack, and the fact that the man would be shot after he had driven his lorry to work.

The man's lorry cab was secretly lined with armour plating and last Tuesday morning he stayed at home while an SAS man, disguised as the driver, took the vehicle along the B4 Omagh to Carrickmore road towards the intended victim's place of work.

During the night, three IRA terrorists had picked up their weapons and staked out the workplace, but the SAS team deliberately stopped the lorry at a pre-arranged spot and punctured one of the tyres.

The lorry's position had been carefully chosen. The area is largely republican,

and word was bound to reach the IRA quickly about the vehicle's whereabouts. The plan was to draw the IRA gang into an area controlled by the SAS.

There were bushes in which soldiers could hide, a disused cow barn where part of a wall was knocked through to provide a better line of fire, and a derelict house for watching the road along which the IRA men were expected to arrive. The SAS man in the boiler suit was to be "the tethered goat".

THE ONLY witnesses to last Tuesday's shooting were the terrorists themselves and the SAS unit. The sequence of events reported to Insight comes, therefore, from sources in the security forces.

As described it was the perfect ambush; and, apart from the initial hitch, it worked perfectly. There could be none of the recriminations that followed the Gibraltar shootings: the three men were known terrorists; they were armed; they were on a murder mission; and they fired first.

In public relations terms it should have been a coup for the authorities. Unfortunately the aftermath was a good deal less successful than the action itself.

No one was likely to forget the remarks made 11 days ago by Tom King, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. After crisis talks with Margaret Thatcher about the upsurge of violence in the province, King said: "Of the matters resolved, some will become apparent shortly in various particular ways... I'm not at liberty to go into them in detail."

That statement puzzled members of the security forces, who had no information on any initiative. It was widely read as hinting at a new, more aggressive counter-terrorist policy. And as the British government has officially given no details about its new security plans, it was enough for the recriminations to start.

After the killings there were widely-expressed fears that King's statement had presaged a new British "get tough" policy in which "shoot to kill" was an

essential ingredient. The shootings, it was believed, were the first example of that policy in action.

The first to express doubts about the manner in which the terrorists died was Father John Cargan, a priest from Omagh, shortly after he visited the scene.

With the area cordoned off, and only scant details available about what had occurred, Cargan, who had seen the bodies, told journalists: "I don't know if they are Roman Catholics or not... Irrespective of who they are, it is not the way people should die."

Then Charles Haughey, the Irish prime minister, publicly asked the Anglo-Irish secretariat in Belfast for a full and urgent report. The following day the Irish government also asked for an early meeting of the Anglo-Irish ministerial conference.

At the same time Seamus Mallon, the deputy leader of the Social Democratic and Labour party in Ulster, spoke on the Radio 4 Today programme, asking

whether the soldiers were under orders "simply to eliminate these people". He questioned whether there had been an alternative way of dealing with them.

Concern quickly spread to London. Jim Marshall, Labour's Northern Ireland spokesman, said he would press King for "a full disclosure to ensure that there is no repetition of the shoot-to-kill policy".

PUBLICLY, the reaction of the security forces was to say nothing. Privately, officials were frustrated and dismayed.

Propaganda is a weapon employed by both sides in Northern Ireland. The IRA is adept at using it to whip up support at home and abroad. To the security services it is essential in highlighting the brutality of the IRA compared with more moderate republicans, as well as pacifying Ulster unionists and countering international sympathy for the republican cause.

"We could hardly have been in a better position,"

said one intelligence source. "Yet, once again, we managed to make a disaster out of a triumph."

Excessive caution shown by both government ministers and the RUC is now said to have cost the security services the advantage in the propaganda war.

The first police statement issued on Tuesday, simply said that a shooting had occurred after soldiers encountered armed men in a vehicle. "There are no security force casualties," it revealed.

The statement did not, however, mention the three dead terrorists or the fact

that the men had been on a murder mission.

It was then left to Seán Fein, the political wing of the IRA, to announce the names of the dead: two brothers, Gerard and Martin Harte, from Loughmacrory, and Martin Harte's brother-in-law, Brian Mullin, from Six-milecross, Co Tyrone.

On television that night Father Cargan gave his version of events. Government ministers recalled the controversy surrounding statements made by ministers in the aftermath of the Gibraltar shootings. They were unwilling to make public statements until the dust had settled.

It was not until the following day that the RUC revealed that Gerard Harte was commanding officer of the Provisional IRA in mid-Tyrone and, in their eyes, a "ruthless, dedicated terrorist".

Martin Harte, the RUC added, was known to target

members of the security forces in the mid-Tyrone area and had been picked up for questioning about last month's bomb on the Omagh-Ballygawley road which killed eight British soldiers and injured another 27. Mullin was also known to have played a prominent part in IRA operations in the Omagh area.

There was then another delay, until Thursday, before the RUC revealed that it had found cartridge

casings at the scene from one of the weapons carried by the terrorists, showing that at least one of their weapons had been fired.

It was not until Friday afternoon that the cordon around where the shooting occurred was lifted, and bullet holes from shots apparently fired by the terrorists could clearly be seen.

Finally yesterday afternoon Tom King issued a statement about the SAS operation. He confirmed

that the security forces had been "under attack" by the IRA and praised their "courage and resolution".

But, the lack of such a strong statement earlier led to a rash of speculative reporting last week. There was general agreement among politicians and the media that the shootings marked the first stage of a new hard-line government policy.

However, this is firmly denied by sources in the security forces. "There has been no change of emphasis," said one MoD source. "Covert operations are the cutting edge of the war in Northern Ireland. Within the law, we have to make use of any opportunities that come our way and use what intelligence we get."

"A while ago things seemed to be going our way and then the IRA had some successes. This time we were lucky."

Edward Pearce, Page B4

Arrested in Europe

A CRACKDOWN on drug smuggling was an important factor in the arrest last week of two IRA terrorists as they tried to cross the border between Holland and West Germany.

Terence McGeough, 30, believed to be a key figure in the IRA's campaign on the Continent against members of the British armed forces, was arrested with another IRA man, Gerald Hanratty, 29, crossing the border along a remote farm track.


Customs officers found a .38 pistol wedged between the two front seats of the car. On the floor behind the seats they found another two pistols in a plastic bucket, and in the boot there were two Kalashnikov rifles, wrapped in a polythene bag, which showed signs of having recently been dug up.

The fact that the weapons had obviously come from an arms cache has led to suspicion that McGeough may have been the "quartermaster" for IRA terrorists on the Continent.

Ballistic tests have shown that one of the Kalashnikovs was used in an attack on three off-duty RAF men in the Dutch town of Roermond in May when one serviceman died. It was also the weapon used to fire on police after a bomb attack in Duisburg, West Germany, in July.

In attempting to enter West Germany without being challenged, McGeough and Hanratty crossed at a point where there is no border post. The area they chose, however, from Limburg into Westphalia is notorious as one favoured by drug smugglers transporting consignments from Holland into West Germany.

As such, there are regular night patrols by German customs officers, armed and with dogs. They frequently go on foot because car headlights would reveal their presence



McGeough sandwiched between two German officers

over a wide area because of the flat terrain. The men chosen for the patrols are of a high calibre, well used to dealing with smugglers who might be armed.

It was the sheer presence of mind of one such officer, the German authorities said last week, which led last Tuesday night to two of the most wanted men in Europe surrendering without a struggle.

A patrolling customs officer saw the terrorist's car slowly edging down the track and at first believed the men inside were drug smugglers.

Earlier in his career the officer had been involved in a particularly fierce gun battle with a drug gang and ever since had taken no chances. Pulling out his pistol, he waited until he was close up to the car before shining a power-

ful handlamp at the occupants, and ordering them to put their hands on the dashboard.

State prosecutor Alexander Prechtel said last week: "It is surprising that they did not resist arrest but he already had his gun out. It was around midnight so the people in the car would not have known whether this officer was alone or had others nearby.

"Also, he had a big dog which is very ferocious. There was no possibility of making a run for it. And it would be a different matter for the IRA to start shooting German people. This has not been known before.

"As soon as they got out of the car the officer radioed for assistance and fortunately two customs officers were nearby."

Although at least one of the weapons was clearly used in

previous terrorist attacks, investigators have not yet established whether the men arrested played an active role.

All they have to go on at present is that the car in which they were travelling, a Peugeot 205, was hired in the name shown on a false British passport carried by McGeough. The same car was hired in the same name at the time of the Duisburg shooting.

Investigators are attempting to piece together details about the men's recent movements. In particular, they are trying to discover whether the two had a permanent base in Holland or West Germany which might provide clues to the identities of other IRA men still at large.

Police believe they know the region in which the men were staying but have refused to release details, including which country it is in.

They believe however, that both men were caught shortly before the launching of a terrorist attack, probably against members of the British Army on the Rhine. The area in which they were arrested is close to numerous British garrisons and training areas.

Among the puzzles facing investigators is why the men were crossing the border while carrying weapons. After recent attacks in West Germany, it was assumed that there was already a supply of IRA arms hidden there.

They also want to know why the men were carrying a mixture of currencies. Hanratty had Deutschmarks and dollars on him, while McGeough had Deutschmarks, Belgian francs, one Irish pound and 56 Egyptian piastres.

The small sum of Egyptian money is a particular riddle, suggesting that he had recently visited that country. Scotland Yard is checking whether the Egyptian authorities have any record of such a trip.

THE INDEPENDENT Thursday 1 September 1988

Pressure grows for clear statement on security

POLITICAL PRESSURE was building up yesterday for a clear government statement on the operational procedures under which three members of the IRA were shot and killed in Co Tyrone on Tuesday.

The RUC yesterday refused to give a clear answer to questions about the police investigation into the shooting, believed to have been carried out by four undercover members of the SAS.

Tom King, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, told the Commons in February that Sir John Hermon, the Chief Constable, had accepted "in principle" proposals to ensure that investigating officers were given "in all respects full and accurate" information on such incidents.

Following widespread concern about three 1982 shootings, in which RUC officers killed six people in three separate ambushes in Co Armagh, Charles McLachlan, one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, had specifically recommended "that an experienced senior CID officer

By Anthony Bevins
and David McKittrick

should attend any debriefing where firearms have been used by the RUC and people killed or injured".

When *The Independent* yesterday asked whether that procedure had taken place after Tuesday's shooting, an RUC spokesman said: "The only thing we want to say is that there will be a police investigation into this incident as there is into all these things."

He added, however: "We would not be drawn into questions of what goes on with the Army, and when things take place."

A spokesman for the Northern Ireland Office said the RUC was "basically" following the recommendations of the McLachlan report.

But Jim Marshall, a Labour spokesman on Northern Ireland, yesterday wrote to Mr King to ask for clear assurances about the incident. He said: "It is essential

that paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland be combated and defeated, and I know that you will agree that at the centre of all strategies to this end lies an understanding that those who resort to violence must be denied any means of gaining public sympathy or claiming that they have provoked a departure from the rule of law."

Mr Marshall asked for an assurance that the RUC had followed Mr McLachlan's recommendation that the CID investigation should be paramount.

Nevertheless, John Stalker, the former Deputy Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, who carried out the initial investigation into the three 1982 shootings, says of those incidents in his book, *Stalker*: "I was astonished to learn that all the policemen involved had been instructed to leave the scene immediately, with their car and their weapons, and return to their base for a debriefing by senior Special Branch officers."

It was reported on Tuesday

night that four men in civilian clothes were flown from the scene of the shooting within minutes of the incident. Following the ambush of an IRA team in Gibraltar earlier this year — into which the inquest is due to start next Tuesday — early departure would appear to be SAS procedure.

But Mr Stalker says in his book: "In the rest of the United Kingdom, the police officers would never have been allowed to leave the scene of the shooting, unless they were injured, until the senior CID officer gave them permission. They would have been subjected to the most rigorous forensic examination and their weapons removed from them for test firing and exhibit purposes. These strict rules apply even to members of the SAS if they are deployed in earnest on the mainland."

"The system is designed to protect the officers involved as well as to give the best evidence to the courts."

Leading article, page 20
Louis Blom-Cooper, page 21

IRA admits ambush men were on 'active service'

THE IRA admitted yesterday that the three men shot dead at Drumnakilly, Co Tyrone, on Tuesday were "on active service" at the time.

The Northern Ireland authorities gave no further information on the exact circumstances of the shooting, but police described all three as important IRA figures.

A revolver was discovered in their car, in addition to two AK47 rifles recovered on Tuesday night. Police said a number of spent bullets found at the scene appeared to be consistent with the recovered weapons, and said tests were being carried out on them.

One of the three dead men, Gerard Harte, was said by the RUC to be the head of the IRA's mid-Tyrone brigade.

Another, Martin Harte, was questioned last week about the

Ballygawley coach bombing which killed eight soldiers earlier this month.

The third man shot dead was identified as Brian Mullin, from Sixmilecross.

Although the official version of what happened has yet to emerge, the most likely scenario is that the three IRA men were intent on attacking an off-duty member of the Ulster Defence Regiment whose lorry was parked by the roadside.

According to speculation, the IRA team was ambushed by SAS soldiers hidden in a derelict house close to the lorry.

Local people said they heard a long burst of shots, followed by a shorter burst and single shots.

The area was still sealed off yesterday.

According to people in the district, the only eye-witness may have been a boy cycling nearby at the time.

He is described as a friend of some of the dead men, and is said to be badly shaken by the experience.

The list of IRA suspects given to Margaret Thatcher by Ken Maginnis, the Ulster Unionist MP, in the wake of the Ballygawley bombing may have included the names of the men shot in Tuesday's ambush, **Alan Murdoch** writes.

During an interview yesterday on Irish radio, Mr Maginnis said

that some of the names of the men shot in the ambush could have been mentioned during his briefing with Mrs Thatcher.

He said he had used several names to illustrate the involvement of known IRA men in the bus bombing.

"It could well be, if I could recall, that some of these people were mentioned. They were well-known terrorists," he said.

He added that he was satisfied the three men had been "on their way to commit a crime".

Mr Maginnis said that under these conditions the only way to stop them inflicting injuries on others was "to take the ultimate action".

He added that if selective internment had been brought in some time ago, Tuesday's deaths might have been averted.

B666-11A

THE GUARDIAN
Thursday September 1 1988

Hallmark 'SAS' ensures few questions answered

'Military link' of broken down truck

David Pallister

THREE armed IRA men, known to the security forces, were driving along a narrow, winding road through the marshy farmlands of Tyrone. They were in a hijacked car and on paramilitary business.

Unconfirmed reports suggest their target was a member of the security forces whose van, possibly as a decoy, had broken down on the road six hours before.

Five miles from Omagh, the three volunteers died after one long machine gun burst followed by one short burst and then single shots.

Within minutes the place was flooded with soldiers and policemen and four men, wearing jeans, scrambled aboard an army helicopter. The operation had all the hallmarks of a covert SAS action.

The exact circumstances of the killings are unlikely to emerge for a long time. Who shot first? Were the soldiers at risk? Was any consideration given, even at the briefing stage, to effecting an arrest? And was the action part of Mrs Thatcher's security review?

In the absence of any detailed police or army statement, all the evidence suggests that the SAS were set on what is known euphemistically as a negotiation.

Fifteen months after eight members of the IRA's East Tyrone Brigade, and an innocent passerby, were killed by the SAS at Loughgall as the IRA prepared to attack a police station, there is still no date for an inquest.

The killing of six people by the SAS-trained Headquarters Mobile Support Unit of the RUC in 1982 — the subject of the inconclusive Stalker inquiry into allegations of a shoot-to-kill policy — has not been examined by an inquest jury.

In both the Loughgall and Omagh cases, the SAS men who pulled the triggers will have to give no more account of their actions than a written statement. In Northern Ireland they are not obliged to give personal evidence at inquests.

Their appearance at the Gibraltar inquest, which opens next week into the shooting of three IRA members there in March, will be the first public examination of their methods since the Iranian embassy siege inquest seven years ago.

Since the furore over the RUC shootings in 1982, a government policy decision was taken, with advice from M15, that any future aggressive action against the IRA should be undertaken by the SAS, whose units are based at Palace Barracks in Holywood and Gough Barracks in Armagh.

The key to SAS success is intelligence, a task the unit has concentrated on ever since its members were deployed individually in Northern Ireland at the beginning of the troubles.

Not all SAS covert killings in Northern Ireland have gone smoothly. In the late seventies, when they were first publicly deployed as a combat unit, two troopers were charged with murdering 16-year-old John Boyle, who they believed, wrongly, was a terrorist about to lift a rifle and fire at them.

They were acquitted, but conflicting evidence at the trial led to the SAS taking a less prominent role. Instead it began to train proxies like the RUC's mobile support units.

● The Attorney-General in Gibraltar, Mr Eric Thistlethwaite, has decided not to prosecute any of the SAS soldiers involved in shooting the three IRA members.

Mr Thistlethwaite, who ordered his own police inquiry into the shootings, yesterday said he would reserve his right to change his mind in the light of evidence to the inquest, which starts on Tuesday.

His inquiry was conducted by a senior officer in the Gibraltar police, who took statements from the seven SAS men involved and from Spanish police who tracked the three IRA members to the Rock.

Mr Thistlethwaite said he was satisfied with the thoroughness of the inquiry, adding that his decision had been passed to the coroner, Mr Felix Pizarrello.

Owen Bowcott

EARLY ON Tuesday morning, a large truck was seen parked opposite a derelict house on the Drumnakilly Road, known locally as Sarah Carr's house, one of its last occupants who died about 10 years ago.

Mr Hugh McAleer, whose farmyard looks out on to the road, saw the vehicle parked and thought it belonged to the man who had bought the house. He presumed the man had come to do some peat cutting and was intending to go over and greet him.

Later during the morning, the father of Mr Enda Cummins went past the lorry. He told his son later there was a man "with a military appearance" near the vehicle. It looked as if the truck had broken down but the man apparently declined assistance when others stopped, waving them on instead.

At 2 pm, the masked IRA men burst in to the house of Mr Justin McBride. They told the occupants to stay put and not to contact the police. They then drove off in Mr McBride's red Fiat.

Just before 3 pm, Mr Thaddeus McAleer went up to the Brick House farm around the corner and found it was held by IRA men. It is presumed the active service unit had taken over this second house shortly after they had left Mr McBride's.

At 3.10 pm, Mr Eamon McCullough, a salesman, and his two young children, Connor and Claire, arrived at the back of the Brick House and were also taken inside.

At 3.40 pm, the IRA returned the red Fiat to Mr McBride's home and apologised for disturbing him.

At about 3.50 pm, the gunmen left the Brick House in Mr McCullough's white Sierra, telling those inside they would be back in 10 minutes.

Minutes later, they were killed in a hail of bullets just a few hundred yards down the road towards Omagh.


Locals who heard the shots claim there was one prolonged burst of machine gun fire, followed by a pause, then another short burst and a few more shots, or possibly just one shot depending upon differing accounts.

A few minutes later, the first of several helicopters arrived and hovered overhead. Another flew in and landed. Some witnesses described seeing four men in civilian clothes climb into it.

At about the same time, a red car, presumably driven by security personnel, was reported to have travelled down the road towards Omagh, turned left up a side road and sped off along roads that were quickly sealed by the army and police.

Locals claim large numbers of soldiers were present in the immediate area after the shooting but before the helicopters touched down.

Guardian reporters look at the sequence of events, local reaction and the SAS role



Countdown to death . . . The sequence of events which led to the shooting of three IRA men on the Omagh to Carrickmore road in an ambush by the army

Hostage feared for life

Owen Bowcott

ONE OF the men held at gunpoint by the IRA gang yesterday said he thought they were the UVF and feared he was about to be shot in revenge for the Ballygawley bus bombing.

Mr Thaddeus McAleer, who lives near the scene of the shootings, had driven his mechanical digger up to the farmhouse owned by his family on the main Carrickmore to Omagh road.

As he went up to the back-door hooded men took him inside. "They were wearing masks or woolly balaclavas with holes in for their eyes. They had a rifle and asked me to go in the house. That was about just before 3 pm.

"We were in the sitting room and they were checking us

every now and again. The curtain on the window was pulled shut.

"After 10 minutes or so Mr McCullough, a salesman, and his two children who had come round to the back of the house in their white Sierra were also brought inside.

"We sat there for about half an hour and then they headed off in the car. They said they would be back in 10 minutes but after about two or three minutes we heard shooting. About 50 shots from a machine gun lasting about a minute. Then a space, then shooting again then more shots.

"We waited in the room and the next thing we heard was the helicopter. We were peeping out through the curtains and we saw the police on the road so we went out to them. They asked us to go back into the house. We didn't see the car."

Unknown to Mr McAleer, his young son Colin who had been playing with friends at a cottage just across the road from his own house had been held captive for over an hour and a half.

Colin said yesterday: "Neighbours had finished about 10 minutes before on television and we were playing in the hallway when men burst in. They said we should lie down on the floor and close the curtains, and to stay where we were.

"One of them threw a bullet on the floor and said 'If you go, you get this bullet through you.'"

The men burst in at about 2 pm and took the family's red Fiat. "They came back at about 3.40 pm and apologised that the car was a wee bit dirty and then threw the keys back. The phone was wrecked. They said they were sorry to disturb us."

2 HOME NEWS

After the killing of three terrorists in Tyrone, Cu

Village mourns shot IRA men

Owen Bowcott in Omagh

N HILLTOP Carrickmore, where the kerbstones are painted orange, white and green, the Irish Republican tricolor flew at half mast in the municipal park yesterday.

For miles along the lanes of County Tyrone around the village of Loughmacrory, home to two of the dead IRA men, black flags were nailed to telegraph poles and trees.

Father Peter Coyle, a Catholic priest born locally, visited the family of Gerard and Martin Harte on Tuesday evening. He said one of the most sickening things had been a stream of telephone calls to the parents, mocking them.

Relatives and friends of the two brothers passed through the family home all day. Mrs Harte said her other son had seen Gerard's body in the mortuary. His face was unrecognisable because of bullet wounds.

"The police, the army and the UDR had threatened to kill my sons. Every time they were stopped at a checkpoint they took them out at gunpoint and threatened to shoot them. I never thought it would happen," she said.

In Carrickmore, the supermarket check-out man knew the Harte brothers. "It was a shock when we heard. They

were well known and well liked. They were very pleasant indeed."

Father Coyle said: "The father and mother I knew when I was younger, but then they were totally apolitical."

"The children became politicised by what was going on at the civil rights time. I gather they had had a lot of harassment at the time of internment when it first took place.

"A lot of families who were quite apolitical became quite anti-army and anti-UDR because of the bungs of internment and the way it was handled."

When he was young, there had been problems for Catholics to get jobs. "Now the general feeling around here is one of hopelessness."

Ten miles away to the west in Omagh there are some fiercely unionist estates where the pillar boxes are painted red white and blue. So are the kerbstones.

For the local Democratic Unionist Party leader, Mr Oliver Gibson, the shooting, though regrettable, may mark an improvement in the security situation. "If this is the first of a new initiative that would eradicate terrorism from the community then I think most of the people I represent would welcome it," he said.

Omagh district council, which also covers Carrickmore, is a hung authority with 13 na-

tionalist to eight unionist councillors. Overall about 60 per cent of the people locally are Catholic and 40 per cent Protestant.

For most of yesterday the Carrickmore to Omagh road remained sealed. Soldiers, their faces smudged with camouflage cream, crouched uncomfortably in ditches, their rifles at the ready.

The RUC, cradling carbines, seemed more relaxed, manning the security cordon as for any security operation in the Province.

Where the killings took place near Drumnakilly, a picturesque stretch of peat bog before the Sperrin hills, local families testified to the good relations in the mixed Protestant and Catholic community.

Mrs Margaret Rutledge, who heard the shots, was at her front door while her younger son pretended to fire a rifle with a stick. She said: "It's a mixed community. Both sides get on very well. Many people leave their doors open."

"A few years ago there was a UDR man who was shot just down the road. He recovered, but other than that there's been very little trouble here."

Farmer Mr Hugh McAleer's only complaint was the perpetual low flights by army helicopters. "You can't sleep here after 6 am in the morning with the helicopters crossing overhead."

Shootings raise concern over SAS action in Ulster

THE CRITICAL question raised by yesterday's shootings concerns the control over operations of the SAS in Ulster.

Following allegations of an RUC-based "shoot to kill" policy after three separate shootings when six people were killed by the police in Co Armagh in 1982, tighter curbs were officially proposed for the security operations of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

The announcement of the new policy was made by Tom King, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in the Commons earlier this year. He said on 17 February that a special investigation carried out by one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, Charles McLachlan, had concluded that "notwithstanding security and other considerations, there is a proper procedure for the investigation of all serious incidents, and that full and accurate information is given to the Director of Public Prosecutions".

Mr King said that it was a key part of thorough investigation of serious incidents "that the poli-

By Anthony Bevins
Political Editor

cies and practices of the RUC should in future reflect the paramountcy of the CID investigations, including the need for evidence to be preserved and for no obstacle to be placed in the way of questioning of suspects and witnesses".

If those involved in shootings are not made available for police questioning, that would obviously be an impediment to investigation.

Mr McLachlan recommended that in controversial incidents involving RUC officers, an experienced and senior CID officer should attend any debriefing where firearms had been used by the RUC and people killed or injured.

He also urged "improved arrangements at the scene of such incidents so that the forensic, pathology and photographic resources available are used to best effect".

Politicians on both sides of the border will now be asking whether those McLachlan recommendations also apply to members of the SAS — particularly in the wake of the Gibraltar shootings.

Mr King told the Commons in February that the 1982 shootings and subsequent events — which included *prima facie* evidence of a police cover-up — illustrated sharply "the acutely difficult problems faced by a Parliamentary democracy and the police service in combating the evil of terrorism".

The opposition can now be expected to seek an assurance that those difficult problems, and the new guidelines, are not to be avoided by using the highly secretive SAS, instead of the RUC, for operations which stretch the letter of the law, and that such a calculated policy was not sanctioned at last week's meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr King. ■ The SAS was first officially sent to Northern Ireland in 1976 by the then Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, after a number of terrorist

killings in Co Armagh.

The SAS's arrival and its undercover operations along the Armagh border temporarily put an end to the IRA activities in the area.

No more than 100 SAS men have probably ever been in Northern Ireland at any one time, but their covert operations have served to inhibit IRA activity.

A number of successes against the IRA have been attributed to the SAS. But the Army has rarely officially admitted its involvement.

Besides the shootings in Gibraltar in March, the SAS last year set up an ambush which badly damaged the East Tyrone brigade of the IRA, after intelligence reports that a major gun and bomb attack was planned on a police station.

Last year, following the murder of Lord Justice Gibson and his wife, government sources indicated the SAS presence in Ulster was augmented as part of the Government's plans to tackle the increased terrorist activity.

R66/5/11A

MP congratulates security forces

Ken Maginnis, the MP for the area in which the shootings took place, last night congratulated the security forces: "One must obviously be grateful to the security forces whose pre-emptive action has obviously saved innocent lives."

But, he added, it was a pity it had taken the murder of eight young soldiers to motivate the authorities. "Would it not have been better if this had happened 10 days before the Ballygawley bombing rather than 10 days after?"

Mr Maginnis, the Official Unionist MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, and the party's security spokesman, said: "One would be foolish to gloat on this particular successful operation because, in the very nature of things, there are many more god-fathers and leaders within the IRA organisation."

"Nonetheless, one is grateful to the security forces for pre-emptive action which on this occasion has obviously saved the lives of innocent people."

"What a pity it is — and obviously it is not a coincidence — that this pre-emptive strike took place after the murder of the young soldiers rather than 10 days before."


Merlyn Rees, the former Labour Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, said: "In these areas, which are quite different from Belfast and Londonderry, it is important to have small groups of soldiers in the area to deal with these people who are carrying guns. In this instance, they have been in the right place at the right time."

The Rev Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, said: "I welcome the fact that the shackles are being taken off the security forces and that instead of being on the defensive they are now going on the offensive."

"I hope this is not an isolated incident, but that it will be followed up by other such incidents and the IRA put down in a manner spoken about by Mrs Thatcher — 'swept off the face of the earth'."

■ The Prime Minister was yesterday accused by one of the architects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of ignoring the need for political progress in Northern Ireland, *Andrew Marr writes*.

Peter Barry, the former Irish foreign minister and now Fine Gael spokesman on foreign affairs, said: "Ireland in general, the North and the South, are not high on the British government's



agenda. They never were and they only tend to think about the north of Ireland when violence erupts there." Reflecting growing concern in the Republic of Ireland that, as the level of violence rises in the North, the agreement is being quietly reinterpreted as a limited, security-based measure, Mr Barry complained that the British were always wanting to discuss cross-border security.

"But we would make the argument ... that you cannot isolate

security in the north of Ireland from political change."

His comments follow a fierce attack in a speech in Cork on Monday night on Charles Haughey, the Taoiseach, who Mr Barry accused of being "unenthusiastic and minimalist" about the workings of the Anglo-Irish Conference. He urged Mr Haughey to call a summit meeting with Mrs Thatcher to lay out ways of developing a joint political agenda for Northern Ireland.

866/5/1A

Three shot in County Tyrone ● Unionist welcomes 'SAS' operation

IRA men die in army ambush

Owen Bowcott in Belfast
David Pallister and
John Carvel

THREE IRA men were shot dead yesterday afternoon by soldiers, believed to be members of the SAS, in County Tyrone, 10 miles from the scene of the Ballygawley bus bombing, in which eight young soldiers were killed eleven days ago.

One of them was among eight men from Omagh held for questioning last week about the bus bomb.

A statement issued by Provisional Sinn Féin in Belfast last night described the three as "courageous and committed young Republicans who have paid a heavy price for peace in Ireland" and named them as brothers Gerard and Martin Harte, from Loughmacrory, and Brian Mullen, from Sixmilecross, all in County Tyrone.

The brothers were both married and each had one young child. Martin Harte was married to Brian Mullen's sister.

A man and a young woman, claiming to be the brother and sister of two of the men, were driven to the police cordon at the scene on the Carrickmore to Omagh road, just after 9pm yesterday evening.

The man, who was crying, shouted at the RUC officers as he left: "They were gunned down by the dogs. They were set up by the SAS, by those northern bastards."

The woman shouted: "They may have gunned down three but a lot more will go for them." And the man shouted

the IRA slogan "Our Day Will Come" in Gaelic.

The ambush of the IRA men appears to have been carefully planned by the security forces and brought an immediate political reaction, relating it to the security review carried out last week after the Ballygawley bomb by the Prime Minister and the Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Tom King.

The Northern Ireland Office refused to say whether the ambush was the result of a change of policy or merely a change of luck for the security forces.

"I am not able to comment on that," a spokesman said. He pointed out that the office had said nothing since Mr King announced last Wednesday that he and the Prime Minister had reached "certain decisions" on security and that these would emerge shortly.

"I can't get into matters of security policy," the spokesman insisted.

However, Mr Ken Maginnis, the Official Unionist MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, who last week said he had given Mrs Thatcher the names of active IRA members in Tyrone, said: "It is obvious that special forces were involved in the ambush. While one can never feel a sense of joy about people losing their lives, one has got to welcome the security forces' pre-emptive action which has probably saved the lives of many people."

Mr Seamus Mallon, deputy leader of the SDLP and MP for Newry and Armagh, who had appealed for a non-violent response from the authorities to Ballygawley, said: "I will suspend judgment until I know all

the facts, but it seems these people have died in what will probably be controversial circumstances."

He said questions had to be answered about whether the dead men were armed or whether an attempt was made to arrest them.

The SDLP representative for Mid Ulster, Mr Denis Haughey, also expressed concern. He called on the security forces to make a full statement.

The IRA men were driving a white Ford Sierra which had been hijacked only a mile from the shooting from the home of a local teacher.

First reports said they shot at the driver of a stationary lorry, believed to be a part-time member of the Ulster Defence Regiment, and then the plain clothes soldiers, hidden close by, returned the fire with a hail of machine gun bullets. Minutes later the soldiers were

whisked away in an army helicopter — the classic signature of an SAS covert action.

It is understood that two rifles were recovered.

A local priest, Father John Cargan, a curate in Drumragh, Omagh, gave the last rites to the men. He described the scene as "horrific" and said that there were two bodies in the car and one lying half out of it. The car was riddled with bullet holes.

A local man, who declined to be identified, said he heard a long burst of machine gun fire, then there was a pause for about 30 seconds followed by a second burst and a single shot. He said he saw about four men in civilian clothes getting into the helicopter.

Last night security forces sealed off a section of the road, which runs through a low lying bog and heather moorland.

A schoolboy, Aidan McAleer, aged 15, said: "I was at a friend's house when we heard shots. We heard that our friend's car had been taken, and that later we heard the men had been shot. Our friends said it was a gun battle."

An RUC spokesman said: "Shortly before 4pm a shooting occurred on the Omagh to Carrickmore road. Soldiers encountered armed men in a vehicle and opened fire. There are no security force casualties."

There has been speculation that extra SAS men had been drafted into the border area because of the IRA offensive against military personnel. An army spokesman confirmed that the SAS operated in the county but would not say if it was involved in the shooting.



The sister of the Harte brothers on the scene last night

THE GUARDIAN
Wednesday August 31 1988

RUC seizes Semtex on bus at border

Owen Bowcott

TWENTY-FIVE pounds of Semtex high explosive and four mortar bombs hidden on a bus bound for Londonderry were seized by RUC officers yesterday.

The discovery was made at a border checkpoint as the Lough Swilly Bus Company vehicle left County Donegal in the Republic.

The explosives, in a red hold-all hidden under a seat, were not claimed when police searched the vehicle. Passengers and the driver were held and some were still detained last night, but no charges had been brought.

The smuggled explosives may have been due to be collected when the bus arrived at Londonderry bus station.

Semtex was used in four bomb attacks in Londonderry at the weekend.

The IRA yesterday renewed its warning that army contractors and suppliers are targets for attack. Two building workers were gunned down this month in an IRA ambush after working at the RUC station in Belleek, County Fermanagh.

A statement issued yesterday said contractors and fuel suppliers to the army and police would be attacked if they continued to co-operate with the security services.

"The killing in Belleek of Fred Love and William Has-sard [the building workers] was evidence of what the IRA called their commitment to carry out the threat," it said.

The IRA had detailed intelligence on fuel contractors, their management and drivers supplying the security services, it added.

"The Provos will be taking action and the contractors and fuel suppliers need not complain they didn't know they were warned," the statement concluded.

Army maps showing military bases in West Germany, which were discovered in a rubbish skip near Londonderry, were put on display

yesterday by a local Unionist politician, Mr Gregory Campbell.

Mr Campbell, who criticised lax security, said: "This was a public area.

"Anyone could have had access to them. Someone is helping the IRA to kill British soldiers."

Army headquarters in Lisburn confirmed that the maps, in English and German, were for use by the British Army of the Rhine. But a spokesman said the maps were not secret.

An inquiry has been launched to establish how the maps, of which there were about 100, came to be thrown away.



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YACW

Reference:

B66/5/1A
B67/1/12

30 August 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

C.C. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Northern Ireland

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.



New Zealand High Commission

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Yelcw

Reference:

B66/5/1A

B67/1/12

26 August 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Northern Ireland

terrorist techniques

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Thatcher and King finalise plans to combat violence

IRA hopes to provoke return of internment

THE PRIME Minister is expected to meet the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Tom King, in London today to finalise plans to combat the present surge of IRA violence.

It is clear that the IRA is set on reversing the Government's decision, so far, not to reintroduce internment without trial. It is thus highly likely that the organisation will try to carry out major acts of violence in the near future. Security forces expect such attacks and there have been clear indications from republican sources that further high profile acts are to be attempted in the near future.

In a move to head off further attacks on British servicemen on the Continent, the Ministry of Defence yesterday announced that the tell-tale registration plates on 94,000 British forces cars would be changed.

Demands for the replacement of the plates, with their distinctive letter B, became irresistible after the opportunist killing by two IRA gunmen of Regimental Sergeant Major Richard Heakin, who was shot dead as he waited at traffic lights in Ostend, Belgium 10 days ago. His murder was preceded by the killings in The Netherlands, in two separate attacks on the same day, of three servicemen based in West Germany.

The calculation of the IRA and Sinn Fein is that one or two attacks on the scale of the bombing which killed eight soldiers in Co Tyrone early on Saturday would generate sentiment strong enough to make internment irresistible to the Government.

Believing internment likely to prove counter-productive, the authorities are considering alternative measures, including a modification of suspects' right to silence and a toughening of sentencing policy for terrorist offences. Not all the decisions which are about to be finalised will be made pub-

By David McKittrick
Ireland Correspondent

lic, as they will concern highly-sensitive fields such as intelligence and counter-measures against IRA attacks.

But the feeling is that some change in the law is needed to make the interrogation of terrorist suspects more effective. Although those arrested can be held for up to seven days without being charged, IRA members have been trained to remain completely silent during questioning sessions.

The right to silence is already under review in Britain. One possibility is to make it an offence, under interrogation in Northern Ireland, not to answer questions on acts of terrorism or the possession of arms or explosives. Such a measure was introduced in the Republic of Ireland this year.

It is also likely that sentencing policy will be tightened, since some IRA members have, in recent years, been given sentences

which are considered much too light. One idea, which is favoured by the Army but which appears to have been rejected, is that of cutting below 50 per cent the amount of remission automatically granted to those imprisoned.

The decision not to intern will be greeted with disappointment by the IRA. One republican source said: "Internment will be the home stretch. Once they've tried that — their last resort — and it has failed, that's the end of it. They'll have to go." The IRA has laid its contingency plans and appears confident that internment would be followed by more — rather than less — violence.


The problem for the security forces is that the IRA has so many potential targets. The 10,000 or more soldiers in Northern Ireland are open to attack both on and off-duty. So are the 13,000 officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and 6,000 members of the Ulster Defence Regiment.

The terrorists' target list also includes judges, contractors working for the security forces, loyalist paramilitaries and, on occasion, loyalist politicians. A further category has been added to this after the car bomb killing of Lt Alan Shields, a Royal Navy recruiting officer, in Belfast on Monday. The IRA is also assumed to be planning further attacks on targets in England and on security force personnel stationed on the Continent.

■ A car bomb exploded in Belfast city centre last night, causing extensive damage to buildings but no injuries. Terrorists held a family hostage for several hours and used their Ford Granada to take the bomb to a street behind Windsor House, which houses the European Community offices. A bomb disposal team set off a controlled explosion, but the main charge went off seconds later.

Tories turn on Dublin, page 2

THE INDEPENDENT Wednesday 24 August 1988



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Tory MPs call for tighter security along Irish border

GROWING frustration among Conservative MPs about the killing of British soldiers turned against the Republic of Ireland yesterday with renewed calls for tighter cross-border security.

David Owen, the SDP leader, also called for the border to be sealed — with barbed wire if necessary. The calls caused irritation in Dublin, but Tory backbenchers confirmed that the recent killings will intensify the demands for changes in the Anglo-Irish Agreement when it comes up for renewal in November.

Ivor Stanbrook, a leading right-winger on the backbench Northern Ireland committee of Tory MPs, called for hot pursuit to be allowed into the South and a common command structure covering the border. "We don't have direct contact between the two armies. It's just something the South won't stomach, but we must have some sort of joint security command," he said.

Dr Owen repeated the call he has made in the past to seal the border, with joint security arrangements and joint courts operating on both sides.

He said: "It would be better if the border could be sealed by joint agreement between the two governments without recourse to border barbed wire, mines and an intrusive physical barrier.

"But if, regrettably, the Anglo-Irish agreement is not itself sufficiently robust to create a joint security commission to operate on both sides of the border, then the UK Government should act on its initiative.

"It will be disruptive — many roads will have to be closed ...

By Colin Brown
Political Correspondent

lochs and lakes will have to be sealed and patrolled; farmers will have to be compensated, and the existence of a physical barrier will have a political cost. But there is already a formidable political cost in allowing the IRA to continue unchecked their campaign of terrorism in Northern Ireland."

Sealing the border would be a far more effective political demonstration than internment of the resolve of the UK that the future of Northern Ireland would be decided democratically, he added.

Sources from the Republic stressed that the bomb explosion which killed eight soldiers at the weekend took place 20 miles inside the border and there was no evidence that the IRA terrorists responsible for the attack had come from the South.

"The level of co-operation is very close. There was considerable satisfaction on the British side at the last Anglo-Irish conference in July," a Dublin source said. "We would resist any suggestion that there are gaping holes in border security."

Dublin also viewed with scepticism reports that the reintroduction of internment was now a serious prospect. Margaret Thatcher personally is very sympathetic to the calls for its reintroduction.

The official line being maintained yesterday was that the option remained open. Mrs Thatcher has made it clear that she intends to keep "the enemy" guessing. But Dublin does not favour the policy and right-wingers,

also doubt that it would work.

The main response to the IRA would be a long, hard struggle by the security forces, according to Paddy Ashdown, leader of the Social and Liberal Democrats and a former member of the Special Boat Squadron. He said intelligence would be needed to be boosted and possibly the political arm of the IRA separated from the military arm.

But Mr Ashdown said: "In the end, the hard but unpleasant fact is that I know from my time in Belfast and other areas where I fought terrorism, the battle against terrorism is painstaking, difficult, painful and detailed. That is the battle on the ground by the ordinary troops doing their job effectively ...

"There may be something which points up an inadequacy of intelligence. I can see reasons why there are some steps which the Government would want to take of a political nature, bringing in the SAS in greater numbers, but ... while the SAS have their function, it will not be defeated by glamour soldiering of that sort."

Internment was also rejected by James Marshall, a Labour spokesman on Northern Ireland. He said internment had been discredited and called for better security.

■ A man accused of arms and petrol bombing offences appeared in a Northern Ireland court yesterday after being extradited from the Irish Republic.

Gerard Harte, 24, from Lurgan, Co Armagh, who was arrested in the Republic on Monday, was remanded in custody by Craigavon court on five warrants to appear at Crumlin Road Court on Friday

Michael Evans on the need for stronger border forces

Closing the IRA bolt-holes

In any review of Northern Ireland security, the border with its twists and turns and myriad crossing points stands out as the major obstacle in the fight against the IRA. It is both their refuge and their vantage point. Whatever additional security measures are taken, the border factor has to be taken into account.

The division between North and South runs for 304 miles from Carlingford Lough in the east to the sewage works and municipal tip at Londonderry in the west. Much of the intensive counter-terrorist activity by the police and the military is focused on this so-called "bandit country", particularly in South Armagh. Even the Royal Marines Special Boat Squadron — the Navy's answer to the SAS — has its role, patrolling Carlingford Lough in high-speed craft.

But the weekend bombing of the Light Infantry bus demonstrates why the Government should give the security authorities in the border areas greater resources. The bombing was carried out by the IRA's East Tyrone Brigade, whose members live in small, fiercely Republican hamlets such as Cappagh, Galbally and Benburgh. The same group was involved in the

Poppy Day massacre at Enniskillen. Within half an hour — perhaps within 10 minutes — of detonating a bomb, the terrorists can be back over the border.

Two major steps have already been taken to increase the pressure on the IRA in the border area. Perhaps the most controversial was the decision to erect four 60ft watchtowers in South Armagh. Completed last year, they provide the soldiers who man them — equipped with powerful, high-resolution binoculars — with a very wide field of vision and have proved a serious irritant to the IRA.

The watchtowers are linked to an array of smaller, often temporary observation posts which are dotted along the border. Sometimes they merely comprise well concealed dug-outs constructed by members of the SAS.

It would be impossible, for political reasons, to build a

whole chain of watchtowers along the border. Such a move would undoubtedly be opposed by Dublin. However, since terrorist activity in the border areas near the four watchtowers has apparently been reduced, it would be prudent to consider building more.

The second security step was the decision to form a new Army unit for the border area. The 3,500-man 3 Brigade, based at Drumadd in Armagh, has been in business since July 1. It is too early to assess how effective it has been but the concentration of this level of manpower in such a crucial area, in support of the police, should eventually bring results. Additional troops from the mainland, or a redeployment of units from the two other brigades, 39, based at Lisburn, and 8, based at Londonderry, would put further pressure on the IRA.

The key objective in the war

against the IRA is clearly to capture the main protagonists. In the border areas, this means catching them with explosives or weapons as they cross into the North from their havens in the Republic. Conclusive evidence of this sort is essential to gain a conviction when they are brought to trial. The East Tyrone Brigade responsible for the murder of the eight soldiers in the bus bombing probably brought the 200lb of Semtex explosive up from the South.

In an attempt to monitor movements across the border, the security authorities have engaged for years in a high technology surveillance operation. Sophisticated electronic devices have been developed solely in response to the situation in Northern Ireland.

They include "Unattended Ground Sensors" (UGS), which are buried in a number of locations along the border.

These consist of seismic sensors which detect the pressure on the ground of someone walking by; ferric sensors which pick out anything metallic; and listening devices, some of which can monitor conversations from the voice vibrations picked up from a window pane.

But this high-tech surveillance cannot cover the whole border. The devices, buried just beneath the surface with thin antennae sticking out in the grass, also pick out everything that moves, including cows and legitimate crossings by farmers, some of whose land straddles the border. Moreover, the equipment is expensive and the IRA has tried on many occasions to pinpoint its location. But it is in this area of high-tech surveillance that the Army and police now need more resources.

However, even if the border operations by the security forces are strengthened, there is a

growing feeling in Belfast that there must also be changes in the rules governing interrogation of suspects. Senior security sources say they are seriously hampered by the regulations that were imposed in 1979 after the inquiry by Judge Bennett which followed allegations, reported by Amnesty International, of ill treatment of prisoners by the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

Following his recommendations, supervision of all interrogations was strengthened. Prisoners have to be seen by a medical officer every 24 hours and closed circuit television monitors every interview. Security sources say this system has played into the hands of the terrorists. With the demise of the ill-fated supergrass era, the standard procedure followed by all terrorist suspects today is to maintain total silence.

This is a politically sensitive area for the Government. But it may now be time for a change in the interrogation system. Terrorist suspects should no longer have the right of silence. Nor should convicted terrorists receive automatic 50 per cent remission of their sentence as they do at present. The majority of those released immediately return to their terrorist activities.

B6615-11A

B66 15/1A

B67 1/1/2

Former officer with the experience for tackling terrorism

By Our Belfast Correspondent

MR KEN MAGINNIS, the Fermanagh-South Tyrone Ulster Unionist MP who flew to Downing Street on Saturday for an emergency meeting with Mrs Thatcher, is well qualified to talk about Northern Ireland's security crisis.

As a former major in the Ulster Defence Regiment, he has expert knowledge and has had practical experience of the difficulties associated with tackling terrorism in the exposed Ulster countryside.

Selective internment of terrorist suspects, a move discussed with the Prime Minister at their London meeting, is just one of a series of measures Mr Maginnis has advocated to help to combat the IRA.

Because of his military background, his views on the security situation command respect, and as the Ulster Unionist Party's security spokesman he has strongly criticised what he sees as the Government's failure to confront terrorism.

Alongside selective internment on both sides of the Irish border, Mr Maginnis would like to see more effective use of security force resources.

The rolling hills of Fermanagh and Tyrone provide a perfect setting for terrorist attacks and the maze of isolated country roads are so dangerous that helicopters provide the only safe transport.

Mr Maginnis has expressed concern about the level of man-hours devoted to helicopter patrols. He also has reservations about the effectiveness of troop deployment.

Throughout his UDR service, Mr Maginnis formed close friendships with many of the regiment's serving officers, and as the local MP he provides a perfect sounding-board for the views of troops on the ground.

He has also been a friend of many soldiers and civilians killed by the IRA and is in close contact with their families.

Mr Maginnis, aged 50, became MP for Fermanagh-South Tyrone in 1983, wresting the seat from Mr Owen Carron of Sinn Fein, who had won a by-election after the death in the Maze Prison in 1981 of the then MP, hunger striker Bobby Sands.



Ken Maginnis: "No alternative to justice"

Mr Maginnis left the UDR in 1981 after 11 years' service to contest the 1981 by-election, but was unsuccessful.

Since his election two years later he has kept a meticulous record of the murder campaign in his constituency, and says the fact that no one has been brought to justice for 92 per cent - 160 out of 174 - of IRA killings supports the need for alternative measures.

Mr Maginnis asserts that the Royal Ulster Constabulary is aware of the identities of those conducting the IRA campaign and that their selective detention would help security forces to regain the initiative.

He discounts the view of nationalist politicians that selective internment would be a propaganda coup for the IRA and boost terrorist recruitment. "I don't seek selective internment as an alternative to justice. I see it as an alternative to the unimpeded march of the IRA through the lives of people in this community," Mr Maginnis said.

"I do not believe it would mark the beginning of a recruitment drive for terrorists if the community really cares about the hundreds of people being killed by them.

The carnage of Ballygawley overshadowed a terrorist attempt on his own life less than 24 hours earlier.

A parcel bomb sent to his home was defused by army experts after he became suspicious about the package.



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Yeraw

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The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Northern Ireland/IRA

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Increasing attacks on soldiers show n

Ballygawley attack part of IRA drive for 'troops-out' call

THE CURRENT refocusing of IRA activity, with its emphasis on attacks on soldiers, particularly while off-duty, fits into a strategy by the organisation of attempting to convince British political and public opinion that it cannot be beaten.

The theory behind the campaign is that IRA hopes to demonstrate that its will and capacity to fight are stronger than the British desire to stay in Northern Ireland. The IRA's hope is that, like the Viet Cong, it will eventually succeed in forcing a much stronger enemy to withdraw.

Next August sees the twentieth anniversary of the commitment of British troops to Belfast and Londonderry after widespread violence in 1969. The message the IRA hopes to put across is that its campaign is a permanent one which will never end until the British troops pull out. The IRA's definition of the campaign is based not only on military capacity but also on political willpower.

It believes, in the words of an old republican dictum, that ultimate victory will go not to those who inflict the most, but those who can endure the most. Its strategy is to outlast the British.

What the terrorist organisation would most like to see is a fundamental assessment in Britain of the advisability of keeping the soldiers in Northern Ireland. The IRA would hope that this would lead to the growth of a movement for withdrawal.

IRA leaders are quite prepared to spell this out in precise terms. After the killing of six soldiers in June, one said: "After it came on the news that six had been killed

Reports by David McKittrick
in Belfast
and Colin Brown
in London

in Lisburn, soldiers' families had hours of not knowing whether their relatives had been killed. That sort of thing feeds into local papers and so on, and will increase the feeling that the soldiers shouldn't be over here in the first place. The object is to completely demoralise the British public and government and build up troops-out sentiment."

One of the IRA's fundamental tenets is that all British influence should be removed from Ireland. Another belief, which with the passage of time has assumed the nature of an article of faith, is that this can only be achieved by the use of force. The IRA analysis is that the current level of violence is probably not high enough to have the desired effect on British opinion.

The next year will, therefore, see an attempt to increase IRA activity on as many fronts as possible. There can be little doubt that the target the terrorists would most like to attack is the Prime Minister herself, whom they came close to killing in Brighton in 1984. It is only prudent to assume that the IRA is constantly seeking opportunities for another attack.

In the meantime, the IRA's calculation is that the killing of soldiers will have the greatest impact on British opinion, as well as bringing other advantages for the organisation.

Sinn Fein will be fighting coun-

cil and European elections in Northern Ireland next spring. In the longer term, it is hopeful of building a political power base in the Irish Republic. The killings of soldiers, the IRA thinking goes, will not cost votes in the way that the civilian deaths would.

From the security forces' point of view, the IRA is particularly dangerous at the moment. Rumours of splits in its ranks are dismissed by security sources, who acknowledge that the organisation has never been better armed.

This is due to the enormous security lapse which allowed four large shipments of heavy weaponry and explosives to reach Ireland from Libya. The sobering fact is that the IRA has not yet systematically begun to use an armoury which includes missiles, anti-aircraft guns, rockets, mortars and dozens of heavy machine-guns.

Only a small proportion of these shipments has been recovered, and the security forces acknowledge that the array of weapons in the IRA's possession gives the organisation the potential to raise its profile still further.

The failure of the authorities to intercept the Libyan weapons is an illustration of the fact that intelligence coverage of the IRA is at best patchy. On some occasions, for example in the Gibraltar shootings and at the ambush at Loughgall, the security forces were waiting. On others, the IRA has been able to carry on its killings with an alarming degree of freedom. This record does not augur well as the security forces brace themselves for the expected escalation of violence.

Semtex bomb explosion marks brigade's return

THE Ballygawley attack demonstrates the propensity of IRA units to regenerate themselves after setbacks.

The bombing was claimed by the "East Tyrone brigade", which lost eight members in an ambush by the SAS at Loughgall in May last year. This group will now feel it has gained revenge with the killings of eight soldiers.

The unit which attacked Loughgall police station was led by Jim Lynagh from Monaghan, who was one of the most important IRA figures. According to one reliable security source: "Lynagh was effectively the man who ran the assassinations for the whole border strip."

The absence of Lynagh is regarded as one of the main reasons for the comparatively low level of IRA attacks in the South Armagh region in the past year.

But the East Tyrone unit re-emerged in recent months with the killing of a soldier by a bomb and the fatal shooting of an Ulster Defence Regiment member earlier this month. Another bomb attack injured six members of a UDR patrol. Last month, a 22-

year-old member of the IRA unit, Seamus Woods, was killed last month while launching a mortar attack on a police station.

The Libyan-donated Semtex explosive which was used to provide the power to blow the soldiers' large coach off the road has become one of the mainstays of the IRA's campaign of violence.

The organisation has used the sophisticated plastic explosive in many different ways not only in Northern Ireland but also on the continent. It is more powerful and much more versatile than conventional explosives.

Normally, IRA roadside bombs are made up of very large amounts of homemade explosive. This was the case in the killing of Northern Ireland judge Lord Justice Gibson last year and in this year's attempt on the life of another judge, when three members of a holidaying family were killed instead by accident.

On Saturday morning, however, the terrorist unit clearly calculated that a much smaller amount of Semtex would cause even more damage. The Czech-manufactured material

first reached the IRA in 1986, made available by Libya along with large amounts of heavy weaponry. Two tons of Semtex was seized when the gunrunning ship, the Eksund, was intercepted off Brittany last year, but a comparable weight of the explosive is thought to have reached the IRA in previous shipments.

Although Sir John Hermon, the RUC Chief Constable, said the security forces had recovered considerable amounts of Semtex, the IRA is still believed to have ample supplies.

In Northern Ireland, Semtex has turned up in boobytrap bombs and in impact grenades, which have the capacity to pierce the armoured vehicles used by the police and army. On the mainland, it was used to bomb army premises at Mill Hill in London last month and was found in letter bombs sent to senior civil servants last year.

Last year, 190lb was seized in Cheshire, foiling an attempted IRA bombing campaign in Britain. It was also used in the bombing of an army-RAF base in Germany last year.

NORTHERN IRELAND AFTER THE TYRONE BOMBING

IRA vows the killing campaign will continue

Kieran Cooke looks at the terrorist strategy that sees every British soldier as a legitimate target

"IT IS very difficult, if you are an IRA volunteer, to attack these people when they are in full armour or wearing flak jackets or in jeeps or on patrol with 50 of their mates - so the IRA ends up attacking them when they are out of uniform and then of course they're criticised for being cowardly... it's all propaganda."

That is the view of Mr Danny Morrison, publicity director of Sinn Fein, the IRA's political wing.

To the IRA, the soldiers killed in the bomb explosion in the early hours of Saturday morning represented "an entirely legitimate target. All soldiers, in or out of uniform, are members of an 'occupying force'."

The IRA knows the British Army will never be defeated. But the formula for victory, according to latest IRA thinking, is a simple one: kill as many British troops as possible.

That will provoke a "troops out" movement on the British mainland which will then force the British Government to withdraw its forces from Northern Ireland. The way will then be clear for eventual "national self-determination" in Ireland.

"The armed struggle pro-

vides a vital cutting edge," says Mr Gerry Adams, the head of Sinn Fein.

Mr Martin McGuinness, also of Sinn Fein, says: "Violence is the only language the British understand."

In recent weeks the IRA has put its new strategy into effect with devastating results. Servicemen have been murdered in the Netherlands, Belgium and in London. There have been other assassination attempts in West Germany and in Gibraltar.


In Northern Ireland, 21 soldiers have been killed so far this year. Of those, 16 were off duty at the time.

A short while ago, many people were claiming the IRA had finally been defeated.

In the last 18 months the IRA has lost 18 "volunteers," many of them senior figures in the organisation. They included the three shot by the SAS in Gibraltar.

The organisation had caused several civilian deaths through botched operations. The security forces both north and south of the border had co-operated in an unprecedented search operation which unearthed large quantities of arms.

But the IRA has shown its capacity to reorganise and



rejuvenate its deadly range of terrorist skills. Senior figures in the security forces have been warning for some time of the present offences.

Last May the SAS wiped out the entire command structure of the East Tyrone Brigade of the IRA, killing eight people as they tried to attack a rural police station.

Significantly, it was the East Tyrone Brigade of the IRA that

claimed responsibility for Saturday's sophisticated and devastating attack.

Just as the army has changed its tactics over the years, so the IRA has altered its structure and strategy. In the early 1970s the Provisional IRA had about 2,000 active members. Today it has fewer than 100.

Those members, organised

on a tightly knit cellular structure, are backed up by about 200 "auxiliaries" who store weapons and explosives to supply to "hit men" when needed.

Below that group are about 2,000 active sympathisers who have "safe houses" and act as tip-offs and general intelligence gatherers.

It was from that last group that word was probably passed down about the arrival of the soldiers on Saturday night and the route of their bus to the barracks at Omagh.

There is part of the IRA that is still amateur, whose members, particularly in rural areas, are engaged in ancient internecine tit-for-tat killings over land.

But the security forces are in no doubt that at the organisation's core there is a highly developed, disciplined and skilled terrorist group.

The IRA has strong international connections, not only with Libya, the source of its present array of weaponry, but also with groups in West Germany, France, the Netherlands and the Eta group in Spain.

Sir John Hermon, head of the RUC, says the IRA has learnt a whole array of techniques for dealing with the security forces.

"They are educated to a high

degree in the workings of the legal system and use their knowledge to their advantage. They receive training in interrogation resistance with lectures and practical demonstrations being given to all so-called volunteers."

Sir John says the IRA is helped by a whole body of people who choose to turn a blind eye to what is happening. These might be neighbours or distant relatives fearful of being seen as guilty of betrayal in Northern Ireland's tightly knit society.

"By withholding information from the police... while at the same time expecting protection is untenable and can only result in continuing death and destruction," says Sir John.

The IRA has always insisted it is fighting a war in Northern Ireland. The security forces, on the other hand, are supposed to abide by the civil rules. That means the IRA can snap and bite at the authorities' heels like a deranged terrier, and only be hurt if caught in the act.

Many politicians in Northern Ireland are now calling for more emergency powers to deal with the present situation. Only then, they say, will the terrier be silenced.

Editorial Comment, Page 10

Troubles hone the army's skills but at a heavy cost in lives

By Kieran Cooke

ON AUGUST 14, 1969, a company of soldiers from the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment took up position in Londonderry. The following day, 600 men from the Light Infantry entered West Belfast with fixed bayonets to act as a buffer between Protestant and Roman Catholic communities. They were the first British soldiers to arrive in Northern Ireland in the present phase of "the troubles."

Today, 19 years on, there are just over 10,000 regular army troops based in Northern Ireland, plus 6,500 locally recruited members of the Ulster Defence Regiment.

Saturday morning's massacre on the Omagh road brought the regular army death toll over the last 19 years to 410. In addition, 177 members of the UDR have been killed and 254 members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. This year alone, 26 regular

army soldiers have been killed, three more than the total for the previous five years.

Northern Ireland is the British Army's only operational area in the world. Perhaps contrary to popular conceptions, many army personnel, particularly officers, enjoy their time in the province.

For one thing, there is plenty of action. The army has developed techniques in Northern Ireland over the past 19 years which are the envy of the rest of the world.

They include night surveillance operations and computer checks on cars and other vehicles. In a 24-hour period, the army, together with the RUC, mounts up to 3,000 vehicle checkpoints, referred to in army language as VCPs, throughout Northern Ireland.

Driving over the border on Saturday, and going via Omagh to Belfast, I was stopped at four checkpoints.

On one remote country road, soldiers with blackened faces and guns poised climbed out of a ditch to surround the car.

In a matter of seconds, by tapping a car number into a computer, the soldiers can have full details on car owners and their movements.

New equipment has been developed in response to the situation in Northern Ireland; the army has listening devices capable of interpreting conversations from vibrations picked up from a window-pane.

The skills of helicopter pilots operating in the province, flying at speed to avoid possible missile attacks, very low over undulating countryside, must be among the best in the world.

The army now has in Northern Ireland six resident battalions plus four battalions on four-month tours of duty.

The number of soldiers there has been much greater in the

past. In 1972, when "Operation Motorman" was launched to clear Republican "no go" areas, there were 21,000 regular army troops in the province. Troop levels have been maintained for several years at approximately half the 1972 peak.

But though army numbers have declined, all the headaches of maintaining security for a large body of military personnel remain. The military are constantly told to be on the alert, to check underneath their cars for bombs, to beware when answering the door.

Some lapses are inevitable. The soldiers arriving at Belfast airport on Friday night with their military-style haircuts would have been easily identifiable. It is virtually impossible to maintain security for more than 10,000 men all the time.

The nature of army operations has changed from manpower to an emphasis on intelligence work and surveil-

lance. The elite Special Air Services, the SAS, has come to play a more important, although highly secretive, role in the conduct of army operations in the province.

In the border area, where a new brigade HQ has recently been set up, small groups of highly trained soldiers "dig in," often for several days, in the corner of fields or in remote barns and derelict houses, observing local movements.

From 1969-77 the army was responsible for all security operations in Northern Ireland. In 1977, under a policy called "The Way Ahead," the principle of police primacy in security affairs was re-established, and officially at least, the army is now confined to supporting the RUC in maintaining law and order.

Although that policy has had the effect of re-establishing some degree of normality in

Northern Ireland, it has in many ways complicated the security command structure.

The new General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Northern Ireland, Lt Gen Sir John Waters, is technically subservient to Sir John Hermon, the head of the RUC. Both sides say relations are very close: but occasionally there are hiccups. The RUC says it did not know the soldiers were being transported along the Omagh road on Saturday.

The Army operates mainly in what it describes as "Hard Green" areas, where the IRA is most active. They include West Belfast, parts of Londonderry, South Armagh and other border areas.

One immediate option that the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, now has is to increase troop levels in those areas. A force of more than 600 soldiers, called the Spearhead Battalion, is on standby

Hunt for expert bomber as attacks are linked

David Hearst in Belfast

SECURITY forces yesterday set out on the trail of an experienced IRA bomber or bombing team capable of targeting fast-moving vehicles with static, roadside devices.

Details emerged yesterday linking the bus bomb on the road between Ballygawley and Omagh to the bomb which killed three members of the Hanna family at Killeen, on a fast stretch of the Dublin to Belfast road, only a month ago. The IRA had thought that the car they were attacking contained Mr Justice Ian Higgins, a Catholic High Court judge, who

was returning home from Dublin airport.

As in the Killeen bombing, the IRA operation early on Saturday morning depended on lengthy mobile surveillance of the vehicle and last-minute planting of the explosive by the roadside. The 200lb Semtex bomb was not in a trailer or car as first thought. It was triggered by a long command wire, which security sources believe had been set up in advance, with established escape routes over the fields.

Once the soldiers' bus turned on to the A5 at Ballygawley, the bombers had about ten minutes to plant the device. Recent arms finds in the South have established

that the Provisionals have a good supply of high quality modern radio transmitters, and receivers acquired from Europe.

Both the bus and the Hannas' Daihatsu car would have been fast-moving targets. In each case the bomb was detonated with such accuracy that the vehicle was blown off the road; in the case of the Hannas, over an entire field.

Command wired bombs are used more often than radio controlled ones, because they can not be jammed by Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) packs carried by foot patrols or armoured army and RUC vehicles. Their signals can jam devices over several hundred metres.

A high-level security review of the travel arrangements of some 10,200 regular army troops stationed in Northern Ireland was instituted at the weekend, after gaping security lapses emerged in the arrangements for the movement of the bus and the 35 troops it was carrying.

It emerged that the bus, which was meeting several British Airways flights from England on Friday night, was at the airport for several hours waiting for delayed flights. Servicemen were understood to have been on at least two of three flights.

According to a spokeswoman for British Airways, the first landed from Bir-

mingham at 6.30, five minutes early. The second, from Manchester, arrived at 8.40 and the last flight, from London, arrived at 11.36 — 56 minutes late because of air traffic congestion at Heathrow. This would have given an IRA surveillance team at least four hours' notice of an impending movement of troops.

A spokesman for British Army headquarters in Lisburn said: "All troop movements on Friday night will form part of our security review."

Security sources in Belfast yesterday discounted suggestions that an IRA mole in the ranks of the army tipped the bombing team off.

Rising toll of murder

David Hearst

THE IRA has killed more British soldiers in the first eight months of this year than in any comparable period since 1979, a spokesman for the British Army in Lisburn confirmed yesterday.

Apart from five British servicemen killed in IRA bombings and shootings in mainland Britain and Europe, 21 regular soldiers, three Royal Ulster Constabulary officers and 10 members of the Ulster Defence Regiment, all of them part-time, have died this year. The comparative table, below, shows only those who have died in Northern Ireland.

The civilian column includes personnel linked with the security forces, such as prison officers, as well as Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries.

Of the 68 deaths this year, the IRA has claimed responsibility for 46.

A decade of deaths

Year	Army	UDR	RUC	Civilian	TOTAL
1979	38	10	14	51	113
1980	8	9	9	50	76
1981	10	13	21	67	111
1982	21	7	12	57	97
1983	5	10	19	44	77
1984	9	10	8	36	64
1985	2	4	23	24	53
1986	4	8	12	37	61
1987	3	8	16	66	93
1988*	21	10	3	34	68

* Up to present



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BEYOND INDIGNATION

Demands for the reintroduction of internment in Northern Ireland, which have been growing in volume throughout the current IRA offensive, reached a new climax at the weekend. It is understandable that a nation, recoiling from the carnage in Tyrone, should search for a fresh means of fighting back. But this particular weapon is double-edged; the Government is right to keep it sheathed.

It was following similar pressure almost exactly 17 years ago that the Heath administration resorted to internment without trial. "No one could be certain what would be the consequences", wrote the then Home Secretary, Mr Reginald Maudling, "and yet the question was simply this, what other measures could be taken?"

When in one night more than 3,000 British soldiers raided the homes of IRA suspects, the flaws in this feeble reasoning became quickly clear. There occurred some of the most appalling street violence ever seen in the six counties. Fourteen died on the first day alone. The Army (which had strong reservations about internment in the first place) soon discovered that the police files from which they had worked were so outdated that many of those arrested had to be freed again.

The IRA gained more than it lost from an internment policy which, four years later, was brought to a close. Although nearly 2,000 people were interned (including some Loyalists), the gaps in Provisional ranks were more than filled by the new recruits inspired to join its bloodstained banner.

The propaganda advantage abroad brought funds pouring in to the IRA exchequer, particularly from America, while Britain was rebuked for pursuing a policy of imprisonment without trial. Those inside the perimeter fence at Long Kesh were able to plot and train together so easily (much more easily than was possible outside) that the place was rechristened the "IRA Staff College".

Those who want to try internment again say that it would be very much better this time — mainly because the security forces have improved the intelligence files upon their enemy. They also want "selective" internment only. This presumably means that a limited number of leading terrorists would be seized, thus enabling the authorities to keep them under closer scrutiny inside.

The Government is certainly right to retain internment among its security options. To dismiss it for all time on the basis of the last unhappy experience would be no less foolish than would its hasty reintroduction. There are circumstances in which it might be an effective way of dealing with a cunning enemy.

But those circumstances would have to

include the full support and cooperation of the Dublin Government. In 1971 most of the the IRA "godfathers" escaped over the border (if they were not already living there) and remained until it was safe for their return. The Anglo-Irish Agreement is a step upon a long road to the day on which an Irish administration will intern unconvicted IRA suspects in the Republic — or return them to Belfast to be imprisoned there. Today that Agreement would collapse under the strain.

This does not mean that the Government should do no more than review security procedures. The revulsion on both sides of the Irish border gives Britain a psychological advantage which should be exploited. Border security is crucial and the objective should be the development of a sophisticated cross-border force, able to operate on both sides in "hot pursuit", with joint training if necessary and coordination at all times. This could not be achieved if Britain now introduced internment.

Secondly, the authorities should carry the battle to the enemy. The most effective single initiative ever launched against the Provisionals was Operation Motorman in the summer of 1972, when the Army moved into the so-called "no go" areas of Belfast and Londonderry. Motorman forced the IRA on to the run — where it must be made to remain.

If the identities of the so-called "godfathers" are known, there should be no political fear of letting them know that is so. If necessary, those in Northern Ireland should be brought repeatedly in by police for questioning, released if no charge can be brought and then brought in again the next night. They should be kept in a state of permanent uncertainty.

There should be no need to reintroduce the 21,000 troops deployed there for Motorman. But if more units are needed than the present contingent there, they should be sent. Consideration should also be given to tougher sentencing for terrorist offences (and perhaps less generous remission for good conduct); also to whether defendants should be allowed the right to silence when facing trial. But those impatient for action must see that this too needs to be the subject of consultation with the South.

There is no quick victory on the journey which the Government has begun. Eight more young men have died. For them, in the words of a great Irish writer, "fierce indignation can no longer tear the heart". But the indignation which burns so fiercely in the hearts of those who remain should not destroy the cool, logical, surgical campaign against those who killed them.

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THE INDEPENDENT

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How to beat the IRA

THERE is no excuse for the bafflement seen in British political circles each time the IRA commits some especially disgusting murder. "How do we deal with this evil organisation?" is the question which arises on every such occasion. It is so familiar that one might have expected the British Government would have thought of a coherent answer to it by now. Yet for all the energy with which the Prime Minister convened a meeting at Number 10 to discuss the latest outrage, the waiting world gained no impression that a strong response had been evolved. The policy seems to be to muddle on, taking a few extra precautions, considering afresh whether internment might help, but failing either to defend the existing policy with conviction or to offer something different.

This feebleness will not do. Our soldiers are duty bound to accept danger: theirs not to reason why. There is, however, no reason why the rest of us should let them be shot at without being told of the necessity or purpose of their ordeal. Although one of Mrs Thatcher's strengths is her clarity, she has never, in nine years of power, enunciated a clear statement of British aims in Ireland: one which the ordinary voter, or soldier, can understand, if not approve.

Part of the confusion arises from the fact that a coherent policy for Northern Ireland falls into two parts. The proper job of politicians is to define and pursue political objectives. This task includes setting limits to the activities of servants of the state, among them soldiers and policemen. But politicians' time is little better spent discussing military tactics than it would be advising the water board how to produce clean water. The Government can say, "We want you to catch terrorists", just as it can say, "We want you to produce clean water". Deciding the best operational means of achieving this is, however, a matter for professionals. The latter are not above criticism. They must be called to account if they fail, and must operate within the law. They have, however, to be allowed their sphere of competence.

In recent days, the question of internment has distracted attention. Since it raises issues of principle as well as practice, it is right that it should be discussed and decided by politicians as well as by military tacticians. On the Monday before last, it was argued in this column that it would be unlikely to work, a theme which David McKittrick takes up on the facing page today. But so far as the British Government is concerned, internment should not be the central issue. It is in essence a tactic, albeit one involving civil rights. It is not an end in itself.

What is the policy of the British Government with regard to Northern Ireland? It is that the province should remain part of the United Kingdom for as long as a majority of its people wishes it to be so, just like Scotland and Wales. As in those countries, nationalists who want to leave the UK should be free to urge that course by all peaceful means.

But surely, it will be objected, this is too simple to be anything so grand as a policy. It is, indeed, incomplete, but it is the foundation on which all else rests. British politicians are good at declaring that there must be no giving in to the IRA, that terrorism must not be seen to pay and that democracy must be defended. They seldom, however, observe in their speeches that the first aim of the IRA is to throw the British out of Northern Ireland,

in defiance of the wishes of most of the people there. It follows that to keep faith with the majority, and to defeat the terrorists, the British Government must stay, and must declare that it is staying.

The government of the Irish Republic conceded as much in the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in November 1985. The two signatories agreed, under Article 1, that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would come about only with the consent of a majority of its people. The Republic has not, it is true, modified the claim in its constitution to "the whole island of Ireland", but nevertheless a glimmer of reality had broken in.

The trouble with the Agreement is that a flood of wishful thinking swamped Article 1. In the communiqué in which Mrs Thatcher and Dr FitzGerald announced its signing, they declared: "The Agreement has the aims of promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland; helping to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland; creating a new climate of friendship and co-operation between the people of the two countries; and improving co-operation in combating terrorism." Nobody could quarrel with these aspirations, but after almost three years they look further from being realised than before. Indeed, some other elements in the Agreement actually made their realisation less probable.

In particular, the setting up of the Intergovernmental Conference muddled the waters. It seemed, by giving the Republic a voice in the affairs of Northern Ireland, to change the status of that part of the United Kingdom, and hence to break Article 1. In vain the acute minds which had drafted the document argued that it was internally consistent. To less subtle intellects, it seemed that the Agreement was designed to be all things to all men: to convince unionists that their position within the United Kingdom was stronger than ever (because recognised by Dublin), while showing northern nationalists that they were at last becoming part of a united Ireland (because represented by Dublin).

Unionist suspicion of the Agreement was increased by the feeling that the British establishment would like, if at all possible, to get rid of Northern Ireland. It was hard to rebut this charge, because it may well be true. Northern Ireland costs the rest of the United Kingdom much in lives and money. Yet as soon as the aspiration to desert the province has, for the sake of honesty, been admitted, it should be added that it is impracticable. It is, unfortunately, possible to imagine a British administration willing to commit the act of treachery involved. No government, however, could be justified in claiming that Britain would be stronger for leaving Northern Ireland. A country which had shown it could not stand up to a few hundred terrorists could be expected to quail before almost any foe. One which was prepared to see the development of another Lebanon on its doorstep would be thought by the rest of the world to have abandoned any determination whatever to defend itself.

The bombing in County Tyrone may well call for revision of the security forces' tactics. Above all, however, it demands political leadership by Mrs Thatcher, Mr King and others. They must say that the reason the IRA is going to lose, no matter how long the struggle lasts, is that Northern Ireland is going to remain part of the United Kingdom.

Will the trauma return?

David McKittrick assesses the arguments for and against reintroducing internment in Ulster

ALL THOSE involved in the internment debate, on either side of the argument, agree on one point: it would transform the security and political situation in Northern Ireland. The disagreement lies in whether that change would be for better or for worse.

It is also common ground that when last used, between 1971 and 1975, internment proved disastrous and traumatic. It is difficult to underestimate its lasting effect on the Irish nationalist psyche: the anniversary of its introduction is still, more than a decade on, one of the major dates in the Republican calendar.

The memory of internment endures because it has never been just another security measure. Symbolically and in practice, it would mark a new era in government policy in Northern Ireland. It would represent an admission that the rule of law is inadequate to deal with the IRA, and signal a reversal of the policy adhered to, through many difficulties, for more than a decade.

The first Operation Demetrius swoops in the early hours of 9 August 1971 netted more innocent men than IRA activists. The files of the RUC Special Branch, it soon became obvious, were obsolete and inaccurate. Within hours street disorders were widespread. Hostility between the security forces and much of the Catholic community reached a new pitch, and polarisation between the communities deteriorated dramatically. Those released told tales of casual brutality in the interrogation centres.

Internationally the image of British justice was considerably harmed — particularly in America, where the IRA benefited from a new wave of support. The dollars rolled in. Anglo-Irish relations plummeted: the Republic accused Britain of torture. Years later, the European Court of Human Rights found the UK guilty

of inflicting "inhuman and degrading treatment" on a number of internees.

Internment triggered off the bloodiest days of the troubles. Gun battles became nightly occurrences. Until 9 August, 30 people had died violently. In the remainder of 1971, 143 were killed. The following year, by far the worst of the troubles, 467 died.

The second tier of IRA leaders, who took over when the first lot were held, took to indiscriminate no-warning car bombing. Even so, the IRA gained greatly in recruits and support.

Some working-class Catholic districts became "no-go areas" for the security forces. I recall, during an exploratory drive along the Falls Road, having to produce my press card to two youths in a hijacked Jaguar. One examined it while his friend, who looked about 16, sat comfortably in the back seat watching me. I shall always remember his piercing blue eyes and his sub-machine-gun.

Thousands embarked on rent and rates strikes; many Catholics withdrew from public life as a protest. The measure was seen as anti-Catholic since it was the work of the then Unionist government, and since no loyalist paramilitaries were held.

Many protestants, far from being reassured that the IRA was finally being engaged, were alarmed by the dramatic increase in violence. Tens of thousands joined underground militia such as the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force. Loyalist assassinations, of the type which still persist in Belfast, began in earnest.

The key question now is whether something similarly calamitous would happen again, or whether everything would be different this time. The basic thesis of the pro-internment faction is that the security forces are more experienced now and wiser; that

almost all IRA activists are known and on file, and that internment could be introduced with a degree of selection, professionalism and sensitivity which was missing in 1971.

This lobby includes almost all Unionist political opinion: the near-unanimous view among loyalists is that internment should be accompanied by a ban on Sinn Féin and the reintroduction of capital punishment. Some Unionist MPs also favour detaining violent loyalists; others, including the Rev Ian Paisley, say that only republicans should be held.

Others in favour include a number of journalists, notably Conor Cruise O'Brien, and the Northern Ireland Police Federation. The latter group appears to represent a large body of opinion in the middle and lower ranks of the RUC, though not the views of the force's commanders.

Advocates of internment can point out that fewer important IRA men are coming before the courts; that the IRA, with its Libyan-supplied weaponry, is now more heavily-armed than ever and intent on raising the level of violence even higher.

Nationalist opinion is without exception strongly against internment. The list of opponents includes the Irish government, the Social Democratic and Labour Party and the Catholic hierarchy, together with the Labour Party, the SLD and civil liberties groups. Most of the nationalist argument is based not on the moral ground that locking people up without trial is wrong, but on the fear that Sinn Féin and the IRA would once again be the beneficiaries. Moderate elements would suffer.

The SDLP, for example, has based much of its recent approach on the belief that Britain regards the problem as political and not merely as a security issue. Internment would be seen as demolishing that argument.

R66/5/1A



H-blocks at the Maze, where internees were held from 1971 to 1975

It is also most unlikely that the Irish government would bring in internment south of the border. Charles Haughey's administration is more likely to condemn the policy than copy it. Internment in the north alone would probably not work and might well mean the break-up of the Anglo-Irish agreement — an important incidental result which would delight Unionists.

The worst nightmare is that something as bad, or almost as bad, as the 1971 experience could happen again. Nationalists, north and south, could again become completely estranged from the authorities. The IRA and Sinn Féin could be strengthened rather than weakened. Britain's image abroad would suffer.

And the likelihood is that public disorder and IRA violence would increase. The IRA has made contingency plans, and violence would also probably become more haphazard and arbitrary, as it did in 1971-72, with less of the relatively tight political control over terrorist activity.

To date the British Government has accepted this analysis. Of course, none of it can be stated with absolute certainty: it is conceivable that internment in 1988 could succeed where internment 1971 failed so dismally.

What is certain is that the risks can hardly be overstated. If internment is tried again and fails, it could result in the regeneration of the IRA — an error of historic proportions.

File B66/5/11A



New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

Reference:

MR M. WATKINS

DLO MFA

MURKIN

TERRORISM

- 9 AUG 1988

I ATTACH A COPY OF THE STANDARD
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MATERIAL - AND HAVE USED FOR THE
PAST YEAR.

THE REASON WHY I DELIBERATELY DID
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15/7/88 TO WHICH YOU OBJECT WAS
BECAUSE I COULD NOT VOUCH FOR THE
ORGANISATION OR ITS REPORT. TO HAVE
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TOM CORBLEIGH AND ALL IN WM WOULD
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REGARDLESS OF ANY CAUTION I PUT.

S.



MINISTRY
OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MFA 510

ATION FOR TERRORISM MESSAGES

MESSAGE NUMBER: S 30303

PAGE 1

18 JAN 88

RESTRICTED
CHARGE CODE: 913
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

00130-ROUTINE

TO: *Mr S.W. Prior*
NZ High Commission
London

Enclosed without covering letter

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Returned with thanks | <input type="checkbox"/> Please reply |
| <input type="checkbox"/> For your information | <input type="checkbox"/> Please return |
| <input type="checkbox"/> As requested | <input type="checkbox"/> For approval |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Please file | <input type="checkbox"/> For signature |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Please complete | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> In accordance with your letter | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Requesting your comments | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kindly phone tel. 728-877 ext. | |

File No: Comment:

your B66/5/1A and
B69/55 of 15 July 88
refer

DATE:

NAME:
(Please Print)

Murphy
22/7/88

Stafford House
38-42 The Terrace
Wellington
NEW ZEALAND

Telephone (04) 728-877
Telex NZ3441
Fax (04) 729-596

SC ; PMO(DIRECTOR)



ED OT OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN
LD FIND IT HELPFUL IF FUTURE
(TERRORISM TYPE TOPICS) COULD BE
THE SORT OF DISTRIBUTION SET OUT
IND IN MR NORRISH'S ALL POSTS
MODIFIED FIRST RE DESC BY OUR
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SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION FOR TERRORISM MESSAGES

MESSAGE NUMBER: S 30303

PAGE 1

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED

SECURE

18 JAN 88

FROM: WELLINGTON

RESTRICTED
CHARGE CODE: 913
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TO : 00020-ROUTINE :

RPTD: 00116-ROUTINE :
: 00133-ROUTINE :

00130-ROUTINE

LD : SFA(DLO, ^{Regional} ~~Division~~ DIS, SEC, LGL, EIB)
: P/S MFA
: POLICE (PTIU)
: NZSIS (TIC)
: DEFENCE (DOT DDI); DESC ; PMO(DIRECTOR)



SUBJ: TERRORISM:

THANKS YOUR 22 WHICH WE HAVE COPIED OT OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN WELLINGTON. IN THIS REGARD WE WOULD FIND IT HELPFUL IF FUTURE REPORTING ON THIS TOPIC (AND OTHER TERRORISM TYPE TOPICS) COULD BE GIVEN (UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED) THE SORT OF DISTRIBUTION SET OUT ABOVE. FULLER GUIDANCE WILL BE FOUND IN MR NORRISH'S ALL POSTS CABLE A154 OF 21 DECEMBER 1984 AS MODIFIED FIRST RE DESC BY OUR ALL POSTS A66 OF 2 APRIL 1987 AND SECOND By THIS MESSAGE.

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R4758

180755Z WLN EBR


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New Zealand High Commission

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Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

109/1/4(LW)
324/4/2
108/30/5



Reference:

B66/5/1A
B69/55

15 July 1988

The Acting Director,
External Intelligence Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(Southern Section)

NAME	INITIALS
J Ryan	R
G Esquivel	
J Matar	
Paul	

c.c. SFA (NAD DLB)
c.c. DEFENCE (DDI)

South Korea: Seoul Olympics: Terrorist Threat

The London-based organisation "Control Risks Information Services Limited" has drawn to our attention its publication of a two-part study directed to security questions in the context of the Seoul Olympics. Control Risks' information letter and background material on other risk assessments it has produced is attached for your information.

2. We drew attention to other work by the CRIS in our memorandum B66/18 of 23 October 1987 ("The Gulf: Risk Analysis").

3. We are not able to vouch for, but have no reason to doubt, the bona fides of Control Risks. On the other hand, it would seem unlikely to us that their assessments of the risks of terrorism in Seoul would be more informed or useful than those we shall be obtaining through our usual London contacts.


S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.



New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

Reference:

B66/5/1A

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.



New Zealand High Commission

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Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

Ylraw

Reference:

B66/5/1A
B67/1/12

8 August 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Northern Ireland

IRA terrorism - backgrounder articles 7/8/88

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

B66/5/1A

THE INDEPENDENT Thursday 4 August 1988

IRA London bomb squad foiled intelligence net

By Colin Brown, Political Correspondent

A MAJOR intelligence operation is being mounted to track down the IRA active service unit responsible for the Mill Hill barracks bombing. Ministers are worried that well-placed intelligence sources, who have succeeded in helping to foil a series of spectacular attacks on the mainland for the past four years, were unable to pin-point the unit.

Their main fear is that an active service unit, which may have been "sleeping" for some years, has been activated and is completely unknown to the intelligence sources. The unit may have slipped in from the Continent, where a series of attacks on soldiers have been carried out.

Such a squad could still be operating in Britain. The security services are urgently trying to discover whether the unit is still on the mainland and its capability for striking again, possibly at key targets, such as Cabinet members.

The security services have relied for some years on high-quality intelligence from IRA informants, possibly from agents

within the organisation. This has succeeded in halting any successful attacks since the attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister and the Cabinet four years ago in the Brighton bombing. Ministers are alarmed that the IRA appears to have found a way of eluding the intelligence sources.

Accurate information has helped the security services to identify the IRA team shot dead in Gibraltar and to arrest IRA units in Britain before they could carry out a seaside bombing campaign or an attack on Mark Thatcher's wedding.

The discovery of a Libyan arms shipment revealed that the IRA was receiving new, powerful weapons, including the explosive, Semtex. This increased the IRA's capability of mounting an offensive. General warnings about the

renewed threat were received from the intelligence sources, but, on this occasion, they failed to provide detailed information.

Faced with this threat, security services are urgently trying to hunt down the unit and plug the apparent intelligence gap. They recognise the IRA only has to be lucky once to get through.

The British and Irish Governments united yesterday in expressing determination to resist the terrorist upsurge through co-operation under the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which they believe the IRA is trying to destroy.

As another UDR part-time soldier was killed in Ulster yesterday, Tom King, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, gave a commitment that terrorism would be beaten and confirmed that protection for security forces, in-

cluding secure car parking, was being reviewed.

On the mainland, the Ministry of Defence has decided it is unrealistic to attempt to impose impenetrable security around barracks which were, like Mill Hill, designed to be part of the community. Security has been tightened where possible, including at Parliament where checks were made yesterday under car bonnets and in car boots. Ministers believe the main weapons to counter further attacks on soft targets are increased awareness of the threat and the use of undercover intelligence.

Ken Maginnis, the Ulster Unionist MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, yesterday renewed the call for selective internment, saying it should be introduced for about 40 known ringleaders. Mrs Thatcher, who has been in regular touch from her tour of Australia, has ruled out a return to internment, though Mr King maintained the official line that it was kept under review.

UDR man murdered, page 2

266K-11A
THE TIMES WEDNESDAY AUGUST 3 1988

Michael Yardley on the lessons of the Mill Hill bombing

Security is not enough

"Didn't the Army have it coming to them?" one broadcaster actually asked an "expert" on the day of the Mill Hill bombing. The implication was that lax security might somehow have been the cause of the murder of one man and the serious injury of several others.

The same line has been pursued throughout the media. Television coverage of the latest IRA attack has been obsessed with the idea that security was the essential problem. This has been reinforced by the statements of government officials promising security reviews and by the "we've been telling them for years" comments of the local residents sought out by television crews. There seemed to be a need to pin the blame on something visible.

Yet the real lesson of Mill Hill is that terrorists will choose a soft target when other options are made more difficult. This has also been shown by the attacks on off-duty servicemen in Germany and Holland and the senseless slaughter aboard the Greek cruise liner City of Poros. As we tighten up on some targets, terrorists move elsewhere. We cannot tighten up on every-

thing. Even if the impossible was achieved and every military installation in Britain was made impregnable, there would still remain an infinite variety of other possibilities.

And what of the social cost? Separating our professional army further from the community plays into the terrorists' hands. The same may be said of any measures which distort our society and indiscriminately inconvenience its citizens. It is just the sort of reaction the terrorists seek to provoke; one may read all about it in the works of Lenin and other revolutionary theorists. The purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to create psychological casualties who will exert pressure on their government. Any response to terrorism which increases the number of psychological victims needs to be scrutinized very carefully.

"Increase security" has become the simplistic reaction to every act of terror. First because it is a relatively easy line for the broadcast media to explore, fitting easily into the structure of their programmes. Second, because it is also the easiest public response for those in government, who are under pressure not only to act but to be seen to act quickly.

So what can be done that would be effective? Prudence dictates that there is a need for considerable permanent security on high-risk targets. Yet this need not be highly visible — a covert approach is far less disruptive.

The crucial problem of maintaining any security screen is human motivation. Achieving this requires imagination rather than money. Meanwhile a whole new industry has grown up,

feeding off the anxiety caused by terrorism. This industry offers all sorts of high-tech fixes, not just to governments but to anyone infected by the anti-terrorism fad. Needless to say, the products are extremely expensive and they are often of dubious practical use.

The main emphasis in the real war against terrorism has to be on the intelligence front. Permanent security is only in place as insurance when everything else fails. Intelligence is dependent on the widespread penetration of the enemy's organization. Brave men have already achieved this in the case of the IRA. Indeed, it is easily forgotten in all the publicity about Mill Hill that the intelligence services have been remarkably effective in protecting mainland Britain from terrorist attack during the last four years. However, after Mill Hill,

it is clear that an even more dynamic and aggressive covert policy may be called for.

A former special forces officer notes: "Options are limited. There is a lot of debate about perimeter security following Mill Hill. But, apart from not curing the problem, I doubt if the public would be willing to foot the bill for increasing it substantially. A better option is to destroy terrorists at source. Even that only buys time."

Terrorism is a challenge to liberal democracy. However prudent the precautions we take there will inevitably be times when the terrorists break through. That is the bitter pill we have to accept. Currently, the public are being led to believe that technical solutions are possible when they are not. That misinformation is destructive.

A new initiative is required.

The responsibility for it lies squarely on the shoulders of the media. To date, they have been presenting terrorism, particularly on television, as theatrical drama. Unfortunately, their coverage has real consequences. For example the call for increased security doesn't attack the real problem, but politicians ignore the illusion at their peril.

Thus a popular base for increasingly repressive measures is being created. Identity cards, and random searches, may all too easily become part of our future. The prospect will make terrorists rub their hands with glee.

The best weapon against terrorism is awareness. As we are all potential victims, we all have a responsibility to increase our awareness. We need to be aware of the political aims of the terrorists, of the psychology of their methods, and that the chance of any individual becoming the victim of a terrorist attack is minute. If we are willing to continue taking that small risk, we can also continue living in a familiar society.

The author, a former army officer, is writing a book on terrorism.

B6615/1A

THE TIMES TUESDAY AUGUST 2 1988

Provisionals may have UK foothold

By Stewart Tendler, Crime Reporter

The Provisionals have not mounted a successful operation against military installations in mainland Britain since the Regent's Park and Hyde Park attacks almost exactly six years ago in the summer of 1982.

They have mounted no successful attacks on the mainland since the Brighton bomb during the Conservative Party conference in October 1984 when five people died.

Now it seems that a Provisional active service unit has arrived safely in Britain. Time will tell if yesterday's attack was simply an attempt by the IRA to regain some stature after a history of recent debacles or the start of a mounting campaign against an enemy which may have grown unwary in recent years.

The reasons for the IRA's recent failures are not difficult to find.

Since 1982 police have discovered four huge caches of arms and explosives in the

Midlands, the North-west and the Home Counties. Weapons and bombs, with timing devices, were unearthed in forest land.

Police have also convicted IRA activists, including Patrick Magee, the Brighton bomber, and an active service unit planning what would have been a devastating attack on resorts and ports in 1985.

Last autumn one of the IRA's most skilled bomb-makers, responsible for scores of deaths, was sent to prison for life at the Central Criminal Court. A few weeks ago two men sent over to plant the latest arms caches were also sentenced to long prison sentences in London.

Try as it might, the IRA does not seem to have been able to mount successful operations in Britain. Experienced IRA men were caught time and again, often soon after arrival.

Scotland Yard anti-terrorist experts believed that the IRA

could no longer sustain that sort of activity or find bombers experienced enough to mount such big coups as the Brighton attack.

In Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic the Provisionals have suffered reversals or — as at Enniskillen last autumn — have lost much support. That happened again when last month they killed an innocent family instead of their target, an Ulster judge.

The IRA — said to be riven internally by suspicion of traitors and dissension between those who want a more aggressive guerrilla war and those who seek the political road — has turned increasingly to attacks in Europe where British security may be weak. Attacks in The Netherlands and West Germany on British bases or personnel this year proved they could succeed.

Now Scotland Yard faces the problem that an active service unit is operating again, possibly from bases close to

London and supplied from a cache which may have remained hidden.

In the Mill Hill attack the unit successfully reconnoitered the camp and smuggled the bomb well inside the camp at a time when many soldiers could be expected to be present.

There are many other Ministry of Defence establishments which are difficult to guard securely and which have a low military rating but their security will now have to be reviewed. The IRA long ago made clear it considered any military establishment fair game for attack.

For a long time anti-terrorist experts have been waiting to see if the IRA could once again operate on the mainland. They will study the timing carefully. For within a month the new round of party conferences begins and in October the Conservatives return again to Brighton for the first time since 1984.

B66/51.1A

THE INDEPENDENT Tuesday 2 August 1988

Timing of raid raises tear of bombers on mainland

THE MILL HILL bombing places the IRA firmly back in operation on the British mainland for the first time since the bomb at the Conservative Party conference at Brighton in 1984.

The bombing comes at a time when the police and security services are anxiously preparing for the return to Brighton by the Conservatives for the first time since the bombing, in which five people died.

Yesterday's bombing must raise the spectre of an IRA active service unit at work in Britain, perhaps located in the large Irish communities of north London or Birmingham, both within easy reach of Mill Hill, which lies close to the M1.

There was inevitable speculation last night that because the bomb was placed so close to Margaret Thatcher's north London constituency of Finchley, it was intended as a message to the Government that despite the setbacks of the past year, in Britain and abroad, the Provisionals are prepared to continue their campaign.

Repeated IRA attempts to strike on the mainland since early 1987 have been defeated by the police, who have issued strong warnings that the possibility of an attack is ever-present.

In March, police arrested four Irish people, later expelled by the Home Secretary, who they believed were an active IRA unit planning an attack on a public figure or military establishment.

At Easter last year a letter bomb campaign failed to hit any of the six civil servants who were its targets, all of whom had been involved with Northern Ireland or Mrs Thatcher.

In September of last year, two men and a woman were arrested and are awaiting trial accused of

plotting to murder Tom King, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Last June, two men were jailed for their part in a planned 1987 bombing campaign thought to have been focused on the general election.

The bombing is part of an emerging pattern of attacks against British military bases at home and abroad which appears to follow the murder of two soldiers at an IRA funeral in April. That was itself part of a sequence of events that followed the shooting by the SAS of an active service unit in Gibraltar.

On 1 May, an RAF man was killed and two were injured when their car was machine-gunned near Roermond in the Netherlands. On the same day a car bomb killed two RAF men and critically injured another at Nieuw Bergen, also in the Netherlands. Four days later a car bomb attached to a serviceman's car in Bielefeld, West Germany, failed to explode.

Last month, terrorists cut through an Army base's fence at Duisberg, West Germany, to plant two bombs. Nine soldiers were slightly injured. The incidents are all believed to be linked and may be the work of an IRA active service unit based in the Netherlands.

In Northern Ireland, six soldiers died when their vehicle exploded while they were taking part in a "fun-run" at Lisburn in June.

The Brighton bombing itself was the culmination of several years of serious IRA attacks concentrated in London. In October 1981, two pedestrians were killed, and 40 were injured, in a nail bomb explosion at Chelsea Barracks, and Lt-Gen Sir Stuart Pringle, Commandant-General of

the Royal Marines, was critically injured by a booby-trapped car.

The following year, 11 soldiers were killed and more than 50 people were injured in bomb attacks on the Household Cavalry and band of the Royal Green Jackets playing in Hyde Park and Regent's Park. In December 1983, six people were killed and 90 were injured in the attack on Harrods, in Knightsbridge. Many of those responsible have been captured.

■ Television detectives are being used to alert the public to the terrorist threat in the build-up towards the Conservative Party conference at Brighton in October.

To increase public awareness of the possible security threat, police are distributing more than 2,000 coloured posters featuring television characters Cagney and Lacey, *Miami Vice* duo Crockett and Tubbs and Sherlock Holmes.

The Cagney and Lacey poster, with a drawing of two women shoppers, says: "Be on the lookout for suspicious activity."

The Crockett and Tubbs poster bears the message: "Be on the lookout for suspicious people," and the Sherlock Holmes poster asks people to look out for suspicious objects.

Each of the posters concludes with the message: "Play detective — play safe."

The conference will be the biggest single policing operation in the history of Sussex and police are also holding talks with publicans, hoteliers and estate agents.

Estate agents are being asked to report anybody they are suspicious of who is moving into the area to rent or buy property. Checks have already begun on the thousands of hotel guests, staff and other regular visitors to premises near the conference centre.

266/5/1A

THE INDEPENDENT Tuesday 2 August 1988

New strategy aims to foster 'troops out' public sentiment

THE bomb attack on Inglis barracks comes in the midst of a significant change in IRA strategy aimed at inflicting casualties on British security personnel rather than security forces like the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Defence Regiment, recruited inside Northern Ireland.

Attacks in mainland Britain have always been valued by the IRA for their propaganda value and impact on public opinion. But yesterday's bombing appears to be part of a wider strategy which so far this year has caused the deaths of more British service personnel than for six years.

According to IRA sources in

Belfast, the decision to concentrate on British security targets was taken in the wake of the deaths of two Signals corporals who were beaten by a funeral crowd and then shot dead by the IRA in west Belfast in March.

The horrified reaction to their deaths on the mainland apparently encouraged IRA leaders to believe that a "troops out" sentiment could be encouraged if the organisation switched its attacks away from indigenous Northern Ireland forces.

One result of the change in tactics was an increase in IRA activity on the Continent. Three off-duty RAF servicemen were

killed in bomb and machine gun attacks in the Netherlands in May and there have been two other bombings at bases in West Germany. The four attacks by the IRA on the Continent this year compare to ten in the previous eight years.

Security statistics in Northern Ireland also illustrate the IRA's switch. Eleven soldiers have been killed so far this year, compared to three in 1987. Of the 15 British servicemen killed in total, 12 have died since March. In contrast seven UDR soldiers and two policemen have died this year, compared to eight UDR members and 15 policemen last year.

Abu Nidal group linked to ferry assault

THE GREEK government yesterday named Hejab Mohammad Jaballa, a suspected member of the Abu Nidal terrorist organisation, as the leader of the group which carried out the bloody assault on the City of Poros tourist ship last week. Jaballa, who managed to escape, was also identified as Khadar Samir Mohammad, who killed an Egyptian journalist in Cyprus in 1978. Police matched the fingerprints of Khadar and Jaballa.

At least five guerrillas were involved in the 11 July operation which killed eight passengers and one crewman and wounded 80 on board, it was revealed. The ship was rocked by explosions and passengers were raked with subma-

chine-gun fire as the ship with 471 passengers approached home-port at Trocadero marina near Athens. One guerrilla, identified as Sojod Adnan Mohamad, 21, died on board the ship.

Details released yesterday by the Public Order Minister, Tasso Sechiotis, indicated that Jaballa, aged 38, was travelling on a Libyan passport but was also carrying a Lebanese passport in a different name. He arrived in Greece from Copenhagen on 1 June, just one day after the Greek police arrested Mohammed Rashid, a Palestinian militant now serving a seven-month sentence for entering the country on a false passport. Rashid is wanted in the US in connection with bomb explo-

From Peter Thompson
in Athens

sions on two American airliners.

The US request for Rashid's extradition, soon to be heard in a Greek court, has been cited as a possible motive for the attempt to hijack the City of Poros and hold its passengers hostage.

As a planning centre for the operation, Jaballa rented a flat in the seaside resort of Glyfada, near Athens. On 11 July, the day of the attack, he hired an Opel Ascona for 24 hours. He did not return the car, and it was found a week later in Piraeus. Police discovered plastic bags in the flat and in the car which had been

used for transporting explosives. They also discovered bank notes in 11 different currencies, as well as the personal papers belonging to Sojod, the only terrorist who has been conclusively identified as being on board the ship, and of the other two named suspects.

Sojod appears to have been blown to pieces by one of his own grenades. The only macabre remnant of his deadly mission is one severed leg in a Piraeus mortuary. The others named by the Public Order Minister were Amoud Aboul Hamid and Merhi Nemer Mehieddine. They were both Lebanese passport-holders and had arrived in Greece from Yugoslavia in early May. They are assumed to have been killed when

their hired Datsun exploded at the Trocadero marina hours before the City of Poros was due to stop there. A fifth unnamed suspect is still being sought.

Meanwhile, the Greek authorities are now doubtful that Laurent Vigneron, the 23-year-old Frenchman killed in last week's attack, actually played a role in the incident, as claimed earlier. The Minister of Merchant Marine, Evangelos Yannopoulos, whose port police are handling the maritime aspect of the investigation, was at pains to emphasise during a press conference yesterday that no more than "indications" of Vigneron's involvement in the massacre had been announced last week.

B661511A



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Telex 24368

YELCW

Reference:
B66/5/1A

19 JUL 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

C.C. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

- GREELE
- ANC/IRA

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

COMMENTARY

by Nicholas Ashford

How Athens faces the Trojan horse of Arab terrorism

ALAS, Hellas. These have not been happy days for the people of Greece. Once again their seas and streets have resounded to the sounds of guns, grenades and bombs; and once again the "those bloody Greeks" brigade have had a field day pointing accusatory fingers at the socialist government of Andreas Papandreou for being soft on terrorists and lax in its security procedures. "Haven for terrorists" proclaimed a headline on a *Daily Express* editorial this week which argued it was no coincidence that the attack on the City of Poros took place on a Greek ship in Greek waters.

Admittedly the record of the past few weeks has not been impressive. First there was the assassination of the American defence attaché, Captain William Nordeen, at the end of last month, for which the urban guerrilla group November 17 claimed responsibility. Then there was the huge car bomb which killed its two occupants hours before the attack on the City of Poros took place. And then came the bloody killing of holiday-makers on a day trip around the Greek islands. But should Greece be singled out for blame? Could these outrages just as easily have happened elsewhere?

In the past Greece's record on terrorism has been particularly bad. As my colleague John Bulloch pointed out earlier this week, two of the most notorious hijackings in recent times began in Athens — the seizure of a TWA airliner in June 1985 and

the hijacking of an Egyptair plane five months later. There have been numerous other acts of violence, many of them directed at Americans. Since 1975 three American officials have been killed and around 100 injured by bombs and bullets.

But to be fair to the Greeks, they have been making real efforts in the past two to three years to clean up their act. Despite continuing lapses, airport security has been significantly tightened up. Greece's rather antiquated police force has had some success in tracking down terrorists, although the highly professional killers from the November 17 group remain as elusive as ever. But most important of all, Mr Papandreou has attempted to give political impetus to international efforts to curb terrorism. As he remarked after the EC summit in Hanover last month, Greece was now in the forefront of attempts to eliminate terrorism.

There are a number of reasons why his efforts have fallen short of success. Greece's geographical position as the gateway to Europe from the Middle East has meant it is relatively easy for Middle Eastern terrorists (and their weapons) to find their way on to Greek soil. Its coastline is so long and so rugged that it cannot be effectively policed. The government's pro-Arab leanings have also meant militant supporters of the Palestinian cause feel more at home in Athens than in other European capitals.

Some critics have also blamed the rash of terrorist incidents, particularly against

American targets, on the wave of anti-American sentiment unleashed by Mr Papandreou's election victory in 1981, and which for a long time he made little attempt to curb. There can be little doubt that groups like November 17 are encouraged by the belief that a significant part of the Greek population, including members of the government, share its distaste of the US role in Greek political life.

Greek anti-Americanism has its origins in the sympathetic attitude which the US adopted towards the colonels who seized power in Athens in 1967. Many left-wing Greeks were imprisoned and tortured by the junta, or else had to flee into exile. Forgiveness does not come easily to them. To his discredit, Mr Papandreou, who is married to an American and once served in the US navy, initially did little to curb the anti-Americanism of his supporters. A series of incidents during his early years in office, such as the US's fierce reaction to his refusal to condemn the Soviet shooting down of a Korean airliner in 1983 or Washington's attempts to stop American tourists going to Greece after the TWA hijacking incident, only served to fuel anti-American sentiment.

The situation has markedly improved since George Shultz made a fence-mending trip to Athens in 1986. Both governments realised the need to improve relations. Greece wanted new American investment to help stimulate its stagnating economy; the US recognised the need to smooth relations with Athens before starting negotiations on the renewal of an

agreement under which it maintains four large military bases and 3,700 military personnel in Greece. However those talks are now deadlocked, and this week Greece gave formal notification to the US that it must remove the bases by mid-1990. Although this was only a procedural move and it is still widely expected that a new base agreement will eventually be reached, the US's apparent refusal to grant Mr Papandreou the face-saving concessions he seeks could rekindle the fires of anti-Americanism — particularly with a Greek general election only a year away.

The weeks ahead will be a testing time for Mr Papandreou's leadership. It is vital that he reaches a satisfactory accord with the Americans before the election so that the bases (which he has pledged to make the subject of a referendum) — and Greece's continuing membership of Nato — do not become the main election issues. The chances of reaching such an agreement will be infinitely more difficult if he allows the anti-American genie out of its bottle again. He must also make sure that his words about defeating terrorism are matched by actions. His government must put every effort into catching the perpetrators of the attack on the City of Poros and bring them to trial. To this end, Mr Papandreou deserves the co-operation of the international community, not its condemnation.

THE INDEPENDENT Saturday 16 July 1988

PLAYING CARDS

Why should an innocent day-trip around the Greek isles be the target of a terrorist hit squad? **COLIN SMITH**, in Athens, unravels the reasons behind the hijack which went savagely wrong

SSACRE

OBSERVER SUNDAY 17 JULY 1988 15

WITH THE DEVIL

THIS WEEKEND a curly-haired terrorist who the world now knows as Mohammed Zozad, which is almost certainly not his real name, must deeply regret that he so obligingly posed for the ship's photographer aboard the City of Poros. Zozad was in the saloon below the sun deck playing cards with a young French secretary called Isabelle Bismuth at the time.

The ship's photographer has his own dark-room aboard and normally takes pictures of everybody during the 11-hour trip, with lunch and sightseeing stops, around the islands of Hydra, Poros and Aegina. Inevitably, the company brochure calls it a 'once-in-a-lifetime cruise'.

While the passengers are on the sun deck or getting to know each other over a beer and a game of cards in the lounges, the photographer is closeted in his dark-room printing up the pictures of those who have agreed to buy.

Isabelle, a 21-year-old, was on the second day of a three-week holiday she'd been saving towards for four months. The photograph shows the dark-haired young woman in a blue singlet sit-

ting at a table with Zozad, also thought to be 21, with a deal of cards in her hands. Isabelle is smiling full face into camera. With hindsight it's possible to detect a slight air of reluctance in Zozad's three-quarters profile.

A few hours later Isabelle was dead and about to achieve a brief and undeserved notoriety when the Greek police released her picture along with Zozad's and two other men claiming that she was Moroccan and one of the terrorists.

Within 48 hours, having withdrawn their allegation against Bismuth, the Greek authorities were accusing a second French victim of being one of the terrorists. A government spokesman said that eight survivors had identified Laurent Vigneron, a 23-year-old engineering student who died in hospital, as one of the terrorists. His parents insist he was on holiday with his girlfriend.

The French embassy here can barely contain its pique. Vigneron is said to have no record of having any pronounced political views, let alone terrorist affiliations.

Some of the confusion might stem from the rivalry that exists between the security service, the harbour police, who've done most of the footwork, and the ordinary police who are furious to find that they have mostly been excluded from the case.

However, both Greek investigators and other interested parties here are now firmly convinced that the gang did not originally intend the instant bloodbath on Monday evening when nine died and about 80 were injured.

Their plan was to hijack the City of Poros and bargain with its 494 passengers and crew for at least two Palestinians now in Greek jails. In the aftermath of the downing of the Iranian airbus, negotiations would probably have been punctuated by the systematic killing of American and British hostages.

IN HER hospital bed in Piraeus, Ing-Britt Kack, a married woman from the Northern Swedish town of Arbra, recalled the smiling young man, probably Zozad, who had riddled her legs with grenade shrapnel.

'He was sitting behind me — about a metre away. He was good-looking, in his early twenties. He could have been Greek, perhaps an Arab. I remember these French girls, they must have been about 14 years old, looking at him and giggling, but he ignored them.

'Then I saw him stand up, pick up the little rucksack he was carrying and put it on one of the lockers where they keep the life jackets. He put his hands in the rucksack and

I remember these clicking sounds, like the noise a roulette wheel makes.'

Mrs Kack was one of a party of five Swedes, all from Arbra. She was sitting on the sun deck with her sister-in-law, Irene Kack and Mr Ulf Johansson, a family friend. Her husband Yngve and his elder brother Herlge, Irene's husband, sat away from them on the other side of the crowded boat.


When the roulette noises stopped, the handsome young man produced from his rucksack something that sounds remarkably like the Birretta sub-machine-gun that was in the Datsun. Ghadaffi's forces have a large quantity of these weapons and it is generally assumed that Abu Nidal operates out of Libya nowadays.

'Ulf saved my life,' said Ing-Britt. 'When the shooting started the three of us all went down on the deck by the rails at the side. Even though he was wounded in the back and the bullets were hitting all around us, Ulf kept screaming at us to "stay down".'

Irene Kack ignored his advice. She got up and tried to run for it and was almost immediately shot dead. A grenade went off near them and started a small fire. The Swedish woman did not realise at first that it had also peppered her legs with shrapnel.

Screams could now be heard over the sounds of explosions and gunfire. One of the terrorists may have managed to drop a grenade down the funnel. The fire took a firm grip in the forward saloon below the sun deck which collapsed into it as the flames consumed the entire area. People began to jump overboard. At least one was cut to pieces by the ship's propellers.

Some of the 12 English convent school girls aboard reported climbing past badly burnt bodies on a staircase between the lower and top deck. One of these was almost certainly Isabelle Bismuth, who has since been identified from her dental



The plan was to hijack the City of Poros and bargain its 494 passengers for the release of their comrades

records. The harbour police say that there is a possibility that one of the four bodies that remains to be identified may be Zozad. But many of the survivors think that all the terrorists jumped overboard and were picked up by rescue vessels.

ONE of the Palestinian prisoners the ferry terrorists wished to release is Mohammed Rashid, a convicted drug smuggler who on Thursday was sentenced to seven months imprisonment for entering Greece on a false Syrian passport. A tall, willowy man with a Zapata moustache, he was arrested at Athens airport on 25 May after a tip-off believed to have gone direct to the former Minister of Public Order from the US Embassy here.

The Americans almost instantly applied for Rashid's extradition because they think he is responsible for placing bombs on two American airliners—a Pan Am flight from Tokyo to Hono-

lulu in August 1982, which killed a Japanese schoolboy, and a TWA aircraft flying from Rome to Athens two years ago. Some of the four American passengers to die on the TWA flight, one of them a baby, were probably still alive when they were sucked out of the ragged hole the bomb tore in the fuselage at 11,000 feet.

The other Palestinian is a waif-like creature called Abdel Ossamah al-Zomor, who was arrested in November 82 while crossing the Turkish border in a Mercedes that had so much plastic explosive hidden in its panelling the Greek police described it as a 'bomb on wheels'.

It almost immediately transpired that al-Zomar was wanted by the Italians for a bombing in a Rome synagogue the previous month which killed a child.

The Italians immediately applied for his extradition, but the Greeks prevaricated.

During one of his court appearances, al-Zomar confirmed in an aside to a reporter that he belonged to the faction run by the PLO renegade Sabra al-Banna, better known as Anidal.

THE RULING Pan-Hellenic Socialistic Movement (PASOK) of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou has never made any secret about where its sympathies lie in the Middle East dispute. In a recent speech, Mr Papandreou referred to Israel's 'fascist occupation' of the West Bank.

His party's links with Yasser Arafat and the mainstream PLO go back to the late Sixties when PASOK members trained in camps in the Lebanon for an armed struggle against the Greek military junta which never took place.

For some time now the Americans have implied that the Greeks have a 'sweetheart deal' with the Abu Nidal gang which trades unimpeded rights of passage for no terrorist action on Greek soil.

Last Tuesday, the day after the attack, Mr William Webster, the Director of the CIA, was telling reporters in Washington that he would like to see Greece 'brought into the fold'. Mr Webster's views on the subject were no doubt enhanced by the assassination on 28 June of the American naval attaché to Greece, who was killed by a car bomb planted by indigenous anarchists called the 17 November Group.

Greece is particularly vulnerable to terrorism. Last year almost a billion pounds of foreign exchange was earned through tourism—6 per cent of its gross national product. When the US issued a 'travel advisory' in June 85, urging its nationals not to go there after hijackers evaded security at Athens and forced a Rome-bound TWA jet to divert to Beirut, it hurt.

Since then not only has airport security noticeably improved but a tougher line has been adopted with more extreme groups like Abu Nidal. Al-Zomar may not have been extradited to Italy, but then neither is he free. This in turn has made the terrorists less susceptible to Greek sensitivities. If there ever was a sweetheart deal, it has definitely gone sour.

WHAT WAS probably intended on Monday was an entirely new concept in terrorist theatre. The City of

Poros would have been hijacked as it came alongside the quay at Paleo Faliron where two other members of the team were waiting in a Datsun hire car.

The ship would then have been taken out into the middle of the smart little harbour, and there, a few hundred yards from the rows of berthed gin palaces and

the World War I two-funnel destroyer the Greek Navy uses as a training ship, the explosives would have been wired up and the negotiations begun.

Unlike an aircraft hijacking, a good many of the hostages would have been visible on deck, because there would have been no room for them all below.

The operation failed when the people in the Datsun were literally blown to pieces. The occupants of the car were so dismembered that 24 hours later the Greek police were still not certain whether two or three people had been sitting in it. (It turned out to be two.)

Nor had they quite cleared up the mess. At the scene on

Tuesday evening, curious Greeks were pointing to a hank of black hair and some fleshy object lying in grass about 100 yards from the crater that marked the explosion. 'Bastard Arabs,' said a taxi driver.

The car was laden with explosives and grenades plus weapons, one of which, an Italian Biretta sub-machine-

gun, remained miraculously intact, as did a large quantity of dollar notes.

It is unclear what caused the explosion, which also destroyed a taxi parked near to the Datsun, whose driver was standing nearby. She heard three bangs: the first was whatever started it off; the second and the loudest the explosive; the third the tank of her own car going up.

The most likely explanation is that it was, to borrow the British Army's Northern Ireland parlance, an 'own goal'. The terrorists blew themselves up through a faulty detonator or grenade, perhaps affected by the extremely hot weather Athens has been experiencing.

But it looks as if the terrorists already aboard the ship, who appear to have numbered two men and a woman, concluded that they had been rumbled by Mossad who had booby trapped their accomplice's car. If this was paranoia, there was some excuse for it. The Israeli secret service have been having a successful year abroad.

'As long as the Israeli Mossad has the right to operate in Greece, we have the right to retaliate,' said a statement issued in West Beirut by something called the Martyrs of the Popular Revolution in Palestine — Abu Jihad unit. Abu Jihad was Arrafat's number two whom the Israelis assassinated at his home in Tunis.

The City of Poros has a TV on board and pictures of the wrecked car were shown on the 6.30 p.m. news bulletin. Twenty minutes later the terrorists began their Götterdämmerung.

ANC denies IRA terror link

David Pallister

THE African National Congress accused Mr Andrew Hunter, the Conservative MP, yesterday of taking part in a Pretoria-inspired smear campaign by suggesting that members of the African National Congress had met the IRA to plan acts of terrorism.

Mr M D Naidoo, the ANC press officer in London, said that if Mr Hunter had any evidence he had a duty to put it in the hands of the appropriate authorities, rather than use the cloak of Parliamentary privilege.

Mr Hunter, who has regularly supported the renewal of sporting links with South Africa, has claimed that he has irrefutable evidence of the place, dates and names of the people involved. He said he plans to raise the issue at Prime Minister's Question Time on Tuesday — the day after the 70th birthday of the ANC's gaoled leader, Mr Nelson Mandela.

The Foreign Office said it had no knowledge of Mr Hunter's allegations and

Scotland Yard said it was unaware of any meetings.

The Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, repeated his call for the release of Mr Mandela as an "important gesture of reconciliation".

He said in a statement: "The British Government has long called for his immediate and unconditional release and indeed the release of all political prisoners. On the eve of Mr Mandela's 70th birthday we renew that call."

"The release of Mr Mandela is crucial to the prospects for peaceful change within South Africa. It would help to create a climate of confidence in which dialogue across the racial divide on South Africa's future would become possible in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides."

Mr Naidoo said that over the past few weeks letters had appeared in newspapers from Scotland to Exeter making allegations similar to Mr Hunter's and suggesting that the ANC office in London should be closed and its members expelled.

"This is quite definitely an

inspired smear campaign organised by Pretoria," Mr Naidoo said. He suggested that it reflected anxiety in the South Africa Government about the description by the Democratic United States presidential candidate, Mr Michael Dukakis, of the South African state as "terrorist".

ANC officials in London are adamant that there has been no formal contact with either the IRA or Sinn Féin. It is understood that the ANC's headquarters in Lusaka are extremely strict about overseas links with organisations which might bring it into conflict with national laws, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

A spokesman for the Republican Press Centre in Belfast said: "We have a beautiful mural across the road from our office which says, 'Mandela: father of freedom, the future belongs to you.' That's the nearest we have got to him."

A rally to commemorate Mr Mandela's birthday will be held tomorrow in Hyde Park, London, when Archbishop Tutu will speak.

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DIRECTORATE OF DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

IAC Current Assessment No
C/A 120 /88

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - THE JAPANESE RED ARMY

The Japanese Red Army (JRA) was formed in Japan in the early 1970's but members were forced to flee to the Lebanon and North Korea in 1972 where they established bases. From 1972 to 1977 the JRA carried out a number of violent terrorist attacks but then went into a period of relative quiescence. Since 1986 the JRA has again emerged as an active terrorist group and has carried out a number of bombings the latest being in Naples in April this year. Strong evidence exists that the JRA have established a support infrastructure in Japan and also links with the Communist rebels in the Philippines. The JRA will continue to carry out further terrorist attacks worldwide, and might be tempted to target the Olympic Games in Seoul. (C)

Background

The Japanese Red Army (JRA) or Nippon Sekigun was formed in the early 1970's as an offshoot of the Red Army Faction which split from the Trotskyist League of Communists. It was the JRA's intention to found a revolutionary army bent on guerrilla warfare. This stand was envisaged as part of a global Marxist-Leninist revolutionary struggle, which it would help to provoke and to which it would contribute. (U)

2 In Japan the JRA proceeded to explode a number of bombs and rob banks in 1971, but suffered the following year from extreme internal factional fighting. During the internal purge in 1972 14 members of the JRA were executed by their own comrades and as Japanese police measures against the JRA took effect, the remaining members fled abroad to continue their fight. (U)

3 Two groups of the JRA were known to exist in the early 1970's; the main group set up their base of operations in the Middle East (probably in the Bekaa Valley in the Lebanon) and the second smaller group in North Korea. (U)

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-2-

4 From 1972-1977 the JRA achieved notoriety through a number of violent incidents which were sometimes carried out on behalf of, and always with the sympathy of, the militant Palestinian movement the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). From 1977-1986 the JRA committed no known terrorist attacks but continued to issue communiques. Since 1986, the JRA have again emerged to carry out terrorist attacks in various parts of the world. (U)

Current Situation

5 Current information suggests that the JRA may no longer be under a unified command and that there are two, or possibly three, factions which espouse similar long terms goals but differ on short-term strategies. These are:

- a) The Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB). This is believed to be a nom-de-guerre under which some radical JRA members operate, with support from Middle East terrorist organisations, and is considered to present the greatest international threat. The group claimed responsibility for the 1986 mortar and car bomb attacks involving the Canadian, United States and Japanese embassies in Jakarta, and in 1987 similar attacks against the British and United States embassies in Rome. It has also been linked to the bombing of a US servicemen's club in Naples in April of this year.
- b) The Anti-War Democratic Front (AWDF) has been identified by Japanese authorities as a JRA support infrastructure in the Far East (particularly Japan) and is linked to the East Asia Anti Japan Armed Front which in recent years has been attempting, through the use of terrorism, to secure the release of their imprisoned members. The activities of these latter two groups appear to be confined to the Far East. (C)

6 JRA membership is small and stable, consisting primarily of the original cadre with only a few new members. Current estimates of their numbers range between 30 and 40, and not many can be confidently identified. The main base of operations is believed to be in Lebanon with a smaller group in North Korea, and there is evidence of financial support and training assistance from Libya. Philippine immigration authorities have claimed that JRA members entered their country earlier this year to finance, train and support the Communist rebels, and on 7 June a senior JRA member, Hiroshi Sensui, was arrested after leaving Manila Hospital where he had undergone plastic surgery to change his appearance. (C)

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Outlook

7 Despite the factional splits within the JRA and recent arrests of senior members, the JRA is a terrorist organisation still capable of carrying out a successful terrorist operation and is known to have been active as recently as April 1988. Identification of JRA members remains a problem and the organisation aligns itself with other terrorist groups to achieve its ends. (C)

8 Terrorist attacks by the JRA will continue and there has been wide speculation that the Olympic Games in Seoul must be considered a prime target. Bombings of hotels and aircraft and hijackings are considered to be the most likely forms of attack. (C)

Comment

9 Although the JRA undoubtedly has the resources to attempt to conduct terrorist attacks in Seoul during the Olympic Games, whether the North Koreans would encourage such action is open to question. Casualties within Soviet or Chinese ranks would certainly not be to the advantage of North Korea, where blame could no doubt be laid, nor would they further the JRA's interests amongst their Communist supporters. A more likely course of action would be a terrorist campaign prior to the games aimed at discouraging countries from taking part and at discrediting South Korea, thereby diminishing the political capital which would otherwise accrue. (C)

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Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

Reference:

B66/5/1A
B69/55

Yellow

15 July 1988

The Acting Director,
External Intelligence Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(Southern Section)

c.c. SFA (NAD DLO)
c.c. DEFENCE (DDI)

South Korea: Seoul Olympics: Terrorist Threat

The London-based organisation "Control Risks Information Services Limited" has drawn to our attention its publication of a two-part study directed to security questions in the context of the Seoul Olympics. Control Risks' information letter and background material on other risk assessments it has produced is attached for your information.

2. We drew attention to other work by the CRIS in our memorandum B66/18 of 23 October 1987 ("The Gulf: Risk Analysis").

3. We are not able to vouch for, but have no reason to doubt, the bona fides of Control Risks. On the other hand, it would seem unlikely to us that their assessments of the risks of terrorism in Seoul would be more informed or useful than those we shall be obtaining through our usual London contacts.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

HE Mr Byrce Harland
New Zealand High Commission
New Zealand House
Haymarket
SW1Y 9JN

Ref: 0200/59

11th July 1988

Dear High Commissioner,

**The Japanese Red Army: A Return to Active Service?
The Seoul Olympics: Target for Terror?**

May I draw your attention to this timely two-part study produced by our analysts?

Is the JRA functioning as an independent group? or working with other terrorist groups?

What are the JRA's capabilities?

Who will it target next?

* * * * *

Is North Korea planning to sabotage the Olympics?

What threat do South Korean dissidents pose?

What do Middle Eastern and other terrorist groups plan to do?

How safe are the Games?

These and other questions relating to the safety of all visitors to South Korea are rigorously examined in a fully argued threat assessment which is available now at a price of £130 (plus VAT in the UK). You can order direct or by completing the attached form.

Yours sincerely,

Peter Janke

DR P.F. JANKE
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH

Please complete this form and send it to:

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15 JUL 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

IRELAND :

NEW COUNTER-TERRORIST MEASURES

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.



BEACHED . . . Lilliputian soldiers standing guard over Gulliver on Dollymount Strand yesterday. — (Photograph: Jack McManus)

A giant step for the little people

By Kathryn Holmquist

THOUSANDS of Lilliputians flocked to Dollymount Strand yesterday to see the giant Gulliver, who was washed ashore following an incident in the Irish Sea. Gardai were called in to control the traffic jam which was backed up along the coast road and the Dollymount causeway. Most of the little people travelled in trepidation. The giant Gulliver was probably one of the most frightening sights they had ever seen.

Like most Lilliputians, Paul Varszegi (4) of Finglas was rendered speechless with fear when he saw the 70-foot-long Gulliver. But a composed Emily Quirk (12) of Elmount, described the scene. "He floated in from sea and some Lilliputians found him on the beach. All the dignitaries came to see him and crawled all over him but when he started moving they were all afraid and they ran away."

Gulliver was fed, given buckets of drink, and then drugged with special vapours by a medical expert. To ensure public safety, Gulliver was tied down with ropes. Later there was dancing, drinking and a religious procession.

Dublin writer, Roddy Doyle, who was also at the scene, said: "It's hard to see what's going on in that huge crowd, but the last I saw was a priest trying to sidle up to Gulliver and excommunicate him."

By 4.30 p.m., Gulliver was asleep. It was only then that the Lilliputians found their courage and moved in to take a closer look at their victim. But as his head began to roll from side to side, the younger Lilliputians screamed in terror. Many jumped into the arms of the nearest adult Lilliputians.

They found little comfort, since most of the adult Lilliputians were telling their children ghastly tales about what Gulliver would do to them if they woke him up. He'll

bite your head off and swallow it," one warned.

The Macnas Theatre Company, based in Galway, constructed Gulliver at a cost of £210,000 (£115,000 in labour costs). The project's technical director, Mr Paraic Breathnach, said that scaring kids was exactly the intention.

Today, Gulliver will be taken from Raheny along the coast road (at about 11.00 a.m.) to Point Depot, where the Lord Mayor, Mr Ben Briscoe, will host a civic reception in Gulliver's honour at 6 p.m.

The Lord Mayor is then expected to sever Gulliver's bonds and set him free. Tomorrow, Gulliver will float on the Liffey for all the citizens of Lilliput to see. On Saturday, he will lead a spectacular parade down O'Connell Street at 3.30 p.m.

Gulliver intends to remain in Ireland, and is scheduled to repeat the entire trauma again at the Galway Arts Festival in August.

Car bomb link suggests cruise ship hijack theory

AS THE Greek authorities remain unable to identify seven badly disfigured bodies out of the nine victims of Monday's cruise ship massacre, one theory gaining ground here is that the attack was part of a plan, which went badly wrong, to hijack the vessel and take the 470 tourists on board as hostages.

At the same time, an anonymous telephone call from Cairo to French radio claimed responsibility on behalf of Islamic Jihad, saying that the killings were a reprisal for the shooting down of an Iranian air liner 10 days ago. However, this claim is being treated with extreme caution.

The hijack theory rests in part on links with the explosive-packed car which blew up with two suspected terrorist occupants on Monday near the marina at which the City of Poros was due to dock after its island cruise. According to this theory, the motivation would have been to try to se-

From Peter Thompson
in Athens

cure the release from a Greek jail of the Palestinian Mohammed Rashid, another suspected terrorist whom the US wish to have extradited. His court hearing, scheduled for today, has now been postponed to 27 July due to a prison warders' strike.

The authorities still insist that they are following all leads in all directions, but say they have no arrests and nothing concrete to report yet. There was some embarrassment yesterday when it became clear that one of the photographs of supposed suspects released by the Public Order Ministry on Tuesday was that of a French tourist, Isabelle Bismuth, who remains unaccounted for. Pictured playing cards on board the steamer with a prime suspect, Mohammed Zozad, she had been tentatively identified as a Moroc-

can passport holder.

The girl's father was quoted yesterday as saying that it was incredible to see his daughter's picture on French television, when he had taken her to the airport to start her holiday just three days earlier. "She's not Moroccan, she's French, and she has nothing to do with terrorists," he declared.

Meanwhile, as Greek officials attempted to limit the damage to their £2bn-a-year tourist trade, the deputy national economy minister responsible for tourism, Nikos Skoulas, told a press conference in Athens yesterday that the government was determined not to let Greece become an arena where factions in the Middle East dispute could settle their differences.

He also revealed that following the City of Poros massacre, new security measures had been introduced on cruise ships, which now carry their own special guards.

Athens waves away terrorist threat

LESS THAN 48 hours after the terrorist attack on a Greek cruise liner, and although the gang is still at large, security at Athens airport was so lax yesterday that I counted at least 27 people allowed to pass unsearched into the passenger lounge, despite setting off the metal detector.

Five security guards stood around at the airside security point in Olympic Airways's west terminal, but simply waved through people who had triggered the metal detector, setting off a "ping" and causing its red light to come on. They included a group of young Arab men who then boarded Olympic's flight 317 to Benghazi, Libya.

At the same time hundreds of passengers, many of them Americans, were at a different gate in

By Michael Sheridan

the same lounge waiting to board the daily Olympic flight to New York. Passengers on flights to London and Rome were also in the lounge. I gave up counting after 27 men, women and children passed through the detector, set it off, and proceeded unhindered.

"This is just incredible," said an American businessman watching the procedure. "It's a disaster waiting to happen," said an Australian tourist. A cursory glance was given to large quantities of hand baggage passing through the conveyor belt. I saw only two bags searched.

The situation at the east terminal of Athens airport, which is used by all foreign airlines in-

cluding British Airways, appeared only marginally better, to judge by a visit there on Tuesday.

The Greek authorities reacted angrily in 1985 when President Reagan, citing the hijacking of TWA flight 847, warned that Athens airport was unsafe. US criticism then centred on loose security procedures. The official US advice to avoid the airport cost Greece millions of dollars in lost tourist revenue.

The airport authorities subsequently said they tightened all security at the airport, which shares its runways with a US Air Force base. This year was promoted as the year in which tourist receipts would recover the lost ground of 1985 and 1986. But unless security is improved, 1988 could be another year of disaster.


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FCO PRESS CONFERENCE : TUESDAY 12 JULY 1988

TERRORIST ATTACK ON GREEK CRUISE SHIP

In answer to questions Spokesman said that British Embassy staff in Athens had been working throughout the night to seek to establish whether any British nationals had been injured or killed. At this stage we could confirm that a John Whittome and a Sonia Thilenius had received minor injuries but had discharged themselves from hospital yesterday. Of those passengers still in hospital, it appeared that none were British. The Greek authorities were now trying to establish the identity of the dead.

Spokesman added that at present we had no particular advice to offer British tourists, but we remained in close touch with the Greek authorities and were monitoring the situation carefully.



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YELCAW

(2)

Reference:

B66/5/1A

- 8 JUL 1988

(1) M. Heath - to see

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

IRA TERRORISM

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Former priest arrested in alleged Gadafy connection

Alex Scott, David Hearst
and Owen Bowcott

A FORMER Irish priest, alleged to be a key figure in the IRA's procurement of arms from Libya, was being held by police in Brussels last night.

Patrick Ryan, aged 58, who once worked as a missionary in Africa, was arrested six days ago after a raid which uncovered explosives manuals and a large quantity of cash in Spanish, West German and US currency. News of his arrest was suppressed until yesterday.

The Belgian authorities confirmed Ryan had been picked up by a joint police and anti-terrorist squad from a flat in Uccle, a prosperous suburb of Brussels, where he had been staying with a woman known to police as an IRA sympathiser. He is being held in Forest Prison, Brussels.

Ryan was remanded in custody for 28 days by a Brussels court yesterday, initially on charges relating to a false passport.

Police tailed Ryan after he arrived on a coach from his home in Benidorm, Spain, last Wednesday, and stayed the first night at the home of another IRA sympathiser in Ixelles, in the centre of Brussels. He then moved to the flat in Uccle.

Ryan is reported to have admitted to police that he was an "IRA sympathiser".

No formal request for extradition has been made by either the British or Irish authorities.

The capture follows the discovery in January of 230 lb of Semtex explosives in the boot of a car rented in Holland, and hidden in a lock-up garage.

Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad has been seeking Ryan since the interception of 15 tons of modern battlefield weapons destined for the IRA from Libya, on the Panamanian-registered coaster Eksund off the coast of Brest, France, last October.

Ryan is believed to have been a key figure in arranging and paying for four arms shipments which got through to the Republic and two hide-



Patrick Ryan ... meetings with Colonel Gadafy

outs on English forests on the Welsh border in 1984 and 1985.

He opened bank accounts in Switzerland and Luxembourg which could have been used not only for arms shipments but by IRA active service units in Europe.

Ryan, a former member of the Order of Pallottine Fathers in Co Tipperary, became a priest in 1954, but quit the order around 1974.

He went underground in the later half of the 1970s but was arrested and expelled from several European countries. He is believed to have travelled to Tripoli, where he met Colonel Gadafy on several occasions.

In 1973 Ryan was thought to have been the chief conduit for £2 million in cash given to the IRA by Colonel Gadafy, part of which was used to purchase five tons of arms found on board the Claudia, off the Irish coast in 1973. Colonel Gadafy has always denied the allegation.

He is not wanted for any offence in Northern Ireland, but his name has been linked in London to involvement in the planning of the 1982 Hyde Park bombing, in which four soldiers died.

In Northern Ireland the IRA has only recently begun to deploy its new weapons. Last week the IRA in South Armagh admitted using two heavy calibre anti-aircraft guns in an attempt to shoot down a British Army Lynx helicopter.

Belgians hold IRA European 'mastermind'

From ANDREW GARFIELD, Brussels

ANTI-TERRORIST police in Belgium have arrested the man widely believed to be the European mastermind responsible for financing and equipping Provisional IRA operations for the last 15 years.

Patrick Ryan, a former priest who was suspended by the Catholic Church in the early 70s for his extreme Republican sympathies, has been the master fixer behind the Provisionals and is one of the most wanted IRA terrorist suspects.

He was the original link between the Provisionals and Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya and is said to have laundered millions of pounds through European bank accounts to pay for the IRA's terror campaign.

He has been arrested at least three times before on the Continent and kept under continued close surveillance. But no charges have been laid against him because of lack of evidence.

Britain has never been able to have him extradited to the UK to face the evidence accumulated against him by Scotland Yard, including alleged complicity in the Hyde Park bomb which killed four soldiers six years ago.

Ryan (58) was arrested last Thursday at the home of an elderly woman professor and known IRA sympathiser in a fashionable Brussels suburb shortly after he had arrived by coach from Benidorm. News of his arrest was kept secret for five days while the Queen began a State visit to neighbouring Holland.


He was found in possession of bomb-making materials, a false passport and a large sum of money in pesetas, US dollars and deutschmarks. He has been charged with having fake identity papers, but an official spokesman said more charges could follow.

Ryan was yesterday remanded in custody to Forest Prison in Brussels for a further 30 days to allow the police more time for their investigation.

Scotland Yard confirmed that Britain will not be seeking his extradition because of the time-lapse since he was active in the UK.

The Home Office said that no request had been received by any police force in Britain for his extradition. The RUC confirmed Ryan was not being sought in Northern Ireland.

However the news of his arrest in Brussels was greeted with great relief. A senior Scotland Yard official said yesterday: "It really is quite a coup. Father Patrick Ryan has



Patrick Ryan

**The godfather of
terror — Page 11**

been on the run for a long time, helping IRA men on the Continent by hiding them, taking messages for them and probably supplying arms to them. It is very good news to have caught up with him at last."

Ryan joined the Pallotine Fathers in Tipperary in 1949 but was forced to quit the order in 1974.

His visit to Belgium might have been connected with the Queen's visit to Holland or point to the existence there of an IRA cell — possibly linked to the killings of off-duty RAF Servicemen in Holland in April.

However, a spokesman for the public prosecutor in charge of the inquiry into the Roermond and Nieuwbergen killings said yesterday there was no evidence of any link with Ryan's presence in Belgium.

Nevertheless, Belgium offers many attractions to terrorists. Travel to and from Holland and Northern Germany is easy because of good communications and lax border surveillance.

Belgium is also a centre for the international arms trade and until recently police rarely acted against foreign terrorists who did not pose an immediate local danger.

However, Belgium's experiences at the hands of her own terrorists and pressure for tighter security from neighbours after bombings in Paris and the IRA attacks in Holland and Germany have stiffened the country's resolve.

The Belgian security services have been congratulating themselves on the success of this latest operation, which was mounted with their anti-terrorist squad. It followed a tip-off from their British counterparts.


After indentifying Ryan's coach they were able to tail him for 24 hours before moving in for the arrest. A Justice Ministry spokesman said: "This is a spectacular breakthrough. We have netted a very important suspect. But he was clearly not operating in isolation. We are keen to find out precisely why he is in Belgium."

● The Dublin District Court yesterday ordered the extradition to Northern Ireland of Paul Anthony Kane (32), in connection with the mass escape from the Maze prison in 1983.

Justice Mr Daniel Shields ordered that Kane, from Belfast, be handed over to the RUC at Carrickarnon, on the main Dublin to Belfast road, to face 17 charges relating to the breakout. Kane has 15 days to appeal. He is accused of escaping, hijacking a lorry, assault and false imprisonment.

The godfather of IRA terror

Nick Davies reports on the trail of death and destruction which has followed Patrick Ryan, the target of what has been Europe's longest-running manhunt



Right: Patrick Ryan: will his Brussels arrest prove to be the final chapter in a tale of lost opportunity for the security forces?

Below: Flashback to the Hyde Park bombing in 1982, one of the murderous incidents in which Ryan has been involved

THE SCOTSMAN
Wednesday, July 6, 1988

IT WAS just before 11 o'clock in the morning on July 20 1982 when a group of Horse Guards riding through Hyde Park in Central London were torn apart by a blizzard of 6in nails hurled from the car bomb which had been planted on their route. Four soldiers and seven of their horses were killed. When police scientists gathered together the charred fragments of the bomb, they found the remains of a sophisticated type of electronic switch, an unusual element which had been used to detonate the device by radio signal. The switch was a potentially vital clue. Police set out to trace its history in search of the bombers.

The search led detectives from London to Paris and there to a witness who admitted knowing the switch's history and who finally disclosed the name of the man who had bought it. It had never surfaced publicly but in the small world of counter-terrorism, the name was loaded with notoriety — Patrick Ryan, the Provisional IRA's bomber priest.

The story of Father Patrick Ryan, aged 58, who is now being held by police in Brussels, reads like a piece of pulp fiction. He is a Catholic missionary who seduces a shy English spinster and embroils her in the world of international terrorism, a church fund-raiser who launders a fortune in IRA funds through a network of secret bank accounts, an amiable barfly who forges the links between the IRA's Chief of Staff and the Libyan leader Col Muammar al-Gaddafi, and, finally the target of what is probably the longest-running manhunt in Europe.

For 15 years, Ryan has been the master fixer behind the Provisional IRA, bumping around Europe in an old camper van, supplying the funds, the arms and the explosives which have kept the IRA alive. The Hyde Park bomb is only one incident in a long list of murderous attacks in which he has been involved. Yet the mere fact that he has been captured is no guarantee that he will be brought to trial.

Ryan's story begins in County Tipperary, where he was born in a small farming town on June 26, 1930. He went to the local school and then joined an order of Catholic missionaries who ordained him as a priest in 1954. He spent the next 11 years in Africa and then in the United States before becoming the assistant curate of a small church in East London in 1968.

Up to this point he had shown no great interest in politics beyond a basic resentment of the British role in Ireland. Now, as the civil rights movement gathered speed in Belfast, Ryan's behaviour in London for the first time showed signs of a new course.

One of his jobs was to collect money for missionary work in Africa but, despite his hard

work, his superiors noticed that he was sending less and less. They challenged him and he declared quite openly that he was sending the cash to a better cause — the Republican movement in Ireland. He defied their request to stop and then gave them further cause for alarm by wooing a timid young woman named Catherine, a regular church-goer who lived with her parents and worked with mentally handicapped children. Catherine fell deeply in love with the charming priest and his chatty ways.

By 1972, Ryan's church superiors were so worried that they suspended him and then gave him six months' leave. He became more outspoken than ever and caused a minor scandal on a trip to Rome in the summer of 1973 when he told Italian priests that he hoped the IRA bombed the centre of London.

This was not mere talk. During his leave of absence he had gone to Dublin, where he had cemented his links with the Republican movement, offering them the priceless asset of his clean record and his respectable front. The IRA put him to work on what was then their worst problem — their chaotic supply lines.

So it was that after scandalising his colleagues in Rome, Patrick Ryan quietly boarded a flight to Libya, still wearing his priest's robe, and made contact with Libyan military intelligence in Tripoli.

During the autumn of 1973 his break with his old life became complete. As he shuttled back and forth between Dublin and Geneva, opening bank accounts and transferring funds from his new friends in Libya, the Catholic church formally suspended him. Weeks later, he transferred several thousand pounds from Geneva through Frankfurt to Dublin — the beginning of a flood of money which he was to direct into the IRA Army Council's coffers.

But unknown to the errant priest, his behaviour had caught the eye of a quick-witted Canadian tourist who was staying in the room next to him in his Le Havre hotel. The Canadian could hear him tuning in to a short-wave radio every morning as if he was trying to pick up a signal, and he noticed him down in the docks, asking about cargo vessels travelling to Ireland. The hotel told the Canadian that this man was Mr Patrick Ryan, a seaman. The Canadian wondered how a humble sailor could afford the string of international phone calls which Ryan made.

After several days, Ryan checked out to go on one of his numerous trips round Europe. The Canadian slipped into his room and seized the contents of Ryan's waste paper basket. The next day he was on the ferry to Southampton.

Hampshire Special Branch did not know quite what to make of this excitable tourist clutching a handful of waste paper. But when they examined the paper they found phone numbers of known IRA contacts in Dublin and Europe and, mysteriously, of a council flat in East London — Catherine.

From this moment, Father Ryan was never again alone. The London Anti-Terrorist Branch embarked on an operation which was eventually to embrace the police Special Branch, the Security Service, MI5, the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, and the intelligence agencies of most of the countries of Western Europe, an extraordinary trans-national manhunt.

Ryan began to exploit the innocence of the besotted woman. He needed an English driving licence in a false name, so he spun her a story about how he could not get one in his own name while he was living in France. She got it for him and smuggled it through Customs in her girdle. She carried bundles of cash back to London for him and sent them to a bank in Ireland. He said the money was for the dream home where they would eventually live together. It was really for Maurice Prendergast, then the IRA's Director of Finance.

BY 1976, Ryan had become a pivotal figure in the IRA. In less than two years, he had pumped nearly £1 million into IRA bank accounts, most of it from Libya. He had supplied pistols and bullets concealed in the floors of lorries. He had smuggled nitroglycerine in loads of lemons from Italy. Crucially, he had discovered a device called a Memopark.

A Memopark is a gadget for motorists: you park your car on a meter, turn the dial on your Memopark so that it rings in your pocket when the time on your meter has expired. The IRA discovered they could attach a metal arm to the dial of a Memopark so that when it rotated, instead of ringing a bell, it completed an electrical circuit — the perfect bomb timer.



Ryan found a novelty shop in Zurich which sold the gadget and in May 1975, he bought out their entire stock of 400 Memoparks. Over the next 18 months, those Memoparks were found at the scene of 185 different explosions in Northern Ireland. They were also found in three bombs and a bomb factory in London.

The operation against Ryan had been striving to find evidence which would justify his arrest. In the summer of 1976, as Catherine arranged to meet Ryan in Zurich, the British per-

suaded the Swiss authorities to mount a joint surveillance in an effort to find evidence to justify an arrest. The couple were followed for a week. As Catherine flew back into London on July 25, she was arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In the Pradier Square in Geneva, Ryan was picked up on the pretext of a minor motoring offence.

After days of questioning, Scotland Yard accepted that the tearful Catherine was merely an innocent dupe. In Switzerland, Ryan denied everything until he was confronted with his

diary — a painstaking record of his movements.

Scotland Yard, however, were playing a losing game. They had no evidence that Ryan had committed an offence on Swiss soil. The only evidence they had was of IRA activities, which would be deemed political by the Swiss courts and, therefore, outside the terms of the extradition treaty between the two countries. After 10 days in custody Ryan was released.

Since then, Ryan has been working on the run. He has been arrested and released all over

Europe — France in December 1976, Italy in February 1977, Luxembourg in March 1977. He was kept under surveillance in Spain for months. While police in Britain have accumulated evidence of his continued involvement in supplying funds and arms for the IRA they have never been able to beat the extradition laws to get him back to London for trial. Nor have other European forces been able to prosecute him for offences in their jurisdiction. It remains to be seen whether Brussels will mark a breakthrough.



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(2) B66/5/1A

21 June 1988

(1) W. Rankin ok to see

cc B67/1/12

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
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TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

IRA/Libyan Weapons: UK Terrorism Campaign

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

IRA men jailed for bomb plot

TWO BELFAST men yesterday gave clenched fist salutes as they were jailed for 20 years and 17 years for plotting an IRA bombing campaign during the run up to the general election in June 1987. In Gaelic they shouted "Our day will come", as they were led from the dock at the Old Bailey.

Patrick McLaughlin, 40, a father of six who received the longer sentence, and Liam McCotter, 25, had buried 190lbs of Libyan-supplied Semtex explosives in forests near Manchester, enough for 25 powerful bombs.

Security sources believe their targets were probably senior Conservative politicians at election gatherings. A direct attack on Mrs

By Heather Mills
Courts Correspondent

Thatcher or her Cabinet was thought to be unlikely because of the tight security which surrounds them after the IRA Brighton bombing in 1985 in which five leading Conservatives died.

The plot was foiled by undercover detectives who had been watching the pair from the moment they picked up the arms from a fishing vessel on the north coast of Wales to the time they buried them in Macclesfield and Delamere forests.

It was one of the biggest arms caches discovered in this country

and would have been sufficient for a "sustained and prolonged" terrorist campaign, the prosecution claimed. Had the plan not been thwarted it was "inconceivable" that there would not have been injuries or death.

It would have enabled the IRA to attack twice as many targets as their last planned "bomb-a-day" campaign in 1985, aimed at 12 British holiday resorts. Police have not revealed how they knew of the Irishmen's activities, but there has been speculation that they were acting on a tip-off from a well placed mole.

Both men were known to the security services as IRA activists. In 1974, McLaughlin, of

Glenalena, Ballymurphy Estate, Belfast, served one year of a three-year sentence after a gun and ammunition were found at his home. In June 1981 he was again jailed for arms offences in the Irish Republic. McCotter, single, from Carrigart Avenue, Belfast, is related to Seamus Twomey, a former chief of staff of the IRA in the early 1970s. His brother Patrick, 29, is serving 20 years after a shoot-out with the RUC in Belfast in 1983.

McLaughlin and McCotter were convicted by a jury on Friday of conspiring on and before February 19 last year to cause explosions in the UK.

Sentencing the pair, Mr Justice

Owen told them: "I accept you believed you were entitled to behave as you did — indeed, I cannot see how anybody could possibly contemplate the carnage and misery likely to be caused without having some such belief."

"This factor cannot however reflect in your favour, indeed it is one of the factors which makes you so dangerous. In my judgment the enormity of what you contemplated and the need to deter others demands very heavy sentences." The judge congratulated Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad and the Manchester police for their joint "Operation Denmark" which ended the Provisionals' plot.

THE TWO IRA men jailed yesterday had at their disposal 190lb of Semtex, the Czech-made and Libyan-supplied plastic explosive, *David McKittrick writes.*

Semtex is difficult to detect and extremely powerful: 7lb of the material was enough to kill six soldiers in their van in Lisburn last week. It has been one of the mainstays of the IRA's campaign for the past two years, being used in armour-piercing grenades, mortars, letter bombs, car bombs and boobytraps.

It forms only part, however, of the fearsome arsenal supplied by Libya. Security forces believe it includes mortars, bazookas, heavy machine-guns, SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles, and hundreds of Kalashnikov assault rifles.

Some have turned up, but the vast bulk remains untraced. The urgency of finding the rest was

Security forces fail to find bulk of Libyan-supplied arsenal

discussed by Mr King and Irish ministers at Friday's meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council in Belfast.

The authorities' worst scenario envisages IRA attacks of such ferocity — in particular using the heavy machine-guns — that the Army and RUC simply could not cope. In such circumstances the question of internment suspected IRA activists without trial would come back on to the agenda.

The Northern Ireland Office has set its face against internment, largely because when it was last used, in 1971, it led to an explosion of violence and commu-

nity estrangement. It would also alienate Dublin and cause the break-up of the Anglo-Irish agreement.

But some senior security force personnel fear things could get so bad that there would be no choice but to take such drastic action.

In recent years, the IRA has failed to hit what it regards as prestige targets in England.

But British attacks have always been an IRA priority, and it must be assumed that at any given moment its planners will be working on schemes to bring violence to England. The tactic has the same purpose as the Lisburn attack —

to induce such a feeling of war-weariness among British public and political opinion that "troops out" sentiments will one day become government policy.

Thus, the IRA theory runs, the sheer longevity and persistence of their campaign will eventually sap the British will to remain in Ireland, and a British withdrawal will give the IRA victory.

To this long-term end, the IRA is now making a priority of attacking British soldiers rather than the RUC and UDR. The Lisburn and Netherlands attacks were examples of this; so too was the attempt to bomb Gibraltar.

"One dead British soldier," an IRA leader said last week, "is worth four dead RUC men."

The organisation calculates that Britain will eventually be affected by the Vietnam syndrome — that television pictures of a succession of bodies being flown home will have a cumulative effect on British opinion. The IRA clearly pays a great deal of attention to media coverage.

Last week the organisation killed six soldiers. Yet the outcry, though great, was not of the same magnitude as that which followed Enniskillen and Holland. This was reflected in the news coverage; some television bulletins and newspapers gave more prominence to English soccer hooligans or other stories.

The IRA has to face the fact that its violence may be subject to the law of diminishing returns.



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20 June 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

UK/Ireland

reflections on bombing of six soldiers by IRA 15 June 1988

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Holding terrorism funds to be a crime

By Colin Brown
Political Correspondent

A NEW criminal offence against the so-called "godfathers of terrorism" is to be introduced, which would make it illegal to hold or control funds that could be used by IRA or other terrorists.

Those charged under the new offence need not have committed a terrorist act. The onus is likely to be placed on the accused to prove that the funds had been gathered for innocent purposes.

The new offence will work in tandem with laws being introduced this autumn allowing the authorities to freeze and seize the assets of terrorist groups operating in Britain. Home Office officials are still working on the details, but sources have confirmed that they will include the new criminal offence.

An official said: "The offence will have to be very carefully defined. There will have to be a proper level of proof. A person dealing with funds would reasonably have to have known what he was doing for the courts to find him guilty. The legislation will have to spell it out."

The creation of a new criminal offence goes beyond the announcement by Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, in April that terrorist funds would be frozen and seized under a new Prevention of Terrorism Act. It follows support for action from Tom King, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

Minister are hoping that, by making it a criminal offence to hold the funds, the po-

lice may overcome some of the major problems which they will face in tracking down and freezing assets used for terrorism.

The Home Secretary has appealed to the Trevi group of interior ministers for international co-operation in opening foreign bank accounts to searches. Although he received an encouraging response, Home Office sources say changes in the laws of some European countries may be necessary before co-operation can work.


Mr King has given strong backing to the initiative because he believes it will provide the security forces with a powerful new weapon to counter the growth of corruption — including extortion and protection rackets — by the IRA and loyalist paramilitary groups in Ulster.

The legislation, to be announced in the Queen's Speech in November, will present the Opposition with a dilemma.

The Labour Party is committed to opposing the replacement of the Act, which is due to expire next March after five years, because it regards the restrictions on Irish visitors at ports of entry as a "recruitment sergeant" for Sinn Féin and the IRA. But Labour supports action against terrorist funds and last night called for this to be introduced in a separate Bill.

SPOTLIGHT

on the fatal fact of soldiering



Peter Sullivan

Soldier's route to death: the carnage would have been worse if the bomb had exploded in the car-park

Deadly errors that gave IRA a soft target

by Stephen Davis and Peter Sherlock

IT WAS an "unmarked" vehicle that officially did not exist. Its plates were regularly changed, and anybody requesting information from the vehicle records office found their inquiries blocked — the computer operator alerted to keep quiet by a special "flag" that appeared against its registration number.

But despite the strict security measures, the existence of the blue Ford transit van, number WIA 1947, and who owned it were no secret in the British Army garrison town of Lisburn, Northern Ireland.

Its movements, The Sunday Times has established, were "clocked" at least six weeks ago by the IRA's intelligence network of spotters — often women — who are ordered to note the movements and registration numbers of all army vehicles.

It immediately became what the IRA terms a "target of opportunity": details of the van's registration number were circulated by the IRA to its supporters, with instructions immediately to inform Provisional "active service units" if it was spotted.

After that, only a change of plate numbers would have given the van protection. But with no reason to believe it had been identified, soldiers running the motor pool at the barracks in Erbrington, Londonderry, issued the van numbered WIA 1947 at 3.30pm last Wednesday to six British soldiers. Within hours it was to become a target in reality.

The soldiers were driving to an evening charity fun run, 70 miles away in Lisburn, County Antrim, where the army in Northern Ireland has its headquarters. The forecast was for a pleasant, sunny

evening, and the soldiers were looking forward to joining the other 4,500 participants, including many children, eager to help raise £10,000 for charity. Instead, the race was to end in yet another IRA outrage.

Sergeant Michael Winkler, of the Royal Corps of Signals, took the wheel for the journey to Lisburn. He and Signaller Mark Clavey, Lance Corporal Derek Green and Corporal Ian Metcalfe had entered themselves some time before for the run.

At the last minute, they were joined by two colleagues — Lance Corporal Graham Lambie, who "hitched a ride" and Lance Corporal John Paterson, who volunteered to take the place of another runner who pulled out of the competition just hours earlier.

The van arrived in the 200-vehicle car park of the modern Lisburn leisure centre just before 6pm.

Although 4,500 people were taking part in the race and hundreds of vehicles were in town for the event, the soldiers found a space close to the entrance of the car park, allowing them to get changed in the leisure centre in plenty of time for the 6.30pm start.

But the convenient parking space was to prove fatal: security forces believe that an IRA spotter noticed the registration number and put a call through to a nearby "active service unit".

As the soldiers jogged along the 13-mile route, taking them through a predominantly loyalist area and then back to the leisure centre, a

four-man Provo team drove up alongside the unguarded van.

Police believe one terrorist stepped out and attached 7½lb of Semtex plastic explosive — almost certainly supplied from Libya — and a mercury connector like those used in heating units, on the underside of the van.

The bomb, wrapped in black masking tape, was held in place with a magnet of the type used by divers. The bomber then activated one connection by pushing a button or flicking a switch, leaving the other connection to be activated when the mercury tilted to one side or another as the vehicle moved.

The soldiers returned just over two hours later. Without showering or changing, because they were in a hurry to get back to barracks, they set off.

In their haste, they committed a fatal mistake: they did not follow standard army procedure by checking underneath the car.

The bomb would have been easy enough to spot: it had been placed, in the bomber's rush, not under the wheel brace, the normal way the IRA would hide it from easy view, but directly under the petrol tank in clear view of anybody glancing underneath.

In theory, the bomb should have gone off as soon as the van moved. Had it exploded as the IRA must have thought it would, there would have been dozens of casualties, an outrage to match the Remembrance-day bomb at Enniskillen which left 11 dead.

Instead, the mercury remained in position as the van edged slowly past the milling crowds, turning left into Hillsborough Road and going through a green light at an intersection (see map).

As the soldiers approached the

in Ulster: relax for a moment and you're a murder victim



Lisburn mourns: flowers mark the place where six soldiers died

the 9,365 regulars in the province, officers admit the boredom suffered by the soldiers leads to frequent breaches of rules.

Soldiers are supposed never to travel in uniform. They are supposed to carry a handgun whenever possible, use unmarked cars, vary routes, check under vehicles for bombs and avoid strong republican areas.

But the three main outlets to beat the tedium of a life in the barracks — sport, booze and women — are all potentially dangerous. As soldiers relax they tend to neglect security.

There are also other problems. Many soldiers are reluctant to check vehicles left in public areas as they feel this only serves to draw attention to them: there is a limit to how many times they can pretend to drop their keys to look underneath cars or vans.

An element of complacency and fatalism sometimes creeps in. As one officer put it: "When you're in the army in Northern Ireland you know you are a target. If you get too upset about it you shouldn't be in the army. The killing has been going on so long it makes people blasé."

It requires effort to stay alert. Last winter, two soldiers who turned out for a local rugby team were the stars of the game, helping the team to a huge victory. After the match, the grateful locals plied them with drinks; but after two pints the soldiers stopped drinking. One explained simply that they were due back at their base in the border bandit country of Crossmaglen. He added quietly: "We're back on patrol down there tonight. And you don't do that with more than two pints in you — or you're dead."

Additional reporting, Liam Clarke

He had watched a fun run: a woman spectator injured by the bomb explosion is carried away by rescuers

at traffic lights half a mile from leisure centre at the junction of Market Place and Bow Street, the lights turned to red. The driver hit the brakes. The jolt "tripped" the car, and the van exploded into a ball of flame.

The force of the charge blew the windscreen on to the roof of the 12-high Northern Bank, 250ft away.

The soldiers died in the road

outside Ted Jamison's bottled-gas business. "For as long as I am here I am going to have to live with the awful picture of looking out through my window every day at the spot where those poor lads lost their lives," he said.

Trevor Woods, 31, owner of the Woods Bar just yards from the scene, was one of the first to reach the blazing van. "It was the most horrific thing I have ever seen.

"The driver was just sitting there stuck to the wheel and there was another man staggering away from the vehicle. It looked like his hands had been blown off. There were bodies on fire. They looked like burning plastic dolls."

The fun-run murders were not just horrific but a blow to army security procedures in Northern Ireland. Although security measures are regularly drummed into

Risk, a price we must pay

LISBURN, the location of the British Army's headquarters in Northern Ireland, is a quiet, pleasant country town in a neighbourhood of good and kindly people. In the cathedral here my eldest daughter was married to a British officer by Alan Buchanan, a famous parachuting padre and then Bishop of Clogher.

At the time I was general officer commanding Northern Ireland, in the period of IRA trouble in the early 1960s, which petered out because the IRA enemy was not yet ready for a major effort and because Eamon de Valera, the president, swiftly introduced internment without trial in the republic.

Lisburn has not changed a great deal since then, the sweet-tempered nature of its people hardly at all.

The savage murder there of six British soldiers, who had shared in a fund-raising event for charity, could hardly have happened in a less appropriate place. Only providence prevented carnage which could have been worse even than in Enniskillen and as great, perhaps, as that planned by the Provisional IRA for Gibraltar.

What is to be done to diminish the danger of attacks such as these on British soldiery? "Troops out" can be dismissed as short-sighted fantasy. The bloodbath that would follow would be catastrophic.

Those who know Protestant Ulstermen know whose blood would flow most freely. The army of the Catholic republic in the south could not fail to intervene as this went on. The



social contact between the army and the people is a basis for the future, writes General Sir JOHN HACKETT

impact on the United Kingdom's American connection would be appalling.

British troops have to remain, and operate as they do. The problem is to calculate the level of personal risk they should be exposed to and how to protect them and their families.

A main objective of Provisional policy is to nail the British military presence as an alien army of occupation, resented and rejected. This view cannot be allowed to prevail. The spectacle of a British military ghetto, with troops confined to barracks except when they emerge, fully armed, for offensive operations would merely play into the hands of the IRA. Continuing social contact between the army and people from both communities is the only bedrock upon which a successful policy in Ulster can be built.

Military action by the British security forces against the common enemy of Britain and the Irish Republic must continue. The increasing shrillness of Provisional propaganda is a growing testament to the success of our policies. Part of that success rests on the willingness of British soldiers and their families to take as full a part as possible in community life.

The Lisburn bomb raises questions about soldiers' personal freedoms. But

But have matters gone too far? Where do we draw the line? Should the six soldiers have been allowed to take part in the fun run? Only the command of the security forces, well informed, sensitive to all currents of opinion, as liberal in outlook and as full of common sense as it must always be, can determine that.

The Northern Irish command will certainly insist on strict adherence to normal rules of prudent behaviour. Perhaps there has been laxity in this respect in the recent past, which will now be corrected.

In Northern Ireland it may not be possible to prevent the identification of motor vehicles, for example, by those looking for murder victims. It is not too much, however, to insist that adequate checks be always carried out for the detection of explosives. There are many other checks too, upon the security of persons and of property, which demand strict observance.

Every servant of the state, whether in uniform or not (such as diplomatic staff) can be at risk without it, and the risk must be accepted. A great mistake made by an American administration was to refuse to recognise this in the matter of the Tehran

embassy. Our own prime minister's resolute refusal to buy the release of hostages reflects its recognition.

In determining the degree of risk to our own people, it is to be hoped that if any error is made it will be on the side of liberality, even with added risk. This will do more to develop support and goodwill in both parts of Ireland than the reverse.

I may be accused of speaking here with bias. If the bias is towards believing that conciliation and harmony is possible in Ireland, I accept the charge. I recall that on the day I handed over command in Lisburn, I travelled south for a friendly interview with de Valera, the hooded old eagle, arranged by a friend of mine, Charlie Haughey, then minister of justice. Friends, let me add, may prove wayward at times but can still remain friends.

Friendship and goodwill between the inhabitants of these two islands is of the highest importance in both, and the murder campaign of the Provisional IRA is a clear threat to government in each. The British Army in Ireland is serving a wider interest than that of its own government alone, and until the Provisionals are put right out of business will continue to be at risk.

How far that risk can be accepted must remain a matter for judgment. Its diminution must never be allowed to cause, as the Provisionals so ardently wish, a total withdrawal of the army from the Northern Irish community, in which it will continue to have to live.

THE TIMES SATURDAY JUNE 18 1988

IRA 'holding big store of Libyan explosives'

By Paul Vallely

Fears that the IRA still possesses significant amounts of Libyan explosives were at the centre of discussions between British and Irish security chiefs in Belfast yesterday.

The Anglo-Irish conference was told forensic experts were convinced Semtex explosive was used in the bomb which killed six British soldiers after a fun run in Lisburn this week.

Semtex is a commercially-made Czechoslovakian plastic explosive which is known to

be used by the Libyans. It is believed to have been one of the more lethal components of big arms shipments from Tripoli, the last of which was intercepted on the trawler Eksund by security forces.

Mr Tom King, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, confirmed that arms shipments from Libya had been discussed at the meeting with Mr Gerry Collins, the Irish justice minister, which was attended by Sir John Hermon, Chief Constable of the Royal

Ulster Constabulary, and Mr Eamonn Doherty, the Garda Siochana commissioner.

Mr King said: "Semtex, we believe, was included in some of those earlier shipments. The events of this week show why it is vital to recover these resources of terror and violence which do exist somewhere in the island of Ireland.

"I think they now have access to a considerable range of weapons. Because of the Libyan arms shipments, they have considerable resources."


Intelligence showed that the IRA was determined to intensify its campaign. Joint operations by British and Irish security forces had seen a number of "very significant successes" in uncovering arms caches. However, the IRA had proved skilful in concealing weapons and explosives.

Mr King said the police forces and the Irish and British Army would have the scope to meet at various levels as frequently as they thought necessary. "I think we shall

see now a steadily developing and improving co-operation."

He said the conference had discussed several areas of co-operation in the fight against terrorism. The British side had explained the new process of genetic fingerprinting.

Mr King seemed convinced of the Irish government's determination to establish an effective extradition mechanism in spite of the decision of an Irish district court not to extradite Patrick McVeigh, the suspected IRA bomber.



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Reference:

B66/5/1A

Yellow

13 June 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Trevi Ministerial Meeting

Hansard record of Home Secretary's report to the Commons
on 3 June meeting

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Ministerial Meeting, Munich

Mr. Soames: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on the recent ministerial meetings he attended in Munich.

Mr. Hurd: The Ministers of the States of the European Community responsible for counter-terrorism and immigration met on 3 June in Munich under the chairmanship of Dr. Zimmermann, the Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany. Lord Cockfield, a Vice-President of the European Commission, was present for the discussion of immigration matters.

In the immigration meeting we reviewed the position on possible changes in controls at the internal borders of the Community in the light of the Single European Act. Some of my colleagues envisaged that it might become possible to abolish immigration frontier controls within the Community if a series of conditions were fulfilled. These conditions would include the strengthening of controls at the external frontiers of the Community, including the full harmonisation of visa requirements. Others agreed with the United Kingdom that it was not possible to envisage the abolition within the foreseeable future of all immigration controls over third country nationals at intra-Community borders. All the Ministers present endorsed the statement by the presidency that no decision to abolish these controls had been taken.

Frontier controls were also discussed, at my initiative, in the TREVI meeting in view of their importance in continued international cross-border co-operation to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and other crime. My colleagues unanimously accepted my suggestion that the TREVI machinery should be used to consider the implications of changes in frontier controls and the kind of measures which could be taken to off-set potential security disadvantages which might otherwise result from the implementation of the European internal market.

At the immigration meeting, we had before us a further report from the ad hoc group of senior officials established in 1986 during the United Kingdom presidency. We endorsed the recommendations made by that group, including recommendations for improved co-ordination between the representatives of member states in third countries, in assessing conditions in those countries which are relevant to the grant of visas, and to the consideration of applications for asylum.

My colleagues and I continue to be concerned at the considerable increase in some member states of the European Communities in the number of applications for asylum from persons who do not satisfy the criteria laid down in the 1951 Geneva refugee convention and appear to be exploiting the asylum procedure for purposes for

which it is not intended. We therefore reaffirmed our aim of guaranteeing every asylum seeking the right to have his application examined in one of the member states but equally the aim of preventing the abuse whereby the same foreign national made different asylum applications in several member states. We welcomed the progress made towards establishing the necessary criteria for determining which state should be responsible for considering any individual application.

In the TREVI meeting we also discussed events since our previous meeting in Copenhagen in December, including the recent murderous attacks by the Provisional IRA in the Netherlands. There was unanimous and wholehearted condemnation of the Provisional IRA and my colleagues supported my suggestion that this should be recorded in the presidency press statement issued after the meeting.

Various measures to intensify co-operation were agreed including priority search measures for major terrorists, improved gathering of information on terrorist movements and the immediate exchange of information following a major terrorist incident. Proposals for greater co-operation between TREVI states in the forensic field will be developed by officials. We also agreed a refined and updated assessment of the terrorist threat to Community countries.

Further co-operation to combat drug trafficking using the drug liaison officer network was agreed.

My colleagues also agreed to my proposal that we should study ways of confiscating funds intended to support terrorism. The United Kingdom Government's proposals for legislation to replace the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, which expires in March 1989, will provide a starting point for that study.

THE SCOTSMAN Wednesday, June 8, 1988

Police followed as men hid explosives for terror campaign, trial told

'Deadly caches' found in woods

TWO Irishmen were shadowed every inch of the way by police as they buried explosives in forests to wage a terror bombing campaign in Britain, an Old Bailey jury was told in London yesterday.

There was enough material to make at least 25 "pretty powerful" bombs, intended for a "sustained and prolonged campaign of terrorist violence", said Mr Roy Amlot, prosecuting.

He alleged the bomb parts were planted by Patrick McLaughlin (40), and Liam McCotter (25), both from Belfast, and included delay timing units which had been used by the Provisional IRA for many years.

However, unknown to the two, they were being trailed in a joint operation by Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad and Greater Manchester police.

He said the detectives watched as 90lbs of Semtex plastic explosives in

34 blocks, detonators, fuses, the time and power units and a transceiver for radio-controlled bombs were hidden in Macclesfield and Delamere forests, south of Manchester. There were also three AK-47 rifles and two pistols.

At one point in the surveillance, which lasted for several days in February 1987, a detective wormed his way close enough to watch the two men digging, added Mr Amlot. In the operation, McLaughlin was known as "Echo" and McCotter as "Foxtrot".

McLaughlin, of Glenalena, Ballymurphy Estate, and McCotter, of Carrigart Avenue, deny conspiring together and with others and before February 19 last year to cause explosions in the UK of a nature likely to endanger life or seriously damage property.

Heavy security precautions were in force for the start of the trial. When

the accused arrived, a police helicopter hovered above and armed police temporarily closed Newgate Street, beside the Old Bailey. Everyone entering court was body-searched by police.

The court was told that the two rented a top-floor flat in Wilbraham Road, Manchester, in January last year.

Police watched on February 15 as they drove in a van to Bramhall Park, Manchester, and talked among trees near a small stream.

An hour later, they went to Buxton Park in the Peak District, then on to Macclesfield and Delamere forests before returning to Manchester.

At a store, they bought five black plastic dustbins, a spade, heavy-duty gloves, dustbin liners and sealing tape, Mr Amlot went on.

The next day, they returned to Macclesfield Forest. A detective con-

stable allegedly saw them digging up soil which was deposited in a nearby stream.

Later, the van went back to Delamere Forest. Officers saw McLaughlin running into the forest, carrying a spade and a black bag.

"Officers went into the forest and got close enough to hear the sound of breaking twigs and branches without actually seeing either of the men," said Mr Amlot.

"It looks as though the dustbins subsequently found by police in the two forests were being buried in the ground on that day and that the day before had probably been used to find suitable hiding places," he added.

On February 17, McCotter bought gloves, white buckets, torches, wellingtons, socks, dustbin liners and black insulating tape, which were put into a Ford Capri car.

Later it was spotted in both forests before being driven back to Manchester and left near the flat in the car park of the Manchester Royal Infirmary.

Mr Amlot said both men were arrested separately on February 19. McCotter had £1,700 on him and McLaughlin more than £3,000.

After the arrests, police discovered the explosives in the two forests. They were "a most significant and potentially deadly collection of materials," said Mr Amlot.

He added that McCotter's prints were on bin-liners in both caches and materials found in the forests were similar to some at the flat.

There, police discovered a radio receiver and aerial and maps covering London and the British Isles. But in several interviews with detectives, neither man said anything.

The trial continues today.

① McLaughlin
② McCotter
866/5/11A



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Yerla

Reference:

B66/5/1A

10 JUN 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

C.C. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

"INDEPENDENT" REPORT OF TREVI GROUP
MEETING 3 JUNE 1988 'EUROPEAN BORDER
CONTROLS POST-1992

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Hurd rejects EC plans on border checks

DOUGLAS HURD, the Home Secretary, yesterday clashed with Lord Cockfield, the vice-president of the European Commission, over plans to scrap all EC cross-border controls.

Mr Hurd believes that, as drafted, the plans would threaten national security. He met Lord Cockfield yesterday after a meeting in Munich of the Trevi group, which comprises European ministers concerned with terrorism.

But Lord Cockfield, who has been charged with creating a barrier-free internal market, considers that the free movement of people is as much within the spirit of the Single European Act as free movement of goods. He wants all controls removed by 1992.

The clash, which was described by Mr Hurd as a "friendly brush", is not the first between Lord Cockfield and British ministers. It looks likely to set the tone for a hard fight by Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Luxembourg to water down the current proposals.

Mr Hurd said in Munich yesterday: "Lord Cockfield's view is that the Single European Act provides for abolition of frontiers and that means there cannot be controls over EC nationals." This ignored the right of heads of governments under the Act to ensure that nothing prejudiced the fight against drug traffickers, terrorism and serious crime, he added.

The Commission has argued that more internal checks could counter the effect of removing border controls, leading to speculation that Britain might be forced to bring in Continental-style identity cards. But Mr Hurd yesterday ruled this out.

"Frontier controls do provide an effective means of dealing with

By Sarah Helm
Home Affairs Correspondent

these problems," he added. "They are not 100 per cent effective but they are more effective than internal arrangements."

He hoped that the "penny had dropped" among other interior ministers that the Commission's proposals had serious practical problems. But Lord Cockfield insisted that Britain could not opt out of implementing the changes.

A spokesman for West Germany, which currently holds the presidency, said it was hoped that guidelines could be agreed by the second half of 1988.

On another front, Mr Hurd scored a diplomatic success by persuading his European partners to back British moves to bring in new laws enabling police to seize and confiscate terrorists' funds.

Britain has announced legislation in this field, but the Home Secretary believes that for it to be effective there must be powers to inspect bank accounts across Europe. He said yesterday that other Trevi group - ministers had "agreed to discuss drawing up legislation in parallel".

The Trevi group made progress yesterday in other areas:

- Asylum: a deal is expected soon on a common European asylum policy by which countries would agree when and where refugees should be accepted;
- Sharing of forensic evidence: proposals for a centralised database look set to go ahead;
- Football hooliganism: ministers examined areas where more intelligence could be shared in the run-up to the European Championships.

Hurd's reservations, page 5

Hurd takes harder line on frontier controls

THE CLEAREST signal yet that Britain will not accept the abolition of European frontier controls has emerged from the latest meeting of the Trevi group of anti-terrorism ministers.

Until recently, Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, has played down his reservations about the impact such a move might have on terrorism controls, drug trafficking and immigration, while making favourable noises about the general principle.

But as the 1992 deadline approaches, and officials look at the details, countries are beginning to stand up and be counted. When closely examined, Britain's commitment to the proposals seems less than wholehearted — in stark contrast to the Government's strong backing for the lifting of trade barriers.

One proposal which Britain has rejected is the plan to create the free movement of legally-obtained arms within Europe.

One Whitehall source said last week: "The effects on Britain of cutting border controls could be very significant. We need every barrier we have got."

By Sarah Helm, Home Affairs Correspondent

The abolitionists are now France, West Germany and the Benelux countries and the backpedalling is being done by Britain, Greece, Ireland and Denmark.

A European Commission proposal issued in 1985 set out the plan for ending border controls. "Nationals of member states of the community may cross intra-community borders without restriction whatever the mode of transport used," it said.

Although member states would be able to carry out spot checks there should no longer be "any question" of travellers being as a matter of course obliged to present an identification document or say what goods they are carrying.

At the same time, controls on people coming into the community from outside the "ring fence" of EC external borders would face stiffer checks. Common immigration policies would also be developed by the European countries.

Discussions since then have revealed some areas where agree-

ment is possible as long as the action is uniform throughout the community. For example, immigration checks can be cut back if the EC has an agreed policy on which countries should accept applications from refugees. Progress was made on this point at yesterday's Trevi meeting.

A common visa policy would also help, because illegal immigrants would be kept outside the "ring fence" in the first place, allowing freer movement of community nationals.

British concern centres on the effect of lifting border controls on the hunt for drug traffickers, other criminals and terrorists. Senior British police officers have expressed their opposition to the plan.

Officials accept the Commission's point that the loss of border checks could, in part, be compensated for by increased intelligence-sharing between community countries and by stiffening the checks at "ring-fence" entry points. Trevi has had notable suc-

cesses at fostering sharing of intelligence on terrorism and is now spreading its influence to sharing information on football hooliganism and public order control.

However, the question is: can we trust our European partners to do their job properly? Will their intelligence be as good as ours? And, more important, if another country's checks on people coming in from the outside the community are slack, the whole system would collapse. Britain's lack of faith in this respect is bound to lead to criticism of its "island mentality."

"It would be of particular concern if a criminal came in from outside and the country receiving that person had a lax system of checks. The man would then be free to move wherever he liked," a British Trevi official said.

Any impression that all controls are to go by 1992 is now being dismissed in Whitehall and the talk is of gradual implementation. "The idea that we are going to move from having controls to having none is a nonsense," one Whitehall expert said.

THE INDEPENDENT Saturday 4 June 1988

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: NZSIS (TIC)

: PMO (DIRECTOR)

: POLICE (COMMISSIONER PTIU)

SUBJ: COUNTER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

YOUR 665.

WE SPOKE TO THE HEAD OF MFA'S TERRORISM SECTION (HELDT) AND TO THE INTERIOR MINISTRY (BISCHOFF, RESPONSIBLE FOR LIAISON WITH THE FRG COUNTER-TERRORIST UNIT GSG9). IN VIEW OF THEIR DIFFERING RESPONSIBILITIES EACH HAD A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE USE OF FRG FORCES ON OFFSHORE COUNTER-TERRORIST MISSIONS.

2. BISCHOFF BEGAN BY NOTING THAT, UNLIKE MOST COUNTER-TERRORIST UNITS, THE GSG9 IS PART OF THE POLICE RATHER THAN THE ARMED FORCES. (THEY ARE PART OF THE FEDERAL BORDER PROTECTION POLICE, A PARA-MILITARY FORCE WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FRONTIER CONTROL AND INTERNAL SECURITY). THIS MEANS THAT THEY OPERATE UNDER POLICE REGULATIONS RATHER THAN MILITARY LAW - FOR EXAMPLE, THE USE OF FORCE IS ONLY A LAST RESORT.

3. THE STATUS OF GSG9 IS IMPORTANT SINCE UNDER GERMAN BASIC LAW (IE THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION) THE USE OF THE ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE FRG TERRITORY IS EXCLUDED EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENCE. IN FACT, THIS PROVISION IS SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS, BUT IT DOES PROVIDE A CONVENIENT EXCUSE FOR THE FRG TO AVOID FOREIGN MILITARY ENTANGLEMENTS: MOST RECENTLY GENSCHER

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4. ON THE BASIS THAT THESE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLICATIONS CAN BE OVERCOME OR IGNORED, THE MODEL FOR GERMAN EXTERNAL COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS WOULD BE THE 1977 MOGADISHU RESCUE. HELDT AND BISCHOFF CONFIRMED THAT A PRECONDITION FOR SUCH ACTION WOULD BE THE AGREEMENT OF THE ''HOST'' GOVERNMENT - AN ENTEBBE-STYLE RAID WHICH VIOLATED THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ANOTHER STATE WOULD BE EXCLUDED. IN THE CASE OF MOGADISHU A GERMAN SPECIAL ENVOY SECURED THE PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE SOMALI GOVT THAT THE GSG9 UNIT COULD UNDERTAKE ACTIONS IN EFFECT AS A SOVEREIGN FORCE, BUT ONLY IN THE AREA OF THE HIJACKED PLANE (THE SOMALIS REMAINED RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE AIRPORT). THE DECISION TO STORM THE PLANE WAS TAKEN BY THE CRISIS STAFF IN BONN, AND THE SOMALIS WERE INFORMED AND CONCURRED - THE OPERATION WOULD OTHERWISE NOT HAVE GONE AHEAD. THE TACTICAL DECISION ON HOW AND WHEN TO CONDUCT THE ASSAULT WAS HOWEVER LEFT TO THE GSG9 COMMANDER ON THE SPOT.

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WERE INVOLVED. WE GATHER HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS NO STANDARD TEXT AS SUCH: EACH AGREEMENT HAS TO BE NEGOTIATED INDIVIDUALLY AND REFLECTS THE DIFFERENT CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY DIFFERENT STATES. HELDT ALSO INDICATED THAT WHILE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS AWARE OF THESE AGREEMENTS THEY DO NOT KNOW (AND WE SUSPECT WOULD PREFER NOT TO KNOW) THE DETAILS OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS.

6. YOU MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SOME INFORMATION WE GLEANED FROM HELDT ABOUT THE RECENT KUWAITI AIRLINE HIJACKING. HE TOLD US THAT THE FRG HAD ASKED THE BRITISH ABOUT REPORTS THAT SAS PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT ON CYPRUS, BUT HAD BEEN ADVISED THAT THEY WERE NOT CORRECT. KUWAIT HAD OFFERED TO SEND IN ITS OWN COUNTER-TERRORIST UNIT, BUT HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN BY THE CYPRUS GOVT (WE WERE ASKED TO PROTECT THIS PARTICULARLY).

7. HELDT ALSO GAVE US SOME INFORMATION ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS ON TERRORISM WITHIN THE EPC. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE HAD PROPOSED FIVE CONCRETE STEPS TO BE TAKEN AFTER THE KUWAITI HIJACKING. THESE WERE, WITHIN THE ICAO FRAMEWORK,

- (I) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TERRORISM ADVISORY GROUP.,
- (II) SETTING UP A TASK FORCE IN ICAO WHICH COULD ASSIST MEMBERS IN TERRORIST SITUATIONS.,
- (III) AGREEMENT THAT HIJACKED PLANES WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE OFF.,
- (IV) FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF AIRPORT SECURITY., AND OUTSIDE ICAO,
- (V) A COMMON APPROACH TO DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS ON TERRORIST INCIDENTS.

HELDT INDICATED THAT THE FRG BELIEVED THAT ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS ICAO AND IMO COULD HAVE A USEFUL ROLE IN COMBATTING TERRORISM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GERMANS SAW NO MERIT IN THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORIST FORCE, WHICH CROPS UP FROM TIME TO TIME - IN HELDT'S VIEW THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNWORK-ABLE.

8. BOTH HELDT AND BISCHOFF WERE INTERESTED IN THE FORUM APPROACH TO ANTI-TERRORIST COOPERATION, AND ANY INFORMATION WHICH WE CAN PROVIDE THE GERMANS IN DUE COURSE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE APPRECIATED.-

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File: 140/1/1



B66/5/1A

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**OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR
DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL SECURITY**

"By A/F Bag"

23 May 1988



The High Commissioner
New Zealand High Commission
LONDON

ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES

Thank you for your memorandum B66/5/1A of 10 May and for the copy of "World Air and Seaport Security and Defence Reference Book 1988" attached to it. We have passed the publication to the Ministry of Transport.

P. G. Guinness
DESC Secretariat



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Stafford House, 38-42 The Terrace, Private Bag, Wellington Telephone 728877. Telex External NZ 3441

B2/43A

B66/5/18

*cc Rainbow
Warrior*

62/1/8
58/327/5



18 May 1988

ALL DIVISIONS

ALL POSTS

D.R.C.
DR
SLP

CORPORATE PLANNING 1988/1989

The Minister has recently approved an amendment to the Corporate Plan adopted in February. A new key objective has been inserted under Programme 3, International Order. Please note that it is listed as number 1 under Goal 3. The remaining key objectives under this Goal become 2, 3 and 4 respectively.

Goal 3

To strengthen the international rule of law and the institutions, in particular the United Nations, which support it.

New Key Objective

1. To secure fullest possible compliance by France with the terms of settlement of the Rainbow Warrior dispute.
2. Would posts and divisions please note this new key objective and amend their corporate and operational plans as appropriate. It is expected that Paris and New York PR, and Legal and European Divisions, will have major carriage of the workload.

W Beath

L A Beath
Head
European Division

Police hunt second Gibraltar bomb team

SPANISH POLICE are hunting a second group of terrorists which they believe smuggled explosives into the country for the attempted Gibraltar bombing which ended in the deaths of three IRA members in March.

Spain's State Security Directorate said yesterday that the police, working closely with Scotland Yard, were still investigating how the IRA was able to lay the groundwork for its operation.

The directorate's spokesman, Agustin Valladolid, said that apart from the three IRA members shot dead by the SAS in the colony at least two other terrorists were involved in the operation's early stages.

He revealed yesterday that Mairead Farrell, a key member of the IRA gang, had slipped through the police surveillance network, which had included electronic bugging. She had been detected only on the day of the killings. The two

From Tim McGirk in Madrid

other terrorists shot dead were Sean Savage and Daniel McCann.

Mr Valladolid said: "We had complete proof that the two Irishmen were going to plant a bomb. We heard them say so."

Farrell, who had a previous conviction for bombing offences, arrived in Malaga on 4 March on the same flight as Savage and McCann. But she escaped detection using the name K Harper.

It was this crucial gap in police intelligence gathering, he said, that made it impossible to tell whether the car left by the terrorists in Gibraltar contained a bomb. "We simply did not know what Mairead Farrell was doing until that Sunday [of the SAS shooting]," Mr Valladolid said.

Anti-terrorist experts were now "positive" that Farrell drove to a spot some 350

km away, probably north of Valencia, to pick up the powerful explosives, which were smuggled into Spain by sea. Mr Valladolid said that the IRA might have relied on the coastal activities of drug traffickers in that region to land its explosive cargo.

"We have the impression that those people who brought in the explosives were not the same three who died on Gibraltar. Carriers were definitely used," Mr Valladolid said. He added that the combined Spanish and British police investigation may reach a "fruitful" conclusion in several months.

Eight experts from the Spanish anti-terrorism brigade, which has experience tracking members of the Basque terror group Eta, were backed by plainclothes officers from the Malaga police department. They used a helicopter to tail the IRA bombing team. A Scotland Yard detective

worked full-time with the Spaniards analysing data culled by the local detectives.

Even so, according to Mr Valladolid, the British and Spanish forces were unable to determine definitely whether the white Renault 5 which McCann had parked near the supposed Gibraltar target was loaded with a powerful bomb or not.

Spanish undercover agents were waiting at the Gibraltar border to resume their surveillance if the three IRA plotters had crossed back into the La Linea border town.

When asked if Spain might have withdrawn its police co-operation had it known that SAS men would kill the three IRA members, the state security spokesman declined to comment. He added, however: "If Spanish police were involved in a similar shooting there would be a tremendous uproar."

Special report, page 7

86615-11A

SAS 'go anywhere' satellite communications system

By Mark Urban
Defence Correspondent

MEN OF the Special Air Service, wherever they are in the world, are kept in touch with their commanders by special communications equipment. Political authority to carry out a mission abroad may be given only when they have their targets literally in their sights.

Special satellite dishes, so small that they can be carried like a rucksack, are used to provide voice communications with base. An even smaller system provides the ability to send burst transmissions of coded signals to satellites.

These British Skynet satellites usually pass their signal down to a ground station at Oakhanger in Hampshire. From there it can go to the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall, where there is a special forces headquarters headed by a brigadier.

In real emergencies this brigadier often works from the Cabinet Office emergency room code-named "Cobra". The Prime Minister is sometimes present during such discussions.

During the Falklands war, the commanding officer of the 22nd

SAS Regiment often held telephone conferences, via satellite equipment, with senior government officials in London. His command system bypassed that used by the rest of the task force. The SAS communications network was even exploited by one of the journalists covering the conflict.

According to well placed sources, there have been other occasions when ministers in London have given SAS ambush commanders in the field their orders to proceed with an operation. In this way it is possible for political authority to be confirmed right up until the last moment.

A special unit of the Royal Corps of Signals shares the SAS barracks in Hereford. It is responsible for maintaining this "go anywhere" communications system.

Gibraltar, unlike the jungles of Brunei or arctic wastes of Norway, has a military communications system linking it with Lon-



In touch: The SAS uses satellite dishes for communication.

don. But if past patterns were observed, it is likely that the SAS retained its own communications with higher authorities.

Shooting of bomb team is praised by Thatcher

By Colin Brown
Political Correspondent

MARGARET THATCHER yesterday firmly backed the action taken by the SAS in the shooting of the IRA team in Gibraltar.

William McCrae, Democratic Unionist MP for Mid-Ulster, protested during Prime Minister's Questions in the Commons that critics appeared more concerned about the terrorists than the welfare of the security services.

She replied: "I join with you in saying how thankful we are for the excellent services of all members of the security services in protecting us from terrorism."

However, Opposition leaders remain concerned about the lack of a public inquiry to determine who decided on the course of action which led to the three killings. They are convinced that the Prime Minister sanctioned the decision to send in the SAS rather than police from the Special Branch.

A former Foreign Office minister said yesterday that the Foreign

Office would have taken the lead, but copies of any minutes concerning the operation with the Ministry of Defence would have been sent to Downing Street for the Prime Minister's attention.

Ian Stewart, Minister for the Armed Forces, last night refused to disclose the rules of engagement under which the shootings were carried out. He said the inquiry in Gibraltar would be "to determine how the terrorists died".

It is a government convention that the Prime Minister's authorisation is required for all British military action abroad. Tory MPs fully support the action. But Labour MPs are determined to press the Government about the way they believe the killing of the three unarmed members of the IRA active ser-

vice unit has undermined Britain's support for the rule of law.

This issue has added to the continuing strains with the Irish Republic. Opposition spokesmen in Dublin have demanded that the soldiers responsible for the killings should face trial.

However, the Opposition in Britain has been careful to direct its criticism at government ministers who they believe were responsible for the decision to send in a team of soldiers more highly trained in killing than in making arrests.

Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Attorney-General, was last night given the strong support of the Tory backbench Northern Ireland committee over continuing problems with the Republic over extradition. He made it clear that he was now prepared to submit a summary of the evidence against those wanted for extradition, but would not disclose the identity of witnesses.

TOMORROW: Carmen Proetta interview

B615/11A

BGG/5/1A

THE GUARDIAN
Tuesday May 10 1988

SAS used in Gibraltar affair on Thatcher's direct orders

Richard Norton-Taylor

MRS Thatcher personally authorised the use of the SAS in the operation which culminated in the shooting of three IRA terrorists in Gibraltar in March.

Though the Ministry of Defence and MI5 were responsible for the surveillance of the IRA active service unit and the details of the operation, the Prime Minister gave the go-ahead to send the SAS.

There is a convention, according to official sources, that the Prime Minister has to agree to military action overseas, or security and anti-terrorist measures abroad involving military personnel.

A decision to send the SAS to storm the hijacked Kuwaiti airliner in Larnaca last month, for example, would have had to be taken by the Prime Minister.

The Ministry of Defence said yesterday that no decision had yet been made about whether SAS men will attend the Gibraltar inquest which is expected to

open late next month. However, it is understood that the SAS soldiers will do so, although their identities will be kept secret.

The SAS are trained to shoot to kill. Their rules of engagement — that they should shoot if their lives or the lives of others are in imminent danger — are likely to be spelt out to the inquest jury by government lawyers. So in some circumstances, the question if warnings are given — a controversy fuelled by eyewitnesses on Thames and BBC television programmes about the Gibraltar shootings — is secondary.

The Government is expected to argue that there was reason to believe that the IRA trio, though unarmed, could have had a remote-control detonating device to blow up a bomb in the white Renault car parked two hours earlier by Sean Savage near the square where guard ceremonies take place. The car, it is said, was equipped with an unusual aerial.

Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, told the Com-

mons on March 7 — the day after the shootings — that the car was "dealt with" later and was found not to have contained a bomb.

Those involved in the operation appear to have been concerned about the lack of hard evidence they had on the IRA activists. That may be given as a reason why they did not arrest them earlier in the day when they were followed to the colony's frontier by the Spanish police.

It also seems clear that the SAS were unlikely to have chosen the busy area where Mair-ead Farrell, Danny McCann and Savage were killed, preferring — if there had to be a confrontation — somewhere closer to the frontier, the runway and Ministry of Defence property.

Gibraltar police will fly to Britain this week to interview potential new witnesses. Mr Eric Thistlethwaite, the colony's Attorney-General, confirmed that one of them was a holidaymaker from the north of England who was wounded by a ricocheting bullet.



New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

YERLOW

Reference: B66/5/1A
→

10 May 1988

The Co-ordinator,
DESC,
Ministry of Defence,
Wellington.

Anti-terrorist Measures

We have received a complimentary copy of "World Air and Seaport Security and Defence Reference Book 1988". It is produced by Cornhill Publications (London) and edited by the Executive Secretary of the International Association of Airport and Sea Police. We attach the publication in case it is of interest to the New Zealand authorities concerned with airport and port security.

S.W. Prior,
First Secretary.



New Zealand High Commission

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Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

Reference:

B66/5/1A

Yellow

9 May 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

C.C. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

*(Copies of relevant papers
sent also to Telvan)*

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:
background commentary on

Lebanon Hostages / France/Iran deal

Gibraltar - IRA shootings

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Syrian reveals details of Beirut kidnap 'deal'

by Hazhir Teimourian

A SYRIAN businessman who claims to have acted as a go-between to secure the release of three French hostages in Lebanon says the deal included a promise to pay Fr10m (£935,000) to the kidnappers in Beirut and an assurance from Jacques Chirac, the prime minister, that France will become neutral in the Gulf war if he is elected president today.

Omran Adham, the businessman, said the deal also involved France's repayment of the final part of a \$1 billion loan made by the Shah of Iran, plus interest accumulated over 14 years. This amount still has to be negotiated.

In addition, he said, France would resume diplomatic relations with Iran, broken in July after an employee of the Iranian embassy in Paris refused to co-operate with the French authorities in their investigation of the 1986 Paris bombings in which 13 people died.

Chirac's government has confirmed it will repay the loan and resume relations with Tehran, but has denied it paid any money to the group that held Marcel Fontaine and Marcel Carton, two diplomats, and Jean-Paul Kauffmann, a journalist.

Under the deal, Adham said, France would not give cash directly to the kidnappers, but agreed that part of the payment to Tehran would go to the Lebanese group. Militia sources in West Beirut confirmed this account. They said Islamic Jihad, the underground fundamentalist group holding Western hostages, expected to receive £1m from



Blood-money: Chirac denies paying the kidnappers directly

the release of the Frenchmen.

Adham said he used his extensive contacts with radical governments in the Middle East to work as an intermediary between Tehran, Syria and France until he was "expelled" on Tuesday by Charles Pasqua, the French interior minister, 24 hours before the hostages were released.

Adham said his expulsion was connected with internal French politics. He said a representative of President Francois Mitterrand accompanied him to the airport to show presidential displeasure with his deportation. He is ready to return to Paris this week to "spill the beans".

For its part, Chirac's government has denied that Adham was acting as an intermediary. Sources said he had been employed by the previous socialist government in contacts with terrorist groups, but had not been used since 1986.

But the evidence suggests close involvement in the

French dealings by Adham, who embarrassed the Chirac government last week by announcing the imminent release of the hostages in advance and by complaining that Chirac had paid £16m for the release last November of two other French hostages.

Pasqua was in charge of the hostage negotiations. He used as his envoy Jean Charles Marchiani, a close aide and fellow Corsican, who operated in Lebanon under the name of Alex Stephani. Marchiani, a former French secret agent, flew to Damascus two weeks ago — on the eve of the first round of the French election — expecting to pick up the hostages, but returned empty handed.

On Wednesday, he was on board the plane bringing the three hostages back from west Beirut, but disembarked separately to avoid publicity.

Adham, who has gone to ground in Geneva, would not identify the Iranian officials involved in the negotiations and declined to comment on

reports from West Beirut that the French deal involved selling military hardware to Tehran, including ammunition and spare parts.

Last week's deal was not the first time French foreign policy has been influenced by Tehran. Last November, when the two other hostages were released, France removed its aircraft carrier, the Clemenceau, from the mouth of the Gulf, and informed Iraq it could no longer count on the delivery of 20 French Mirage F-1 fighter bombers.

Iran has reacted favourably to the release of the hostages and the resumption of diplomatic ties. It is seen as a much-needed success at a time when Iran has suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the Iraqis and Americans.

Details of the release are still hazy, but American sources said Manicher Ghorbanifar, who was closely involved as an intermediary in the Iran-contra affair, helped clinch the deal.

Sources in Beirut also said that Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the Iranian parliamentary speaker, personally gave approval on Wednesday for the release. They said Rafsanjani telephoned a mediator who arrived in Beirut on April 30. He was named as Razah Raad, a French doctor of Lebanese origin.

Raad visited the Iranian embassy in Beirut several times and was present when the hostages were handed to Syrian security officials. He said the hijacking of the Kuwaiti aircraft and fighting in the Gulf had delayed their release.

Additional reporting by Marie Colvin and John Witherow

La France perfide, page B2

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OBSERVER

Chelsea Bridge House, Queenstown Road, London SW8 4NN. 01-627 0700

Hostages: Chirac may gain, France will lose

SELDOM has a proud nation been so effortlessly manipulated as has France by the Ayatollahs of Iran. In the past few weeks, the French Prime Minister and claimant to the Gaullist tradition, Jacques Chirac, has been waving a blank cheque in the hope that somebody will fill in the amount — any amount — and release the three French hostages held in Lebanon. Finally, as the French election campaign entered its last days, the Iranian Government decided that the price was right and brought the obscene auction to an end by directing its proxies in Lebanon to release the men.

One rejoices for their freedom but despairs for France and for the lost hopes of Western solidarity in the face of the barbarous practice of hostage-taking. Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the French National Front, whose views on most subjects are odious, this time was right to dissent from Chirac's claim of a 'dignified and honourable settlement.' 'Everyone is talking about a victory, but it's actually a defeat for our country,' he grumbled. Even if we accept French assurances that no direct ransom was paid, the price in concessions to Iran was heavy and it is impossible to believe that the hostage-takers will not be indirect beneficiaries.

Mr Chirac has fallen into the same trap that destroyed President Carter: setting the human rights of a few actual hostages above those of millions of potential ones. One cannot prevent hostage-taking by demonstrating that it pays. What greater

encouragement could there be to the hoodlums of East Beirut than to see the French Government crawling to meet its conditions? How soon will it be before they are tempted to take another Frenchman from the streets, clap him in irons, and wait for a weak government to succumb to the blackmail?

The French, of course, are not alone. West Germany has negotiated over hostages and may have paid ransoms — or at least allowed them to be paid. The Reagan Administration destroyed its reputation by talking tough, while engaging in clandestine dealings with Tehran. The lesson seems to be very slow to sink in.

On this issue, Mrs Thatcher is right. Negotiating with hostage-takers is not only bad in principle, but also ineffective as policy. It may release a few unfortunates, but only by putting countless others at greater risk. It is hard-hearted — unbearably so for the friends and families of the British hostages still held in Lebanon — but it is the only policy that can be rationally defended. Alas, few governments have the resolve to carry it out, though plenty are prepared to put their names to solid-sounding international declarations on the subject.

Today France votes in the second round of the Presidential election. In the absence of opinion polls, one cannot judge what effect the release of the hostages may have on the result. But if Mr Chirac should unexpectedly triumph, his performance in the past weeks will ultimately come back to haunt him.

France to buy oil in Iran deal

THE FRENCH government has told French oil companies to resume buying Iranian crude oil after a nine-month embargo as part of the deal with Iran for the release of three hostages held in Lebanon, oil industry sources said yesterday. They said the resumption was to be regarded as a goodwill gesture to Iran following the freeing of the three Frenchmen in Beirut on Wednesday.

French and Iranian delegations are meanwhile expected to meet in Geneva in the coming week to finalise arrangements for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. Diplomatic ties were broken in July last year during the standoff over the Iranian interpreter, Vahid Gordji, who sought refuge in the Iranian embassy in Paris rather than answer questions about a bombing campaign in France the previous year. In-

formed sources said ambassadors are expected to be exchanged one month after the successful conclusion of the Geneva talks.

Sources in the international oil market played down the economic significance of the reported lifting of the oil embargo, imposed last year after diplomatic relations were broken. They speculated that oil companies operating in France, including the state-owned Total and Elf-Aquitaine, had probably been buying products refined from Iranian crude during the period of the embargo. Any commitment to lift guaranteed quantities of crude from Iran, however, would be a significant gesture to the Iranians, who are desperate for customers in a glutted market. In the first eight months of 1987, France's imports of Iranian crude were worth almost £350m.

By Harvey Morris
Middle East Editor
and Safa Haeri
in Paris

Informed sources said that during negotiations for the hostage release Iran eased its political demand for an end to French military assistance to Iraq in favour of more tangible financial benefits. These include repayment of the third and final tranche of a \$1b (£534m) loan made to France by the late Shah.

Informed Iranian sources say the hostage deal was hastened, on Iran's part, by its recent setbacks in the Gulf war, including its naval losses in clashes with the Americans and the Iraqi recapture of Fao.

"The last three months' fiascos for Iran were a welcome omen for

the moderates who have once again got the upper hand in their endless fight against the hardliners," said one Iranian analyst. "They have convinced the Ayatollah that either they jump on an opportunity to strike a deal with France or they let go and they all sink."

It is the hardliners who have been most closely associated with the radical Shia groups in Lebanon which were holding the three Frenchmen and continue to hold at least 17 foreigners, including Terry Waite, the Anglican envoy. The hardline faction suffered a setback in a power struggle with the parliamentary speaker, Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, over his role in promoting contacts with the Americans in what was to become known as the Irangate affair. One hardline leader was executed last

year, others were jailed and the main agency for liaison with the Lebanese extremists was shut down, an indication that Mr Rafsanjani and other "moderates" might be prepared to rein in the kidnappers.

The French news agency AFP yesterday quoted security sources in Beirut as saying Mr Rafsanjani personally gave the go-ahead for the release of the hostages during a telephone call on 30 April to a French mediator, Reza Raad. It said Mr Raad paid several visits to the Iranian embassy in Beirut. He was also at the Summerland Hotel minutes before the three hostages, Marcel Carton, Marcel Fontaine and Jean-Paul Kauffmann, arrived there in a car driven by a Muslim cleric.

Mr Raad is Franco-Lebanese and has stood as a candidate for Jacques Chirac's RPR party.

—IAN MADDIS

OBSERVER SUNDAY 8 MAY 1988

Arms deal won freedom

FRANCE agreed to sign a £45 million arms deal with Iran in order to secure the freedom of the three French hostages released from Lebanon last week.

Despite French Government denials, sources in Tehran and Paris suggest that France has agreed to supply Iran with new arms. It also appears that, in an indirect deal, more than £1 million will be paid to the actual hostage takers. In addition, the French have promised to pay the last instalment of a £700 million loan made by the Shah, re-establish diplomatic relations with Tehran, and agree to oil purchases.

But the French Government appears to have prevaricated over demands for the expulsion of Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, the former Iranian President exiled in Paris, and the release of Anis Naghsh, head of a

by FARZAD BAZOFT

unit which tried to assassinate former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar.

His release would have needed the consent of President Mitterrand.

The arms deal goes directly against assurances given by French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac to Mrs Thatcher, shortly after the three hostages were released last week. He said that the French did not pay in cash or arms for the release.

The main Iranian representatives in the negotiations were Abbas Kangarlou, a deputy Prime Minister, and Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, an Iranian businessman.

The Iranians, apparently in desperate need of an air defence system, asked for arms during the negotiations. The French apparently agreed

to supply 155 mm and 175 mm artillery shells and a sophisticated air defence system.

The talks, as pieced together by *The Observer*, started in February this year after Paris despatched Jean-Charles Marchiani, Mr Chirac's special envoy, on a tour of shuttle diplomacy to the Middle East, where he held talks with Iranians in Turkey, Lebanon and Syria.

The first sign that Iran was prepared to obtain the release of the three French hostages came last month, when a group of French journalists were promised a 'surprise' by Iranian officials.

This surprise was designed by Tehran to undermine President Francois Mitterrand's presidential campaign, but failed to achieve its objective when the Kuwaiti airliner was hijacked by a pro-Iranian Islamic group.

Iran's price for freeing

Beirut captives

***FOREIGN NEWS 9

MONEY, arms and French neutrality in the Gulf War — this was the price which Iran set for securing the freedom of the last French hostages in Lebanon. How much the Chirac government eventually paid after months of often aborted negotiations is yet to emerge.

But what was clear yesterday was that it included a promise by France to repay an outstanding loan to Iran and a French commitment to re-establish diplomatic ties with Tehran. The Chirac government denied that a direct ransom had been paid to the kidnappers, but this did not rule out the possibility that Tehran may have paid them off as part of the deal.

Denis Baudouin, a spokesman for the Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, revealed that France had repaid to Iran two-thirds of a \$1bn (£534m) loan made by the Shah to finance the Eurodif nuclear energy project. He said the government was now preparing to pay the third and final tranche.

Mr Chirac, in a statement after the hostages arrived back in France, specifically thanked the Iranians for their help in securing the release of the three men. "As everyone knows, the release of our hostages must be seen in the context of our relations with Iran. It is the Tehran authorities who intervened to get the kidnappers to release our countrymen." He said that following the release, the restoration of normal relations between France and Iran could now be expected. Relations

By Harvey Morris Middle East Editor,
Jina Barakat in Beirut
and Safa Haeri in Geneva

were broken in July during the stand-off over an Iranian embassy interpreter, Vahid Gordji, who took refuge in his embassy in Paris in order to avoid questioning about a bombing campaign in France the previous year.

Well-informed sources in Beirut said Iran had demanded to buy through third parties £15m of French-made arms, ammunition and spare parts, repayment of the Eurodif loan, renewal of diplomatic ties and the expulsion from France of the Syrian-born businessman and Mitterrand negotiator, Omrane Adham, for allegedly trying to delay the Frenchmen's release until after the presidential elections on Sunday. Mr Adham was expelled to Switzerland yesterday, where he told *The Independent*: "I know all the details. All the time I was telling the French not to bow to blackmail." He said arms were part of the final deal and that delivery would be made through Syria. He said Syria's President Hafez Assad played a central role in the hostage release.

The Beirut sources said Mr Chirac's special envoy, Jean-Charles Marchiani, clinched the deal when he paid the kidnappers a ransom of 10m francs (£1m).

The unspoken implication of Mr Chirac's statement of thanks to Tehran was to confirm that Iran effectively controls the activ-

ities of the pro-Iranian groups holding foreign hostages in Lebanon. The Islamic Jihad group, which held the three Frenchmen captive for three years, is the same organisation held responsible for last month's hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner to Iran, Cyprus and ultimately Algeria. Sources in the Middle East have said that a leader of Islamic Jihad, Imad Mugnyah, was at Mashad airport, in Iran, with the knowledge of the Iranian authorities while the plane was on the ground there and helped to co-ordinate the hijacking. Mugnyah's group is believed to be holding American hostages, with whom the Frenchmen say they were in touch during their captivity, and Terry Waite, the Anglican envoy.

The Iranian official who was responsible for overseeing the hijacking crisis at Mashad, Deputy Prime Minister Alireza Moayeri, yesterday took credit on behalf of Iran for the release of the Frenchmen. Referring to France's "positive attitudes", he said on Iranian television: "For humanitarian reasons, we asked the Muslim people of Lebanon to help in the French problem, and as a result the remaining French hostages were released."

He added: "This humanitarian measure was taken in view of the developments after Mr Chirac's election as Prime Minister and

the observed positive attitudes towards Iran's declared conditions."

He was apparently referring to Iran's long-standing demands that Western countries, including France, should take a more "even-handed" stand in the Gulf War and that France, in particular, should reduce its role as one of Iraq's main armourers. Iran may regard Mr Chirac as a more sympathetic interlocutor than President Mitterrand in view of the former's efforts to improve ties with Tehran after his election as Prime Minister in 1986. Middle East sources were nevertheless sceptical yesterday about the prospects of France's ending its special relationship with Iraq or of its undertaking arms sales to Iran on any scale. After previous hostage releases, there has been speculation that France would reduce its naval presence in the Gulf. But there were no indications yesterday that this was part of the latest deal.

Mr Adham yesterday said he believed President Assad was working to obtain the release of all the remaining foreign hostages in Lebanon. This would square with Syria's recent attempts to regain international respectability after long being associated in the West with support for terrorism. There have also been indications that some factions within the Iranian hierarchy regard the hostages in Lebanon as a diminishing asset and that the time may have come to secure their freedom: the price is right.

Revealed: Why the SAS

THE SAS took no chances in killing three IRA terrorists in Gibraltar because they had secret intelligence which convinced them that the gang was able to detonate a bomb by using a sophisticated remote control device, military sources have told The Sunday Times Insight team.

Insight was told that the bomb discovered by Spanish police after the shooting was not the one that the IRA had originally intended to use in its planned attack on the

Royal Anglian Regiment band in Gibraltar in March.

The bomb it had planned to use was discovered by chance in January by police in Brussels, along with a powerful remote control timing device. The loss of that bomb and its device forced the IRA to change its plans and use a smaller bomb with a more conventional remote control device.

But British intelligence did not know that a different detonator had been substituted

and that the new bomb package was less sophisticated than the original. It could not rule out the possibility that the IRA would have another long-range remote control device to use in Gibraltar.

When the confrontation came between the SAS and the three IRA terrorists in Gibraltar on March 6, the security forces took no chances. Rather than giving the IRA activists time to detonate a bomb, they were warned and then shot dead.

INSIGHT

Insight has established that when the IRA began planning the raid on Gibraltar last November, one of the organisation's top bomb-makers, Sean Savage, was sent to Brussels to find the components and store them for collection and smuggling to Spain.

But on January 21, a routine

search by Brussels detectives, looking for leads on a gang of armed robbers, uncovered a Renault 4 with Dutch number plates in a lock-up garage. Three hundred pounds of Semtex-H, an exceptionally powerful Czech plastic explosive, were found inside the car. Five detonators and a

Focus: SAS in the dock, pages 14-15

shot IRA terrorists

sophisticated remote control device were also found.

British intelligence concluded that the Brussels bomb was destined for Gibraltar.

The controversial Thames Television programme, This Week, unaware of the IRA's technical advances in remote control devices, had suggested it was highly unlikely a remote control device could be used in Gibraltar and had therefore questioned the need to shoot the terrorists. [David Elstein of Thames TV comments on

page B5.] However, Colonel George Styles, the expert quoted in the programme, told Insight that its new evidence "put a whole new complexion on the matter".

The threat of a remote-controlled bomb being detonated from outside Gibraltar forced the security forces to move against the terrorists before they crossed the border.

The SAS had instructions to arrest the three terrorists. But it was made clear that if they felt their lives or the lives of

innocent people were threatened, they should open fire after issuing a warning.


Bomb victim's wife hits out

THE wife of an Enniskillen bomb victim, who appeared with her crippled husband in the film on the Gibraltar shootings, attacked the film, saying she was "misled".

Full report, page 2

IAN JACK, in Gibraltar, unravels the tangled,

Graphics: MICHAEL WRIGHT



THIS DIAGRAM is based on a map drawn by Lt-Col George Styles for Thames Television, who have given it to *The Observer*. The witnesses, attackers and attacked are more precisely placed and annotated on Styles's map — drawn with great care on the back of laundry list for the Rock Hotel, Gibraltar, but our version differs from it in no substantial way.

It shows the scene in Winston Churchill Avenue around 3.45 on the afternoon of Sunday, 6 March. Police Car 1 arrives first from the north, unloads three SAS men, picks them up three minutes later and drives away (Styles's legend says: 'The police driver... has to be urged to leave the scene.')

Police car 2 sounds siren and arrives at garage around the same time from the opposite direction. Evidence from five witnesses does not exactly match, but they are watching two separate incidents from four different angles at five separate times. In sequence:

① Carmen Proetta hears siren, goes to window, sees three men in civilian clothes and a fourth in police uniform leave car, which has screeched to a stop. Shot fired as three jump barrier and two head towards Farrell and McCann. (Affidavit)

② Stephen Bullock has partial view of petrol station, sees McCann falling backwards to ground with hands in air. Police car siren sounds 'almost simultaneously', could be before or after. SAS men at corner begin to run towards Savage (*The Observer*)

③ Josie Celecia hears two shots and looks towards petrol station. Sees couple on ground and man standing above them, hears automatic fire. 'I don't know where this man came from.' (TV interview)

④ Anonymous witnesses say Savage shot first in back as he runs towards town, then gunman fires two or three times into him 'at point blank range.' (TV interview, affidavit)

AMBUSH

IT IS all to begin with an apology and a caveat. A week which has seen more gratuitous murder inflicted by the Provisional IRA may not be the best — it is certainly not the easiest — of times to pursue further the true manner of the deaths of the three IRA terrorists, Mairead Farrell, Daniel McCann and Sean Savage, at the hands of British special forces in Gibraltar on 6 March.

So far as Ireland is concerned, Britain these days has a bitter, sometimes hysterical, emotional climate. Nor would it be wise to claim that the reconstruction on this page by any means approaches the final truth, if that is ever to be found.

Its aim is more modest: to present as careful an assembly of the available evidence as any yet attempted by a British newspaper, gathered from civilian witnesses and excluding leaks and unattributable briefings from Government sources, but backed by the considerable military expertise of a man who has spent a great deal of his life combating, very bravely, terrorism in Northern Ireland.

The result flatly contradicts the sparse on-the-record statements of Government Ministers as well as the anonymous leakages which have watered the most persistent speculative theory — that this was a hastily arranged operation moved from its original locale because of a sudden discovery of the terrorists' intentions; that death was not intended and came about only because the three made suspicious hand movements; or that, if it was, the blood should have been spilled elsewhere.

Trial by graphics

Before the Conservative backbenches raise an original new cry — 'Trial by graphics!' — they might consider the character of the man who drew the detailed map on which the reconstruction above is based.

He is Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen George Styles, holder of the George Cross, formerly the British Army's chief ammunitions technical officer and chief of the bomb disposal squad in Northern Ireland, with hobbies listed in 'Who's Who' as 'rifle and game shooting, cartridge collecting.'

Thames Television hired Styles as a consultant for its investigation, 'Death on the Rock', and it was in this role that he was commissioned by the reporter, Julian Manyon, and the producer, Chris Oxley, to draw a diagram of what he thought had happened, based on four days' work in Gibraltar, during which he had talked to witnesses, inspected bullet damage, paced the site and, according to Manyon, 'generally sniffed around.'

That was on 29 March. The programme was broadcast, despite the intervention of Sir Geoffrey Howe and the 'deeper-than-furious' opposition of Mrs Thatcher, on 28 April. In the days since the broadcast, a picture has emerged in the Press of Lt-Col Styles as a simple soldier tricked into appearing on the programme by some of British television's few remaining 'radical' journalists — Wantage meets Islington — who did not disclose their smarty-boots intentions.

Last week's *Sunday Times* reported him as an angry man who was writing a stiff letter of complaint to Thames, with a copy to the Prime Minister. He was one of several witnesses, according to the *Sunday Times* report under the Insight label, who were punching holes in the testimony of Mrs Carmen Proetta and rapidly diminishing the programme's credibility.

As it turned out, the only letter that Thames received from Styles last week was addressed to the programme's junior researcher, Eammon Hardy, and in five short paragraphs simply recorded his disappointment that two of his views had not been included in the film.

First, that although, as he said in the film, there was little danger that the notional remote control device carried by the terrorists could have exploded the notional bomb in the white Renault parked a mile and a half away across the jumbled streets of Gibraltar, it could, on the other hand, have activated an equally notional bomb in the red Ford Escort which the terrorists had parked a mile away over flat land and on the border with Spain. And, secondly, that the hands of Farrell and McCann were in

his view flung up by the impact of bullets rather than as a gesture of surrender.

Then comes an intriguing paragraph: 'There would have been little justification, in my view, for shooting the terrorists once they had planted the bomb, as the action would have been lost from our point of view. The agony and risk of defusing would, once again, have had to be carried by the ammunition technical officer, to name but one risk.'

The implications of this paragraph are quite devastating. What Styles seems to be saying — what he has in fact said to Manyon and Oxley on other occasions — is that the terrorists may have been shot *because* at that stage they had not planted a bomb; and that, if they had, they would have been seized rather than shot and then marched smartly back and ordered to defuse it.

Why, then, shoot them? Styles's answer comes in one of the many portions of Manyon's interview with Styles that stopped in the cutting-room.

Manyon: 'How would the planning and training for this [British Army] have been conducted? I mean... you appear to be suggesting that there was a policy decision at a relatively early stage that these people were to be stopped from carrying out their plan.'

Styles: 'Well, that is my firm belief, because when you look at what happened, the target for the bomb

wasn't going to arrive until Tuesday, i.e. the band of the Anglian Regiment. The car parking space was reserved on Sunday... that would be the time to stop them going any further. You would have a clear indication of their intent to carry on this nefarious plan by putting the car down to reserve a place for the bomb. What better time to take them out, to stop them going any further.'

Later Manyon asked him if the three could not have been arrested rather than killed. Styles replied: 'I think it would have been reckless to have attempted to stop those terrorists, because more than likely they would have been armed, and I think that if this is the way they want to wage their war, well this is the way in which organised society, thank goodness, has got to take them.'

Feared thesis

In the end, Styles's line in direct reasoning was too much for the programme-makers at Thames, and only a whiff of it emerged in the documentary. According to Oxley, they saw that a thesis which flew so directly in the face of everything the Government had said — suspected car bomb, remote-control device, suspicious hand movements — needed harder evidence to sustain its conclusions.

They wanted to protect themselves and Styles from the charge of coat-trailing with intent. So the pro-

impression that we formed at the time, you know. And her evidence was just corroboration really.'

This is a rather important statement. It gives the lie to any suggestion that the old soldier may have been seduced by the directness and vivacity of the woman who was once Miss Gibraltar.

Styles had formed his impression of where the first shots had been fired from on purely ballistic evidence when Manyon pointed out two holes in the petrol station's pumps, before he had heard Proetta's testimony.

'Where do you think those bullets came from, George?' asked Manyon.

'Low-velocity jobs fired from over there,' said Styles, and pointed to the central reservation in the dual carriageway of Winston Churchill Avenue.

gramme reflected his considerable military knowledge rather than his equally considerable military beliefs, based in his phrase on 'prevention rather than cure.'

He may not have minded as much as has been made out. Last week, in a long telephone conversation with Oxley, he told his producer: 'You don't have to apologise to me, mate. I'm an old soldier, remember?' The thing that had made him most cross, he said, was the way the Press had gone for Carmen Proetta 'because, you know, what she said was true.'

SET aside the quarrel over whether the hands of Farrell and McCann were raised in surrender (Proetta) or shock (Styles). The fact remains that Styles found this formidable woman a most convincing witness. In another unbroadcast part of their interview, Manyon asked him his opinion of the accuracy of her account. Did it reflect what she genuinely saw and heard?

Styles: 'Oh, I think so, yes. Exactly. And she was very coherent about it all, too, and shocked.'

Manyon: 'What gives you particular reason to believe in terms of the detail that she gave, that this was what she actually saw?'

Styles: 'Well, we had walked the course before, hadn't we? We'd seen the marks on the petrol pumps, we'd heard the descriptions of other people, about people jumping over the railings, and it all fits into the general

Manyon says he was incredulous. Until that stage what little evidence there was pointed to shootings which had begun and ended on the pavement, by gunmen who had approached on foot from behind and (possibly) shouted a warning.

But Styles was adamant. When he heard Proetta's account of how she had heard a police siren and then watched as gunmen jumped over the barrier from a car which had pulled up on the other side, Styles merely recognised that his opinion had been endorsed. 'QED,' he said.

FOR other investigators, however, the conclusion has not been as simple as that. We are, after all, looking at two different series of shootings from four different points of view.

Then there are the number of police cars to consider, and the matter of the siren. Ian Mather in last week's *Observer* suggested that its sounding was a mistake, a 'boob' by the Gibraltar police, which had alerted the terrorists and forced the SAS to shoot.

That may not be right; Styles himself believes that it was always part of the plan, to make Farrell and McCann look back and away from another police car out of which SAS men were already making their attack from the flank.

But it remains a relatively harmless piece of speculation, compared to the same day's *Insight* report, whose air of magisterial authority and omniscience was matched only by its ability to disregard inconvenient facts, all of this imbued by an awe of the Government's yet-to-be-disclosed case.

The main thrust of this piece was to attack the evidence assembled by the Thames documentary, which last week was supported by another film made by BBC Northern Ireland and my own investigations in the colony.

According to *Insight*, the testimony of another key witness, Stephen Bullock, 'destroyed' the evidence of Carmen Proetta. The SAS men could not have emerged from a police car, said the story, because when Bullock saw the police car it was full of uniformed officers.

Alas, Bullock and Proetta were talking of two different police cars (see graphic); nor has he ever insisted, as *Insight* reported, that McCann's arms were raised in defence rather than surrender. He was more than 100 yards away and simply does not know.

Last week Bullock could be fairly described as livid at the misrepresentation of his evidence which, he told me, does not necessarily contradict Mrs Proetta.

He was next to the police car, when it sounded its siren, and thinks that gunfire began outside the petrol station almost simultaneously.

'Then I looked and saw McCann falling back with his hands in the air. Bang, bang, bang. I could vaguely see something flapping on the ground [Farrell]. Just before that this guy came out of the children's playground beside us with a pistol pushed down the back of his jeans, vainly trying to cover it with his t-shirt.'

Gun in jeans

'As he got to the corner another guy appeared, also with a pistol pushed down his jeans. They were watching the shooting at the petrol station; then suddenly they both turned and ran up the hill out of sight. There were several more bangs from that direction. My wife and I decided it was time to get down behind some fairly serious masonry.'

He and his wife, then heavily pregnant, laid their daughter's push-chair on its side and crouched beside a low wall, until they were certain the shooting had stopped. Then they crawled and ran into town, where Bullock went to the police station to report 'a very serious crime.'

The next day he made a statement to police and offered his wife's name as another witness. Two months have elapsed and, says Bullock, the police have made no attempt to contact her. Like many Gibraltarians, he is convinced that the police are not seriously trying to gather evidence from civilian witnesses.

But at least Bullock himself should be called by the coroner, when the date for the inquest is eventually set. He should make an impressive witness: a commercial lawyer by profession, Trinity College Dublin and Gray's Inn, who migrated with his young family from south London last year, so that they might escape the 'violence and mess.'

The last bangs he heard were those directed at Sean Savage who, according to anonymous witnesses, was shot first in the back and then several times, as he lay on the ground, in the chest.

Like Styles, Bullock has a simple view: 'If we have a rule of law, we don't tolerate death squads operating outside the law. Everyone is subject to it.'

Wheeling out the weapons of silence

I SUPPOSE I must begin by saying I wish nothing but ill to the IRA and that those who risk their lives fighting it deserve the benefit of any doubt. Such a preamble is necessary only because of the passion aroused by the killing of three IRA members in Gibraltar on March 6 and by its increasingly messy aftermath.

Some government ministers genuinely believe that recent investigations by Thames Television and the BBC into the Gibraltar killings are a travesty, not of truth, but of justice. This belief reduces normally mild ministers, including Sir Geoffrey Howe, to apoplexy. Some even wish to use it as an excuse for new controls on broadcasting, including prior censorship of programmes.

Such a reaction is extraordinary and is becoming alarming.

When the three IRA members were shot, most Britons gave a mighty cheer. The three were engaged, said Sir Geoffrey, on a "dreadful terrorist act". Their killing had been unavoidable. They were shot in the course of what the IRA itself acknowledged was "active service". A car bomb was found. So clear-cut was the case, the prime minister indicated, that no inquiry beyond the normal inquest was called for. The soldiers were to be congratulated.

At the time, I recall no government reticence about giving its side of the story. The papers were full of it, as were television bulletins. Statements were made in the Commons and in Gibraltar, details were given, journalists were briefed off-the-record. This ma-



● The government's post-Gibraltar hysteria is rich in irony, writes SIMON JENKINS. Worse, it benefits the IRA

terial — most of it presumably "prejudicial" — was freely available in Gibraltar. Ministers bathed in the afterglow of a triumph over terrorism.

Then what happened? With grim inevitability, the March 6 incident was followed by the funeral killings in Ulster on March 16 and 19.

Again I can find no ministerial protests about the media reconstructions of these incidents, nor complaints at the assiduousness with which journalists, often at great risk, pursued their work.

Television repeated over and again its footage of the savage IRA attack on the two murdered British corporals. The authorities were frantic to get their hands on it. No amount of speculation or investigation was an offence against a present or future coroner or court.

I draw no parallel between the Ulster killings and those in Gibraltar, whether in morality, strategy or the legitimacy of our emotional responses. The former were mob murders, unprovoked and obscene. The latter was a preventive operation by soldiers against potential murderers. In terrorism, as Mrs Thatcher says,

there are only two sides; for and against. That in no way alters the fact that the idea of "taking no prisoners", even in a hot war, disquiets most decent people and leads them to want reassurance.

The unease is not only ethical, but practical. As The Daily Telegraph, no less, asked on March 8, were the Gibraltar killings really so vital as to justify the publicity they offered the IRA? Might terrorists not be more use under interrogation than as martyrs? Did the killings not mean the certainty of reprisal deaths?

Whatever the answer to these questions, the British government could not seriously congratulate its soldiers on gunning down three people in a European street and expect the world respectfully to maintain three months' silence pending a British colonial coroner's hearing. The world does not work that way.

Europe's air waves and newspapers were alive with witnesses giving interviews within hours of the shootings. The government case — as it is slowly emerging — is plausible. Remote-control techniques are such that the British soldiers were forced to treat verdict

and sentence as rolled into one horrific split second. Many innocent lives were at risk. They had to act on the basis, not of hindsight, but of instant danger.

Sir Geoffrey hinted at this but did not spell it out. He teased the media into investigation. Ministers fell painfully between two stools: they could neither make a clean breast of what I believe to be a good case nor do the opposite, shut up completely and await the inquest, riding the occasional publicity counterpunch. They made a partial statement, congratulated themselves and began some high-profile media bullying.

A couple of fairly ragged television programmes that should have been broadcast and vanished have now got ministers thoroughly rattled. They have ponderously wheeled out this cabinet's favourite weapons for silencing public debate, the accident-prone law of contempt and its even more counter-productive companion, the "heavy lean on the broadcasting authorities".

The doctrine of contempt is meant to maintain the "streams of justice, clean and pure". It is noticeable that ministers only discovered its virtues when the publicity from which they were benefiting began to go sour: when journalists found witnesses who did not confirm the received version of the killings, particularly over the "shouted warnings".

The witnesses may or may not have been speaking the truth. There is a widely held view in Gibraltar that every detail of the incident has been debated to the

point of boredom in every bar in town. The idea of prejudicing a coroner's jury in such a place is ridiculous.

Even so, ministers cannot find Thames Television or the BBC guilty of any specific contempt offence, so they have resorted to an extraordinary ill-directed hysteria against broadcasting in general. Of necessity, an intriguing doctrine has been cobbled together, that television can be prejudicial even where the press is not.

What is worrying is that the cabinet appears to be losing self-confidence in its command of this affair. The pleading of "trial by television" when nobody is on trial suggests panic. As over Spycatcher, ministers are seeking refuge from a possibly embarrassing bout of accountability in the "dusty purlieus of the law". They are drowning a triumph in hesitancy and wetness.

By calling down the curse of censorship on the heads of the BBC and IBA, ministers have made themselves look foolish even to their own supporters. Worst of all, they have given the IRA yet more of the oxygen of publicity.

Hypersensitivity to media criticism and slaphappy recourse to the law were early symptoms of the paranoia that afflicted Lord Wilson's last years in office. It is the occupational disease of those who have been long in power and whose minds have become hermetically sealed against common sense.

In Gibraltar, Her Majesty's government played it tough. In Westminster, it is playing half bully, half wimp.

Mellor rules out hostage deals

BRITAIN will pursue all legitimate means to get its hostages out of Beirut, the Foreign Office Minister, Mr David Mellor, pledged yesterday.

But he repeated the Government's view that there was no question of doing deals to secure the release of TV journalist Mr John McCarthy and the Anglican envoy, Mr Terry Waite.

The Foreign Office yesterday announced that it would investigate reports that one of the three French hostages released from the Lebanon spent part of his time in captivity with Mr Waite.

Mr Mellor, speaking on TV-am, said: "We would like to have Terry Waite and John McCarthy back. We will pursue all legitimate means to do that."

He said he would shortly be meeting Mr McCarthy's girlfriend, Ms Jill Morrell, to reassure her that everything possible was being done. "If there was more we could do within our principles, we would want to do it."

He added that British diplomats in Beirut follow up all rumours and tips they receive about the hostages, but that "when it comes to doing deals with hostage takers... we won't do that."

Some press reports from Paris said that Mr Marcel Fontaine, a diplomat, had been held with the Archbishop of Canterbury's special envoy, who was kidnapped in January 1987 while trying to negotiate the release of hostages.

Ms Morrell said her visit with Mr Jean-Paul Kauffmann, another of the released French hostages, in hospital in Paris at the weekend was "worthwhile", but she said she would not give details of their conversation until next week. By that time, Mr Kauffmann, who is also a journalist, will have spoken in full to the French authorities.

Ms Morrell, aged 29, who will return to Britain tomorrow, said she remained "optimistic" about the fate of Mr McCarthy, who was taken hostage on his way to the airport in April 1986.



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SWP

THE FOLLOWING WAS THE FIRST EDITORIAL IN THE TIMES 7 MAY.

CHIRAC'S SHAME

International relations conducted wholly without cynicism and opportunism is a utopian dream. A foreign policy conducted wholly without reference to morality, shared culture, or international law would be indistinguishable from that of Hitler or Stalin.

Most governments, therefore, conduct themselves according to the statesman's rule of thumb, in which short-term self-interest is moderated by varying degrees of ethical influence, international opinion and enlightened patriotism. Judged by this flexible scale of values, France, and more particularly the government of the electioneering M Chirac, has not yet hit the bottom. But it is sinking fast.

It is difficult to decide which of his recent actions is the more deserving of contempt. The decision to bring Captain Dominique Prieur back to France seems a blatant transgression of an international agreement which was already far too easy on the French.

The French government claims that she is pregnant, and has interpreted the terms of the agreement to make this justify her transfer. If she is pregnant, this may be considered to suggest a less than arduous imprisonment on her pacific atoll. Certainly, the invoking of the "medical" clause at this point is suspiciously useful to M Chirac.

By the standards usually observed among the Western democracies, not merely should both the officers responsible for the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior have served out their prison sentences in New Zealand, but the ministers responsible for sending them on their mission should have been impeached. Neither of these outcomes has happened.

Greenpeace, the subject of the French attack, does not espouse death or violence against its opponents. The French sabotage of the Rainbow Warrior was an insolent breach of international law in a fellow Western democracy. If those countries do not stick by the agreed rules in dealing with each other, they can hardly complain if the rest of the world shows equal disregard in dealing with them. The French action devalued the whole stand of the West against international terrorism.

France used the coarsest tactics of economic bullying to bring New Zealand to accept the United Nations-sponsored agreement by which the two officers were confined to a French Pacific island. Now M Chirac has

simply torn up this agreement and flung it in the face of New Zealand, the United Nations, and indeed also of Britain, insofar as we retain residual ties to the remaining dominions of the British crown.

Britain should now do its best to defend New Zealand against any further threats of French trade sanctions carried out through the European community. It is in our own interests to do so, and also in those of Europe. The development of the European community into a more united economic force and a more effective international one depends crucially on a measure of self-restraint and mutual respect among its members. This is an argument which has been urged against Britain often enough in recent years. It is equally applicable to the arrogant selfishness of France.

Also to be condemned is M Chirac's decision to pay what is in effect a ransom to Iran to procure the release of the French hostages in Lebanon. This has been only the last of a whole series of similar French actions. No decent human being can be unresponsive to the agony of the Lebanese hostages and their families. But statesmanship is a matter of making hard choices; politicking a matter of taking easy ones. The merest common sense is enough to show that M Chirac's decision was the wrong one.

It is an invitation to future acts of blackmail — unless he thinks that France is in a position to ensure that no French citizen, aircraft, or ship will ever be kidnapped or hijacked in the future. The Kuwaiti government's stand against the hijackers of its aircraft gave some hope of a stiffening of international resolve against acts of barbarism. Now France has dissolved that. The British government is right to be angry.

French policy has become an unlovely combination of bullying arrogance towards the weak — environmentalists and New Zealanders, not to mention the Kanaks of New Caledonia — coupled with cringing compromise with any state which has some sort of "hold" on France. All this has happened in the cause of domestic political advantage of the most narrow kind, without reference to the long-term interests of France or the free world. This is not patriotism, but vulgar opportunism. It is unworthy of a great nation.

R66/5/1A
11/5/92

Our Foreign Staff examines the background to the freeing of the three Frenchmen held in Lebanon.

Questions surround Syria's role in hostages' release

R. JACQUES CHIRAC, the French Prime Minister, yesterday linked the Iranian Government with its role in securing the release of the three French hostages, and the re-establishment of normal relations could now be considered.

But Mr Chirac also thanked Syria's President Hafez al-Assad for "his personal action and the interest he has taken in finding a solution to this painful affair."

The message surprised Middle Eastern specialists in Paris, who believe that Syria had otherwise been excluded totally from the negotiations. In some earlier cases hostages released in Beirut had travelled back to France via Damascus, but observers say that for almost two years now France has negotiated almost exclusively with Iran, rather than Syria.

The exclusion of Syria from the negotiations is also thought to have contributed to the dispute which prompted the French Government earlier this week to expel Mr Omrane Adham, a Syrian businessman who has been involved in some past negotiations over the hostages.

Mr Adham was accused of being the source of a lengthy article in the Beirut newspaper al-Haqiqa, containing a string of often far-fetched accusations against the Government of Mr Chirac, ranging from the payment of FF200m (£18.7m) to Mr Jean-Marie Le Pen in return for the support of his voters in the second round of the French presi-

dential election, to the transfer of arms to Iran through two bogus oil companies.

Although Mr Adham's credibility, and particularly his closeness to President Assad, has often been put into question, some observers believe the al-Haqiqa article, which sharply criticises Mr Chirac's behaviour in the hostage negotiations, may partially reflect Syrian irritation with France's decision to deal with Iran. It has also been suggested that Mr Adham was involved in separate hostage negotiations involving President Francois Mitterrand.

In an interview with the Associated Press in Geneva yesterday, Mr Adham said the French President had asked him to mediate in March 1986. He also claimed to have travelled to Damascus on March 9 of this year as part of an official French delegation including Mr Jean-Charles Marchiani, who was entrusted with hostage negotiations by Mr Charles Pasqua, the French Interior Minister.

No details emerged yesterday of the terms of France's agreement with Iran, but the same issues are presumed to have arisen as in past negotiations. In public, the kidnappers have principally asked for the release of 17 Shia Moslem activists from jail in Kuwait and a fair French stand on the Gulf war.

The main Iranian claims have been:

- The restoration of diplomatic relations, broken off last


summer after a dispute over the status of an Iranian interpreter, Mr Wahid Gorji, wanted for questioning in connection with the bombings in Paris in 1986. A revival of French oil purchases on Iran would depend on the restoration of relations.

- The settlement of the disputed \$1bn loan made by the ex-Shah of Iran to France's nuclear energy agency, blocked after the revolution when Iran stopped payments on a nuclear plant construction contract. Two repayments have already been made, coinciding almost exactly with the last two releases of hostages. Official negotiations on the rest of the loan, around \$330m, are expected to take place soon.

- The reduction of French military aid to Iraq. Mr Chirac said yesterday that France had "remained absolutely faithful to its friendships and its engagements in the Middle East." Iraqi diplomats, however, are understood to be concerned about the deal.

- The release of convicted terrorist Anis Naccache, leader of the group which tried to assassinate the exiled former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar. The release of other terrorists held in French jails, such as Georges Ibrahim Abdullah, has also been claimed intermittently.

Suggestions that a cash ransom had been paid to the Lebanese kidnappers themselves were yesterday dismissed by French government officials.



The three hostages pictured yesterday on their arrival in France.

However, observers in Beirut and elsewhere are convinced that a ransom to the kidnappers would also have been involved. Mr Adham said: "There were presents for everybody."

Well-informed Moslem observers in West Beirut said on Tuesday that Mr Marchiani had negotiated a deal with the hostage-takers several weeks ago for the release of the three Frenchmen in exchange for the payment of FF150m to Iran, together with the supply of weapons and spare parts to Iran via a third unnamed party. However, on the eve of the first round of

the French presidential election last month, the kidnappers had reneged and demanded an additional FF10m to be paid to the Hizbollah (Party of God).

Despite the official denials in the French capital, Shia security officials in Beirut confirmed yesterday that the extra FF10m had come through to the captors at the last minute. It seems clear that the kidnappers chose the timing of the release to ensure maximum impact in favour of the candidate who they thought could best deliver on their demands after Sunday's French presidential election.



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6 May 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
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TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Anglo-Irish terrorism
France/Iran hostages
EC terrorism

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Terrorists' timing alarms police

Peter Murtagh in Bielefeld, West Germany

WEST German police believe that the bomb found on Tuesday under a British Army captain's car in Bielefeld was planted between noon on Monday and dawn the following day.

Bielefeld police said yesterday that the captain, who has

not been named, thoroughly checked the car on Monday morning. At noon, he parked it opposite the officers' mess on a public street, near his home.

The prospect of the bomb being planted between Monday and dawn on Tuesday, when the captain drove it into Ripon Barracks, may alarm anti-terrorist police because it suggests that only 36 hours after Sunday's two attacks in the Netherlands — and with police

in the Netherlands and West Germany looking for an IRA gang who had just killed three RAF men and wounded three others — someone was prepared and equipped to carry out a third attack.

The Bielefeld bomb contained 1.2 kilos of plastic explosives and a timing device.

The two Scotland Yard officers who returned to London yesterday after helping Dutch police examine the debris of the

Nieuw Bergen bomb which killed two RAF men said it was similar to bombs used by the IRA in Britain.

The British Forces Broadcasting Service renewed its security warnings yesterday. All cars entering Ripon Barracks were thoroughly searched.

The bomb found in Bielefeld was hidden inside a wooden box, like a cigar box, and held by two magnets under the front passenger seat.

It contained small commercial batteries, a timer, an electric device and cable. It was made safe using a high pressure water gun to break the cable and separate the components from the explosives.

There is official caution in linking the German and Dutch incidents and no organisation has claimed responsibility for the Bielefeld bomb. The IRA claimed the Dutch attacks.

Herr Rudiger Michalik, the public prosecutor supervising the Bielefeld police investigation, said yesterday: "We are now checking to see if this bomb is identical to others used against the Rhine army. We are very careful in saying if this is the IRA because we do not know it yet for sure."

In 1980, an IRA gunman and a female accomplice shot dead an officer, Captain Mark Coe,

based at Bielefeld, outside his home in the town. Two years before, seven British bases, including Bielefeld, were bombed. The IRA claimed responsibility.


At that time, West German police issued an identikit picture of a man, named as Peter Farrell, wanted for the series of bombings.

In the Netherlands, a Dutch police spokesman said they had no suspects but hoped to compare notes with the West German police.

He denied suggestions that West German border police were following a definite lead. "We checked that out and it's a balloon. It is not true," he said.

Detectives spoke briefly yesterday with two of the survivors. Senior aircraftsman Mr Andrew Kelly was too ill to provide much information and his colleague, Mr Richard Garth, is still shocked. The other survivor of the Roermond shooting, Mr Ifan Lewis, who lost his left foot, is too ill to be interviewed for at least two weeks, his doctors said.

Princess Margaret, who was on a long-planned visit to West Germany yesterday, diverted to the military hospital at RAF Wegberg to meet Mr Garth. His fiancée, Ms Lee Gascoigne, was with him during the five-minute visit.



Killing kit . . . The 1.2 kg of explosives from the Bielefeld bomb (left) and the remains of a box, possibly a cigar box, and electrical equipment found linked to it

THE GUARDIAN
Thursday May 5 1988

THE TIMES THURSDAY MAY 5 1988

Paul Wilkinson on the need for frontier controls after 1992

Internal market for terror?

The continuing hunt for the IRA unit which killed three British servicemen on Sunday raises the question whether the European Commission's aim, not simply to reduce internal frontier controls by 1992 but to scrap them altogether, will not make life too easy for the terrorist.

For police, intelligence experts and other security specialists the speed and irreversibility of the proposed changes create a nightmare of additional security problems. It is all very well for Lord Cockfield, Britain's senior internal market commissioner, and his fellow crusaders to assert that the abolition of all frontier controls will lead to a better alternative way of combating terrorism, drug-trafficking and other serious international crimes. The point is that much as we would like to find alternative solutions we have so far failed to find a safe way of abandoning internal frontier controls.

We still have diverse national security policies, laws and legal and police systems. There is no chance of harmonizing them by 1992. I doubt whether it is realistic to expect a single European judicial area and legal system until well into the next century.

Freedom from border checks for the law-abiding means freedom for terrorists and other

dangerous criminals. Do we really want IRA and ETA terrorists, for example, to have unfettered freedom of access to any part of the Community? It is true that our present system did not stop the IRA murder gangs getting into the Continent to commit further ghastly outrages. But at least the system of border controls provides some chance of spotting them as they move through ports of entry. And in Spain good surveillance and intelligence work did manage to spot the IRA gang planning a massacre at Gibraltar.

Some West European countries, such as West Germany and the Netherlands, have ultra-lenient political asylum policies which have been freely exploited by terrorists. If we abolish internal frontiers we make the security of Western Europe against terrorism only as strong as the weakest link in external frontier control.

Once the terrorists have got through and established their

base areas they would then be free to launch attacks anywhere in the European Community. Think what a boon this would be to groups such as the pro-Iranian terrorists, aching for access to targets in Europe. It would also pose a grave threat for the UK, facing the well-armed Libyan-backed IRA. It is for reasons like these that Britain and France are likely to be among those EC states opposing the total abolition of internal frontiers.

It is of course true that since the US bombing of Libya in April 1986 the EC states have made considerable improvements in co-operation against terrorism. Trevi, the European standing conference on terrorism, has been the main instrument for the ministers of interior to concert police and intelligence action against terrorism. It has established useful measures such as a secure communications network among all the EC police forces, and enhanced moves to trace

and undermine terrorist weapon supply and funding and other elements of support. It has also compiled a valuable black list of wanted terrorists and "diplomats" who have abused their status by engaging in terrorism.

It is the police and intelligence services which have been most effective in enhancing anti-terrorism co-operation for they are clearly aware that increased co-operation and intelligence sharing and a strengthening of external frontiers are vital prerequisites for any relaxation of internal barriers. It is a pity that their clear-headed approach has not always been reflected by their political masters.

In the context of the move to abolish internal frontiers the most important step taken has been the establishment of a high-level EC working group, including ministerial advisers on immigration and European Commission representatives as well as security experts. This group has been studying border

controls and their role and effectiveness in combating terrorism and other types of crime. It has also been engaged in the important task of studying methods of preventing the abuse of political asylum. Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of this group's work from the point of view of the fight against terrorism, is that its proposals are to be co-ordinated with progress towards the internal market.

If this principle is adhered to we have less reason to fear the security implications of the internal market proposals. But there is still a worrying gulf between the Utopian expectations engendered by Lord Cockfield's crusade and the hard necessity of protecting the national security of member states.

We cannot afford to be complacent about the readiness of our EC allies to move towards a stronger and more consistent stance against terrorism. For example France and some other

states still seem prepared to negotiate squalid secret deals with terrorist hostage takers which would only fuel more terrorism and endanger hundreds of other citizens of many nationalities. Some states, such as Ireland, still seem determined to use bureaucratic devices to obstruct extradition of terrorists. Some governments are only too willing to turn a blind eye for the sake of a juicy arms deal, markets or other commercial gain.

The truth is that despite recent modest improvements in West European co-operation against terrorism the whole structure is as leaky as a sieve. It is not simply reactionary stubbornness that leads the British and security advisers to oppose the instant abolition of internal border controls. It is an absolute necessity for us to ensure that national security against the growing international scourge of terrorism is in no way weakened. If we go along with the hasty abolition proposals being put forward from the European Commission we risk turning Western Europe into an internal market for terrorism.

The author, Professor of International Relations at Aberdeen University, is chairman of the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism.

☆☆☆☆

Anglo-Irish effort to cut off vast IRA smuggling profits

By Paul Vallely

A co-ordinated security operation is to be mounted by the British and Irish Governments to counter a cross-border smuggling operation which is earning the Provisional IRA millions of pounds a year in protection money.

Government sources in Dublin said yesterday that one of the most significant elements in the Anglo-Irish conference talks held in the city on Wednesday was an agreement to try to stem the smuggling.

Some security sources estimate that the racket nets the IRA as much as £25 million a year.

Government officials were more wary about fixing a figure but said that unofficial estimates of the overall loss to the Exchequer from smuggling was thought to be as high as £100 million.

Evidence of the racket was presented to the Anglo-Irish conference by intelligence sources from both sides of the border during a restricted session on security attended by Sir John Hermon, Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Mr John Stanley, Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, and

Mr Eamonn Doherty, the Irish police commissioner.

Yesterday Customs officials at several of the dozen manned border posts said that the IRA did not seem to be directly involved in smuggling schemes. Rather it took a cut as "protection money" from syndicates of smugglers, which included farmers and businessmen.

The officials said smuggling had got "out of hand" along the 320-mile border.

Most of the profits found their way into the hands of private racketeers but a large cut was said to have been given to the IRA.

Since 1985, encouraged by currency fluctuations between the North and South and by VAT differentials which could be significant on items like television sets and videos, smuggling had shifted from the earlier emphasis on cattle and agriculture. Electrical goods, alcohol and petrol are now the main sources of illegal profit.

Informed sources in Dublin said the other important area of agreement to have emerged from the latest round of Anglo-Irish talks was over legislation to outlaw job

discrimination against Catholics in the North.

The source said the reform will undermine the Noraid activists in the United States.

"For some time they have been given respectability by campaigning for a "civil rights" cause which to most Americans seemed self-evidently fair. Now that this has been agreed, it will rob IRA supporters in the United States of a legitimate platform on which they can campaign."

Such a development would remove the pressure on many US state bodies and pension funds to withdraw vital investment in Northern Ireland.

Government officials in Dublin were also said yesterday to welcome the signals given by Mr Tom King, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, that the British Government is prepared to make some concessions to arrive at a viable formula for the extradition of terrorists from the Republic to Britain.

The Irish Government had been concerned that existing arrangements could lead, as in the past, to the extradition of terrorists who were subsequently acquitted in Northern Ireland courts because of inadequate evidence.

Thatcher sticks to hard line on deals with terrorists

Hella Pick
Diplomatic Correspondent

MRS Thatcher pointedly restated Britain's policy of refusing to deal with terrorists and hijackers yesterday, while remaining sceptical about but unable to challenge publicly French assurances that no concessions were made to release its three hostages.

Though Britain feels unable to charge France with violating its international commitments, it is undeterred by its growing diplomatic isolation on the issue, and will continue to call on its allies to act in line with Mrs Thatcher's conviction that deals become incentives to more hostage-taking.

The Prime Minister told the House of Commons yesterday that "our policy has not changed." Britain, she said, does everything it can to secure the release of its hostages "unconditionally." But, she added, "we will not pay ransom."

Britain, said the Foreign Office yesterday, "was not in

the business of giving incentives to potential hostage-takers," and it wanted to hold the EEC countries, as well as the US, Canada, and Japan, to commitments made in a host of official declarations.

Officials do not deny that these anti-terrorist declarations have been breached by Britain's allies. But they claim that this does not invalidate them. "The allies have to be lashed to the mast of virtue," Sir Geoffrey Howe said.

Not content with pressing the allies to abstain from deals over hostages, the Foreign Secretary also intends to pursue his efforts to win international support for a five-point plan for better coordination in resisting hijacks.

Drawn up after the recent Kuwait airliner hijack, the plan reflects Mrs Thatcher's anger that Algeria has failed to bring the hijackers to justice, and her belief that the international community must in future act to prevent such leniency.

Britain's attitude is deeply resented in Algiers, and has won few friends in Europe. But

Britain has long been the odd country out in its absolute refusal to make concessions to hijackers, or offer incentives to obtain the freedom of British hostages.

France, on the other hand, has made no secret that its emissaries have been intensively negotiating to free its hostages; or that it had told Iran that diplomatic relations could be resumed once the French hostages were freed.

Britain is unwilling to offer even this kind of inducement to secure the intervention of Iran or Syria on behalf of its hostages. Britain downgraded its diplomatic relations with Tehran last year to a point where it no longer has even a junior diplomat serving in Iran.

Britain suspects, although it has no hard proof, that Iran was implicated in last month's Kuwaiti hijack — further ground for withholding Iran's full reintegration into Britain's network of diplomatic relations.

Mrs Thatcher also continues to resist all arguments in favour of restoring diplomatic

relations with Syria, broken off after the foiled attempt to blow up an Israeli El Al aircraft at Heathrow, in which Damascus was implicated.

She does not agree that Syria has purged itself from terrorism, and professes to be unconcerned by the loss of British influence in Middle East diplomacy.

Britain's European allies, as well as the US, which showed solidarity with Britain at the time of the El Al incident by downgrading their own diplomatic ties with Syria, have now all restored their contacts. Mr George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, made Damascus one of his main contact points when he resumed his Middle East shuttle earlier this year.

Nor can Britain be under any illusions that its allies support Mrs Thatcher's absolutist approach to no deals with terrorists or hostage-takers. Both France and West Germany have negotiated the release of hostages in Lebanon before, and the Irangate scandal in the US showed Washington's willingness to do likewise.

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COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TERROISM : FRANCE :
HOSTAGES
UK REACTION

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THE GUARDIAN
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The Chirac exchange

JOY is the only valid response to the release of the last French hostages from their three-year ordeal in Lebanon. There need be no quibbles over that, regardless of the other considerations which intruded even before the three men boarded the flight home. In March 1986, when Mr Chirac became Prime Minister, there were ten; now at last there are none. The slate was wiped clean just 80 hours before voting begins in the second round of the presidential election. And no sooner had a grateful nation registered the release of the trio than news came of the bloodbath — 15 Kanaks and two soldiers killed — in which the Army ended the humiliation of a law-and-order government in New Caledonia.

Mr Chirac's cup apparently runneth over, even if it is not quite clear with what. He leapt up the opinion polls six months ago, the last time French hostages were freed in a similarly clandestine deal. It has been an open secret that his emissaries have been trying to stage-manage a repeat at election-time. Like the American administration, the French government clearly has its own special view of such things, reflecting a different national outlook. The authorities in both countries have tried to have their cake and eat it. They want their hostages back and they call for the defeat of international terrorism but see no conflict between the two. When Mr Chirac says that French dignity and honour remain intact, everybody wants to believe him.

How different on this side of the water, by jingo. Before dawn the

self-righteous were elbowing the more reflective out of the queue for the microphones to condemn Paris for dealing with terrorists or those who support them. Mrs Thatcher once again reiterated her total opposition to deals. Marianne, and in his aberrant moments Uncle Sam, may flirt with terrorists; but John Bull will have no part of it. Indeed when Uncle Sam learns resolve and bombs Libya, John Bull alone can be relied upon to lend him an airfield.

How simple life is in black and white. Grey question: what do you do when Terry Waite and John McCarthy disappear and Syria is the only alternative to Iran as a channel of communication with the kidnappers? Answer: there is no alternative to standing firm. This is true, but only because relations have already been broken off with both on principle over earlier incidents. One begins to understand E. M. Forster when he hoped he would betray his country rather than his friends if forced to choose: certainly Mr McCarthy may feel he is better served at present by his friend Miss Morrell than by his government. How convenient for the superior didacts in SW1 that the British hostages were let off early from the hijacked Kuwaiti jumbo: that made it all the easier to castigate Algeria for agreeing to end the crisis without more bloodshed. How convenient also that the world seems to have forgotten how the British meekly let the non-diplomats as well as the diplomats from the Libyan Embassy go free after the murder of Policewoman Fletcher. The British position is right; but it isn't *simply* right.

Still, the simple question today is whether his deal will bring Mr Chirac the whopping 31 per cent extra he needs to win on Sunday. One hopes without reservation that it won't, for two reasons. Terrorists, even when they show calculated mercy, should not sway the fate of nations; and politicians should not profit from manipulating the release of hostages to suit their campaign schedules.

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The price of freedom

THE EXPLOSION of public joy which yesterday greeted the return to France of three French hostages after three years' captivity in Lebanon recalls the similar explosion in the United States seven years ago when the staff of the US embassy in Tehran were released after 444 days. In both cases the joy is entirely comprehensible, indeed impossible not to share, when one thinks of the individuals directly concerned, yet at the same time it cannot but make a detached observer uncomfortable.

Emotions

As a leading French journalist remarked yesterday, this joy, like the fear, anger and frustration which preceded it, is part of the terrorist arsenal. It demonstrates the hold which a group of cynical and ruthless men can establish over the emotions of a large body of humane and civilised people, simply by playing with the life and liberty of a few unfortunate individuals.

That fact is unpleasant in itself. It becomes positively dangerous in its implications when one remembers that the people in question are citizens of a democracy, whose emotions have to be taken into account by their government when it frames its policy. Such a reflection is inescapable when, as in the present case, the event occurs in the immediate run-up to a national election.

Clearly the release of the hostages is something valued and desired by the French electorate. How could it not be? Equally naturally the French government, elected to serve the people, sees it as part of its duty to work to obtain the hostages' release, and expects some political advantage if its efforts are crowned with success. It is therefore entirely natural for cynics (of whom France has its due share) to conclude that the government has arranged and timed the whole thing for political advantage alone.

That is probably unfair. In fact the release has almost certainly come too late to win the presidency for Mr Jacques Chirac, and there is every reason to think he did his best to make it happen sooner. To stage it deliberately in the very last week of the cam-

paign would have been too risky and too crude, with a very great danger that it would backfire. President Carter paid dearly for building up expectations, unfulfilled in the event, that the US hostages would be released just before the 1980 US presidential election; and some of France's more sophisticated voters may even now be feeling that it would be wrong to let Mr Chirac win in circumstances such that his election would be widely attributed to this one factor.

If the Carter precedent is anything to go by, the timing was probably dictated not by the French government but by the holders of the hostages, either precisely with a view to humiliating Mr Chirac or, more likely, with the aim of extracting the maximum price from the outgoing government while avoiding the risk of having to start afresh with a new government which might take a harder line - as Mr Ronald Reagan had strongly hinted he would do in 1981, and President Mitterrand likewise suggested last week when he attacked Mr Chirac for releasing Vahid Gordji, the Iranian who had been accused of involvement in the Paris bombings of 1986. There is little doubt that this release, like that of the Lebanese suspect, Mohammed Mouhajer, in March, formed part of the Franco-Iranian bargaining process.

Pressure

That there was a bargain no one doubts. This is a bitter fact for the British hostages still in Lebanon, and for the British government which is steadfastly refusing to bargain for their freedom. It is all too easy to present the British government as callous and unrealistic, the French as humane and statesmanlike. Yet the fact is that France has shown its Middle East policy can be influenced by hostage-taking. Whatever the merits of France's involvement with Iraq, and however good the arguments on their merits for an improvement in relations with Iran, it is not a happy position for future French governments to know that Iran can, whenever it is displeased with French policy, resort again to this kind of pressure with some reasonable expectation of success.

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the business of giving incentives to potential hostage-takers," and it wanted to hold the EEC countries, as well as the US, Canada, and Japan, to commitments made in a host of official declarations.

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FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: THURSDAY 5 MAY 1988

VISIT BY MRS CHALKER TO THE CONGRESS OF EUROPE, THE HAGUE, 6-7 MAY

Spokesman announced that the Rt Hon Lynda Chalker MP, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, would represent the British Government at the 40th Anniversary Congress of Europe in the Hague from 6-7 May. Mrs Chalker would address the closing session of the Congress.

VISIT BY LORD GLENARTHUR TO NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA: 9-15 MAY

Spokesman announced that Lord Glenarthur, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, would visit New Zealand (9-13 May) and Australia (14-15 May).

VISIT BY MRS CHALKER TO BERLIN: 10-12 MAY

Spokesman announced that the Rt Hon Lynda Chalker MP, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, would visit Berlin from 10-12 May.

HUNGARY: COUNT SZECHENYI SCHOLARSHIP

Spokesman said that the Secretary of State had today announced the setting up of the Count Szechenyi scholarship in cooperation with the Shell International Petroleum Company. The scholarship would be awarded annually to a Hungarian citizen.

FRENCH HOSTAGES

In answer to a question, Spokesman said that we were not in possession of all the facts of the circumstances of the release of French hostages in the Lebanon. We were seeking clarification from the French authorities. In response to further questions, Spokesman said that Britain and other countries were committed to combatting terrorism and he referred to the commitments made at the London European Council in December 1986 and the Summit Seven meeting in Venice in July 1987. He added that Britain was not in the business of giving incentives to potential hostage-takers. Asked about the British hostages in the Lebanon, Spokesman referred to Sir Geoffrey Howe's statement on 15 April 1988.

GIBRALTAR: BBC TV PROGRAMME

In answer to a question, Spokesman confirmed that Sir Geoffrey Howe had spoken to the Chairman of the BBC on 4 May. Sir Geoffrey wanted to know the facts about the programme and had expressed to Mr Hussey the same concerns he had made known to the Chairman of the IBA concerning the recent Thames Television programme "Death on the Rock".

INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN POLAND

In response to a question Spokesman said that we had heard with considerable concern press reports that the Polish authorities had used violence to break the Krakou steel works strike. We were awaiting a report from our Embassy. We deplored any return to repressive methods. We supported the Polish Government's plans for economic reform. The strikes underlined that Poland's problems could only be solved by a resolute approach to both political and economic reform.



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VERBATIM SERVICE VS040/88

WEDNESDAY 4 MAY 1988

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TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS

Following is a statement made by the Secretary of State for Defence Mr George Younger in the House of Commons on 3 May 1988, together with extracts from supplementary questions and answers:

Mr Younger: With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement about two incidents involving the savage murders on 1 May of three Royal Air Force personnel serving in RAF Germany.

Shortly after 1 am local time on Sunday 1 May, an attack was made with an automatic weapon on three Royal Air Force personnel sitting in a private car near the King George public house at Roermond, in the Netherlands, close to the border with the Federal Republic of Germany. Senior Aircraftsman Ian Shinner, a gunner with 16 Squadron of the Royal Air Force Regiment based at RAF Wildenrath, was killed, and his companions, SAC Lewis and SAC Garth, were injured.

Very shortly afterwards a powerful bomb destroyed a car in the car park of the Baccus discotheque in Nieuw-bergen, killing SACs John Baxter and John Reid, both serving at RAF Laarbruch, and seriously injuring SAC Andrew Kelly, their companion.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army has admitted responsibility for these atrocities.

The whole House will join me in sending condolences to the relatives of the dead and injured, and condemning this further manifestation of the callous barbarism to which the IRA and its supporters and sympathisers are prepared to stoop. The victims were off duty, non-operational, in civilian clothes and were in the Netherlands for purely recreational purposes. They posed no threat to anyone and their murder is nothing short of a crime against decency and humanity.

Immediate steps have been set in hand by the Netherlands police to identify and trace the culprits. The British authorities are in close touch with the Netherlands and German authorities and members of the Metropolitan police are assisting the Netherlands police at the latter's request.

Our security procedures are kept under constant review and extensive measures are already in hand to guard against terrorist

attacks of this kind. All service personnel, wherever they are serving, are reminded continuously of the need for vigilance and of the wisdom of taking appropriate precautions in the light of the threat. We have already taken steps to strengthen still further the security of British forces in Germany and the Netherlands in the immediate aftermath of these attacks and we are considering what further security measures might be appropriate in the longer term, both there and elsewhere. Other British overseas representatives are also maintaining a high state of vigilance at the present time.

The fact remains that, even given the murders and injuries to which our servicemen have been subjected this last weekend, normal life for our servicemen, and indeed for all other British representatives overseas, must continue as far as practicable. They, like us, must be able to enjoy the benefits of the way of life that they are dedicated to maintain on behalf of the nation as a whole.

Extracts from Supplementary Questions and Answers

Mr Davies: Murder cannot be justified or condoned wherever it takes place, and there can be no shred of justification for the criminal attacks on those young men, who were doing no harm to anyone.

The right honourable Gentleman has stated that security is being constantly reviewed and that he is looking at security in the longer term. When security is being considered could the right honourable Gentleman and those in other departments consider the effect of proposals for 1992 whereby freedom of movement of people and goods throughout EEC countries will be allowed. Will not those proposals make it more difficult to detect, to control and to deter terrorists?

Mr Younger: With regard to 1992, it is worth pointing out that, in accepting the provisions of the Single European Act, the United Kingdom and other member States have expressly reserved their right to take such measures as they think necessary to combat terrorism. The provisions of the Single European Act will not, of themselves, require the abolition of immigration controls at the Community's internal frontiers by the end of 1992., nor do they provide any fresh rights of free movement to European Community nationals. The Government are determined to take any measures that are necessary to ensure security within the United Kingdom.

Sir Antony Buck: Will my right honourable Friend ensure that there is a NATO initiative to help us to ensure that the IRA does not have any safe haven and that an international campaign is mounted against the terrorists?

Mr Younger: I agree that there is absolute unity among all the parties and other people about the matter. I also entirely agree that, at the end of the day, international co-operation is the only way to make an impact on terrorism.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: Does my right honourable Friend recall that it is some time since the Provisional IRA, in common with other terrorist organisations on the continent with which it has relations, decided that it would attack NATO installations and personnel - and indeed has done so? May we be assured that there will be the fullest co-operation with other NATO powers and forces so that there can be a

common campaign to defeat terrorism on the continent?

Mr Younger: I am grateful to my honourable Friend. I assure him that we shall do all that we can to involve our NATO allies in co-operation to defeat terrorism. We are enjoying excellent co-operation from our friends in the Netherlands, which we greatly appreciate.

Mr Kilfedder: Will the right honourable Gentleman condemn those politicians in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic as well as in this country who equate the killing of those young, innocent servicemen, who were off duty, with the killing of the three IRA terrorists in Gibraltar, who were intent on the murder and slaughter of hundreds of people there?

Mr Younger: I sympathise with the honourable Gentleman. I see no link with anything else. The murder of an innocent person by a terrorist is an event on its own, which should be condemned absolutely on its own.

Mr MacLennan: Will he also accept that, at this time, it is right to repudiate the talk that has come from some sources in Northern Ireland about the containment of violence at an acceptable level? Does he recognise that there is no acceptable level of organised violence and that we are engaged in an international attack upon a vile force? Does the right honourable Gentleman propose to treat the matter in that way when he next meets the Trevi group?

Mr Younger: I am sure that the whole House will agree that there is no acceptable level of violence anywhere - we are all united upon that.

Mr Goodlad: Will he reassure the House that all possible resources will be mobilised and sustained by all European Governments including that of the Republic of Ireland - to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice?

Mr Younger: I certainly agree that all Governments throughout Europe, and further afield, will, I have no doubt, join in condemning this violence.

Mr Clarke: Does the right honourable Gentleman agree that those who perpetrate this sort of activity are gravely mistaken if they think that violence and terrorism do any good to any cause?

Mr. Younger: It is worth recording that there can be no political belief for which it is worth killing a wholly innocent life. That is something that we all believe.

Mr Cartwright: As the IRA is clearly dedicated to continue this callous targetting of off-duty servicemen and their families, is the Secretary of State satisfied about the present level of European co-operation in intelligence gathering of information about the movements of suspected terrorists, and about the necessary monitoring of what they get up to?

Mr Younger: I could never be satisfied with intelligence gathering until it was virtually perfectly able to tell us what is likely to happen. I can say only that any shortcomings in intelligence are not due to lack of co-operation from our friends in other Governments,

all of whom have expressed considerable sympathy for us.

Rev Smyth: Will the right honourable Gentleman acknowledge that those who have compared the shooting in Gibraltar with this incident either suffer from amnesia when they suggest that this was in retaliation for Gibraltar, given that these events have been going on for a long time, or, far worse, are acting as spokespersons defending the activities of the IRA?

Mr Younger: I appreciate the honourable Gentleman's remarks, but those people who mention retaliation should bear in mind that this is one of a long series of atrocities in various places, and it should be seen in its perspective.

Mr. Browne: Does my right honourable Friend accept that this latest incident, which, as he says, is just one in a long series, highlights the fact that, in the minds of millions of people in this country, the death penalty should be available to the courts as punishment for such incidents?

Mr. Younger: There can be no division between people in the battle against terrorists. Whatever cause terrorists purport to represent, terrorism is an enemy of all civilised societies and there can be no division in the fight against it.

ENDS VS040/88



New Zealand High Commission

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YERKAW

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The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

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TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

IRA - Netherlands killings - press commentary on
implications
Armenian separatism

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

IRA killings may herald new look at battle with terrorism

By Terry Kirby and David McKittrick

SECURITY forces and police across Europe began last night to investigate the IRA murders of three British soldiers, aware that a reassessment of international efforts against terrorism may be needed.

While it is recognised that IRA operations against British bases on the Continent have succeeded in the past, some analysts will feel that the recent high degree of co-operation between ministers, officials and police forces should have helped to prevent the killings.

This disappointment is made more acute by what is considered to be the success of the Gibraltar operation that led to the killing of three members of an IRA active service unit. Co-operation with the Spanish, who first alerted British intelligence and security forces, was deemed to be excellent, whatever questions were subsequently raised over whether any of the terrorists had surrendered.

British bases in West Germany would also have been expected to be alert to the possibility of a reprisal, irrespective of whether the IRA planned the Gibraltar and Netherlands attacks as a joint operation.

The Trevi group of European interior ministers, including Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, agreed in September 1986 to

compile a list of the most wanted terrorists in Europe. The police forces of the various countries were to co-operate in monitoring their movements and easy exchange of information was to be made possible.

Since then, exchanges between the British intelligence services, Special Branch and Scotland Yard's Anti-Terrorist Squad and their European counterparts have intensified, outside and inside formal structures such as Interpol. The members of such bodies include countries thought to sponsor or condone terrorism. Senior officers at Scotland Yard recently said they were very happy with the level of co-operation and ready for a Europe without customs barriers in 1992.

Police liaison with counterparts in The Netherlands and West Germany should be excellent. Both forces are considered modern in outlook and equipped to use the latest technological aids.

The 3,500-strong West German Bundeskriminalamt has wide experience of dealing with terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction and the Baader-Meinhof gang, while the Dutch police and security services, the BVD, have liaised with British security forces in anti-IRA operations.

Whether the names on the Trevi list included any of the IRA unit responsible for the weekend's attack is not publicly known, neither is it immediately clear whether the unit came from The Netherlands or West Germany.

The operation may have been the work of an IRA active service unit based in West Germany which is regarded by both the security forces and the Provisionals as a "successful" group. None of its key members has been charged. There are indications that the unit may be embedded in the large number of Irish workers in West Germany.

It is no secret that the IRA has been active both publicly and secretly in The Netherlands, particularly Amsterdam with its reputation as an arms-dealing centre. The IRA is believed to have a network of supporters in the country, presumably including safe houses and escape networks.

Dutch police and intelligence services, investigating the IRA bomb that injured 31 people at Rheindahlen, the headquarters of the British forces in West Germany, in March last year, established that the car carrying the 300lb bomb was Dutch-registered and bought in The Netherlands.

Amsterdam also became the

base for the arms-dealing ring run by Brendan McFarlane and Gerard Kelly, two IRA men who escaped from the Maze prison in 1983. They were arrested by the Dutch, assisted, according to some accounts, by the SAS, extradited to Belfast and last week given fresh jail sentences.

Some explosive material was discovered at the time of their arrest, but according to intelligence sources the two may also have been involved in arranging much larger consignments of weaponry originating in Libya and making their way to Ireland by way of the Continent.

If the reports that the foiled Gibraltar bomb and the Dutch attacks were the two prongs of an IRA blitz are to be believed, it would have been the culmination of 10 years of terrorism on mainland Europe.

In IRA terms, the European violence has been among the more successful elements in its campaign. Those responsible generally escape detection, and their actions generate much publicity.

Several years ago an IRA statement said: "Overseas attacks have a prestige value and internationalise the war in Ireland. The British government has been successful in suppressing news about the struggle, but we have kept Ireland in the headlines."

The years 1978 and 1979 saw a

flurry of republican violence. In 1978 eight British bases in West Germany were bombed in one night. An Army officer was also shot dead.

In March 1979, Sir Richard Sykes, British Ambassador to The Netherlands, was murdered by an IRA squad who ambushed him outside his residence. In August that year, an IRA squad placed a time-bomb under a bandstand in a Brussels square where a British Army band was to perform. Seven of the band and 11 Belgian civilians were injured.

In December 1980, the attempted assassination of the British EC Commissioner, Christopher Tugendhat, in Brussels was put down to the IRA. In August 1982, Paris police foiled attacks on British targets in France and The Netherlands when they arrested a gang of IRA suspects.

But the weekend attacks should also be seen in the context of the setbacks for the IRA which culminated in Gibraltar. They began last year when eight of its most experienced men were killed in an SAS ambush at Loughgall, Co Armagh. The IRA lost 150 tons of Libyan arms when the trawler Eksund was seized by the French. The Enniskillen bomb, which killed 11 people last Remembrance Day, was seen as a propaganda disaster.

Leading article, page 18

HOME NEWS 3

Republicans deny killings were revenge for Gibraltar

IRA sends defiant signal to Thatcher

David Hearst
in Belfast

A SUCCESSFUL IRA attack against concentrations of British troops had been expected since eight volunteers were killed in an SAS ambush at a part-time police station at Loughgall, County Tyrone, last May.

Republican sources in Belfast yesterday discounted the suggestion that the attack in the Netherlands had been planned as a result of the SAS shootings in Gibraltar.

The likelihood is that it would have been planned some time ago, and that the unit involved was left to choose its own opportunity, once escape routes had been tried and tested.

If there was a direct cause of Sunday's attack, it lay not so much in the latest shoot-to-kill controversies — which echo criticism of security force policy over 20 years — but in the publicity Mrs Thatcher generated by her appearance last month at RAF Northolt, when the bodies of the two corporals killed by the crowd at the IRA funeral in Andersonstown were flown home.

She may have intended simply to show commiseration for the families of Corporals David Howes and Derek Wood, but her appearance sent the Provi-

sional IRA a powerful message.

It argued that if such scenes were repeated, perhaps British public opinion about Northern Ireland could be changed to the point where withdrawal would become politically imperative.

Such an argument is partly borne out of the British policy of "containment", under which Northern Ireland can be thought of as a political nightmare, which has the merit of existing on the other side of the Irish Sea.

The situation is reflected in the annual security casualty figures. Over the past three years, the regular army has lost between three and four men each year, with an average of 50 injured.

The locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment and Royal Ulster Constabulary have lost more than 20 people a year, with more than 300 injured.

The policy of putting the RUC and the UDR in the front line has meant that nearly six times as many locals as "Brits" have been killed.

A successful attack on troops in Gibraltar or Holland affects British opinion in a way that not even an outrage like the Remembrance Day killings in Enniskillen can.

But the current turmoil also damages Sinn Fein's attempts to emerge as a serious political contender.

A senior figure in Sinn Fein yesterday denied that the at-

tack in the Netherlands had diverted attention from the Gibraltar shoot-to-kill allegations.

He said that by Saturday the controversy over the World in Action evidence that the three IRA members were shot surrendering had already been lost in the row between Mrs Thatcher and the Independent Broadcasting Authority.

But the suspicion remains that the bullet sits less easily with the ballot box today than it did before the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed three years ago. Certainly there is a greater distance between the political and military wings of the Republican Movement.

It is possible that the attack in Holland may damage the talks between Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic and Labour Party, although senior figures on both sides yesterday played this down.

The SDLP took a policy decision before the talks began three months ago not to let any IRA action become an excuse for abandoning them.

The party's deputy leader, Mr Seamus Mallon, said yesterday that the talks would be abandoned only if the SDLP considered there was no possibility of movement in Sinn Fein's position. The party, he said, would not pull out because of violence.

Both sides have agreed to at least one further meeting, probably in three weeks time, after a Sinn Fein executive meeting.

UK anti-terrorist team joins Dutch hunt for IRA unit

ANTI-TERRORIST officers from Britain yesterday flew into the Netherlands to assist Dutch police in the hunt for the IRA unit which killed three off-duty RAF servicemen and injured three others.

Scotland Yard said last night that a Special Branch officer and an anti-terrorist squad officer had gone to the Netherlands at the request of the Dutch authorities. The 45-strong Dutch investigation team has not found any eyewitnesses to either incident.

One of the leads being followed by investigators is the possible involvement of Tony McAllister, an IRA member who escaped from the Maze prison five years ago.

Detectives and forensic experts were last night still unable to identify the make of the car blown apart by the bomb which killed John Baxter, 21, and John Reid, 21, both senior aircraftsmen (SACs) at RAF Laarbruch, West Germany. The blast was such that the two men were identified only by a British forces dentist.

However, police confirmed that they were searching for a brown Corvette, registered in the Netherlands, in connection with the shooting in Roermond in which Ian Shinner, 20, an SAC at RAF Wildenrath, also in West Germany, was killed.

A memorial service for the dead is to be held in Bergen on Wednesday afternoon, a few miles from Nieuw-Bergen where the bomb attack happened. On the same day, Princess Margaret is due to visit RAF Bruggen, another base in the area. It was unclear yesterday whether she would visit the injured.

Military surgeons last night amputated the left foot of Ifan Lewis, 19, an SAC at RAF Wildenrath who was also a victim

From Phil Reeves and David Usborne in Roermond

of the Roermond attack. The operation lasted four hours. Afterwards he was described as "very seriously ill".

SAC Lewis, who was yesterday transferred from Roermond Hospital to an RAF hospital several miles across the border in West Germany, was being treated for bullet wounds in both legs and his left side. The RAF said he was hit by "a minimum of three bullets".

The brother and fiancée of Richard Garth, the third victim of the Roermond shooting who was also transferred to the same hospital at RAF Wegberg, were flown into West Germany yesterday to visit him.

Martyn Ward, the senior orthopaedic surgeon at RAF Wegberg, said he was hit by one bullet in the right shoulder but was not seriously injured and his condition was "entirely satisfactory". Andrew Kelly, the aircraftsman injured in the bomb blast, was said to be "very seriously ill". Detectives have been unable to interview him.

Dutch police said the two attacks, which happened 30 miles apart within 15 minutes, may have been carried out by one person, planting the Nieuw-Bergen bomb in advance. But this was only one of a range of options under investigation.

Meanwhile, there was speculation yesterday that a fire in a farmhouse a few miles from Nieuw-Bergen on Saturday night may have been deliberately started by the attackers just before the explosion, in an attempt to divert the emergency services from the town.

Trauma of terrorism, page 2

Inexperience hampers Dutch hunt

By Brian Cathcart

ALMOST alone among European Community countries, The Netherlands has no experience of fighting terrorism. Not since the mid-1970s, when South Moluccan extremists took to hijacking railway trains, have the Dutch authorities faced a serious internal security problem. And the Moluccans, desperate young men from a tiny and isolated immigrant community, did not constitute in any way a rehearsal for dealing with the IRA.

So, unlike their counterparts in France, West Germany, Italy, Spain and Britain, the Dutch police and intelligence organisations have never had to prise open cells of dedicated extremists which have burrowed their way into the population. Nor have the Dutch people endured the trauma and the frustration produced by campaigns of bombing, assassination and hostage-taking.

Like the Swedes before the murder of Olof Palme, they make the most of this happy position. Government ministers are to be seen walking in the streets or dining in the restau-

rants of The Hague, apparently unprotected. Ruud Lubbers, the Prime Minister, often dispenses with his guards. On one occasion last year, he gave chase to a group of youths who threw a petrol bomb through the window of his private home in Rotterdam.

On law and order, however, Dutch liberalism these days tends to be skin deep and the IRA would be unwise to count on it in any way. The country is well-organised and well-policed, and as in France or West Germany the strands of red tape can fairly easily be drawn tight. Frederik Korthals Altes, the justice minister, is by no means weak on terrorism, and has enthusiastically entered into the EC's schemes for improving security co-operation.

The courts, too, appear to have changed. Where once they allowed Patrick Magee, the IRA man who later bombed the Grand Hotel in Brighton, to walk free, they have since

authorised the extradition of the Maze escapees Brendan McFarlane and Gerard Kelly to this country. Sympathy, of the sort which would offer hiding places for killers, is also unlikely to be in generous supply. Amsterdam's days as a capital of the European counter-culture are over, and the squatters and anarchists are now a mere rump.

What The Netherlands does offer the IRA is what it offers everyone: good communications, free movement and an international environment in which English is spoken and young foreigners are inconspicuous. Rotterdam port, the world's biggest, and Amsterdam's Schiphol airport are to hand, and motorways offer fast overland exit routes.

Nowhere is this crossroads role more evident than in the province of Limburg, the southern finger of The Netherlands, where Sunday's murders occurred. In 20 minutes, the killers could have been well inside West Germany or Belgium and two hours would have seen them in Luxembourg or France.

Security sources blame faction fighting for murder

Turkey linked to Armenian killing

Adrian Foreman in Ankara

THE assassination in Athens of Agop Agopian, a leading figure in the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, has provoked intense speculation about possible Turkish involvement. But Turkish security sources claimed yesterday that faction fighting within Asala was a more likely cause.

Agopian, who was posing as a Yemeni diplomat, was killed by unidentified gunmen in the Greek capital on Thursday. He is said to have been involved in terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats and interests abroad, as Asala pursued a campaign of revenge for the alleged massacre of Armenians in Turkey under the previous Ottoman regime.

Asala had previously said that Agopian had been killed in the Israeli bombardment of Beirut. A spate of killings of Turkish diplomats abroad, blamed on Asala, stopped suddenly in November 1984.

Sources in Ankara close to the security services said Agopian may have been identified by Turkish agents in Athens.

The sources said specially trained Turkish operatives are believed to have been sent to a number of European capitals, and are also believed to have been responsible for a number

of killings of known Asala members in Beirut about two years ago.

Turkish security chiefs are said to admire the techniques of the Israeli security service, Mossad, which has been connected with the recent assassination in Tunis of the PLO second-in-command, Abu Jihad.

Speculation about Turkish involvement in Agopian's killing has also been heightened by alleged British covert action against IRA agents in Gibraltar.

One diplomat in Ankara commented: "Turkey may not have carried out the killing. But it's certainly not sorry that Agopian's dead."

Well-placed Turkish Government sources say they have no information whatsoever about any Turkish involvement in the Agopian killing.

"State-sponsored-terrorist action is not our style," said one.

Security officials maintain the killing reflects faction-fighting within Asala. They point to a number of murders, especially in Athens, of known Asala activists.

Asala has recently been concentrating on political lobbying against Turkish interests, especially in the US. It also issues political statements through a front group in Athens.

Armenian political activity is banned in Turkey. Armenian activists fled the country fol-

lowing Turkey's 1980 military coup, or were gaoled.

Florica Kyriacopoulos adds from Athens: A militant Armenian organisation continued to insist yesterday that Agopian had been dead for years.

Mr Vartan Vartanian, a spokesman for the militant Armenian Popular Movement, claimed Agopian had died in the Israeli bombings of Beirut in the summer of 1982 and "all Armenian people knew that." He said he did not know the identity of the assassinated man.

The Greek Government has dismissed such claims, positively identifying the man as Agopian, leader of the organisation that has apparently claimed responsibility for the killing of 13 Turkish diplomats and 15 other people, since it surfaced in 1975. Turkey has put the figure at 40 diplomats.

Greek police investigating the killing were yesterday questioning Turkish refugees in Athens but declined to comment. Press reports speculated the killing was committed by a splinter Asala group that disapproved of Mr Agopian's "murderous tactics."

After a 1983 bombing attack at Orly airport in Paris that killed eight people, Asala was split and the Asala Revolutionary Movement which emerged condemned "the murderous deviation" of Agopian.



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Reference:

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YBICAW

27 April 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
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POLICE (PTIU)
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TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Kuwaiti Hijack

Independent article of 23/4/88

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Airlines try to learn lessons from hijack

AIRLINE security officials are concerned that the hijackers of the Kuwaiti Boeing 747 obtained access to computerised reservation systems which enabled them to target a flight carrying members of Kuwait's royal family.

A European ambassador in Kuwait said Kuwait Airways and European airlines serving sensitive destinations were reviewing "all their security measures, on and off the plane, at the check-in and in the booking office" after the latest hijacking. The implication for senior business travellers and government officials is that extreme care should be taken in making bookings and, if possible, reservations should be delayed until the last moment, he said.

Several European airlines are now quietly carrying armed guards from their national anti-terrorist forces on flights to and from the Middle East, the ambassador said. During overnight stops in the Middle East, firearms are locked up on the plane and the guards check in to hotels with the crews. Kuwaiti security officials believe Hizbollah sympathisers were able to access computer passenger lists from Kuwait Airways terminals. They are exploring ways to restrict programming on the airline computer to permit fewer users access to complete booking information. A concerted effort to redouble security checks on ground staff, such as cleaners who may have access to aircraft, is under way. Accounts from the hostages point to the gunmen obtaining their weapons from a hiding place in a lavatory.

As the methods of the hijackers are becoming clearer, neutral diplomats experienced in the area believe the identities of their apologists within the Iranian government and religious establishment are also emerging. Two figures in the Iranian government appear the most likely patrons for the Lebanese Shia Muslim militiamen. The new Minister of the Interior, Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi Pur, is the most senior man in the cabinet who has

From Michael Sheridan
in Kuwait

long connections with Lebanese political violence. As ambassador to Damascus in 1982 and 1983, he nurtured relations between Lebanese militia and Iranian clerics, intelligence men and Revolutionary Guards. A letter bomb blew off the Hojatoleslam's right hand in 1984 and he thereupon returned to Tehran.

He is a key figure because, while in Damascus, he oversaw the merging of the Lebanese Islamic Amal extremist group, the Hizbollah faction and the exiled Iraqi fundamentalist party, Al-Daawa Al-Islamiyya (Islamic call). All three groups contributed members to the bombing operations in Kuwait in 1983 for which 17 men were convicted. The hijackers' only demand was for the liberation of the 17.

The second important figure in the Iranian hierarchy is the Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs, Hussein Sheikholeslam. A student militant who joined in the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran, Mr Sheikholeslam is in perpetual diplomatic motion between Tehran, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and those Gulf countries which will have him on the premises. His ties with Iran's violent surrogates in Lebanon are intimate and his visits to Damascus (while Mr Mohtashemi was ambassador) coincided with the suicide bombings of the US and French barracks in Beirut. Both men are the Iranian officials most closely tied to the violent extreme of Lebanese Shia politics.

Now that the hijackers are presumed to be at liberty, there is little doubt that their backers, at some point, will employ their services again.

■ ALGIERS — The British Ambassador, Patrick Evers, was summoned to the Algerian Foreign Ministry yesterday after official British criticism of the decision to allow the hijackers to escape unpunished, AP reports.

THE INDEPENDENT Saturday 23 April 1988

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SUBJ: FRENCH PRESIDENTIALS : RAINBOW WARRIOR

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YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM THE ABOVE AND OTHER REPORTS ON THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST ROUND OF THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIALS THAT PM CHIRAC, WHOSE PUBLIC IMAGE ON SECURITY HAS BEEN ONE OF THE STRONG POINTS OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY, IS ON THE BACK FOOT ON THIS ISSUE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE FAR RIGHT NATIONAL FRONT. THE EVENTS IN NEW CALEDONIA IN WHICH FOUR GENDARMES WERE KILLED AND OTHERS TAKEN AND STILL HELD HOSTAGE BY WHAT CHIRAC HAS TERMED SAVAGES, HAVE NOW SERVED TO MAKE THE LINK EVEN MORE STRONGLY BETWEEN TERRORISM AND HOSTAGES. CHIRAC IS, WE BELIEVE, DESPERATE FOR AN EARLY SUCCESS IN THE HOSTAGES FIELD. BESIDES THE CAPTURED GENDARMES IN OUEVA, PRIORITIES WILL BE THE FRENCH HOSTAGES STILL HELD IN LEBANON, WHOSE LIBERATION HAD SEEMED RECENTLY TO BE VERY CLOSE. HOWEVER, ANYTHING THAT MAY BE PERCEIVED BY THE FRENCH PUBLIC TO RESSEMBLE A HOSTAGE SITUATION MAY BE A TARGET FOR CHIRAC, ESPECIALLY IF HE CAN GET AWAY WITH IT. PRIER MAY BE FAIR GAME BUT IF SO, HE WOULD BE CLUTCHING AT STRAWS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE COULD PERCEIVE THAT IN HIS PRESENT SITUATION HE STANDS TO LOSE EVERY LITTLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

Hurd moves to block terror funds

By Peter Evans, Home Affairs Correspondent

Tough new action against terrorist finance was promised yesterday by Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary. The Government intends to legislate to "broaden and strengthen an attack on terrorist funding", he said.

The measures are expected to be introduced in a new Prevention of Terrorism Bill to come into force next spring. The Home Office is talking about powers to freeze terrorist assets but not yet to seize them, though that has not been ruled out.

Mr Hurd's announcement was made in the knowledge that international terrorist groups have used Britain for laundering funds. He is aware of evidence that funds have been raised in Britain by groups to buy arms and explosives. The accumulation of cash could help terrorists to put down deep roots in society, Mr Hurd said.

Existing legislation penalizes the giving and receiving of funds for Ulster terrorists. Ministers are examining a proposal that the law should be widened to cover international terrorism. The Government is also considering methods to enforce disclosure of funds for terrorism held in British banks, so that a transfer could be blocked.

Mr Hurd, opening a con-

ference on the rule of law and control of terrorism, saw a parallel between the finances of drug trafficking and terrorism. The Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 holds that it is an offence knowingly to "launder" funds of drug traffickers.

"The Act, which is already proving its worth, enables the police to obtain a court order requiring the production of material relating to possible drugs offences," he said. "It also provides powers to obtain the restraint, or freezing, of drug traffickers' assets and confiscation in the event of an offence being proved."

In his report on the Prevention of Terrorism Act, Lord Colville of Culross recommended that the Government examine whether the provisions of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act could be applied more widely to the campaign against terrorist funding, Mr Hurd said. There were important differences. "We are here talking not usually about funds generated by crime, but funds needed to commit crime."

● An anti-terrorist exercise to test plans to deal with a plane hijack was held in Dorset last night, involving an aircraft with "hostages" on board landing at Hurn airport, Bournemouth.

COMMENTARY

by Nicholas Ashford

Hostages suffer for a high-handed policy of inaction

LAST weekend, while the hostages on board the hijacked Kuwaiti airliner were enduring their 11th day of captivity, about 2,000 people gathered in north London for a pop concert called *An evening without John McCarthy*.

John McCarthy is the British journalist who was kidnapped in Beirut just over two years ago. For the past 737 days (or 17,688 hours) he has been held in a grimy cell somewhere in Lebanon, twice as long as Terry Waite and almost 50 times longer than those unfortunate passengers and crew on board flight KU-422. Despite persistent efforts by his family and his girlfriend, Jill Morrell, his whereabouts are still unknown. So is the identity of his kidnappers, although they are believed to belong to a faction of Hizbollah.

Listening to government ministers and pundits trot out the familiar line — "no deals with terrorists" — I sometimes wonder whether they ever give much thought to the hell which Mr McCarthy, Mr Waite, Brian Keenan and the other hostages still in Lebanon are going through.

One could be excused for thinking that the Government had forgotten about Mr McCarthy for much of his two years in captivity. Inquiries about his fate were brushed aside with bland assurances that "we are doing what we can to secure his release, but we cannot tell you what we are doing because it might jeopardise his safety".

Put into plain English, this "diplomatic-speak" meant that British embassies were told to gather any information they could about his whereabouts and to seek whatever help Middle Eastern governments could provide. It hardly amounted to a determined effort to obtain Mr McCarthy's freedom. In fact, Britain has only raised the hostage issue twice with the Iranians, the country with the greatest influence with Hizbollah, in the past year.

It was only after Miss Morrell and about 20 others launched a group called "Friends of John McCarthy", that the Government became a little more responsive. MPs began writing to the Foreign Office and David Mellor, the minister in charge, responded in

terms which suggested that the Government was not only going to pursue his case with greater vigour, but that it was also prepared to adopt a slightly more flexible approach.

The record of the British press has been little better. Even though Mr McCarthy is a journalist, his fate seemed to provoke little interest or attention in Fleet Street or in television studios. An ITN news broadcast on the release last month of Peter Cole-ridge, a British aid worker, after being held for six days, made no reference to the fate of Mr McCarthy or Mr Waite. How different from the French approach, where photos of the remaining three French hostages in Beirut are flashed on the screen each evening before the Antenne 2 newscasts to remind French viewers of the plight of their compatriots. Only since Miss Morrell launched her campaign has the press begun to take more interest.

Miss Morrell is due to have her first meeting with a Foreign Office minister early next month. She does not intend to urge Mr Mellor to offer any deals in return for Mr McCarthy's release, because she knows the answer will

be no. But she will make the point that the Government could do a lot more than it is doing at present, while continuing to maintain its "no deals" approach. Why not make greater use of the good offices of the Red Cross, the aid agencies or even the PLO, which helped to secure Mr Cole-ridge's speedy release?

I am personally not convinced that the Government's "no deals" approach is the best way of dealing with hostage-takers, and I certainly do not share its disdain for the French practice of striking bargains to secure the release of their hostages. In fact, I wish there were a British equivalent of Jean-Charles Marchiani, the former French intelligence agent who has been entrusted by the Chirac government with the highly sensitive negotiations over the release of the three French

hostages. Although I suspect Mr Marchiani's brief is a little too generous, at least the French have a high-powered official with excellent contacts whose sole function is to get the hostages home.

Britain's principled approach to the issue of hostage-dealing ignores certain points. For a start, it must be remembered that there is a long tradition of hostage-taking in the Middle East. Inhuman though it may sound, hostages are often bought and sold in the same way that Persian carpets are traded in a *souk*. The hostage-takers see no reason why Westerners should not behave in the same way as they do. In fact, most Western countries do just that. The French have made deals, so have the Americans, and the Germans. It is all very fine for us to adhere to our lofty principles when incidents occur in far-away Lebanon or Algeria, but let us not forget that we did a deal with the Libyans during the 1984 Libyan embassy siege, when a police-woman, Yvonne Fletcher, was shot dead in central London. Was our behaviour then in allowing the Libyans involved to leave the country so different from that of the Algerians now?

Nor has Britain's "no deals" policy been a striking success. Three British hostages have been murdered in Lebanon and three remain in captivity. By comparison, only one Frenchman has been killed, seven have been freed and the remaining three are likely to be released shortly. The British argue that giving in to kidnappers or hijackers will only encourage further kidnappings and hijackings. This is clearly a real danger, although it has not happened as far as the French are concerned. Against this, Kuwait's unbending refusal to treat with terrorists has not prevented it from being the frequent target of hijackers, bomb-throwers and others seeking the release of the 17 Shias held in prisons there.

No reasonable person wants to reward those who use terror tactics to promote their cause. But is it reasonable to use Mr McCarthy, Mr Waite, Mr Keenan and other innocent hostages as weapons in our fight against these gangsters? Surely we should invest our efforts in building up a wall of international solidarity against terrorism, ensuring that hijackers are never allowed to board airliners and making certain that all who seek to endanger the lives of innocent civilians in pursuit of their goals do not go unpunished. But first let's get the British hostages back home.

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FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: THURSDAY 21 APRIL 1988

KUWAITI AIRLINE HIJACK

In response to a question, Spokesman confirmed that we were in touch with the Algerian and Kuwaiti Governments in order to try to establish the full details of the arrangements which allowed the hijack to be brought to an end.

In answer to a further question Spokesman said that the Foreign Secretary would wish to raise the question of the hijack and its aftermath with his European Community colleagues at the Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 25 April. Spokesman added that we had been in touch with Summit Seven countries about possible further discussion within the Summit Seven machinery, and that the issue would be raised by the British delegation to ICAO in the organisation's appropriate sub committee next week.

File 86615/1A

THE GUARDIAN
Friday April 22 1988

EEC unwilling to punish Algeria

Hella Pick,
Diplomatic Correspondent

MRS Thatcher is inviting a rebuff from Britain's EEC partners as well as Japan if she presses for collective sanctions against Algeria once it is established that the Algerian authorities allowed the Kuwaiti airliner hijackers to go free.

Japan has already indicated it is unwilling to court the displeasure of the Arab world, its suppliers of crude oil, by joining sanctions against a country that failed to punish hijackers.

France, with its close links to Algeria, is equally reluctant, and West Germany, the head of the EEC, is also counselling against any action that is certain to antagonise even the Arab moderates.

A Conservative member of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr Peter Temple-Morris, and the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Gerald Kaufman, have warned the Prime Minister to be less strident in her criticism of the hijack deal, and to remember that she allowed the Libyan diplomats who shot PC Fletcher in London to leave the country.

Britain and the US strongly urged Algeria last week against making any deal with the hijackers that would allow them to go unpunished. Other allies were pressed into sending similar messages. But not all were strongly worded, and Japan, has confirmed that the mild tone of its diplomatic intervention caused displeasure in London and Washington.

Mrs Thatcher, commenting on the outcome of the hijack, has said that "those responsible ought without question to be brought to justice. If terrorists are allowed to go unpunished, it will only lead to more hijacking and more hostage-taking."

If Algeria failed to accept this argument, then, according to Britain, the seven Western allies must act together and apply sanctions against "any country, which refuses the extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft."

This is a reference to the 1978 declaration in Bonn by the US, Britain, Canada, Japan, West Germany, France and Italy which called for an immediate halt in air routes to the offending countries.

The Prime Minister is said to recognise that for such action to have any impact, it would have to be taken collectively; and she has no intention of unilaterally banning flights between Britain and Algeria.

Meanwhile, Britain wants the issue on the agenda of Monday's EEC Foreign Affairs Council. Sir Geoffrey Howe will insist on re-examining EEC's anti-terrorist cooperation machinery, and the means of an effective protest to Algeria.

Burton Bollag adds from Geneva: The International Air Transport Association has strongly condemned Algeria's decision. "We have a very strong position that terrorists need to be prosecuted, need to be punished, because otherwise it's a very bad precedent that encourages others to attempt something similar," said a spokesman.

Threats no longer powerful weapons

Julie Flint in Beirut

HIJACKING will no longer work as a method of pressure, one of West Beirut's most seasoned analysts said confidently yesterday.

Speaking about the possible next move of the Kuwaiti jet hijackers, he said: "The hijackers must feel that the method itself will not work — not today and not tomorrow."

Although the hijackers appear to have escaped to fight another day, winning the battle for their own freedom if not for that of the 17 prisoners they sought to release, their 16-day marathon has in all other respects been an abject failure. Not only are the prisoners still in gaol, but public opinion in Kuwait, outraged by the murder of two Kuwaiti hostages, is for the first time demanding that the death sentences passed on three of the 17 be carried out.

The inescapable lesson of the odyssey of KU 422 is that hijacking is not the instrument it once was, especially in those parts of the world where regimes have developed skills in dealing with such incidents.

Not one of the states touched by this latest hijacking bowed to the threats, even to that of a final conflagration that would sacrifice the entire jet.

Kuwait, although risking the death of three members of its own royal family, remained uncompromising from start to finish. Syrian and Lebanese officials, calm almost to the point of callousness, refused landing permission in West Beirut even when the plane's tanks were almost empty. Algerian and Palestinian negotiators refused to talk unless the hijackers promised there would be no more bloodshed.

Airport authorities handled the crisis with expertise, treating the hijackers with a carefully calculated mixture of respect and resolution, keeping control of the situation in the face of multiple threats and provocations.

In West Beirut, when the anguished pilot radioed that "We'll land in the sea," the control tower responded: "Land where you like. It's not our problem." Convinced that there

was no way down in Lebanon, the hijackers turned to Cyprus. There, specially trained staff rode out the murder of a second hostage — keeping the busy tourist airport open all the while — until agreement was reached for safe passage to Algeria and traditional Arab mediation.

"The hijackers tried everything — in a very resolute manner — and in spite of this they were not successful," says another observer who believes hijacking has been much discouraged. "Even when they carried out their threat to kill, the reaction was to become more intransigent, not to meet their demands. They got publicity, yes, but if publicity does not lead to anything, what's it worth?"


While there is general agreement that the danger of fresh hijackings has been significantly reduced by the experience of KU 422, there is also agreement that the hijackers will not give up their cause because of this failure.

The fate of the 17 prisoners invokes loyalties that are both tribal and ideological, as they are the first group of Islam extremists to be gaoled in Kuwait. Two planes have been hijacked on their behalf and hostages have been seized in West Beirut. The hijackings achieved nothing. Hostages were exchanged — but for the arms and policies sought by Iran, not for the 17.

Shi'ite officials in Beirut do not entirely exclude the possibility of future hijackings, but believe they will need a new twist if they are to have any hope of influencing Kuwait, perhaps diversions not to Iran and Lebanon but to Kuwait itself.

Hostage-taking, these officials fear, could also assume new dimensions by moving outside its current confines in Lebanon. "It is a principle of all underground movements to fight for their militants in gaol," says a Shi'ite who believes he knows some of the hijackers — Lebanese, he says, who should not be expected to take no for an answer. "Of course they will try again. But how? That is the question now. Maybe they'll try something in Kuwait itself. This, I think, is most likely."

THE GUARDIAN
Thursday April 21 1988



New Zealand High Commission

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London SW1Y 4TQ
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YELLOW

Reference:

B66/5/1A

20 April 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

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NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Kuwaiti Hijack - further commentary and reportage, including
on British SAS and American special forces in UK


International Terrorism - survey by Financial Times 20/4/88
of recent developments.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Edward Mortimer looks at the factors behind the latest resurgence of terrorist activity

The rising curve of violent death

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM



ONCE AGAIN terrorism is dominating the headlines. Two people have so far been killed, and 31 are still being held hostage after more than a fortnight, by the hijackers of the Kuwaiti airliner. Five people were killed and 16 injured last Thursday by a bomb outside a US servicemen's club in Naples. During Friday night an important Palestinian leader was shot dead at his home in Tunis, along with his bodyguards and a gardener. On Saturday afternoon the same fate struck a leading adviser to the new Italian Prime Minister.

Those are four types of terrorism to which Western public opinion is particularly sensitive:

- Hijackings have a built-in element of drama and suspense, and their victims are easy for anyone who has ever travelled by air to identify with. In the present case, however, the media appeal of the drama began to flag in the second week, aided no doubt by the fact that there were no longer any passengers from Western countries on board the airliner

- Bomb attacks in European cities, especially on American targets, are obviously threatening to the general public on both sides of the Atlantic.

- Events relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict are almost always assured of greater publicity in the West than similar events anywhere else outside the Nato area. Reasons for this include the European background to Israel's existence and the very close involvement – emotional as well as political – of the US in Israel's destiny.

- The murder of Senator Roberto Ruffilli marks the return of the purely ideological terror, which traumatised Italy and West Germany, and to a lesser extent France, in the 1970s and early 1980s. The authorities in those countries believed they had succeeded in containing this, if not eradicating it. It is particularly disturbing that this murder, claimed by a movement stemming directly from the Red Brigades, should so exactly and no doubt deliberately recall the agony of the Aldo Moro affair which Italy endured just 10 years ago. Like the Red Brigades then, the "Fighting Communist Party" has struck with precision at the Christian Democrats just when they are again feeling their way to a new relationship with the Communists. Just as Aldo Moro was the architect of a new parliamentary majority including the Communists, so Senator Ruffilli was intimately involved in the plans to strengthen the state through institutional reform, for which the support of the Communists is being sought.

It would thus be easy to conclude from the events of the last two weeks that terrorism is on an inexorably upward curve and that all the efforts made by governments to combat it have been in vain. That grim conclusion is apparently borne out by the statistics of "casualties caused by international terrorism" compiled by the US State Department. These show that the total for dead and wounded taken together has risen in every year since 1984, with an alarming 25 per cent increase in 1987.

But things are not so simple. First of all the number killed, as opposed to wounded, was significantly lower in both 1986 and 1987 than in the peak year of 1985. Secondly, the 1987 figures

reflect an "extraordinary" increase in terrorist bombings in Pakistan, most of them believed to be linked to the secret police of the Afghan communist regime. These bombings accounted for 1,298 casualties last year (1,076 wounded and 222 killed) – well over a third of the worldwide total. Yet compared with the events referred to above they received remarkably little attention in the Western media.

The US figures, in any case, cover only "international" terrorism – incidents in which either the territory or the nationals of more than one state are involved. This is an artificial distinction. Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, attempts to monitor "domestic" as well as international terrorism, and finds that the latter fairly consistently outnumbers the former by a factor of ten to one.

In both cases he finds that the overall number of incidents has not increased dramatically, but the number killed has: in international incidents two thirds of all the deaths in the last 15 years have occurred since 1984. This is because terrorists have resorted to increasingly lethal and indiscriminate methods such as the blowing up of aircraft and the use of car bombs.

"Domestic" terrorism, according to Prof Wilkinson, is increasing very rap-

Most terrorist groups finance themselves wholly or partly by criminal activity – bank-robbery, extortion and drugs

idly, but not primarily in Western Europe, as a country-by-country examination shows. In Spain, the Basque separatist group ETA, responsible for hundreds of murders over the last 10-12 years, appears to have been significantly weakened and has been seeking to negotiate a ceasefire with the Spanish Government. In the UK, the IRA, though far from beaten, has suffered a series of recent setbacks.

In France, the government scored a spectacular success last year with the arrest of the leaders of the Action Directe group, responsible for most of the political killings in France over the last 10 years or so, other than those related to the Middle East.

In West Germany considerable numbers of known terrorists continue to elude the formidable array of police technology deployed by the Bundeskriminalamt, but they appear to be on the defensive, obliged to concentrate on avoiding capture rather than on spectacular exploits. The violent incidents that do occur tend to be directed against property (electricity pylons or the perimeter fences of nuclear plants) more than against people, and are thought to be the work of autonomous activists rather than of hard core terrorist groups.

Even in Italy, while the murder of Senator Ruffilli is certainly disturbing, it is probably safe to say that it does not presage a return to the heyday of the Red Brigades. Compared with Mr

Moro in 1978, Mr Ruffilli was a "soft" target. Significantly an attempt to kidnap Mr Ciriaco De Mita – Mr Moro's successor as leader of the Christian Democrats, who has since been named Prime Minister – was foiled by police a few weeks ago.

Terrorism of the Red Brigades, Action Directe, Baader-Meinhof type flourished in the 1970s in a particular ideological climate. At the time, the student generation of the 1960s, nourished on neo-Marxist libertarian ideas, was experiencing acute disillusionment at the discovery that it could not change the world by non-violent demonstrations or semi-spontaneous "happenings."

The majority drifted into various degrees of compromise with the established order, but a minority of dedicated revolutionaries was prepared to take up arms against the state, and a somewhat larger group was ready to identify with them, even if it did not participate directly. The climate of the 1980s seems very different, though there is always the danger that unemployment and conspicuous inequality will spark off a new wave of anger among the have-nots or guilt among the haves.

ETA and the IRA, like the Corsican nationalists who constitute France's main remaining "domestic" terrorist problem, are movements of a different sort, much more difficult to extirpate because they express, in however extreme a form, the grievances of national groups with a strong sense of their own identity.

Such groups have something in common with the nationalist or communalist movements that are the main breeding grounds of terrorism in the "ordinary" Middle East, Africa and Asia. Shiites in Lebanon, Iraq and the Gulf, Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, Armenians still seeking revenge on Turkey for the massacres of 1915, Sikhs in India, Tamils and now also Moslems in Sri Lanka, Moslems in the Philippines, blacks in South Africa, Eritreans and Tigrayans in Ethiopia, southerners in Sudan, Sahrawis opposed to Moroccan rule in Western Sahara: these are only some of the groups which have taken up arms "in self-defence" or "to resist oppression" in recent years.

The validity of their grievances varies from case to case, and so does the extent to which the types of violence they resort to can fairly be categorised as terrorism. Terror may be used in a good cause (without thereby becoming good in itself) and more conventional methods of warfare are often used in a bad one. It is not always easy to say where one begins and the other stops.

Nor is it easy, in many cases, to disentangle political terrorism from gangsterism or banditry. Most terrorist groups finance themselves wholly or partly by criminal activity – bank-robbery, extortion, drug-running. The longer they go on the more important these activities are likely to become in comparison with their ostensible political goals.

In Latin America – another region where "domestic" terrorism has increased spectacularly in recent years – violence has become a normal way of life for some groups, and the intertwining of drug cultivation and com-

merce with ostensibly political activity is almost endemic.

Much has been said and written in the last few years about "state-sponsored terrorism," especially in connection with the Middle East. The US has taken the lead in denouncing this phenomenon and using sanctions - economic, political and, in the case of Libya, military - to counter it. These policies seem to have had some effect. Arab governments which were more or less openly sponsoring terrorism, such as those of Iraq, Syria and Libya, have become much more cautious about it, if they have not given up altogether. The main remaining culprit in the region is Iran, or at least a powerful faction which may unfortunately be getting more powerful within the Iranian regime.

Further east, the activities of the Afghan secret service presumably also come into this category, but so (it could be argued) does the use of Western-supplied missiles to shoot down civilian aircraft by the anti-communist Afghan mujahidin. Many would say that the same applies also to some of the activities of the Contras in Nicaragua (though one imagines these are not included in the State Department statistics). As for the killing of the Palestinian leader, Abu Jihad, that probably comes under the heading of "state" rather than "state-sponsored," if, indeed, it was carried out by a special unit of the Israeli Defence Forces.

Terrorism in some form has always existed and is unlikely to disappear. In the contemporary world, air travel makes all of us more vulnerable to other people's quarrels, while television and other media enable one group of malcontents to learn about and imitate the methods of another on the other side of the world.

But we are not quite defenceless. The State Department's figures show that only seven US citizens were killed by international terrorism in 1987 - the lowest figure for six years - and three of those were caught up accidentally, not deliberately targeted. More strikingly, none of them was a diplomat. This has been achieved mainly by strict security precautions at US embassies and other premises in foreign countries: inconvenient, often expensive, but still effective. In Europe, too, much has been achieved simply by better coordination between national police forces, of which the French capture of a boatload of arms destined for the IRA and the Spanish identification of the Gibraltar would-be bombers were two recent fruits.

The bar-chart shows a significant decline in Western Europe's share of international terrorist incidents over the last five years. While it would be dangerous to assume that this will continue, it does suggest that constant vigilance and growing firmness can provide some protection, at least against the effects of those conflicts whose true locus is in other parts of the world.

SAS and the menace of media myths

THE SAS regards four key elements as essential to any mission it undertakes: stealth, intelligence, information and surprise.

But last weekend, any prospect of an SAS assault to free the hostages held aboard the Kuwaiti airliner in Cyprus was abruptly dashed by dangerous speculation in the media.

On Saturday, the Daily Mail reported that the SAS was ready to move. "A squad of British SAS soldiers based on the island was put on standby to support Cypriot police in case it was needed to storm the plane," a report said.

Next day, the Sunday Telegraph published a report headlined "Troops stand by in Cyprus". It began by stating that "35 soldiers of the SAS Regiment were standing by in Cyprus. Central Defence Staff sources, who confirmed the squad's presence there, stressed they would support a Cypriot-led rescue mission only if the Nicosia government made a formal request for help".

It added: "According to military sources, the SAS group — two 16-man Sabre troops and a three-man headquarters cell — have been carrying out rehearsals at RAF Akrotiri in preparation for a storming operation".

The Sunday Express, too, suggested that, acting on orders from the prime minister, the SAS had the jet under surveillance.

All these reports were wide of the mark at best, and flights of Fleet Street fantasy at worst. Immediately after the hijack began, the SAS was routinely consulted. But it concluded that an assault on the aircraft would be exceptionally difficult and would probably result in heavy loss of life.

It had looked at various contingency plans at its base in Hereford, but members of the SAS's counter revolutionary warfare wing, which is responsible for hostage rescues, were not in Cyprus.

The Sunday Telegraph story quoted "Central Defence Staff sources" to give it credibility and it was this that, for a time, convinced the hijackers and even the Kuwaiti and Cypriot governments that SAS members were on the island.

At 7.10 on Sunday morning, BBC Radio 4 in its review of the Sunday papers picked up the Sunday Telegraph report and broadcast it. Radio 4 has an agreement to pass on material, including its review of the papers, to the British Forces Broadcasting Service. It sent out the same report which was broadcast by BFBS at Dhekelia in Cyprus three times that morning. It is assumed the hijackers were monitoring the radio as, at about 10.50am, they requested copies of the Sunday papers from the airport control tower.

One of the hijackers, already alerted by Saturday's Daily Mail report, which is believed to have been broadcast by Lebanese radio, contacted the control tower at Larnaca airport and warned that "as

far as Mrs Thatcher is concerned, advise her not to be too much nosy in this case . . . We will send back her troops [as] corpses if they came and we will visit her in London if she wants that".

Other terrorists in Lebanon picked up the reports and later that day issued a statement saying that if the jet were stormed, hostages held in Beirut, who include Terry Waite, the Archbishop of Canterbury's special envoy, would be executed.

The British government had previously promised both the Kuwaiti and the Cypriot governments that no SAS personnel would be deployed and that no unilateral action was contemplated. Immediately after the Telegraph report appeared, both governments privately approached the Foreign Office and accused them of lying.

Officials in the Ministry of Defence and members of the SAS were furious; the press



speculation served only to endanger the lives of British hostages in Lebanon and the hostages on the aircraft.

"There is an automatic knee-jerk reaction on these occasions to suggest the SAS is going into action," said a Ministry of Defence source. "If we had actually been planning an operation, such reporting would have warned the terrorists and undoubtedly have resulted in a lot of innocent people being killed. Clearly when fiction is published on occasions like this, it is both dangerous and damaging."

Officially, the ministry has a firm policy — it refuses to confirm or deny the involvement of the SAS in any operation. This policy has allowed wild speculation to flourish. Last Monday's Daily Express, spurred no doubt by the story in the Sunday Telegraph, perpetuated the myth with its own heavy-handed embroidery.

"A team of SAS men was believed to be in Cyprus last night, ready to storm the hijack jet . . . The team flew out to Akrotiri on Friday . . . 50 strong . . . training on a British Airways jumbo jet . . . ready to move in minutes . . . a sniper squad in position . . . two helicopters on constant standby . . . the assault troops were already in combat gear — black flame-proof fatigues, flash hoods, flak jackets, 'no-noise' rubber boots and respirators."

This report, like many others last weekend, was fiction.

James Adams

British base for elite US hijack squadron

AN elite US helicopter squadron trained in hijack rescues is to be based in Britain. The squadron will be equipped with six state-of-the-art Sikorsky helicopters designed for anti-terrorist missions.

It will be the first time such technically advanced equipment has been based in Europe, allowing Delta Force, America's equivalent of the SAS, to react faster to terrorism in Europe or the Middle East.

In the past, both men and equipment had to arrive from bases in the United States. In particular, the helicopters had to be dismantled, shipped on transport aircraft and then re-assembled.

A new squadron of 125 men, to be known as the 21st Special Operations Squadron, will be formed at RAF Woodbridge in Suffolk this summer. In the past, other squadrons have been based at Hurlbert Field in Florida.

The men will be equipped with MH53J Pave Low enhanced helicopters, some of which are still being modified.

by James Adams
Defence Correspondent

The helicopters have special equipment that allows them to fly at very low level in all conditions. They have a range of 300 miles but can be refuelled in mid air so could reach the Middle East in a single flight.

On board, they have terrain-following radar and a computer-projected map display that appears in front of the pilot; forward-looking infra-red radar that can see in the dark; and, instead of weapons, a complicated electronic jamming system designed to fool enemy aircraft and ground forces.

The Pave Low uses a unique system to lift people trapped on the ground or at sea where landing is impossible. Up to three people can be withdrawn at once using a rope attached to a special harness. For extraction in heavily wooded areas, a device called the forest penetrator, a weighted torpedo-shaped hook with three folding seats, is used.

The helicopters were designed specifically for rescue missions after the disaster that befell Delta Force at Desert One during the attempt to rescue the American hostages held in the US embassy in Tehran in 1980. Early versions of the same helicopter were used for that mission but they had none of the right equipment on board and had to stop for refuelling in the Iranian desert. A number of the helicopters broke down and, after another crashed during refuelling, the mission was abandoned.


Officially, the helicopters will be attached to Nato. However, they are replacing other helicopters that have a simple search-and-rescue role and there is no doubt that when the need arises they will be brought in to help America's special forces.

The new helicopters are expected to train both with British special forces and US Navy Special Warfare Unit 2, which is permanently based at RAF Machrihanish on the Mull of Kintyre.

'It would have been a certain recipe for carnage. This sort of

WHY THEY DIDN'T

OBSERVER SUNDAY 17 APRIL 1988



STORM PLANE

rescue has never been tried before on a jumbo jet.'

AS THE hostages aboard Kuwait Airways flight KU 422 begin their thirteenth day in captivity today, an investigation by *The Observer* can reveal that there never was a plan to storm the plane in Cyprus.

While the bodies tumbled to the tarmac at Larnaca airport, during the plane's 90-hour stay, the Greek Cypriots asked their friends what they should do: to storm or not to storm? They were told they had better keep talking. A rescue operation was far too risky for the hostages.

'It would have been a certain recipe for carnage,' said George Iacovou, the Cypriot Foreign Minister, in an interview with *The Observer*. 'We were advised that this sort of rescue operation had never been done before on a jumbo jet. The case was very strongly made for us that it could not be done without high risk to the passengers. We had contact with two friendly governments in Europe on this matter.'


He declined to identify these governments, but senior officials in both the Cyprus foreign ministry and in the police, who command a unit which has been extensively trained to deal with aircraft hijackers, have confirmed that the West Germans and the British were asked if a rescue was feasible. An assessment was made on the spot and the Cypriots insist that both said no.

Stun grenades

An Israeli expert who was also at Larnaca last week, was apparently of the same opinion.

'It doesn't surprise me. A 747 is one of the most difficult aircraft in the world to storm,' said Paul Wilson, clerk to the London-based Guild of Air Pilots, who was an RAF pilot for 20 years.

'All entrances are well up off the ground. You'd have to creep up on it in the dead of night, get up to those exits and then blow the doors off with small charges of plastic explosive.' It would then have been necessary to enter at least six of the eight exits simultaneously including the cockpit level exit for the upper deck



George Iacovou:
European advice.

that Kuwait Airways reserves for its first class passengers on the Bangkok-Kuwait route.

Most of the experts then seem to favour the use of the stun grenades employed by the two SAS men with the German GSG 9 commandos who rescued 86 hostages from a hijacked Lufthansa 737 at Mogadishu in October 1977. But this was the only entirely successful storming of a hijacked aircraft. At Entebbe, Uganda, the Israelis rescued the passengers from an airport building.

One of the main reasons for victory at Mogadishu was the relatively small size of the 737. This not only meant that the effect of the stun grenades was particularly devastating but also that the four terrorists were bunched up. Only one survived.

Explosion heard

A 747, even one like the hijacked aircraft with at least a third of its fuselage taken up by freight, is much wider and bigger. The terrorists, whose number has been estimated at between seven and 10, are unlikely to be bunched and the effect of stun grenades would be much reduced.

The Cypriot Special Police Commando does have a hijack unit, trained by GS9 in West Germany using Cyprus Airways jets. But they have been unable to practise on jumbos because the island's airline does not fly them.

None the less, it seems that the police commandos surrounding the hijacked 747 at Larnaca were equipped for a rescue attempt had the terrorists speeded up their 'slow massacre' of its passengers. Four hours before the jet soared away to Algiers, and two hours before the 12 hostages were released, a small explosion was heard in the vicinity of a hanger where about 30 commandos of the Mobile Immediate Action Unit, the anti-terrorist squad, were gathered.

Akis Fantis, the government spokesman, explained it away as a firework. It is the Greek Cypriot habit to celebrate the Orthodox Easter, which has just passed, by setting off bangers. But two independent sources in Cyprus admitted that the cause was the accidental detonation of a small charge of plastic explosive—exactly the sort of thing that might have been used for blowing open a door.

Despite their evident experience and fine planning, the hijackers undoubtedly feared that the aircraft would be stormed. Hence their shrill attack on Margaret Thatcher, who was invited to put herself into an old folk's home, following Press speculation last Sunday that the SAS were about to go in.

The hostages claim to have wired explosives to the doors

and some hostages have confirmed seeing reddish coloured sticks joined by electrical flex on the exits. Almost all the outsiders who have dealt with them have been impressed by the 'professionalism' of the hijackers. Takis Telenis, Senior Air Traffic Control officer at Larnaca, has described them as 'a different breed' and familiar with every technical detail of the aircraft.

Arafat attack on hijackers, page 23

'They never panicked,' said the controller, a 54-year-old veteran of four previous hijacks. 'When the ventilator generator blew back poisonous gas into the plane I explained to them that it was a technical fault combined with a change in wind direction. That is exactly what it was and when I told them the technical details they accepted it.'

This sort of coolness has been reflected in their negotiating technique. Dr John Potter, a former Ministry of Defence psychologist specialising in hostages, and now a lec-

turer at Plymouth Polytechnic, thinks they have been especially clever in their use of deadlines.

'They would threaten to execute a hostage in half an hour, then extend the deadline, then suddenly commit the act. That was very disorientating for the negotiator.' The second killing last Monday ended any hope of a peaceful solution to the hijack in Cyprus.

It came as a bolt from the blue at probably the most optimistic stage of the hostages' ordeal. The night before the hijackers themselves had offered to release 34 of their passengers in return for enough fuel to take them to Beirut despite the warning shots the Syrians had fired at the aircraft when it attempted to land there the week before. This would have left 17 hostages on board—exactly the same number as the Shia prisoners held in Kuwait.

Both the Cypriots and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, who were then the main mediators, were convinced that this was the breakthrough. The terrorists' only

other demand was that PLO leader Yasser Arafat should obtain a reprieve for the three of the 17 who have been sentenced to death.

At 2.30 a.m. on Monday, the hijackers were heard wishing the control tower a very good night's sleep. But when daylight came the hijackers performed an inexplicable about-turn saying they would not be seen as weak and hesitating.

Within hours the second murdered passenger, a 20-year-old Kuwaiti fireman, hit the tarmac. This led to Arafat's outburst against the

hijackers at a Press conference in Kuwait and accusations that this mercurial change of mind had come about because they were in direct contact with hidden masters in either Iran or the Lebanon. (The hijackers themselves offered the unconvincing explanation that they had been advised by a Kuwaiti lawyer among the hostages that it was impossible to reprieve the sentences.)

In Nicosia, Iacovou, the Foreign Minister, told *The Observer*: 'The hijackers said, "We'll keep 17. We'll release 34 and then we will have fuel." They volunteered it. That was the optimistic stage. The following day they said we also want the full release of the three prisoners in Kuwait — the three under sentence of death — or they would not

deal. They were not interested in only commuting the sentences.'

The Cypriot authorities think that the terrorists were either receiving coded messages in the normal programmes put out by Cypriot radio — the way the BBC sent messages to the French resistance — or over the VHF radio always installed in aircraft flying Far Eastern routes. They dismiss the notion that the terrorists were at any time having two-way radio conversations with their backers.

Cyprus, home of 9th Signals Regiment at the British base at Dhekelia, is the eavesdropping centre of the Middle East and one of the most important

Continued on page 23

WHY THEY DIDN'T STORM THE PLANE

Continued from page 21

gatherers for GCHQ at Cheltenham. Any such transmissions would have been monitored; and code-breaking is GCHQ's speciality.

'I asked our experts to monitor all transmissions,' said Iacovou, 'and we couldn't find any transmissions from the plane. But it appears very strongly that they had outside guidance.' Kuwait, which supports Iraq in the Gulf War, is now making no bones about the fact that it thinks Iran is behind the hijack despite bitter denials from Tehran. Released hostages have said that at least two terrorists boarded the plane in Mashhad, Iran. Some have insisted that at first the hijackers had only pistols, but after Mashhad they had sub-machine guns. An eyewitness in Mashhad thinks the extra arms and men went on as part of a medical team headed by Dr Nader Ghassemi, the same man

who examined the passengers on the hijacked Kuwaiti jet brought to Tehran in 1984.

Since the kidnapping of the Archbishop of Canterbury's special envoy, Terry Waite, the SAS appears to have maintained a permanent presence in Cyprus. They are there in case what intelligence circles call 'a window of opportunity' presents itself to rescue Western hostages, particularly the three Britons.

The hijackers are almost certainly a mixture of Lebanese and southern Iraqi Shias. Last week their friends in Lebanon threatened to murder their hostages if any action was taken against the terrorists. Whether, despite the difficulties a 747 presents, the Cypriots would have been advised not to storm had the Lebanese hostages not existed or the 22 Britons still been on board remains a moot point.

THE IRICKEN

● In the history of international terrorism, the hijacking of KU422 must rank as the most sophisticated and sinister operation yet — thoroughly planned, precisely executed and systematically sustained. But by whom? Insight reporters in Algiers, Cyprus and Kuwait have investigated the events of the past 12 days, gaining exclusive access to the secret negotiations with the terrorists. The evidence that has emerged is overwhelming — once again the finger of guilt points unequivocally at Iran

INSIGHT

Iran: guilt guns and grenades

THE PATIENTS recovering in the Archbishop Makarios hospital in Larnaca, Cyprus, had no doubts. Mohamed Ashkanani was convinced, so too were Sherif Badrani and Ali Ramadan. The hijacking of Kuwait Airways flight KU422 which has dominated world news for nearly two weeks is no ordinary terrorist act.

In the 12 days since the routine flight from Bangkok to Kuwait was savagely interrupted, the world has witnessed the now predictable contradictions — the brutality of the hijackers in cold-bloodedly shooting two hostages and the apparent compassion in releasing some hostages, women, children and those taken ill during the ordeal.

But the world has never witnessed a terrorist operation that has been so sophisticated in its preparation and execution, an operation that has added psychology to its armoury of guns and grenades.

As the terror-stricken jumbo jet bakes on the tarmac in Algiers with 31

hostages still on board, one inescapable conclusion has been drawn by negotiators, politicians, security experts and the released hostages themselves: whoever is pulling the strings, they are not on board the aircraft.

THE FIRST clues to the identity of the terrorists' controllers came nine days ago when flight 422 left Mashhad in Iran. It had been hijacked and diverted there as it approached the Gulf. When it took off again the terrified passengers noticed sinister and puzzling changes.

Ashkanani, a 42-year-old airport communications worker sat with his hands tightly bound. "The numbers of the hijackers definitely increased after we arrived in Iran. On the first day of the hijack they had only small silver pistols and grenades. When we left for Cyprus, they had three or four machineguns, a larger pistol and different grenades."

Badrani, 33, an Egyptian travel officer with the Kuwaiti airline, was

severely beaten when, stretching his cramped legs into the aisle, he tripped one of the hijackers. He too noted the changes.

"At Mashhad, a box of grenades appeared. I could see it in the aisle beside one of the galleys."

Ramadan, an Egyptian engineer, watched the hijackers' every move.

"When we landed in Iran, the attitude of the gunmen changed. They had been nervous before but at Mashhad they were confi-

dent, almost cocky. There had been five gunmen before Iran, each had a small handgun and two held grenades.

"After Iran, there were seven hijackers. I counted at least 10 grenades, three machineguns and saw a coil of heavy, thick rope and six bars of explosives."

Small weapons have often been smuggled on to aircraft hidden in hand baggage. But the formidable array of guns and explosives that appeared on

board in Iran would be difficult to hide — and a box of grenades impossible.

Ashkanani, Badrani and Ramadan needed no more convincing that Mashhad was more than a destination — it was a rendezvous.

IRANIAN leaders expressed outrage. Javad Larijani, the deputy foreign minister, was incensed at the terrorists' touchdown.

"Hijacking innocent people is wrong. These people should be released immediately." Iran, he said, was prepared to storm the plane.

superior, Ali Akbar Vafati, the foreign minister, wrote to his Kuwaiti counterpart, offering his regret and sympathies. "Iran is against any act that jeopardises the lives of innocent people," he said.

Akhoond Zadeh Basti, the Iranian chargé d'affaires in London, vowed the hijackers would face trial and imprisonment if caught.

But just as the hostages on board were growing suspicious, so was the outside world.

Kuwaiti negotiators who arrived at Mashhad were at first confined to their hotel. When, eventually, they visited the airport, the plane had been moved.

The sudden release of all Western hostages negotiated by Iranian officials served only to fuel their suspicions. Soon the Kuwaiti suspicions were being given vocal support.

The emirate's newspapers reported that "the gunmen have a set role which the regime of murderers in Tehran asked them to play".

In Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan — as well as, predictably, Iraq — officials and the media also accused Iran of complicity.

Yasser Arafat, whose Palestine Liberation Organisation attempted to act as an intermediary, was equally unequivocal when asked about the identities of the hijackers. "Some of them are Lebanese, some of them belong to the Iranian government. According to my best information, they [the Iranians] are behind the whole operation."

WHEN KU422 finally took off from Mashhad, a week last Friday, the Iranians insisted they had been given little choice but to let it leave, for the terrorists had threatened to kill all on board and blow up the aircraft.

But it is now apparent that it was only when it was in the air and en route to Cyprus (Syrian troops had blockaded Beirut airport, which had been a favoured destination) that the hijack-

ers began to assemble the explosive devices that had appeared at Mashhad.

Then, it was only when the aircraft had taxied to a halt at Larnaca airport that they armed their bombs.

"In Cyprus, the rope was used to secure the four exit doors and then two hijackers taped explosives to each exit with white and red wires leading to batteries," said Ramadan.

At Larnaca, a war of nerves between the hijackers and the negotiators began. It was to last 100 hours (see panel above) but here too, negotiators became convinced that the hijackers were not acting independently.

The hijackers were highly trained and included one man whose knowledge of the plane was such that he could only be an experienced airline employee operating on outside orders.

According to the Cypriots, that fact became most obvious last Monday morning. The negotiators, after a series of meetings which started after the killing of the first hostage at 11.32am on Saturday, were already aware that the hijackers were closely following news broadcasts.

During negotiations it became clear they were monitoring a number of radio stations, as they referred to particular broadcasts.


Monday began with the negotiators optimistic that a deal involving the release of 34 more passengers and a promise from Arafat to "do what he could" about the hijackers' demand that 17 terrorists being held by Kuwait, could be struck.

But abruptly, the deal fell through, and at 3.08pm a body was thrown out.


Some Cypriot officials held the tenor of news

broadcasts to blame for suggesting the hijackers were dispirited, and repeated British newspaper claims that the SAS had been called in — thus strengthening the hijackers' resolve (see page opposite).

But the negotiators dealing face-to-face with the hijackers were convinced the hijackers had been instructed to prolong matters. Arafat voiced their



Rafsanjani: opposed



Hashemi: executed

concern. "The whole mood changed because of outside orders. They have received instructions from their leaders, maybe by radio."

Investigators have been unable to establish how that was done — perhaps on a difficult-to-detect high-frequency radio link with either Beirut or Iran, or even with someone outside the aircraft at Larnaca.

Either way, the realisation that someone outside was pulling the strings meant any negotiated deal with the gunmen could be countermanded. That, and

the killings, increased the Cypriots' desire to be rid of the crisis.

The prospect of a bloody massacre loomed large and then the Palestine Liberation Organisation offered a solution.

AMONG Arab nations only Algeria enjoys good relations with all sides in the labyrinthine politics of the Middle East. It's revolutionary credentials — liberation from France in 1962 — appeal to Iran and radical Shi'ite groups in Lebanon. But its relations with conservative Arab Gulf states are also good.

Algeria's reputation as a successful mediator with terrorists stems from its help in securing the release in 1981 of the American hostages at the US embassy in Tehran. The Algerians have also negotiated the release of hostages in Lebanon and mediated between the Iranians and Iraqis in the Gulf war.

When Algeria agreed to accept KU422 there was immediate optimism. Everyone concluded that the ordeal would soon be over.

By last night, much of that optimism had evaporated. KU422 was still on the tarmac at Algiers with 31 hostages held at gunpoint. The stalemate was interrupted only by the terrorists' complaints about conditions on the aircraft. There was brief excitement yesterday afternoon when three journalists were asked to approach the plane, but the hi-jackers simply repeated their demands.

The only concession Algeria had managed to wring from the hijackers was the release of one elderly diabetic. And there were indications last night that

continued on next page

they had begun negotiating directly with officials in Iran.

Meanwhile, Western intelligence sources believe they have identified at least one hi-jacker; he is Hasan Ezzidine, a Lebanese national under indictment for murder and air piracy in the United States for his role in the TWA hi-jack in 1985 (see Page C1).

In Kuwait, there were reports, possibly passed on by Algeria, that a split had occurred in the terrorist ranks. The hijackers who joined the aircraft in Iran had grown increasingly hardline. "They are awaiting instructions from outside and particularly Iran to decide what to do over the stalemate."

That the instructions they awaited were Iranian seems in no doubt. But who,

precisely, in Iran is pulling the strings?

AT FIRST, Iranian complicity seemed unlikely. It is trying, through negotiating the release of French hostages in Beirut, to gain some respectability in the eyes of the world. Western observers doubted that Iran would be foolish enough to orchestrate a hijacking that would destroy its ambitions.

Also counting against Iranian complicity was the timing of the hijack — parliamentary elections were about to take place in Iran. Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, in particular, is said to have wanted no distractions.

At present, the parliament is Rafsanjani's power base, but to retain his position as a key player on the

Iranian political stage, he had to give the election his undivided attention, for he faced considerable opposition.

Within Iran he is widely regarded as a pragmatist, willing, when it suits him, to deal with the West. He is also opposed to the policy of spreading the Islamic revolution beyond Iran.

That stance, in a country where revolutionary fervour confers its own political power, has confronted Rafsanjani with numerous enemies among the ranks of other, much more fanatical, Shi'ite fundamentalists.

Last week, the enmity that Rafsanjani has incurred inside Iran appeared to be the most likely explanation for the evidence of Iranian involvement in the hijack. Among his foes, Rafsanjani must number friends of Mehdi Hashemi, executed last year

after falling foul of the speaker.

Hashemi had a big budget to maintain links with "liberation movements" in many countries, including Lebanon. Hashemi had leaked a story about Rafsanjani to the Lebanese magazine, *Ash-Shiraa*, revealing that the speaker had been arranging arms-for-hostages deals with the Americans.

In the West, the leak sparked off the Iran-contra affair, but Rafsanjani had wisely obtained Khomeini's permission before undertaking the politically hazardous negotiations.

Hashemi was arrested, tried and executed. The job of running the Lebanon operation was then hived off to several ministries, including that of foreign affairs, and Rafsanjani's own office.

The likelihood exists that

Iranian involvement in the hijack occurred through links between powerful, extremist factions in Iran opposed to Rafsanjani, who used their links with fundamentalist terrorist groups. One key factor is thought to have been fears among Lebanese fundamentalists that the French hostage deal would go ahead without the winning of any concessions over the 17 Shi'ite prisoners in Kuwait whose release is demanded by the hijackers.

That demand remains the obstacle to a negotiated end to the hijack. Kuwait remains adamant — it will not budge on the issue. Middle East experts agree that it requires only the condemnation of the Ayatollah Khomeini to bring the hijack to a rapid and peaceful conclusion. But last night, there was only silence in Tehran.

An enemy within: why Kuwait stands firm

SINCE the hijacking began nearly two weeks ago, Kuwait has earned the respect of the West in its steadfast refusal to bow to the demands for the release of 17 Islamic fundamentalists. They are serving prison sentences for terrorist acts inside the oil-rich emirate, which shares a border with Iraq and sits across the Gulf from Iran. Their release would bring an immediate end to the stalemate in Algiers.

But while France, West Germany and even America have tried to deal with the terrorists, Kuwait, like Britain, stands firm. The reason is domestic.

On board KU422, the matter of life or death has been decided by religion. The two Kuwaitis shot and killed on board the aircraft and dumped on the tarmac at Larnaca were Sunni Muslims, followers of the main branch of Islam, as is Kuwait's ruling Al-Sabah family. Those so far released are all Shi'ites, like the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, the 17 radical Islamic fundamentalists imprisoned in Kuwait and the hijackers themselves.

Since Khomeini rose to power in 1979, Kuwaiti Shi'ites have shown a growing identification with their religion and this has led to the rise of an Iran-backed underground in Kuwait. That has been accompanied by Sunni fears of a potential fifth column for Khomeini's radical Islamic fundamentalism. Kuwait's rulers fear that concessions to the hijackers will encourage greater unrest within.

Two events last week underline the division within Kuwait. When the four released Shi'ite hostages returned last Wednesday night, they were met by a small, emotional crowd that was almost outnumbered by the attendant media.

In contrast the next day, thousands of Kuwaitis crowded into the Sulai-bikhat cemetery, the Sunni cemetery across the road from the gaudier and separate Shi'ite cemetery, to attend the burials of the two murdered Kuwaitis.

The religious split existed in Kuwait long before this hijacking. Kuwait-backed Iraq from the beginning of the Gulf war, now in its eighth year, out of

fear that it would be overwhelmed by Iran's radical Islam.

One third of Kuwaitis are Shi'ite in a nation already worried that only 40% of its 1.6m population is Kuwaiti. The non-Kuwaiti majority are all expatriate workers, including 60,000 Iranians. "These are people who speak in Arabic but whose hearts beat in Persian," said one Sunni.

Among the Shi'ites there is evidence of worry and anxiety too. At a Shi'ite reception, one businessman said of the freedom and return of the four Shi'ite hostages: "This is not good for us. It points the finger at us." Some of the wealthiest families in the oil industry, the military and the police are Shi'ites. They are worried by government efforts over the last year to move them from sensitive positions. "There is increasing hostility towards us and suspicion of our loyalty," said one.

Concern about the Shi'ite population crystallised last year when, for the first time, terrorism within the country was perpetrated by Kuwaiti citizens, fulfilling all the fears of a fifth column.

Sixteen Kuwaitis, all Shi'ites, were arrested in January for bombing oil fields, docks, and setting off a bomb in Kuwait City. Until then, all terrorism had been mounted by foreigners.

Observers now see the possibility of a Sunni backlash, particularly among Sunni fundamentalists who have openly advocated attacks on Shi'ite mosques. "If the hijacking goes wrong, you could have 20 funerals," said one worried Western diplomat. "All it takes is a few hotheads for one of those funeral processions to head for a mosque with torches."

In the face of such unrest, the Kuwaiti government remains firm in its refusal to release the 17 prisoners. And last week saw a reminder that no matter how the hijacking ends, the internal threat looms large. A small bomb exploded in the city centre last Monday night in the parking lot of a police station. Security forces believe it was set by fundamentalist Shi'ites.

Marie Colvin

~~Mr P. Nov~~
R 866/5/1A

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: WEDNESDAY 20 APRIL 1988

KUWAITI AIRLINE HIJACK

In response to a question about the release of the hostages in Algiers from the hijacked Kuwaiti airliner, Spokesman drew attention to the statement made by the Secretary of State this morning:

We are very glad, in human terms, that the hostages ordeal is over; but obviously there is a great deal more to it than that and we shall want to know the details.

And to a statement issued by the Prime Minister's office this morning:

We are relieved that the hostages are safe after their ordeal. But we are not yet in possession of all the facts. We have to remember that a particularly vicious act of terrorism has been committed, including the cold-blooded murder of two innocent people. Those responsible ought without question to be brought to justice. If terrorists are allowed to escape unpunished, it will only lead to more hijacking and more hostage-taking.

In response to further questions, Spokesman made it clear that we were in close touch with our posts in the region; and would be following up with our partners and allies.

DEPORTATION OF PALESTINIANS

In response to a question, Spokesman drew attention to the statement made on 12 April in which the British Government deplored Israel's deportation of 8 Palestinians. We did so again now. The international community's rejection of this illegal policy was also made clear in the United Nations Security Council and in the Twelve's statement of 15 April.

THE SCOTSMAN Tuesday, April 12, 1988

Gaddafi pledges support for IRA

THE LIBYAN leader, Col Muammar al-Gaddafi, pledged his support for the IRA in a television interview screened last night.

The colonel would not be drawn when asked if he defended the Irish Republican Army's use of the bomb and the bullet on innocent victims.


Speaking from a tent in the grounds of his home in Tripoli, Col Gaddafi told *Channel 4 News*: "We believe the cause of Ireland is a just cause and we support this just cause because we believe Ireland is Ireland and Britain is Britain."

He said the British presence in the North of Ireland was a form of colonisation and added: "This we will fight, to get rid of colonisation. It is a just fight and we will support it."

Asked directly about the IRA's use of terror tactics, the colonel said: "We are not responsible about these means. It is their responsibility."

● A number of people were arrested in Northern Ireland and England yesterday as the Royal Ulster Constabulary moved to smash paramilitary racketeering.

Police in the province picked people in Cookstown, Co



Col Gaddafi: "The cause of Ireland is just"

Tyrone, and others were detained in South-east England and flown back to Belfast.

The RUC said those arrested were being questioned about terrorist-related offences associated with Republican racketeering.

● A major arms cache was found in Londonderry last night, only hours after security forces discovered a Soviet-made RPG-7 rocket launcher in a garden shed in the city's Creggan area. Police said the latest find, in the same area, included four drogue bombs, two pistols, two revolvers, timing devices and ammunition — and two Heckler & Koch rifles.

Three people, all thought to be from the same family, were in police custody.



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Reference:

B66/5/1A

Yellow

15 April 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Kuwait: Aircraft Hijack

Further backgrounding/commentary.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Iranian minister linked to hijack

Julie Flint in Beirut

SHITE officials, in close contact with Iran, believe the hijackers of the Kuwaiti jumbo are a specially trained team of Islamic extremists with links to Iran's Interior Minister, Mr Ali Akbar Mohtashemi.

The hijackers are reportedly drawn from two main groups — Lebanese radicals close to the Islamic Jihad kidnappers and Iraqi expatriates with connections to, although not necessarily ordered into action by, the opposition Da'awa party.

A similar team is said to have been responsible for the hijacking of a Kuwait Airways airbus in December, 1984. The demand then, as now, was for the release of 17 convicted terrorists held in Kuwait. The 1984 hijack ended after six days when Iranian commandos stormed the plane. There is no evidence that the hijackers were ever brought to justice.

Lebanese observers believe that the KU422 hijackers are showing unusual determination in refusing to surrender without winning some concession from Kuwait is a sign that the ordeal of the hostages may be far from over.

One source, who knows him well, says that Imad Mugniyeh has masterminded this latest hijacking. Mugniyeh is an early member of Lebanon's Hezbollah party, and his interest in the Kuwait 17 stems from the fact that one of them, Mustafa Badreddine, is related to his wife. Badreddine received the death sentence after being found guilty in connection with the bombings of the French and American embassies in Kuwait in December, 1983. An explosives expert, he is on record as boasting that he could make a bomb with kitchen salt.

Mugniyeh, who has himself been implicated in the bomb attacks on French and American targets in Lebanon, divides his time between Lebanon and Iran, where he is reportedly studying to be a clergyman in

the holy city of Qom. In Beirut, when the Archbishop of Canterbury's special envoy, Mr Terry Waite, disappeared in January, 1987, he was linked to the kidnapping by the Druze Progressive Socialist Party that was in charge of the envoy's security.

During a lengthy meeting with Druze officials, Mugniyeh refused to be drawn on Mr Waite's disappearance, instead insisting: "I have a relative gaoled in Kuwait."

Gulf papers said that Mugniyeh boarded the jumbo on its first stop at Mashhad. Lebanese sources say that extra men and weapons did go aboard the plane at Mashhad — the security at Bangkok airport imposed limits on the hijackers' — but are unable to confirm that Mugniyeh himself did.

The Iranian Government may have been embarrassed by the hijacking — and by the plane's diversion to an Iranian airport just as Tehran was stressing the chemical weapons atrocities at Halebja. The Majlis Speaker, Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani, called the hijack a plot, and the deputy foreign minister, Mr Javid Larijani, said the plane would be shot down if it attempted to return to Iran.

Lebanese observers do not find these reactions inconsistent with an Iranian involvement — an involvement which would seem to be confirmed by the false Bahraini passports held by several of the hijackers. Similar passports have been found on Iranian agents arrested for subversion in Dubai, Kuwait and Bahrain.

Corroborating reports in the Gulf press that trace the hijacking back to Mr Mohtashemi, Lebanese sources say Mugniyeh's own ties are to the Interior Minister, who, until little more than a year ago, served as Iran's ambassador to Syria. In this capacity, he was reportedly in close contact with the Islamic Jihad and, according to one source, was a key figure in trying to arrange the arms-for-hostages deal. It was at this time, sources say, that his relationship with Mugniyeh began.

Religious fundamentalism in the Middle East — especially Shia fundamentalism — is so hostile to the policies and the very existence of the Arab dictatorships, that the governments of the region have little or no idea how to communicate with the minds of the "Islamic Jihad" hijackers on the Kuwait Airways Boeing.

For pragmatic reasons, Arab leaders have always refused to have open contact with religious radicals, fearing that the contagion of the Iranian revolution might touch them if they did. And now those same Arab governments — which have never shrunk from imposing the death penalty to keep order within their domains — are faced with men who have donned shrouds because they actually want to die.

It is this absolute and apparently unbridgeable gulf between the hijackers and the Arab states who are trying to talk to them — between the aims of a martyr who seeks paradise and the corrupt states on earth, as the gunmen would see it — which chiefly accounts for the deadlock in Algiers and for the betrayal by the hijackers of the original deal for the passengers' release worked out by Mr Yassir Arafat, the Palestine Liberation Orga-

Robert Fisk explains why Algeria cannot get through to the hijackers

A fundamental deafness

nization chairman. Perhaps the only men who truly understand the hijackers are their colleagues of "Islamic Jihad" back in West Beirut; and until the plane left Larnaca, they could in fact listen in Lebanon to the drama being played out in Cyprus over the Boeing's flight-deck radio. But now the aircraft has flown so far to the West that those in Beirut can no longer hear their words.

Mr Arafat has suggested that the hijackers were communicating with their supporters outside the aircraft and it may be that some of the written statements they read out over the plane's radio contained pre-arranged code-words.

In Southern Lebanon those chosen to immolate themselves in suicide car bombings against the Israeli occupation army are believed to have received their instructions in just such a way; the code-words, a phrase or form of devotion — would be contained in a sermon at Friday

prayers in the small *Husseiniyas*, the village mosques. Indeed, the village mosque as a centre of social and fundamentalist thought — both reverent and intransigent — has much to do with the gunmen on the jet at Algiers airport.

In the past, the Arab regimes have quite cynically manipulated the more extreme of their religious opponents, encouraging them when their hostility to communism was useful to the administration, but ruthlessly slaughtering them when their demand for an Islamic state ruled by *sharia* law acquired too much popularity or took the form of armed insurrection.

First President Nasser and then President Sadat used the Egyptian Muslim Brothers as a bulwark against the far left and then cut them down when they became too influential. When Sadat was himself assassinated by Khaled Ahmed Shawki Islambouli — a man who would

have instinctively admired the minds of the hijackers in the Kuwaiti jet — young Muslim fundamentalists in Assiut were tortured with razor blades by the Egyptian police.

In Lebanon President Assad of Syria manipulated the pro-Iranian Shia forces into positions of enormous influence in the struggle against the Americans and against the Israelis but is now in the process of castrating their ability to operate independently by promoting the more moderate Shia group under Mr Nabih Berri. When Sunni extremists rose up in the Syrian city of Hama in 1982, however, Assad sent his brother's special forces troops to suppress the rebellion with ferocity. Many of the officers who were responsible for the Hama slaughter — and for later acts of great brutality in the Lebanese city of Tripoli when Sunni fundamentalists took control there — are now based in West Beirut.

If radical internal opposition had been more tolerated in the early years of post-colonial rule in the Arab world, movements like "Islamic Jihad" would perhaps not have been born or might have been accommodated in less volatile form than they later assumed. But Muslim fundamentalism — the pan-Islamic ideal that places divine guidance above earthly governments — was forced to take root in secret. Middle East leaders either denied its existence, claimed it was a form of communism — which is what the Shah did — or hanged its principal figures as traitors.

The idea of a truly Muslim alternative to the bureaucratic and often genuinely corrupt regimes in the region has thus always attracted the most deprived and neglected communities in the Arab world, which are usually minority communities.

It is for this reason that Shia extremists so loathe Kuwait —

whose Sunni ruler is now among the most vulnerable of the Gulf potentates — and are so willing to follow the spiritual and physical example of Ali, even when this means the reneging of agreements and the murder of innocents. Freedom for the 17 prisoners in Kuwait is not so much a physical demand — though it has taken that form in the drama of Flight KU422 — but a means to an end; the destabilization and ultimate destruction of the "corrupt" Kuwaiti regime.

Arab leaders probably understand this much. Certainly "Islamic Jihad" succeeds in persuading its Arab enemies to speak like its Israeli enemies. The Kuwaiti officials who were on Wednesday demanding an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth might have been the allies of Mr Yitzhak Shamir.

Those who do not understand — particularly Westerners — are swallowed up in the darkness. Mr Terry Waite, the Archbishop of Canterbury's envoy, suffered just such a fate when he attempted to talk to the very same organization which has now hijacked the Kuwaiti jet. The sound of the deaf talking to each other is not a new one in the Middle East.

Hijackers free

From Brian Cathcart and
Tim McGirk in Algiers,
and Michael Sheridan in Kuwait

THE HIJACKERS of the Kuwait Airways 747 last night freed one of their 32 remaining hostages at Algiers airport.

A man, named as Djema Abdullah el Chati, a Kuwaiti citizen aged about 50, was escorted from the plane by an Algerian doctor after four hours of intense activity at the airport. He looked frail and weak as he entered the airport VIP building, and was supported under both arms. He did not speak to the Press.

Members of the Kuwaiti delegation, which has been in Algiers since the plane arrived on Wednesday, said they had earlier expected two or more hostages to be freed. They did not give a reason why Mr el Chati had been singled out for release.

At dusk the chief Algerian negotiator, the Interior Minister, El Hadi Khediri,

had climbed aboard the aircraft, alone, to meet the hijackers. The Algerian authorities at that time were extremely optimistic about the outcome of his talks, and two Algerian police passenger vans had been pulled up in expectation close to the jet's stairs.

In Kuwait, two freed hostages from the airliner, speaking separately in detailed and extensive interviews, said yesterday that more hijackers, automatic weapons and explosives had been brought on board the plane at Mashad in north-east Iran, from where the hijacked plane flew to Cyprus.

The two were Mohammed Ramadan Ali, 42, a construction engineer who has dual American and Egyptian nationality, and Sherif Mandouh Badrawi, 33, an Egyptian employee of Kuwait Airways in Cairo.

Both men are devout Sunni Muslims, and both said they thought their obvious religious convictions helped to save them. Their wrists were still scarred red

Iranian commander by released via

from wearing plastic handcuffs for days on end. Mr Badrawi had a burn on his right forearm where a hijacker had stubbed out a cigarette.

Mr Badrawi spoke to *The Independent* at a suburban house in Kuwait City. Mr Ali was interviewed by *The Independent* and Associated Press in the south of the city. Their accounts sometimes contradicted each other in detail, but had much in common.

"After we had been on the ground in Mashad they produced plastic handcuffs and put them on us, one by one. I didn't see any markings on the handcuffs," said Mr Ali, speaking in English.

"The whole thing started with six people. Then two more guys showed up when we landed in Mashad. They didn't

hostage in Algiers

police confirmed victims in Kuwait

act as guards, but they seemed to be making decisions.

"The hijackers were young guys between 20 and 25, except the two in charge, who seemed between 30 and 40. We could sometimes see their faces because they raised their masks due to the heat.

"They started out with small handguns. Then, after we took off from Mashad, I saw three submachine guns, like [Israeli-made] Uzis, and more hand grenades — we started with one or two, but I saw about 10 pieces, and ropes, thick ropes, and explosives."

All, he said, appeared after the stop at Mashad. Questioned repeatedly, he said he was sure of this.

Mr Badrawi, speaking in Arabic, said:

"We were handcuffed shortly after landing at Mashad. They had a big plastic bag full of handcuffs.

"We could not see anyone actually get on or off. But cleaners came on to clean the bathrooms." Mr Badrawi agreed that he could not say for certain who got on or off the plane. "But there were seven or so of them before we got to Mashad and then afterwards they became eight or nine," he said. "There were two leaders on the plane, one big shot and his assistant. The boss was staying up with the captain all the time. He would come down and walk around to inspect, but he always wore a mask.

"Before we arrived in Mashad they only had pistols, small guns. Then after we landed at Mashad they each had a big gun." Shown a makeshift drawing, Mr Badrawi agreed the guns were submachine guns, similar to the Uzi.

Asked repeatedly if he was sure of what he was saying and if he understood its implications, Mr Badrawi said: "Yes,

absolutely." He added that he believed some hijackers were substituted at Mashad. "I could tell because, although they wore masks and changed their clothes, I learned who they were by their height and manner."

At Algiers airport, earlier yesterday, a false air of peacefulness had settled over the hijacked jet, as the Algerian authorities attended to the comfort of those on board, but gave no outward hint of progress towards a resolution of the crisis.

Only once in the radio exchanges between the plane and the Algiers control tower was the true plight of the hostages raised: when one of them, a man who identified himself as Said Ahmed, was brought to the microphone, and told the control tower: "They asked for the freeing of the 17 prisoners held by the government of Kuwait. If not, they will execute us all."

Kuwait funeral;
Hostage anniversary, page 8

Weapons smuggled in food trolleys

From Robert Fisk
Larnaca

The hijackers of the Kuwaiti airliner smuggled their weapons and explosives on board the Boeing 747 in the aircraft's food trolleys at Bangkok airport. Newly released hostages at Larnaca also said yesterday that the gunmen — of whom there are seven, most of them Lebanese — had booby-trapped the plane with wire and chocolate-coloured sticks of explosive.

So serious were the hijackers that they all dressed in loose white shirts with "I Love martyrdom" printed in Arabic on the front when they were at Larnaca airport on Tuesday. These were the "shrouds" about which the gunmen talked over the radio to the control tower.

The reality behind the drama of Kuwait Airways flight KU 422 began to emerge yesterday in the third-floor wards of the Larnaca General Hospital, where the 12 hostages released late on Tuesday were recovering under the care of Cypriot and Kuwaiti doctors. One of the passengers, Mr Muhammad Ali Ramadan, is an Egyptian-born American citizen who only escaped the discovery of his identity by hiding his US passport in his briefcase.

While Kuwaiti, Algerian and Western intelligence agencies yesterday desperately sought evidence of the identity and behaviour of the hijackers, who flew their 37 remaining captives to Algiers in the early hours of yesterday morning, freed hostages at Larnaca revealed to *The Times* that:

- the gunmen tied the wrists of all the passengers, hitting them on the head with their fists if they attempted to look out the windows.
- they had Israeli-made Uzi sub-machine-guns, grenades and stick explosives with wire which they used to rig up the plane as a bomb.
- they were seen pulling their

Continued on page 22, col 1

Weapons smuggled in trolleys

Continued from page 1

weapons from the food trolleys in the economy section as the Boeing flew through Indian airspace en route to Kuwait.

- there were seven hijackers on the plane, at least four of whom had Lebanese accents.

- the hijackers tried to find any Americans on board and demanded to know whether any of the passengers had studied or even visited the US.

The luckiest passenger was undoubtedly Mr Ramadan, an Egyptian mechanical engineer who has been a US passport holder since 1978. "When they asked about anyone who had been to America, I immediately hid my passport in my briefcase," he said. "I put it behind the last of the back flaps of my briefcase and they did not search the hand luggage of the passengers, thanks be to God, so they never found it. I gave them only my Egyptian passport when they collected the identity documents. I am the most fortunate man — and this is because I believe in God."

According to another freed hostage, all but one of those released at Larnaca were Shia Muslims, which is believed to be the sect to which all seven hijackers belong. The gunmen only discovered the religious denomination of the twelfth man when he was leaving the plane. He was a Christian Copt from Egypt.

"He had reached the doorway and one of the men with a hood on suddenly realized that the passenger had a cross tattooed behind his wrist," another freed hostage said. "We could not see the reaction

of the hooded man. He suddenly asked, 'What is your religion?' The man replied 'I am a Christian Copt'. I guess the hijacker could not do anything then."

The seven men referred to each other by different names in an apparent attempt to confuse the passengers. Two of them called each other "Jamil" and "Kamal" for some of the time.

But Mr Ramadan said they treated the three Kuwaiti royal

family members in the first class section with much respect. "The hijackers would always preface their remarks with a phrase from the Koran so we knew they were Muslims."

"When I heard we were leaving Larnaca and I did not know I would be released, I thought we would all die and I told the nearest passenger that I would admit that I was an American. I had the idea that if the hijackers found out, they

would use it to get the United States to put pressure on the Kuwaitis and perhaps the hijackers would free us. It was the other passenger who persuaded me to keep silent, thanks be to God."

That the weapons were put on board the aircraft in airline food containers did not surprise one security officer for a major Western airline, who was specially posted to Larnaca to observe the hijacked aircraft and the behav-

iour of the gunmen. "We have a big problem on this matter. In Third World countries, junior airline staff and baggage handlers are paid very low wages and it is easy for someone to bribe poor people," he said. "It is a security man's nightmare."

The psychological training for terror mission

THE HIJACKERS of the Kuwaiti jumbo jet appear to have been psychologically prepared for their mission — probably by special training.

"They have shown tremendous sophistication in the way they have kept control of the situation over such a long period of time," said Dr James Thompson, a psychologist at the Middlesex Hospital, London, who has studied hijacks.

"They have not succumbed to the grinding pressure of the negotiators who are using well-established tactics. The negotiators are extremely polite, they never confront the hijackers and they always delay. But the hijackers are equally polite and have been able to keep everyone guessing.

"The hijackers fooled the PLO and the control tower. It seems as if they have talked to previous hijackers and learnt

By Oliver Gillie
Medical Editor

from them, or they have been trained in negotiation skills."

The hijackers have controlled the passengers with similar psychological skill. The passengers were kept in doubt over what was happening: they did not know that they were in Cyprus until they received food with a Cyprus Airways logo on it. They did not know that two of their number had been shot.

"If the hijackers had left the back door of the plane open and unguarded I doubt if one of those passengers would have tried to escape," said Dr Thompson, who has studied victims of the TWA airliner hijack in Beirut in 1985.

"All proper contact is cut off for the

passengers. It is like solitary confinement. The average citizen who is dealt with in a cold manner becomes very suggestible and will do just about anything he is told to do.

"Under these circumstances captives instinctively try to establish a rapport with their captors. They ask them about themselves and try to tell them something about themselves. They are trying to tell the other side that they are a person. Sometimes strange bonds are forged under these circumstances.

"It works like an encounter group. The people who are hijacked may come on to the phone and swear at the authorities because they have come to believe that it is the outsiders who are to blame. This is why the passengers say when they come off the plane that the hijackers treated them well."

In this case it appears that the hijackers always maintained the upper hand, allowing the passengers to believe that they were friendly, while in fact keeping their distance. The hijackers did not hesitate to shoot two passengers but they also allowed one deadline to slip by without an execution, always keeping the control tower guessing.

The exhilaration shown by the passengers when they finally escaped gives a false impression, according to Dr Thompson. During the days following their release, they will try to tell the story as often as possible, reliving the experience. But as the days go by their families will want to move on to other subjects and often a difficult distance develops.

Almost all those involved in the hijack will suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. They are likely to be sleepless

and have nightmares. They will also suffer from loss of concentration and be irritable over small things. They may become reckless, as if they are testing fate.

"People who were involved in the Kings Cross fire are still suffering from these elevated levels of distress," Dr Thompson said. "Psychological intervention to help people who have been in such disasters will take at least two years."

Paradoxically, the stress on the pilot and co-pilot may be less than that on the passengers because the crew has a job to do and something else to worry about beside themselves.

There is no single treatment to suit all victims. Some will need psychotherapy, others medicines. Some will need to talk about it endlessly, others will want to forget. Thus there is no simple advice for relatives.



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13 April 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

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NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Kuwaiti Airliner Hijack

background commentary

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Years in crossfire steel Kuwait

Ian Black

KUWAIT'S repeated insistence that it will not negotiate with the Arab gunmen on board the hijacked airliner at Larnaca airport has come as no great surprise to those who know the record of the quiet but determined men in flowing robes who rule the tiny sheikhdom squeezed into the northern corner of the Gulf.

The sheer resilience and tough-mindedness of the government response to the hijack drama are qualities which have stood Kuwait in good stead ever since the once sleepy fishing port and trading centre emerged as an independent and immensely wealthy state over a quarter of a century ago.

Geography has been at once generous and harsh with the country: nature's bounty with oil reserves has guaranteed it prosperity for a good two centuries to come. But that cannot alter the cruel fact that Kuwait is and will always be sandwiched awkwardly between two powerful and occasionally predatory neighbours.

The pressure on the sheikhdom — a poor little rich state caught in the crossfire — has been high and growing ever since President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, exploiting the chaos that followed the overthrow of the Shah, launched his ill-fated offensive against Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic in September, 1980.

The Iraqi gamble has brought Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Kuwait's doorstep on the occupied Fao peninsula; the rumble of artillery and the explosion of Silkworm missiles have shaken the high-rise office blocks on the featureless sands. And there has been even more serious trouble nearer home.

The Emir himself, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah, survived a bold suicide car bomb assassination attempt by members of the Iranian-backed Al-Da'awa Al-Islamiya (the Islamic Call) three years ago.

No one who knows how finely the country is balanced between internal strains and external pressures doubted Sheikh Jaber's sincerity when he declared that the gunmen were badly mistaken if they believed that the presence of members of the 1,200-strong royal family on board would make Kuwait more pliant.

It simply cannot afford to be.

The release of the 17 prisoners the Larnaca gunmen want — all serving life sentences or facing the death penalty for the 1983 bombings — would mean forgiving acts of calculated violence that seemed designed to bring the whole structure crashing right down.

Sheikh Ahmed will have raised a wry smile with his insistence this week that all Kuwaitis are one happy family. Only 40 per cent of the 1.8 million population are full citizens. The rest, including 300,000 Palestinians, are mainly expatriate workers from Egypt, Pakistan and the Philippines.

Of the 700,000 natives, at least 25 per cent are Shi'ites and thus


identified, willy-nilly, with the ayatollah across the water. Many of the Shi'ites, in addition, are of Iranian origin.

The combination of the Iranian threat with internal Shi'ite subversion and terrorism has eroded some cherished freedoms, including the suspension of the national assembly in 1986 and the imposition of strict press censorship. Popular feel-

ing against the hijackers is running high and no one believes the Government should give in. "Let them kill," said a retired government official.

"We don't mind our citizens dying as long as the integrity of the Government and people of Kuwait is kept. These people are on the battlefield. If my son was with them on the plane I would feel the same way."

Anatomy of a hijack



THE GUARDIAN
Wednesday April 13 1988

Graphic: Chris Madden

Fanatical fight to secure release of the jailed 17

Calm pilot at eye of jet storm

THE CAMPAIGN to release the Kuwait 17 prisoners lies behind a wave of terror that has haunted the Middle East for four years.

The passengers on Kuwaiti airlines flight KU422 are the latest victims of a fanatical fight to secure the release of 17 terrorists inspired by the Islamic fundamentalism of Ayatollah Khomeini.

The statement from the hijackers to the outside world, read over to the control tower at Mashhad airport last Tuesday, made their purpose abundantly clear.

"We have 17 prisoners in Kuwaiti jails who are under the worst kinds of tortures. We are informed that some of them have been hospitalised due to severity of their wounds... We request [the Kuwaiti government] to release these 17 prisoners and this is our main demand. We are ready to co-operate with them [the Kuwaiti government] and if they accept our demand we will prove our goodwill."

To most Westerners, the crimes of the 17 have merged into the relentless pattern of violence in the Middle East. But demands for their release have become one of the major issues behind terror carried out by supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeini under the name Islamic Jihad.

The kidnap of the first Western hostage in Beirut took place a day before the trial of the 17 started. More

INSIGHT

kidnappings followed during the trial. When guilty verdicts were returned, the kidnappers warned of dire consequences against their victims if releases were not immediately forthcoming.

The failure of Terry Waite, the Archbishop of Canterbury's envoy, to win any concessions over the 17 is believed to have been a major contributory factor to his abduction. Their continued detention led to terrorist attacks in Paris and Spain.

The 17 have all been convicted of taking part in a spate of bombing in Kuwait on December 12, 1983. The attacks began when Raad Ajeel, a young Iraqi suicide bomber, drove a truck loaded with gas cylinders and explosives through the gates of the American embassy, exploding the vehicle 10ft from the building. Five people died.

Elsewhere bombs exploded at the French embassy, a Kuwaiti government building, the airport and an industrial complex. More than 80 people were injured.

The only piece of Ajeel's body that survived the blast intact, one of his hands, enabled the Kuwaitis to discover, from fingerprints, the identity of the suicide bomber.

Within days, that discovery had enabled them to arrest a number of other men involved in the mission. Most of

them were Iraq-born Shi'ites but there were also two Lebanese Shi'ites and a Lebanese Christian named Elias Saab, a mercenary believed to be an expert bomb maker. Grenade launchers and machineguns were also discovered in a number of safe houses.

On February 11, 1984, the trial of 25 defendants, four of them *in absentia*, opened in a converted schoolroom in Kuwait. On March 23, 17 of those being held were convicted. Three of them were sentenced to death, seven to life imprisonment and the rest to lesser terms.

The day before the trial opened, two significant events took place. An Iranian-based group of exiled Iraqis warned of "serious consequences if the heroes are harmed" — and the first Westerner, Frank Regier, engineering professor at the American University, was kidnapped off the streets of Beirut.

Not every hijack or kidnap that was to follow can be laid at the door of bids to free the Kuwait 17. But in a number of cases the release of the prisoners was the only demand made by terrorists, while in others it was one of a number of conditions.

The fate of the Kuwait 17 played a key role in Terry Waite's abduction in January last year.

The arms-for-hostages deal

between America and Iran in 1986 had already compromised his independence to the extent that he was increasingly regarded as a US envoy.

He compounded the problem by allegedly misleading the kidnappers of two American hostages, Anderson and Sutherland, into believing that the Kuwait 17 might be released. When it became apparent that was not to be the case Waite, too, disappeared.

He was to be followed into captivity by a number of others. Today there are believed to be 18 Western hostages alive in captivity.

In Kuwait, the terror campaign waged since the 17 were imprisoned has included numerous bombings and the sabotage of Kuwaiti oil pipelines. A cinema and a Kuwaiti bank were bombed in Paris last year.

Kuwait became a "legitimate target" for Iranian-inspired terror after the start of the Iran-Iraq war. Kuwait, like other conservative Gulf states, had aligned itself with Iraq, contributing cash, some \$6 billion (£3.2 billion) by 1983.

During the first year of the war, Kuwait was bombed three times by Iranian aircraft.

In 1983, Iranian threats grew more bellicose after the delivery of French Super-Etendard aircraft equipped with Exocet missiles to Iraq — and Ajeel's suicide mission was arranged.

THE pilot of the hijacked plane, 53-year-old Captain Subhi Yousif, is one of the airline's most experienced officers and, according to his daughter, is well known for his calmness in the face of a crisis.

In an interview at her home in Kuwait, his eldest daughter, Jenny Yousif, 22, said she thought he would remain calm and in control of the situation.

"He is very strong. I have never seen him agitated or nervous," she said. She felt he would be able to keep up the spirits of the rest of the crew.

Yousif, an Iraqi, has three other children — the eldest, Leith, 24, is also a pilot for Kuwait Airways, his daughter Nora, 18, is studying art at an American college in London. Osama, the younger son, is 12. Yousif's wife, Sonia Portioian, was too distressed to talk.

Jenny, who is studying science at Kuwait University and is a part-time reporter for a local Arab newspaper, said: "Obviously we are all under a lot of strain and my mother is distraught."

"But I know my father will handle the situation professionally. The lives of his crew and passengers will be his main concern."

Yousif has been a pilot for 32 years and has worked with Kuwait Airways for more than 20 years.

He and his wife are frequent visitors to London — they try to spend several months in Britain each summer.

Captors used psychological tricks to break hostages' wills

TO THE hostages aboard the hijacked Kuwaiti Boeing 747, the efficiency of the operation was staggering. Instead of crazed gunmen, they faced a disciplined group who appeared calm and in control.

The hijackers used psychological techniques to ensure the hostages knew exactly who was in charge. The first tactic was to create high tension, followed by a more relaxed atmosphere.

This involved switching the air conditioning off for lengthy periods while all the cabin lights were turned on. The heat built up and the passengers, forced to sit with their hands above their heads — the men with their wrists bound with plastic strips — became uncomfortable and lost track of time.

As suddenly as the lights had gone up, they would be dimmed, and the hostages were told they could relax. Drinks were served, and on raising their hands they were allowed to use the toilet. Then, abruptly, the atmosphere would change for the worse again.

When the lights were extinguished, the hijackers would roam the cabin with torches, shining the beams into the

faces of various individuals for no apparent reason. "Every time the light fell on you, you thought, that's it, it's me they want," one passenger said after being freed.

The hostages were frequently ordered to move to different parts of the aircraft and, when the plane landed in Mashhad, it was only when Iran Air food containers were taken on board that they knew where they were.

These were all classic disorientating techniques, but there were embellishments. Nobody, for instance, was ever certain just how many hijackers there were. They moved around constantly, usually hooded with airline pillow cases in which slits had been cut for their eyes. And they exchanged clothes with one another to add to the confusion.

To disguise their origins from Arab-speaking passengers, the hijackers spoke classical Arabic, avoiding the tell-tale accents of their home countries.

While it is known that terrorist gangs will spend months planning a hijack, studying the details of previous acts of air piracy to guard against mistakes, the suspicion among

various security experts last week was that some of the gang had actually taken part in previous incidents.

Nobody, they pointed out, had ever been charged or conclusively identified in connection with the hijack of an Air France Boeing 737 to Tehran in July 1984, or a Kuwait Airways jet taken to the same destination in December the same year. Islamic Jihad, the umbrella title of a number of a Lebanon-based terror groups supported by Ayatollah Khomeini, claimed responsibility for both hijacks. It has close links with the Hezbollah, "Party of God" group, believed responsible for the latest hijack.

Despite the efficiency of the early stages of the hijack, the gang badly misjudged the political reaction of their closest ally, Iran.

The reactions seem to have swept all their carefully laid plans aside. Instead of a drawn-out affair in Iran, with the prospect of eventual freedom whatever the outcome, they were forced to try to seek sanctuary elsewhere.

From the Iranian point of view, the timing of the hijackers could not have been worse, as parliamentary elections

took place on Friday. Iranian anger with the hijackers was reflected by Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the speaker of parliament, the country's most important figure after Khomeini. "It's a plot," he raged.

In addition, the hijacking switched attention from Iraq's use of chemical weapons in killing 5,000 Kurds in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran is also anxious to do nothing to upset an imminent hostage deal with the French, in which two diplomats and a journalist are expected to be exchanged for further repayments from £1 billion originally made by the Shah of Iran to the French Eurodif nuclear group.

Two-thirds of the sum have already been released to Tehran, the latest tranche having been returned when two French hostages, Jean-Louis Normandin, a television crewman, and Roger Auque, a photographer, were released at the end of last year. Some return to normal diplomatic relations is also expected if the hostages are freed.

With so much at stake, the Iranians were clearly anxious to wash their hands of the hijack affair once it became clear a peaceful end was unlikely.

Evidence grows of Iranians' role in hijacking jet

THE INDEPENDENT Tuesday 12 April 1988

THE PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, yesterday joined the growing number of Arab officials blaming Iran for the hijacking of the Kuwaiti plane. "It seems they are receiving outside orders, outside even Lebanon," he said.

In Kuwait, one newspaper roundly blamed Tehran for the crime, while another accused "certain political circles" in Iran. Privately, officials in a number of Gulf states said they had evidence of help given to the hijackers while the plane was at Mashad, in north-east Iran.

As a result of the debriefing of the passengers released in Iran, Kuwaiti authorities now believe that at least three and possibly four extra hijackers went aboard the jumbo in Mashad. They are also convinced that extra guns, ammunition, grenades and explosives were loaded there.

Even more disturbing for the Kuwaiti authorities is the strong suspicion that a Kuwaiti member of the crew helped the original hijackers to smuggle arms aboard.

The Kuwaiti airline carried out

By John Bulloch
Middle East Editor

an extensive "Kuwaitisation" programme a couple of years ago, and as a result some candidates for jobs were taken on who might otherwise have been rejected.

Among them, it is believed, there were a number of Shia Muslims, many of whom sympathise with Iran and with the more militant Shia groups. About 30 per cent of Kuwaitis belong to the Shia sect.

Mr Arafat, who is in Kuwait for a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organisation, said two of the hijackers were Bahraini, four Lebanese and two were of unknown nationality. Aviation sources said that two of them might be Kuwaiti.

In Lebanon, security sources said the hijackers were members of the Hizbollah (Party of God), though this was denied. But Hizbollah is little more than a generic name for a number of groups which look to Iran for

their inspiration. One of them is holding Terry Waite and the other hostages, and has demanded the same as the hijackers as the price for their release: freedom for the 17 men convicted in Kuwait of terrorist bombings of the French and US embassies five years ago.

In Lebanon, Hizbollah is in disarray after suffering its worst defeat at the hands of Amal, the Syrian-backed Shia militia. In a series of recent battles in southern Lebanon, Amal regained control of most of the territory it had lost to Hizbollah, and killed at least 40 of the Iranian-backed guerrillas.

Diplomats believe it was the victory of the group it backs in Lebanon which gave the Syrian commanders there the nerve to refuse to allow the Kuwaiti plane to land at Beirut. Up to now, the Syrians have been reluctant to make any moves which would annoy Iran or Iranian sympathisers, in case this led to reprisals by Hizbollah against their 30,000 troops in Lebanon.

Kuwait's ruling family had final say on taking hard line

KUWAIT's tough policy in refusing to negotiate with the hijackers or to make any concessions was decided on by the small group of ministers who make up the country's inner cabinet. Ironically, in view of past involvement of various Palestinian groups in air piracy, many of the officials on whom the group depends for information are Palestinians, John Bulloch writes.

Kuwait is a hereditary emirate, ruled by the al-Sabah since 1752, and though at times a vociferous National Assembly has been allowed considerable power, the ultimate decisions have always been taken by the ruler and his closest associates, who are not always members of the government. The Sabah dynasty has always relied for support on the merchants who have transformed Kuwait from a fishing port and caravan halt into one of the world's most

successful city-states.

Like his predecessors, the present ruler, Sheikh Jaber al Ahmed al-Sabah, has made sure that key ministries and positions in the country's structure are held by members of his family. Thus the ministers of oil, defence, foreign affairs and information are all Sabahs, as well as the governors of Kuwait's two most important provinces.

It is the inner cabinet, made up of these powerful figures which takes all the crucial decisions, sometimes with other members of the ruling family who have decided not to take part in public life, and with representatives of the leading merchant families, the Ghanims, the Jabirs, and several others. But with 1,200 members, it is the al-Sabah who have the final say, through the body formally known as the Ruling Family Committee.

And from the time the 17 members of the Dawa Party — the pro-Iranian underground in Iraq — were found guilty of the bombings of the US and French embassies in 1983, the Kuwait government has stuck to that position. So determined were they not to deal with the terrorists, or even to appear to be contemplating doing so, that they refused a visa to Terry Waite to go there to discuss the situation of the hostages in Lebanon. Almost all the Americans and French prisoners there could be freed if Kuwait agreed to let the 17 go.

The Kuwaitis, who have learnt constructive diplomacy as a result of their situation between Iran and Iraq, know that if they give in once to terrorists, others will follow. They are showing no signs of being about to change their policy because their own people are involved.

Richard Norton-Taylor on the complex questions raised by the seizure of the Kuwaiti airliner and the long agony of the hostages

Fear of flying

AS SOON as Whitehall learnt that a Kuwaiti jumbo jet had been hijacked with 22 Britons aboard, the Foreign Office opened its round-the-clock underground emergency operations unit. Inevitably, a picture began to be painted — and yesterday still was — of a counter-terrorist SAS group storming the aircraft, putting into practice the tactics it has learnt with a mock fuselage at SAS headquarters in Hereford.

But the hijackers released, first the women, then all the non-Arab passengers. Some of the Britons who were released were quoted as saying that Mrs Thatcher should still send in the SAS. They were echoing what seems to be popular enthusiasm for a "quick end" to hijacks. There is little doubt that if the Kuwait Airways jet had been full of Britons while it was standing on the Larnaca tarmac public (and media) pressure on the Government to send in the SAS quickly would have been intense.

But of the attempts so far to attack hijackers by force, only two have been successful in that they did not lead to a loss of innocent lives. The first, in 1976, was the Israeli raid on Entebbe (where hostages were held in an airport lounge).

The second — the only one in which SAS men have so far been involved — was the attack on a hijacked Lufthansa aircraft at Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1977. Two SAS men were on hand to help the operation by West Germany's GSG/9 squad.

The prevailing view has been that it is better to keep hijackers talking. "While there is talking, there is always hope, and the hopelessness of the hijackers' situation becomes evident," Mr John Brindley, spokesman of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) said yesterday. But he conceded what others already have — the hijackers of the Kuwaiti jet, believed to be Lebanese supporters of the pro-Iranian Hezbollah (Party of God), are different.

They have demonstrated they are not prone to panic, as other hijackers have been. They have clearly spelled out their demands, they have been patient, in their conversations with negotiators at Larnaca's control tower they have explained in detail such technical problems as the state of the plane's air conditioning system, and calmly saying they are prepared to die. They have made calculated decisions about which passengers to shoot, and how many.



Taking the strain: the pilot of the hijacked Kuwaiti aircraft, Subhi Naim Yousef

They released the non-Arab passengers to concentrate on their stated aim, the freeing of 17 prisoners in Kuwait, most of them Iraqi Shi'ites but including some Lebanese, convicted of terrorist attacks in Kuwait in 1983. The campaign to release the 17 has involved previous hijackings, including that of a Kuwait Airways airbus in December 1984 (when Iranian commandos stormed the plane at Tehran), a spate of other terrorist attacks in Kuwait, as well as in Paris and Spain, and the hijacking of an American TWA plane to Beirut in June 1985. Their fate has also played a role in the kidnapping of Western hostages, including Terry Waite, the Archbishop of

Canterbury's envoy, in January last year.

There are reports that the hijackers of the Kuwaiti airliner last week wanted to embarrass Tehran for excluding the case of the 17 from negotiations with Paris for the release of three French hostages held by the Islamic Jihad, the movement which has close links with Hezbollah. British diplomats have repeatedly expressed concern about the willingness of Britain's European allies, notably France and West Germany, as well as — in the past — the United States, to hold secret talks with Iran over hostages in breach of the EEC's "no deals" policy.

The FO's emergency unit is

still functioning, its main purpose to keep in close and constant touch with the Kuwaiti and Cypriot authorities. The Government's message to Kuwait is to keep firm, a policy the Kuwaiti Government has so far maintained. It is widely assumed that Mrs Thatcher would respond positively to a request from Kuwait or Cyprus to send in the SAS.

Some observers yesterday were saying that the international dimension to the crisis, involving as it does, the Cypriot authorities, the Kuwaiti Government and the PLO, was a useful, rather than an unhelpful, complicating factor. IATA believes that some kind of international corps with the special

task of negotiating with hijackers should be set up.

But it pointed to one immediate problem: the lack of security and control on airfields. Airlines and airport authorities, it said, had probably mastered the screening of passengers. The weak point, it said, was the security around the airfield and what and who could get to a plane without going through the terminals.

Although the Thai authorities have denied it, security around Bangkok airfield, where the Kuwaiti jet started its flight, is said to be weak. And there are accusations, notably by Kuwait, that other hijackers and ammunition got on to the plane at Mashhad.

Negotiations always the first option

NEGOTIATIONS are the first option to end an aircraft hijacking; storming it is always the last. This "general rule" for handling hijackings could be seen in the tense unfolding last night of the hijack drama around the Kuwait Airways 747 jet.

The Cypriots and Kuwaitis certainly must have been considering the option of storming the hijacked jet from the moment it landed at Larnaca airport on Friday. In the end, however, the jet was allowed to take off after a new flurry of negotiations and the release of some hostages.

There were a number of reasons why Cyprus and Kuwait were reluctant to see the airliner stormed.

Apart from the political and military complications, there was clearly concern to ensure the hostages' safety - and the release of as many as possible - even though lengthy refusals to meet the hijackers' demands touched off the murder of two hostages.

In the storming of a jet, the odds are stacked against success; the risks for the passengers and

the assault unit are huge.

Although there have been violent and bloody ends to some hijackings, most in fact have ended peacefully, through negotiation.

The strategy is to keep the hijackers talking, win back the initiative from them and if possible to gain their trust. The most effective resource is time - to wear the hijackers down mentally, erode their demands and to exhaust them physically.

The negotiators try to set up communication links, to supply the hijackers with food, and to meet all their requests - short of the main demand.

In attempting to bring about a peaceful end to a hijacking - or at least the release of hostages - negotiators need to be in possession of as much information as possible about events within the aircraft.

This "psychological ammunition" gives an edge which can be exploited in negotiation, and if necessary, it enables a counter-terrorist unit to judge the right psychological moment to strike.

Behind all the negotiations

BY ANDREW MARSHALL

with hijackers, a decision to storm an aircraft, with its attendant risk, is always a political trade-off. Is the safety of hostages paramount, or do concessions merely encourage future use of blackmail?

Though the first officially recorded act of air piracy was in 1931, "storming" aircraft to release hostages is a more recent development.

It was a consequence of the arrival on the scene in the 1970s of dedicated, politically-motivated terrorists prepared both to kill and die for their causes.

Most countries possess specialised military or police units armed and trained for counter-terrorism. The British have the Special Air Service, the Germans have GSG/9, the French, GIGN and the Americans, the SFOD-Delta force.

The Israelis are probably the leaders in the field. In one of the

first attempts to storm an airliner, in 1972, Israeli commandos, dressed as cleaners, hit a Sabena airliner which had been hijacked and forced to land at Ben Gurion airport.

Probably the best known storming, now immortalised in print and celluloid, is the Israeli raid on Entebbe of July 1976. Israeli commandos flew 2,500 miles to storm an Air France Airbus, also tackling some 80 Ugandan soldiers in a 40-minute gunbattle at the airport. Two Israeli hostages died in the battle, and a third later.

It was out of the question for the Israelis to participate in any operation on Cyprus.

But their expertise is probably matched by that of Britain's SAS. Though they have never carried out such an exercise on their own, the SAS have considerable experience of hostage situ-

considered to end hijacking

ations, notably the siege of the Iranian embassy in May 1980.

They are also known to have assisted in at least two previous operations against aircraft.

In 1977, 60 West German commandos of GSG/9 with support from the SAS rescued 86 hostages from a Lufthansa Boeing 737 which had been hijacked to Mogadishu by an organisation believed to be linked to the Red Army Faction.

The attack lasted only two minutes and the hijackers were killed without casualties among hostages or raiding troops.

The SAS also provided assistance in March 1981 when Indonesian troops stormed a Garuda airliner at Bangkok airport, freeing 41 passengers and killing the five hijackers.

Members of the SAS were also on standby during the hijack of a TWA jet from Athens to Beirut in June 1985.

The vital element in any such operation is timing. To minimise casualties, the assault must be unexpected, quick and at a psychologically well-chosen moment.

The exercise is extensively rehearsed beforehand, and intelligence on how many hijackers there are, their disposition on the plane, and their armaments, is acquired, either from electronic surveillance of the plane or first-hand evidence from released hostages.

Remote controlled cameras and microphones can also be pre-planted on aircraft.

Communication between those dealing with the hijack is also important. Typically, military, political and civil units of several nationalities are involved. It is crucial that they are all kept fully informed as to the demands and mental state of the hijackers and what action is planned against them.

The worst incidents have occurred when the timing has been misjudged.

Probably the bloodiest catastrophe was in 1985, when Egyptian commandos stormed an Egyptair Boeing 737 in Malta. The hijackers realised what was going on and fired on hostages. The attack ended with 59 passengers dead.

FINANCIAL TIMES

13 APRIL 1988



New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
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London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

Reference:

B66/5/1A

YBLOW

8 April 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Financial Times background article 8 April 1988.


S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

INTERNATIONAL AIRCRAFT PIRACY

Mashhad hijack ends air travellers' long peace

BY RICHARD JOHNS

THE HIJACKING of the Kuwaiti Airways Boeing 747 by pro-Iranian Shi'ite terrorists on Tuesday ended the longest lull enjoyed by the Middle East since politically motivated air piracy began in earnest in the region 20 years ago.

Any complacency that the evil had evaporated in the face of a concerted security clampdown imposed worldwide in the wake of the spectacular outrages of 1985 will have been shattered.

"We were somewhat reassured by the results of tighter restrictions imposed by security authorities," a spokesman for the International Air Transport Association said yesterday.

As it happens, IATA had just completed a programme of checks in the Middle East and was about to start a survey of Asian airports. The surmise is that the weapons used for the forcible diversion of the Kuwaiti airliner to Mashhad in Iran were smuggled on board while it was parked at Bangkok airport, where it was stationed for 15 hours before take-off.

While the outcome of the Thai investigation is awaited, IATA and the International Civil Aviation Organisation believe that there is some reason for satisfaction. In 1986 total hijacks worldwide were down to 13 compared with 26 in 1985 and a peak of over 50 in 1973, according to the figures of the US Federal Aviation Authority.

Its count for the first half of 1987 is eight. Half of them were on internal US flights and three of the remainder were easily thwarted take-overs on the ground.

Poland and Cuba account for probably the biggest proportion of the cumulative total outside the US as people have sought to flee the country or seek the cheapest route home. LOT of Poland followed by Delta of the US are reckoned to be the most hijacked airlines.

Last July an Air Afrique DC-10 on a flight from the Central African Republic, hardly the most efficient of countries, to Paris landed at Geneva at the pilot's initiative after being hijacked by a Lebanese Shi'ite who shot one passenger on arrival before he was overpowered.

Then just before Christmas a

15-year-old boy with a history of mental illness who pretended to have a bomb brought about the diversion of a KLM flight on a Amsterdam-Milan flight to Rome, demanding a \$1m ransom and a get-away aircraft. He was easily taken care of after a promise of a flight to the US.

Apart from these two incidents, none caught the attention of the world's press or ruffled the international scene. It is debatable whether even the Lebanese Shi'ite, who comes up for trial soon was politically motivated — he never issued a demand or nominated a destination.

Until this week there had been no major terrorist hijacking since September 1986 when four Palestinians took over a Pan American 747 on the ground at Karachi. The episode ended with 21 passengers dead and over 100 wounded after the hijackers turned their guns on them as Pakistani commandos stormed the aircraft.

Before that there were two particularly horrific episodes in 1985. After a succession in the previous year, these really mobilised international efforts to crack-down on air piracy.

First there was the cliff-hanging saga of the TWA 727 which was diverted to Beirut in June.

Despite a 17-day duration it resulted in the death of only one man, a US serviceman who was murdered at Algiers when the hijackers' demand for the refuelling of the aircraft was denied.

The protracted drama and the duress suffered by American passengers were of critical importance, however, in arousing the US Administration to intensify the war on terrorism, as was the fact that the hijackers partly succeeded in their objectives by obtaining the release of Shi'ite prisoners held by Israel.

Five months later in November in Malta there was a far bloodier outcome to a one-day episode. A shoot-out ended the seizure of an Egyptair Boeing 737 with the deaths of 58 passengers.


That hijacking was the work of Abu Nidal's Fateh General Command group. Apart from demonstrating their hostility to Egypt's peace treaty it was never clear what objective the hijackers had.

It did emerge from the Karachi affair, for which the same group was responsible, that it wanted the release of Arabs jailed in Cyprus, the destination sought by the gunmen. In the TWA drama, as in the forcible diversion of the Kuwaiti airline this week and the one hijacked to Tehran in 1984, the aim has been the same: freedom for fellow terrorists and in both cases the 17 imprisoned in Kuwait convicted of the embassy bombings in 1984.

Most of the early Palestinian hijacks, including the multiple one in 1970, which triggered off the Jordanian civil war, were directed at publicising a cause. In recent years a new dimension to the phenomenon, developed by extremists enflamed by both the Arab-Israel and Gulf conflicts, has been holding to ransom hostages to obtain the freedom of fellow terrorists. It is a game that others outside the region, like the Sikhs, have played.

Motives are numerous. Whilst the first recorded hijack during a coup in Peru in 1931 was political, the whole business began seriously in the late 1940s as East Europeans sought asylum in the West. Ironically, one of the two hijackings of note last year was perpetrated by a youth without any weapon who was angered by his grandparents' decision to send him to Italy for Christmas.

World Airline Hijackings



R66/5/1A

1A1A1A

ZCZC

WLN 5334

RR LON

GR 00134

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED

7 APRIL 1988

FROM: TEHRAN

CHARGE CODE:

TO : WELLINGTON 00308-ROUTINE

RPTD: BAGHDAD 00052-ROUTINE

: CANBERRA 00060-ROUTINE

: BANGKOK 00003-ROUTINE

: OTTAWA 00049-ROUTINE

: WASHINGTON 00054-ROUTINE

:BAHRAIN

:LONDON

:NEW YORK PR

:RIYADH

00089-ROUTINE

00107-ROUTINE

00048-ROUTINE

00049-ROUTINE

12331

LD : SFA (MEA UNC EIB)

: DEFENCE (DDI)

SUBJ: HIJACK OF KUWAITI AIRLINER

FILE: 82/1/1

THIR MORNING IRAN RADIO ANNOUNCED THAT ALL 32 NON -KUWAITI PASSENGERS

HAD BEEN RELEASED. THE JIJACKS HAVE EEEE THE HIJACKERS HAVE THREATENED TO COMMANDEER THE PLANE TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION IF THEIR

DEMAND FOR THE RELEASE OF 17 PRISONERS IN KUWAIT ISNOTMET. THEY HAVE ALSO DECLARED THAT THE LIVES OF THE THREE MEMBERS OF THE AL SABAH FAMILY ON BAOEEE BOARD ARE IN DANGER.

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COL TEH 799

7/1745LT

TORW 08/04/88 07:36:45

WLN 5334

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culs

File B66/511A

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: THURSDAY 7 APRIL 1988

HIJACK OF KUWAITI AIRLINER

Spokesman confirmed that all the British passengers had now been released and were in the Hyatt Hotel in Mashhad. They were fit and well and, we understood, in good spirits. We were now working hard on arrangements for their return to the UK but could not yet be precise as to how or when they might travel. We hoped that Mr Hashemi, a locally-engaged member of the staff of the British Interests Section in Tehran, would leave for Mashhad this afternoon to help with those travel arrangements.

We were obviously delighted by the release of the British passengers but, at the same time, remained extremely concerned for the passengers and crew who remained on the aircraft. Mrs Chalker had this morning, in thanking the Kuwaiti Chargé for Kuwait's assistance, underlined our readiness to do everything possible to assist in their release.

In response to questions Spokesman said that no decision had been taken as to whether a British diplomat would travel to Iran. We would of course continue to have further contacts in London and elsewhere as appropriate.

WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE

Spokesman drew attention to the text of a speech which was delivered by Mr Rodric Braithwaite, a senior official in the FCO on behalf of Mrs Chalker in Brussels this morning at the World Food Conference.

By 16615/1A

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: WEDNESDAY 6 APRIL 1988

HI-JACK OF KUWAITI AIRLINER

In answer to questions Spokesman made the following points:

- The British Government continued to do everything possible to establish the facts.
- The Kuwaiti authorities had confirmed to us that the 10 British women on board the aircraft were among the group of 24 who had been released. They were now in a hotel in Mashhad, whose name we did not know. We were urgently seeking to establish whether they were well.
- The Kuwaiti authorities had dispatched an aircraft to Mashhad. It was due to land at any moment. There was a medical team on board. We understood that this aircraft would assist in the evacuation of those released.
- The Iranian Chargé d'Affaires had assured us yesterday that the Iranian authorities would work to bring this incident to a swift and satisfactory conclusion. Mr Basti would again be seeing a senior FCO official later today.
- The Swedish authorities would be sending their Consul General in Tehran, Mr Gunnar Sommarin, to Mashhad at the first available opportunity. They had sought permission for him to travel from the Iranian authorities. He would be accompanied by a member of the locally engaged staff of the British Interests Section in Tehran, Mr Hashemi. The Swedish Embassy was able to communicate with the Swedish MFA in Stockholm although telephone contact was proving difficult.
- The hijackers seemed to have set three deadlines. The most recent, of 12 hours, would have expired at 0900 GMT this morning.
- The hijackers had not identified themselves.

File B66(5)1A

HAG 614
QQ WELLINGTON T QQ PARIS T PP LONDON

ZCZC
HAG 614

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL 05 APRIL 1988
FROM: THE HAGUE C/C: 880
TO : WELLINGTON 436-IMMEDIATE
RPTD: WELLINGTON B 48-IMMEDIATE : PARIS 45-IMMEDIATE
: LONDON 49-PRIORITY : NEW YORK PM 19-PRIORITY
LD : SFA (NORRISH BEEBY POWLES JUDD KEATING BEATH)
: PMO
: P/S MFA
SUBJ: RAINBOW WARRIOR : INSPECTION

11983

*Hc
DHG
LAP*

BOS HANDED HIS REPORT TO US AT 5.00PM TODAY. IT READS AS
FOLLOWS:

NO CLIPS

'REPORT ON AN INSPECTION VISIT TO HAO

I CARRIED OUT MY MISSION TO HAO ON 28 MARCH 1988. IN THE MORNING I WAS COLLECTED FROM MY HOTEL BY THE COMMANDER OF PAPEETE AIR BASE, COLONEL VILAIN, WHO HAD ALSO BEEN PLACED IN CHARGE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MY STAY IN PAPEETE AND WHO DISCHARGED THIS RESPONSIBILITY IN AN OUTSTANDING FASHION. COLONEL VILAIN ACCOMPANIED ME TO THE AIRPORT, FROM WHERE I WAS THEN TAKEN TO HAO BY MILITARY CARAVELLE. LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GOURDIEN WAS ASSIGNED TO ESCORT ME.

IN HAO I WAS RECEIVED BY THE MILITARY COMMANDER OF THE BASE. LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CASTAGNET. AN INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN DOMINIQUE PRIEUR HAD BEEN ARRANGED TO TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY ARRIVAL.

THE PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH HAD BEEN SUPPLIED TO ME BY THE NEW ZEALAND AUTHORITIES WERE SUFFICIENT TO IDENTIFY HER AS DOMINIQUE PRIEUR. NONETHELESS, DURING THE INTERVIEW I CHECKED A NUMBER OF DETAILS OF HER CURRICULUM VITAE AND HER STUDIES. AND THE INFORMATION WHICH SHE GAVE CORRESPONDED TO THAT WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ME.

OFFICIALLY, HER MILITARY FUNCTION ON HAO IS THAT OF OFFICIER CONSEIL AND OFFICIER ADJOINT. IN THE FORMER CAPACITY SHE PERFORMS CERTAIN SOCIAL FUNCTIONS, WHILE IN THE LATTER SHE DEPUTISES FOR THE COMMANDER OF THE BASE IN CARRYING OUT CERTAIN DUTIES.

Q

CONFIDENTIAL

A FEW MONTHS AFTER HER ARRIVAL ON HAO. ON 22 JULY Q1986 SHE WAS JOINED BY HER HUSBAND. WHO IS ALSO AN OFFICER. ALTOGETHER. THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 17 OFFICERS ON HAO. TOURS OF DUTY ON HAO ARE NORMALLY LIMITED TO ONE YEAR. NOTABLY BECAUSE IT IS VERY UNUSUAL FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR FAMILIES THERE.

DOMINIQUE PRIEUR AND HER HUSBAND HAVE ACCESS TO THE NORMAL RECREATIONAL FACILITIES AT THE BASE. AS REGARDS CONTACT WITH HER FAMILY. DOMINIQUE PRIEUR SAID THAT HER MOTHER HAD VISITED HER TWICE AND HER PARENTS-IN-LAW ONCE. TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD IS SUBJECT TO SUPERVISION BY THE BASE COMMANDER. WHO IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESS.

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE COMMANDER. SINCE DOMINIQUE PRIEUR HAS BEEN ON HAO THE GENDARMERIE IN PAPEETE HAS BEEN CHECKING PEOPLE WISHING TO FLY FROM PAPEETE TO HAO ON THE MONTHLY CIVILIAN FLIGHT.

DOMINIQUE PRIEUR TOLD ME THAT SHE FELT ISOLATED ON HAO AND WAS NOT LOOKING FORWARD TO THE REMAINDER OF HER STAY. WHICH IS DUE TO CONTINUE UNTIL JULY 1989.

AFTER MY INTERVIEW WITH DOMINIQUE PRIEUR I ATE WITH THE OFFICERS ON THE BASE AND THE COMMANDER THEN TOOK ME ON A TOUR OF THE BASE. I SAW THE OFFICERS' QUARTERS. INCLUDING THE PRIEURS'. IN THE EVENING I FLEW BACK TO PAPEETE WITH THE SAME ESCORT.

I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK THE GOVERNMENTS OF NEW ZEALAND AND FRANCE FOR ENTRUSTING THIS MISSION TO ME. I AM ALSO GRATEFUL TO THE AUTHORITIES OF NEW ZEALAND AND FRANCE FOR EVERYTHING THEY DID TO ENSURE THAT MY JOURNEY AND STAY WERE PLEASANT AND THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY. ABOVE ALL. I HOPE THAT THE REPORT ON MY INSPECTION WILL SERVE THE PURPOSE ENVISAGED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

THE HAGUE. 5 APRIL 1988

ADRIAAN BOS''

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

41110 GOT TWO OO HERE

ZCZ.
HAG 5

AP B66/5/1A
CONFIDENTIAL

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 05 APRIL 1988

FROM: THE HAGUE

C/C: 880

TO : WELLINGTON 437-IMMEDIATE

RPTD: WELLINGTON B 49-IMMEDIATE

: LONDON 50-PRIORITY

: PARIS 46-IMMEDIATE

LD : SFA (NORRISH BEEBY POWLES

: NEW YORK PM 20-PRIORITY

: PMO

JUDD KEATING BEATH)

: P/S MFA

SUBJ: RAINBOW WARRIOR : INSPECTION

11984

Hc

DHC

(all)

no cuts

OUR IPT.

IN COMMENTING ON HIS REPORT BOS SAID THAT DOMINIQUE PRIEUR WAS DEFINITELY ON THE ISLAND. THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT THAT. BUT HE COULD NOT VOUCH FOR THE SITUATION PRIOR TO OR AFTER HIS VISIT. THAT WOULD BE SHEER SPECULATION. HIS REPORT HAD STUCK TO THE FACTS AS FAR AS HE COULD ASCERTAIN THEM.

2 THE ISLAND WAS VERY ISOLATED. THERE WAS NO CLUB MED ATMOSPHERE. THE OCEAN WAS THE ONLY RELAXATION. MOST PEOPLE BECAME EXTREMELY BORED AFTER THE PASSAGE OF A FEW WEEKS AND BOS SAW NO REASON TO DOUBT THIS. THE PRESENT ISLAND POPULATION WAS 120 PERSONS INCLUDING 17 OFFICERS.

3 DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF HER HUSBAND PRIEUR WAS NOT VISABLY PREGNANT. SHE HAD NOT COMPLAINED OF ANY SICKNESS.

4 THE COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS IN AND OUT OF HAO WERE VERY RARE AND CONTROLLED BY THE FRENCH MILITARY.

5 ASKED TO EXPAND ON PRIEUR'S OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS BOS SAID THAT SHE HELPED ARRANGE (AND PARTICIPATE IN) LECTURES ON THE ISLAND. AND IN THE SETTING UP OF INTEREST GROUPS. SHE ASSISTED THE COMMANDER IN CERTAIN OTHER TASKS. THESE WERE NOT SPELLED OUT BUT BOS ASSUMED THAT THEY WERE OF A ROUTINE ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE.

6 BOS IS OF COURSE PREPARED TO ANSWER ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS BUT DOUBTS WHETHER HE CAN ADD VERY MUCH.

7 THE FRENCH HAVE ALSO BEEN HANDED A COPY OF THE REPORT.

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NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref B66/5/1A

FCO PRESS CONFERENCE: TUESDAY 5 APRIL 1988

HI-JACK OF KUWAITI AIRLINER

In answer to a question Spokesman said that according to our information he understood that a Kuwaiti airline flight from Bangkok to Kuwait was hijacked in the early hours of this morning and diverted from course 85 miles east of Muscat. It landed at Mashad in north-eastern Iran at 0356Z. Spokesman confirmed that our information is that there were 96 passengers and 15 crew on board and that 22 of the passengers were British nationals. Spokesman added that our Embassy in Kuwait had informed us of the hi-jacking and that the government were in touch with the Kuwait authorities, the Iranian Embassy in London and the Swedish Embassy in Tehran. In answer to a further question Spokesman said that we had no information as to the identity of the hi-jackers.



New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
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London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

YELLOW

Reference:
B66/5/1A

5 April 1988

The Coordinator,
DESC,
Ministry of Defence,
Wellington.

c.c. SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC)
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

UK: Prevention of Terrorism Act

Please refer to our memorandum B66/5/1A of 10 December 1987 on the above subject.

2. Attached for your information (not for other addressees) is a copy of the report "Review of the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984" by Viscount Colville of Culross which the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, presented to Parliament last December.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

B66/5/1A